The Nuclear Negotiations Between the P5+1 and Iran

Floor Speech

Date: June 24, 2015
Location: Washington, DC
Issues: Foreign Affairs

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Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to highlight the ongoing negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran concerning Iran's nuclear weapons program. In today's polarized environment there are few areas where we can all reach agreement, but certainly Democrats and Republicans alike can agree that Iran must not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon. I believe that every single pathway available to Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon must be completely blocked.

I commend the efforts of President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry, as well as our partners in the P5+1, as they have worked diligently to reach a framework agreement that will halt Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapon. We must ensure that any agreement reached has as its aim a framework that allows for unobstructed verification and enforceability. Such an agreement is not only in our best interest, but also in the best interest of the region at-large. We need such a framework because it is no secret that the Iranians have engaged, over the years, in deceitful actions that are cause for much concern. This reality of course does not mean that we should not engage fully in negotiations, but simply, that we must weave this reality into our final agreement. Buyers beware, Mr. Speaker.

It is my belief that as we move closer to a final agreement, we must ensure that Iran allows United Nations' inspectors the necessary and sufficient access to nuclear sites. This must include military sites. Along similar lines, we must be allowed a full accounting of Iran's previous efforts at weaponization. In knowing their past progress, we will be better able to discern their compliance with the agreement. These factors are essential if we are to determine whether Iran is meeting its obligations.

Although these elements are needed, we must also have a strong mechanism that allows sanctions to be re-imposed should Iran violate the agreement. The political calculus of reimposing sanctions could be quite difficult and, therefore, it is not enough that sanctions be able to be ``snapped back,'' but we must also ensure that any sanctions in place now are lifted gently and deliberately. We cannot lose sight of the fact that Iran continues to fund terrorist organizations the world over. Any sanctions relief will undoubtedly increase their ability to fund such organizations. The final deal must spell out the immediate consequences for Iran should it violate the agreement, and sanctions must only be reduced when Iran provides unequivocal proof of compliance with the negotiated agreement.

Furthermore, this ought to be clear as day to all involved--any agreement must block Iran's path to a nuclear weapon not for a year, not for five years, but for decades to come. It concerns me that Iran's breakout time will be just a matter of days after twelve or thirteen years. It is important to remember that should we need to re-impose sanctions that we will certainly need more than a few days to do so. Any deal worth signing, therefore, must mandate that Iran demonstrate that it has entirely abandoned its desire for nuclear weapons capabilities.

Similarly, a final deal must insist that Iran dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. Allowing such infrastructure to remain simply courts trouble further down the road. Should Iran's nuclear infrastructure remain in place, it will be far too easy for Iran to not only skirt its responsibilities under the agreement, but to reinvest in its nuclear weapons ambitions quickly and meaningfully.

Mr. Speaker, I applaud President Obama and Secretary Kerry for working diligently to find a diplomatic solution that stops Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The United States must certainly continue to negotiate from a position of strength. Such a position is clearly strengthened when Congress continues to weigh in on what a final agreement must entail. At the end of the day, however, I do believe that no deal is better than a bad deal. Let us work together to ensure that we choose neither ``no deal'' nor ``a bad deal,'' but a strong deal that denies the Iranians all paths to a nuclear weapon.

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