Press Briefing - Abu Ghraib Prison Abuses in Iraq
Federal News Service
HEADLINE: PRESS BRIEFING SUBJECT: ABU GHRAIB PRISON ABUSES IN IRAQ
WITH: SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI) VIA TELECONFERENCE
BODY:
SEN. REED: Hello. It's Jack Reed.
Q Oh, Senator, good afternoon. It's Pauline Jelinek with the AP.
SEN. REED: Good afternoon.
Q Senator, it's Tom Bowman, the Baltimore Sun.
SEN. REED: Hey, Tom, how are you?
Q Good.
Q John Landay (sp) with Knight Ridder.
SEN. REED: Hi, John.
Q Hi, Senator.
Q David Finney (sp) with CorpWatch.
SEN. REED: Hey, David.
Q Hi.
SEN. REED: Hi, everybody. Listen, let me just begin.
I've had a chance to look in some detail at the Jones and Fay reports, and also to look at the report from Secretary Schlesinger and his colleagues, and they raise in my mind some very serious questions.
We have been waiting now for months for a thorough, no-holds- barred look at all the different aspects of the problems at Abu Ghraib prison. What we initially saw was a-first a very slow response, I think, by the authorities to look into the prison situation. And then we had the report by General Taguba, which was, I think, given its limits, a very thorough one, one in depth.
Then we had the Fay report. The thought would be this would be sort of a rapid, all up, pull it together, ask the hard questions and get the tough answers. Now we find in the first few pages of this report we have to have another report because apparently they can't ask any other agencies any real questions, so now the inspector general has to ask those sort of questions. And that's disappointing in itself because one of the key issues here is, of course, these "ghost" detainees.
And throughout there's been this persistent drum beat that this is just a few corrupt soldiers in the prison. But that doesn't really fit when you're talking about "ghost" detainees who are in and out of the prison, who are moving out and about. And yet this report avoids that issue by simply saying they can't look in that direction.
And it also occurs to me to be somewhat, again this sort of slow walk. If that was the case, then months ago they should have been able to inform the public that they weren't capable of looking at this issue of ghost detainees in a serious way, and they should have made the referral then to the IG at the Department of Defense and we should now be having his results. So that is, I think, in a procedural way another great disappointment.
But as I look at specifics of the report, they raise very serious questions. For example, in General Jones' piece, at page 17, he talks about the fact that personnel, unnamed personnel, principally in the Staff Judge Advocate's Office and in the JC-2, the intelligence section, had knowledge of potential abuses and misconduct in violation of the Geneva Convention at Abu Ghraib, but they did not present this to the commanders, the Task Force.
Now to me, that is a startling announcement, that there were people that had knowledge of this-that in itself I think is startling-but then not to communicate it with your commanders? And yet this was passed over very briefly. And in the same paragraph the general concludes, but in my-his opinion, his professional opinion, they did-the staff did everything they could have reasonably done to successfully complete all their assigned missions. So I think that's a huge question that has to be addressed.
Now there's another issue here and it ties in with the ghost detainees once again, and that's the CIA role. And at page 9 of, I think, General Fay's section, he talks about that there's no-there was no memorandum of understanding between the CIA and the CJTF-7, the Combined Joint Task Force 7. Now once again, that's not the fault of Pappas or Jordan or the prison guards; that is a failure at a very high level to determine who is in charge, establish the rules of the game, and hopefully those rules would include, at least on the part of the United States military personnel, observing the Geneva Convention.
And then further, as you go through the report, you find out that at least on one occasion, as I read the report, at page 54, Colonel Pappas and Colonel Jordan both approached Colonel Boltz (sp), who I believe was the assistant to General (Fast ?), and talked to about the CIA, raised the issue of CIA abuse at Abu Ghraib. And yet apparently they were told to just cooperate-which raises the question, who was in charge? Do American soldiers have the responsibility of following the Geneva Convention, and by the way, reporting about other's failure to follow it? Or they simply were told to look the other way. That is, I think, very serious. And again, that's not within these individuals-the individuals that are strictly within the prison.
The other thing I find is somewhat ironic is that now, having made the case-and again there seems to be lots of evidence of poor performance by Colonel Pappas and Colonel Jordan. They are criticized for-and this is with respect to Colonel Pappas-allowed the soldiers and civilians at the JIDC, the Joint Interrogation and Detention Center, to be subject to inordinate pressure from higher headquarters. Sep 08, 2004 15:34 ET .EOF
Well, what's the higher headquarters, what's this inordinate pressure? And if it's something that he's criticized about, then what they're essentially saying is the higher headquarters are wrong also. And that's the same charge, basically, that's lodged against Colonel Jordan. Very artfully, though. And so, I think, again, this report raises as many questions as it answers.
Q Well, where should it head from here now? I mean, do you think there should be some sort of a special prosecutor, or a special congressional panel?
SEN. REED: Well-I think we've got-I think we really have to investigate this issue as one complete piece. You can't have the little-these little reports cut up into little segments-okay, we're going to do-this week we're doing to do the military police, and the next week we're doing military intelligence-oh, and by the way, now we have to do the Central Intelligence Agency, et cetera. So --
Q Well, what form should that be?
