Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010--Conference Report

Floor Speech

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Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I wish to speak on the Iran sanctions conference report which I assume we will be approving in a matter of a few minutes. This is a very important event in the Congress and could play a very significant role in the history of our country. I support the conference report. It is designated as H.R. 2194. I reiterate, I believe it is crucial that the Senate approve the conference report and that the President sign it into law as soon as possible. I fully predict both of those things will occur.

Let me mention three of the most important provisions of the bill so we know what it does. It deals with sanctions against Iran. There are two reasons: No. 1, to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear capability, and No. 2, to support the aspirations of the people of Iran for a more representative government.

What the bill does first is to expand the scope of existing sanctions against companies that invest in Iran's energy sector, and it includes measures to punish firms that export gasoline to Iran. We would think a country such as Iran would have plenty of gasoline, but they do not have refinery capacity to create the finished product which their people must use. So something on the order of at least 40 percent of their gasoline has to be imported. Because of this heavy dependence on imported gasoline, it is vulnerable to outside pressure, and that is why this particular sanction is an important step. By putting a squeeze on Iran's gas supplies and dissuading energy firms from investing in the country, we can hopefully force the Iranian regime to make difficult decisions about its finances, thereby further increasing its unpopularity.

Second, the bill limits nuclear cooperation agreements between the United States and countries which sell illicit materials to Iran. It also limits licenses under any such current agreements. A country that allows its citizens or companies to provide equipment or technologies or materials to Iran that make a material contribution to its nuclear capabilities should not benefit from nuclear cooperation with the United States, and we make it clear that won't be permitted under this provision.

The third thing the bill does is it includes the so-called McCain language that requires the President to compile a list of Iranian officials, specific people who have brutalized the Iranian people, and to impose sanctions against those particular individuals identified as human rights violators. The administration can use the new authority it is given in this legislation to publicly identify those people in the Iranian Government who are actually responsible for perpetrating human rights violations in Iran since the fraudulent elections in June of 2009. It can hold these people accountable through these targeted sanctions. The measure also requires that such persons be subject to restrictions on financial and property transactions. It also makes such persons ineligible for U.S. visas.

We can see there is a broad array of targeted kinds of sanctions that, combined, could have a significant impact on our policy with Iran.

While I am pleased that the conferees concluded their work and the legislation is here on the floor, I do wish to note in passing that it is long overdue. At the request of the administration, Congress has repeatedly delayed action on bilateral sanctions legislation. Because sanctions take time to work, we have given up some time here.

In some respects, we have wasted too much time waiting for the United Nations to finally act, as it eventually did earlier this month. The U.N. Security Council resolution, however, will do very little to slow down or stop Iran's nuclear weapons program or even prevent its support for terrorism around the world. Its provisions--the bulk of them--are voluntary. They don't deal with Iran's energy sector. This is primarily because of the demand of the Chinese Government. It also excludes Russia's cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr powerplant as well as the sale by Russia of the S-300 missile system to Iran, a very modern and effective anti-aircraft system which could certainly play a role in defending Iran against an attack on its nuclear facilities.

In addition, the divided vote of the Security Council displays to Iran that the world is not united in dealing with its illicit conduct. In fact, I argue that, in a way, we are in a worse position than we were 18 months ago when the President started his diplomacy in dealing with Iran. Up to then, all of the resolutions that had been passed against Iran had been unanimous. This one was not unanimous. In some respects, we have lost ground.

It is clear that the President's effort to get the Iranian regime to negotiate for that 18-month period did not achieve anything except allow the Iranians more time to develop their weaponry. The U.S. sanctions resolution is not going to be very effective in going any further than that, in my view, nor will the European Union add much to the U.N. resolution, although they will add something.

Before I conclude, let me ponder for a second a question others have asked, which is, How important is it that we do everything we can to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon? What would happen if it did acquire a nuclear weapon? What would be the big deal?

Imagine a world in which Iran does have a nuclear weapon. Lay aside the fact that we have a picture of the Iranian leader, Ahmadinejad, with a nuclear weapon and just imagine what he would do with that. Would it really be possible to contain a nuclear Iran using conventional deterrence mechanisms?

Some would say: We lived with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union for four decades. It worked with Moscow; why would it not work with Tehran? To some extent, it depends on the definition of ``work.'' Will it work?

Remember that while the Soviets never actually used their nuclear weapons, the fact that they possessed the weapons made a big difference in political events over those 40 years. It allowed them to subjugate Eastern Europe, and we had no way of responding. Had we tried to respond, there was the nuclear threat against us. It allowed them to foment a Communist revolution around the world and to sponsor a range of international terrorist groups during this period of time. When the Soviets invaded Hungary in 1956 in order to crush a democratic uprising, they knew the risk of a nuclear exchange would prevent the United States from responding with military force. I remember at that time the disappointment of the Hungarians who thought the United States had led them to think we would be supportive. In effect, there was nothing we could do that wouldn't potentially provoke a nuclear attack by Russia, and nobody wanted that. In other words, Moscow's nuclear arsenal served as the ultimate deterrent. It allowed the Kremlin to undermine U.S. interests across the globe without fear of an American reprisal. The Soviets didn't need to use their nuclear weapons in order to achieve results; the mere fact that it had nuclear weapons dramatically increased both its strategic power and its leverage over foreign policy and, to some extent, over the United States.

