Hearing of the Subcommitte On Aviation of the House Committee On Transportation & Infrastructure on Airport Screener Privitization Program -Transcript

HEADLINE: PANEL I OF A HEARING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

SUBJECT: AIRPORT SCREENER PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM

CHAIRMAN: REPRESENTATIVE MICA (R-FL)

WITNESSES: ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; CLARK KENT ERVIN, INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

BODY:

REP. MICA: Good morning. I'd like to call this hearing of the Aviation Subcommittee to order. Today our topic is a review of the airport private security screening pilot program. The order of business will be as follows: We'll have opening statements from members, and we have three panels of witnesses-a rather long hearing today, so hopefully we can keep the program moving. We'll start with opening statements. And I do have an opening statement, and then I'll yield to other members for recognition.

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REP. JAMES OBERSTAR (D-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the seriousness with which you have approached this hearing, and Mr. DeFazio as well, our ranking member. This is right now and for the foreseeable future the most significant aviation security issue-perhaps the most important security issue next to port security-we face.

The focus of this hearing is the BearingPoint company evaluation of the private screening companies. And looming ahead of us is the opt-out opportunity this coming November-a provision that I was not-I did not willingly embrace, but it was something we needed to do to get our TSA bill passed in the immediate aftermath of September 11th. I thought in the end that will be a good performance indicator-will be a yardstick of measure. It's a federal program which I've advocated since 1987 or '88, and private comparative system operating pretty much on the same level.

But we need assurances.

We've got to put this opt out in the context of the present administration's overall policy of privatization of government programs. The president announced two years ago a plan to privatize 150,000 federal jobs. They succeeded in doing roughly 30,- or 35,000. So I want to see assurances that the opt out program in this context is not going to create unwarranted opportunities or incentives to airports to opt out. As Mr. DeFazio said, the BearingPoint study shows that certain airport passengers actually had less confidence in the security process at those privatized facilities than at the federalized.

Second point. The heart of the airline transportation security provisions was one level of security. That wasn't plucked out of the air aimlessly, but it was based on one level of safety at the FAA - something that I advocated for many years, and we finally got that policy established with the cooperation of the FAA and the DOT and Secretary Slater at the time and the FAA working hard to establish it. So there should not be a difference in one flight standards district office in Miami to one in Seattle. All right? Same with security. You shouldn't encounter a different level of security at Minneapolis- St. Paul than you do in Chisholm-Hibbing or than you do in Eugene, Oregon, or than you do in Orlando, Florida. No unwarranted advantages to the privately-operated security checkpoints and those that are federally operated.

Now, part of the problem is the appropriations process that first set an unrealistic level, lowering the numbers, and then didn't fund that even lower level of personnel.

Now, on March 17, Mr. DeFazio and I and Senators Hollings and Rockefeller sent you some questions about the opt out program. We wanted assurances that there wouldn't be preferential treatment for those who opt out compared to those who choose to stay in the program. Some of those airports are operating in the mistaken belief that if they opt out they will be able to increase their screener staffing. I have head this from various airport operators. They think that they are going to get better treatment if they are not in the federal system than if they remain. It's clear under one level of security that is not the case. It should not be the case. Your response, admiral, did not answer those questions, and I expect a clear response today, and I'm going to be pressing you on it.

The GAO audit suggests there is widespread underutilization. We hear it, members of the committee and members of Congress generally travel extensively. They see the security system. They know whether facilities are being well used or under-used. And then we see, as Mr. DeFazio pointed out, various airport personnel just being waved on through.

I suggest, admiral, that you go to Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, to the new Air France terminal concourse, and watch how they conduct security with multi layers. I did this in February to specifically see their security system. They have 500 EDS deployed, Mr. Chairman, at Charles de Gaulle Airport -- 500 -- to screen checked luggage. I walked through the security system with the chief of security of CDG, the chief of security for the county-which we would call the county in which the airport is located-the head of security for Air France. Every one of them was not only screened, their badge read by a reader, their thumbprint taken after they went through, and then wanded-and wanded again at the checkpoint before you board the aircraft. That multi-layered security is going to make sure that we don't have another September 11 attack.

Now, the centralizing of the process-one of the problems we had in the 1980s in aviation safety was that highly super-centralized operation of FAA. And what wee needed to do was maintain the single standard, but allow local flexibility. TSA needs to move away from the centralized hiring process, set realistic standards for how many personnel are needed at each airport, given its passenger load, its cargo facility, and then staff it and give them the authority to staff those facilities. There is no excuse for the discrepancies that we have and the failures to fill positions, and the head security officers at various airports having to always get clearance from Washington. Set the standard, give them the money, give them their head, and then hold them accountable. That's what we need to do. I look forward to the testimony to come today. And again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your vigilance on this subject. And, Mr. DeFazio, thank you for staying so thoroughly informed and vigilant, and providing the oversight we need.