SEN. REED: Well, I think ideally it should have been-I think it should have been done by an investigation by the Congress. But I must commend, though, let me say, Chairman Warner, because he has stepped up in a, I think-I assume, in the midst of a great deal of criticism from his colleagues, and tried to keep this issue focused, tried to keep this thing from just being swept under the rug.
Q Well, some of the Army officers I talk with say they believe there will be some sort of a, you know, congressional panel that will be charged with looking into this.
SEN. REED: Well --
Q Is that what you're hearing from Warner and his people, that he --
SEN. REED: I'm not-no, I'm not, Tom. I'm not hearing that from-I'm just-you asked the question; let me-in my --
Q Okay.
SEN. REED: I-I assume, frankly, giving the benefit of the doubt, that this report would be that comprehensive report --
Q Right.
SEN. REED: -- that this report would look at every aspect-thoroughly: command influence, not just within the task force, but within CENTCOM; not with-just within the strictly military lines, but also the intelligence lines.
Q Mm-hmm.
SEN. REED: They would look at-certainly ask questions about what led competent Army officers to believe that the CIA had a free rein in that prison, and that they had no responsibility to moderate their behavior. You know, those questions haven't been answered to my satisfaction.
Q You've been in the --
Q Senator, you have a strong interest in the use of contractors at Abu Ghraib and, I imagine, elsewhere. What were your impressions of the Fay/Jones report on the use of contractors as well as the other reports, and what concerns have been left unaddressed?
SEN. REED: Well, you know, I think, again, they went into some detail talking about training standards and vetting-all that's very valuable. But, you know, the impression that I'm getting from this report is that very early on there was this presumption that the CIA and others sort of had no rules, and that there was no responsibility on the part of the military, who were running the prison, to guarantee that the Army regulations and, you know, the Geneva Convention was applied. And my sense-again, a sense-is that in the minds of the troops, at least, the soldiers there, the differences between civilians wearing Army uniforms, contractors, and CIA people who refuse to identify themself even, was-you know, that's an academic difference.
These are just-you know, I guess the rules are, you know, if you're not a soldier then you can do a lot more than you can do when you're a soldier. And so I think this whole overall problem contributed to the way the contractors were used as well. But I think there are very sound, you know, criticism of the contracting, of the doctrination, of the vetting. All those things have to be done better.
Q Senator, can I just bring you back to this-it's Eric Schmidt here --
SEN. REED: Yeah. Hey, Eric.
Q-the question of whether or not at this point in time, though, you support or call for an independent 9/11-style inquiry at this point. Yes or no?
SEN. REED: I think we've got to get an inquiry, an independent inquiry because, to my point, we have not yet established in a credible way the complete picture. And we have waited now for months, we've waited for-now there are I don't know how many separate reports, but each one of them seemed to come up and say, well, that's not our responsibility; we can't look at the intelligence agency, the Central Intelligence Agency. That's the same way, I think, with respect to the Schlesinger report. I saw in there where they said about the ghost detainees, we just didn't get that cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency.
So I mean, it's-somehow we're going to have to get the whole picture because we haven't gotten it. We've got bits and pieces.
Q Sir, this is Vicki Allen with Reuters. What are the chances, do you think, of more hearings before the October break?
SEN. REED: Well, you know, again, we're going to have a hearing tomorrow, but the very nature of the hearing process is not particularly efficient. We're going to have --
Q But I mean after that one.
SEN. REED: -- six to seven minutes with each one of-with the panel, and then, you know, we've got 30 members attending. That's about it. But I would hope so because, you know, there's-these are serious questions that have to be raised. Maybe there are answers to these questions. Maybe it's-I hope there are, other than we didn't-we don't know or we didn't ask. But I think there should be additional hearings.
Q Senator Reed, it's Elise Ackerman with Knight Ridder. How important is it that the Army had a policy for keeping these off the books for extended periods of time, and that when you asked General Mikolashek about it a couple weeks ago that he did not give you a direct answer?
SEN. REED: Please repeat that because I just --
Q How important is it that the Army had a policy, a written policy, a standard operating procedure for keeping detainees off the books for extended periods of time, dating back to the beginning of 2002 in Afghanistan, and in theory still in effect now?
SEN. REED: Well, I think it is serious. I think, again-and my understanding-and I'm not the absolute expert-is that there is a requirement to register detainees so that we're aware of who they are and others are aware of who they are. And not-violating that persistently or ignoring it creates problems.
I mean, there's one problem that was related to in the Fay-Jones report, where there were three Saudis who were actually, I think, trying to-who were there helping the forces, who were missing, and it took the secretary of State to try to track down who they were. Well, that's just, you know, one example.
But I think there's a much more significant, profound issue here, and that's the corrosive effect of ignoring laws and regulations, of just saying, "Well, you know, we're going to just look the other way on these regs, because we have a short-term expedient goal of getting this done." After a while, you end up paying the price, and the price is a situation where the rules are anybody's guess, where it's not just confusion; it can be-they can be deliberately manipulated by people of ill will. And we've seen that in Abu Ghraib.
