Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009

Floor Speech

Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 -- (House of Representatives - January 27, 2009)

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Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.

The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 is necessary to overturn the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear. In that decision, this Supreme Court once again went out of its way to read our anti-discrimination laws as narrowly as possible, and refused to interpret the law as intended by Congress. In doing so, the Court said something astonishing: the only discriminatory act was the initial decision to pay Lilly Ledbetter less than her male coworkers. Once the employer had successfully concealed that fact from her for 180 days, she was out of luck, and Goodyear could go on paying her less--just because she is a woman--forever. The 180-day deadline to sue had passed. The decision to discriminate was illegal, but paying her less than her male colleagues from that moment forward was not.

This is astonishing because it rewards employers who successfully conceal pay discrimination and makes it virtually impossible for employees to challenge such discrimination. It is also astonishing because--17 years ago when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991--Congress rejected the reasoning that the Supreme Court relied upon in its Ledbetter decision. Through the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress rejected the Supreme Court's conclusion that a statute of limitations begins to run when an employer adopts a discriminatory seniority system and does not restart when the discriminatory effects of that system are felt. Congress made clear that it was rejecting this reasoning in the context of discriminatory seniority systems, which was the question presented by the Lorance case, and in all other contexts as well.

Until its Ledbetter decision, the Supreme Court seemed to have gotten Congress's message. In Ledbetter, however, the Supreme Court relied upon the faulty reasoning in Lorance and ruled, once again, that a statute of limitations runs only from the time that a discriminatory decision is made. Now we're called upon to do it over again. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will hear us once and for all and interpret statute of limitation periods as we intend. Thus, while Ledbetter addresses discrimination in employment, our passage of this bill expresses broad disapproval of the Court's reasoning in any context where it might be applied. Within the specific context of pay discrimination, our use of the phrase ``discriminatory compensation decision or other practice'' should be read broadly, and to include any practice--including, for example, seniority or pension practices--that impact overall compensation.

I urge adoption of The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.

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