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REP. OBERSTAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think one of the most important parts of your testimony, Admiral Stone, and Inspector General Ervin, is the observation that the TSA needs to establish performance standards-program standards by which to measure achievement that will be applied both to the privately-operated and to the federalized facilities. Without those performance standards we aren't going to be able to evaluate adequately. And in studying the performance standards you need, as the FAA has been directed to do with the new structure of an operating officer, to evaluate each airport at its peak load times, down times, and how many personnel do you need at those times, and then the rotation of personnel from online screening to training, to provide some diversion from the routineness of day-to-day operations. One of the lessons of the European airport security screening in the '90s was the rotation of personnel for a week or two weeks or a few months to another task within the airport and then bringing them back after retraining and reevaluating their skills, putting them back at the screener positions. I think that is something you need to establish.

What I've been concerned about though is that there might be a bias, and I'm very encouraged by Chairman Mica's statement that there's no thought, no purpose of pushing this screener program in a direction of total privatization. But I just also want to hear your assurance that TSA will not give preferential treatment to those airports who choose to opt out over those who choose to stay in.

MR. STONE: Yes, sir, you have my assurance we will not give that preferential treatment.

REP. OBERSTAR: Especially when it comes to levels of staffing and standards.

MR. STONE: Our intent on that-definitely not on standards. in terms of staffing, what we would like to see if we could craft is a process by which our federalized airports, as well as our privatized airports, are able to adjust their hiring locally, so tee FSD can make that choice on efficient use of resources and adjusting their screener numbers and whether or not they would like to hire non-screener baggage handlers. So we see an opportunity here to have both the federal and the privatized leadership be able to make those adjustments. But I'm totally committed to the non-preferential treatment, sir.

REP. OBERSTAR: General Ervin, does that satisfy you?

MR. ERVIN: I'm pleased to hear that, congressman, and certainly that is something we will monitor.

REP. OBERSTAR: Thank you. Now, the covert testing-I have some concerns. There may be some things you may not want to answer in an open hearing.

And that is pre-September 11 civil penalties program of FAA resulted in 94 percent of the civil penalties assessed against airlines being assessed for security failures by their privately engaged security companies. There was a covert testing program conducted regularly by FAA. Now, the question: Is the covert testing program TSA is operating a step above substantial levels of rigor above that of FAA pre-September 11th? And, if so, have you measured what TSA is doing against how FAA conducted that security program?

MR. STONE: It is our position at TSA that the program of testing that was being conducted in the '90s that you refer to was in no way even comparable to the testing that we're doing today. It's an apple and an orange. We are building our program to be a state-of-the-art-what is our weakness? -- let's break it. Let's break the system every opportunity we get and expose to ourselves in our covert testing program where are our weaknesses. We're not looking to have numbers to justify our existence-instead we're looking to find out so as operators and warriors in this war on terror where are we weak. What kind of technologies do we need? What type of remedial training? And then we plot how are we doing, even with this tough testing. And we've had a 70 percent increase in the 18 months since we federalized those checkpoints on overall performance. However, in a classified setting I'd like the opportunity to provide where is it that we still find that as a result of this very demanding testing that we are doing that there are areas where we need some additional help with regard to either training and focus or on technology. But our view, the TSA view of the previous testing was large guns, not very creative-tests that today would be rudimentary for our screening force.

So -- (audio break) -- certification of our screeners was just completed. TIP-we're finding that our TIP scores, which now we can monitor, allow us to get the insight into the daily performance of our screeners. There are a number of metrics. We just had a survey done by BearingPoint that I would like to provide the chairman that was conducted in the area of, What is the confidence of the American people in your level of security at your checkpoints? Do they think it's acceptable, meets expectations? Ninety-two percent of the traveling public surveyed by independent industry says that TSA meets or exceeds their expectations. And we take those data points-I think the customer service satisfaction from those sampled was 86 percent. Now, we realize we want 100 percent, and we're going to work on that other metric. But these indicators, these metrics that we're measuring, are very important to us so that we can then go back and train our screening force to ensure that it continues to improve, whether it be security or customer service. And in fact the rise in aviation industry and volume in flight we believe is in direct correlation to the enhanced security we are providing and the consumer's trust and confidence in our security. And that's why we're seeing some of these increases this summer, and that's our position.