The same would be true if Iran acquired nuclear weapons. Even if the mullahs never actually detonated a nuclear bomb, their acquisition of a nuclear capability would forever change Iran's regional and global influence, and it would certainly forever change the Middle East. If Iran went nuclear, its neighbors--thinking particularly of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey--might feel compelled to pursue their own nuclear arsenals. Tehran could easily trigger a dangerous chain reaction of nuclear proliferation. Once they had nuclear weapons, the Iranians would be much more aggressive in supporting terrorist organizations that are killing even American troops, for example, in Iraq. The Iranians would also ramp up their support for Hezbollah and Hamas and possibly provide them with nuclear materials. They would be emboldened to conduct economic warfare against the West, for example, by disrupting oil shipments traveling through the Straits of Hormuz. Iran would also be more confident about expanding its footprint in Latin America, where it has established a close working relationship with Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez. Governments around the world would lose faith in America's reliability as a strategic partner. U.S. credibility would be irrevocably weakened.

Remember, this is not the worst-case scenario. We are assuming that a self-preservation instinct would dissuade the Iranians from ever launching nuclear weapons against our allies or even the United States. But then again, is this really a safe assumption? Iranian leader Ahmadinejad has repeatedly expressed his desire to destroy the State of Israel, and given his radical, millenarian religious views and the viciously anti-Semitic ideology espoused by the Iranian theocracy, we can't simply dismiss the idea that Iran would attack Israel with nuclear weapons.

Because the United Nations took so long to act and because its sanctions are relatively weak, there is also the possibility, as the Jerusalem Post pointed out in an article entitled ``Too Little, Too Very Late,'' that U.N. sanctions could lull the international community into a false sense of security. That is where the action we take today could really help.

Here is what the Post wrote:

Breaking and evading these sanctions--

Talking about the U.S. sanctions--

ought to be a breeze for Ahmadinejad. A full year after Iran's deceptive elections, which spurred countrywide demonstrations, he may be less popular but his position is stable. After the regime brutally quashed his opposition, it is very doubtful that stunted sanctions will destabilize his hold on power. ..... [The U.N.] sanctions ..... are not the antidote to the Iranian nuclear threat that Israel had hoped for and that the free world so badly needs. In some ways, they may even exacerbate Israel's predicament. They will lend the appearance of an international mobilization to curb Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions, but in actuality will achieve nothing--the worst of all worlds.

That is why I think the United States separate sanctions authorized by the legislation we will vote on shortly are so important to come in behind the United Nations sanctions and what the European Union might do to supplement those actions in a way that will truly be meaningful.

Finally, I want to note something that, frankly, is as important as everything else I have said and should be seen as part and parcel to our action in adopting this sanctions legislation. It has nothing to do with nuclear weapons, but it has everything to do with human rights. We need to make it very clear to the Iranian people that we care about them, we care about their aspirations for more freedom, for more representative government, and for the ability to take advantage of the opportunities their country should be presenting for them.

We can help the people of Iran achieve those aspirations by putting pressure on the people who prevent that from occurring, the regime in Tehran, the mullah-led government. These sanctions can have an impact on those mullahs and, in turn, help the Iranian people achieve their goals.

We need to be lending moral and rhetorical support to the Iranian activists. These are the people who poured into the streets last summer in protest of a fraudulent election. Just as we championed the cause of Soviet and Eastern European dissidents during the Cold War, I believe we should promote the efforts of Iranian freedom fighters and, frankly, shine a spotlight on the regime's brutal repression. That can be done especially through the McCain provisions that are part of the Iran sanctions legislation we are considering.

Had the United Nations imposed strong sanctions on Iran a long time ago when it was first found to be in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, I would be more optimistic about our chances of success. Iran's economy would have been under severe strain for an extended period, and the government would have had fewer resources to fund its nuclear program and less power to repress its people.

As I said, there is still time, and because we are able to approve this conference report today and send it to the President for his signature, we are able to add to the sanctions that the rest of the world is willing to impose in such a way as to not only have an opportunity to dissuade the Iranian leaders from pursuing their nuclear program but, as I said, just as importantly, to demonstrate to the Iranian people we aim to support them in their quest for greater freedom.

So I hope my colleagues will send a very strong message with a unanimous vote for the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2009. I hope the President will sign this legislation immediately and begin to implement its provisions.

Mr. President, there is a long list of folks to thank: Representatives BERMAN and HARMAN and CANTOR in the House of Representatives are just some who come to mind; Senator Lieberman and Senator Bayh, colleagues in the Senate; the leaders, Leader Reid and Leader McConnell, who have worked to bring this report to us for a vote today in an expedited way. I think this is a very good example of cooperation both between the House and the Senate and between Democrats and Republicans to accomplish something that is not just good for the people of the United States of America but people around the world--in the Middle East, and in particular the people of Iran.

So I urge my colleagues to unanimously support the conference report when we have an opportunity to vote on it shortly.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

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