Joint Hearing of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee and the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade Subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee - Preventing Nuclear Iran

Interview

Date: April 17, 2008
Location: Washington, DC

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REP. DAVID SCOTT (D-GA): Thank you.

Last week, when General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker came before our full Foreign Affairs Committee, and they asked him the question, specifically, if they were preparing for -- if the administration was preparing for a possible shift in policy, with the anticipation of the upcoming presidential elections.

You know, much has been mentioned about time. And we're at a very critical point. We're at a very crucial point, because we know the presidential elections are before us; and surely as we know it, the world knows it. And we've got some significant decisions to make here.

In the face of all of this, we have a 200 -- 2007 estimate, National Intelligence Estimate that comes out and reverses almost everything we had been talking about we've been running. What's the whole point? What validity did the sincerity and the seriousness of economic sanctions carry with other nations when we've used the whole pretense that they're moving towards acquiring nuclear weapons, and then we come out with a National Intelligence Estimate that says, no, that's not true. They stopped that in 2003. What in the world? What kind of messages? How stupid is this administration looking to the world? And then you expect other countries to take us seriously?

Well, when I asked that question of General Crocker -- General Petraeus and Crocker, they said, well, no. We only serve one boss at a time. Well, they may have that luxury, but I don't nor do the members of Congress. I serve about 500,000 or 600,000 bosses. Collectively, as the Foreign Affairs Committee, we represent about 300 million bosses. And these bosses are growing very, very impatient!

Now, we've got an election coming up. We've got to change policy. We need to have and send a clear message to the word -- what in the world are we going to do with Iran? Iran is the elephant in the room of China, of Russia, the United States -- of everybody in the world. I mean, they are the apex of everybody's concern, because if they get a nuclear weapon, a cascade rolls. It'd be a cascade of events, because then Egypt and Saudi Arabia get nervous -- they got to have one. And they get one, then Turkey's got to have one.

Then you've got the -- Iran is so unique and it is Muslim, it's Islamic. But it's not Arab. It's Persian. It's Shi'a. When the opposition in that much of the region is concerned about the Shi'a from Sunni to Sunni -- from Sunni to Shi'a, it's very, very critical. So this is a very, very critical situation.

So I guess what I'm saying here is that, how realistic -- what are you saying -- I understand your answer in reference to the National Intelligence Estimate was rather muddled. I mean, what's the point of that? How could the administration not know what the estimate was in 2003? And for four long years we carried on a policy that was based just to the opposite of what that -- how do you explain that?

And then why don't we have contingency plans in place? You're going to be, certainly in your positions, for six, seven more months. We're going to have a new administration. The American people have already spoken. We've got to have a new direction, a new policy. And what we've got to do as members of Congress and members of this administration -- we've got to put all these differences aside.

We've got to get some honest dialogue going between this branch of government and the executive branch of government to get all our information tighter, because I'll tell you the other thing: If this country continues to lose the credibility that we once had, I mean, then you've got people going to their own means.

And I guess my question, as I get around to it, is: Within this policy, I want to get a clear understanding of what is the assessment? Are they getting nuclear weapons? What is the intelligence saying? I sit on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and we have our NATO -- everybody's up in arms about building this missile defense system in Eastern Europe for what? To stop Iran in the case of nuclear weapons! But yet we have an estimate here that says they're not having nuclear weapons. So you've got Russia up in arms -- what's the point? Why are building this thing next to us? Are you coming after us?

So I think there's a lot of mixed signals that are going forward. I think we do need a shift in policy. It needs to be direct and then we need to seriously consider about the military option. Is there -- is there a need to have that military option on the table dealing with Iran? Do we weaken ourselves when it is not? And I'm not advocating any preemptive war as we did in Iraq or anything else.

I am saying that the rest of the world is looking to the United States to set the curve on this, and gentlemen, we are falling mighty, mighty, mighty short.

So my pointed question is this: how serious -- what is the situation in Iran and their ability for nuclear weapons today? How much credibility is there still in this report from the National Intelligence Estimate? Do we believe that or where are they in their nuclear capacity? And then thirdly, what about that military option? Is it there? Is it not there.

If you could address those three points for me, please.

MR. FELTMAN: Congressman Scott, thank you.

Iran has never come clean on what it's doing or has done in terms of weaponization. That's the basic issue. The international community can have no confidence when Iran states that it is establishing a peaceful, civil nuclear energy capacity like any other country would have the right to have. None of us can have confidence that those statements are true without IEA -- IAEA verification, without a credible statement from Iran of what it has done in the past and what it's program is about now.

The NIEA -- I'm sorry -- the National Intelligence Estimate that you referred to from December made it clear that Iran did have a weaponization program. Iran has never come clean with that information. Iran has never answered the International Atomic Energy Agency's questions about the weaponization program that proceeded 2003, 2002. So how now could we have any confidence in what Iran says today?

The NIE -- the National Intelligence Estimate also made clear that there were other parts of the Iranian nuclear program that were continuing apace. So weaponization could start again at any time and perhaps already has started. I don't -- none of us can be complacent about what it is that Iran's up to, because none of us really know what Iran is up to, because Iran has never shared the information as Iran is required to do so under its international obligations.

REP. SCOTT: Ambassador, the point is, though, why would not the --

REP. SHERMAN: Mr. Scott, I believe your time is --

REP. SCOTT: Could I just ask this one -- just take 10 seconds on this. It's very important. Then I'll be finished.

REP. SHERMAN: I'll tell what -- ask a 10-second question for the record. And then we'll add --

REP. SCOTT: The 10-second record for the question is your points are very well taken, which begs the point of why it is a part of the current United States policy not to even talk with Iran about its nuclear program! I don't understand how we can complain and not have --

REP. SHERMAN: I thank the gentleman for his question.

REP. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. SHERMAN: We look forward to an answer for the record.

And we now call upon the gentleman from California.

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