MR. ERVIN: May I interject on that? As you know, TSA does its own testing, and then the Office of Inspector General does our own testing. I'll let Admiral Stone talk about TSA's testing vis-a-vis the FAA testing. But with regard to our penetration testing, we purposely designed our methodology in a way that was for all practical purposes comparable to, equal to, the testing methodology of DOT OIG when TSA was the responsibility of the Department of Transportation. And, as I said, the results are essentially the same.e

The 70 percent overall increased performance level that the admiral has twice now mentioned-it's the first time I ever heard of it, and I don't know what that's based on. But with regard to our testing it's comparable to DOT OIG and the difference is infinitesimal.

REP. OBERSTAR: Well, I find it very encouraging that you, General Ervin, have patterned your testing program after that of the DOT IG, because I know that program was very rigorous and very effective.

Now, how does all of this square with Admiral Loy's testimony? From my handwritten notes of last time he appeared before the committee, we picked up a million illegal items-or seized a million illegal items at airports from the time that TSA began operating, 54,000 box cutters, and made 1,700 arrests. If the operation of screeners is unsatisfactory then there must be an awful lot more stuff going through, or maybe that million-among those million items seized are lots of fingernail clippers with little fingernail files attached to them which were considered to be a threat in the early days. I remember so well-had several of them confiscated. I carry them on just to see what someone would do, and they routinely confiscated my little fingernail clipper with that little file this long --

MR. STONE: Yes, sir.

REP. OBERSTAR: -- while box cutters were getting through. Why?

MR. STONE: I think this is in sync with Admiral Loy's testimony that we realized that that checkpoint, that that's a filter. It's not foolproof. We think it's had a quantum leap and continues to grow in terms of the performance at that checkpoint, but also reflects why we have the layers of federal air marshals, federal flight deck officers, hardened cockpit doors-all of those layers of security to ensure that we mitigate the risk should anything get through that checkpoint. So it's just one piece of that filter. And I'll be glad to provide the IG the metrics of that 70 percent improvement that is very clearly delineated in our testing trends.

REP. OBERSTAR: I cited earlier the experience I had at Charles de Gaulle-requested a review of their security system-and in a discussion with Chairman Mica, he said, Well, they do use private contractor firms to conduct the-but there is a significant-my point was not to-was to show the level of intensity and the multi- layered security that is used at Charles de Gaulle that should be our model of effectiveness of security at airport checkpoints, in addition to which they are screening the daylights of luggage that goes on-that is checked luggage onboard aircraft-and packages-which we're not doing.

But in the Charles de Gaulle model, while those employees are contractors, or with a contractor company, they are vigorously overseen by the equivalent of our county sheriff who was there, and went through the screening system himself, and had not only his ID run through the reader and show up on a big screen so that his face on the screen matched the face in person-but also stepped through and put his thumb down to get a thumbprint read to match with that on record. And then to be full-body screened, as all of us were. That's a great standard to have. And then also a very highly effective X-ray screening of carrying on baggage at the security checkpoint, and then again as you board the aircraft.

MR. STONE: Sir, the checked baggage piece as well, we meet regularly, we are meeting with the French and the U.K. and partnering on building on each other's best practices. Our checked baggage there's great interest in as well from their perspective, because of the number of CTX machines and the granularity of our check, as opposed of the filtering that takes place through X-ray machines, like the CTX machines that we use here that we believe provide us a higher level of security. So that exchange is ongoing to capitalize on each other's best practices.

REP. OBERSTAR: One last question, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the time.

General Ervin, can you rate the difficulty of establishing performance standards and discuss how that might be done and how long a period of time it might take to achieve that goal?

MR. ERVIN: Well, I think, sir-I think first of all a baseline needs to be established. This is where we are at this point, and I think we have the data with which to do that, and then to determine what could reasonably be done within six months, within a year or so, and then to manage toward the standard.

REP. OBERSTAR: Can we get to a point, Admiral Stone, where we are not taking two million pairs of shoes off everyday at the airports? People are going to wind up with foot disease here. You're going to have a real case.

MR. STONE: Sir, when we go up to Atlanta, at our research lab up there, we have some devices that were concerned about shoes, and we'd like in the covert testing program to rate that.

REP. OBERSTAR: I would think you'd have found out now which shoes are likely to harbor an unknown bomb and which aren't, and you could have machines that could tell that rather than-I mean, we're going to have people stripping down to their skivvies pretty soon if you continue on this standard. I need performance-I think we need performance standards, as General Ervin is suggesting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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