So I think there's two issues, and one issue is it's, you know-and what I find remarkable, too, is that we're talking about-in fact, I think General Fay pointed out that General Pappas is an excellent officer. I would suspect all of the officers that were involved are, by and large, you know, patriotic, fair-minded individuals; men and women who serve their country with distinction, who got to be colonels and majors and lieutenant colonels because they followed every rule and regulation.
And so suddenly now we have this massive sort of ignoring regulations, ignoring procedures, failing to train subordinates properly, ignoring operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, which contributed to the chaos, which I think the report cites.
And that raises the question of why did they do it. I mean, were they told to do it by people they thought were competent authority? And then that raises the question: Well, who are these people? And that question still has not been satisfactorily answered, to my accounts.
Q Senator, there are several civil suits against the contractors as well as the military, representing detainees and widows. The lawyers who have been doing their own investigations claim that the abuse is far more pervasive and extends beyond Abu Ghraib, that it goes to the other prisons in Iraq and perhaps may even be worse. Have you heard any of this? And do you give any credibility to those allegations?
SEN. REED: I have only sort of read about them in the press as you've presented them, as the allegations of attorneys and others, but I have no specific knowledge.
I've been just trying to get my handle on what happened in the Iraqi theater of operations, at least in Abu Ghraib.
Anyone else?
Q Senator, Tom Bowman again.
SEN. REED: Yes, Tom?
Q Another sort of related question about Iraq and the press conference we had yesterday with General Myers and Secretary Rumsfeld talking about Fallujah and how to deal with some of these what are called safe havens for insurgents around the country, Fallujah and Ramadi and Sadr City and so forth, Samarra.
Have some of these negotiated settlements failed, in your mind? And do some of these areas have to be dealt with, pacified before the January elections?
SEN. REED: Well, I think they have to be dealt with. The problem we have and the dilemma is that if you don't move against them, then there are places where they can reorganize, regroup, stage other attacks, so they're a threat to the stability of the country and to our forces. If you do that, you run the risk, of course, of American casualties, and also you run the risk of an adverse reaction by the Iraqis to the use of our power. So it's the classic sort of "no good option."
Q Right.
SEN. REED: And, you know, I think-I don't know, but my sense is that they're in this conflicted sort of strategy out there at the moment. They know they've got to take these people down, they know they've got to disarm them. When it gets to be an extreme situation like Najaf, they'll do it, but then at the end, the local political forces will come in and say you can't do this because, you know, you just can't do this. And so essentially we let the insurgents regroup with their weapons and plan to hit us again.
It's part of-endemic, I think, to the country, not so much historically or culturally, but, you know, we had opportunities before in the midst-right after the military operations in the spring to be more directed in terms of disarming militias; but again, they looked at the situation and said, well, you know, maybe that's going to be too provocative, let's wait. We still have the problem.
Q So what's the way ahead?
SEN. REED: Well, I think what they're doing right now is they're hoping that-and this is going to take months-that they'll have credible Iraqi security forces because it's a much more palatable operation to send them into these hotbeds of resistance than American troops. I think also they're probably in a more force protection mode right now of trying to protect our forces because I don't think they want to run the risk of serious casualties in the next several weeks or months.
But at the same time, I-you know, they are-still understand they can't surrender entirely the initiative and they can't give them a total safe haven. So they are taking-you know, whatever intelligence they have, they go in with helicopter attacks and other attacks. They're trying to keep them on the-disrupt it. It's not-there's no clean-cut strategy because it's not a-you know, it's a situation you don't want to be in.
Q What does that mean for the elections that are looming?
SEN. REED: The elections in --
Q In January.
SEN. REED: In January?
Q Yeah.
SEN. REED: Well, I just-again, I just read today where Kofi Annan said that this could be compromised because they only have about 35 U.N. election people in the country. They can't move in those areas. You know, if you can't-if you can't have-physically have a presence in Fallujah to conduct elections, how can you say you've had a national election when a significant part of the country hasn't been able to vote, even though it's the result of terrorism?
Q Right.
SEN. REED: So it's going to, I think, severely compromise any type of real election.
Q All right. Okay. Appreciate it.
SEN. REED: That it?
Q All right. Thank you.
Q Senator?
SEN. REED: Thank you, ma'am. Yeah?
Q Senator, it's Lolita Baldor with AP. Just one quick question about this independent inquiry that you think you'd like to see. Have you had any discussions with any of the other senators or leadership or anything on that?
SEN. REED: No, I haven't really. My reaction --
Q There's no formal request?
SEN. REED: No, but my reaction is-frankly, is that, you know, we've-I think we've given a sufficient time and opportunity for the Department of Defense to conduct an investigation. This has stretched now many, many months and at least two major investigations and several ancillary investigations, and yet we still come up with this report to the conclusion by the general officers is that we have to have another investigation. You know, I think it's about time we had an investigation that is complete and thorough and answers all the questions.
Q Okay, great.
SEN. REED: Thank you.
Q Thank you. Bye-bye.
SEN. REED: Bye. Bye-bye.