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OFFICIALS LEGISLATION INTEREST GROUPS PUBLIC STATEMENTS COMMITTEES VETOES

Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions - S. 2088 - Part Two

By: Edward Kennedy, Sr.

Date: Feb. 12, 2004

Location: Washington, DC

Issues: Women Labor Unions Education Immigration

"(iv) For purposes of clauses (ii) and (iii), a showing that the covered entity has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassment based on disability includes a demonstration by the covered entity that it has-

"(I) established, adequately publicized, and enforced an effective, comprehensive, harassment prevention policy and complaint procedure that is likely to provide redress and avoid harm without exposing the person subjected to the harassment to undue risk, effort, or expense;

"(II) undertaken prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations pursuant to its complaint procedure; and

"(III) taken immediate and appropriate corrective action designed to stop harassment that has occurred, correct its effects on the aggrieved person, and ensure that the harassment does not recur.

"(v) Punitive damages shall not be available under this paragraph against a government, government agency, or political subdivision.

"© As used in this paragraph:

"(i) The term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.

"(ii) The term 'tangible action' means-

"(I) a significant adverse change in an individual's status caused by an agent or employee of a covered entity with regard to the individual's participation in, access to, or enjoyment of, the benefits of a program or activity; or

"(II) an explicit or implicit condition by an agent or employee of a covered entity on an individual's participation in, access to, or enjoyment of, the benefits of a program or activity based on the individual's submission to the harassment.

"(iii) The term 'unlawful harassment' means harassment that is unlawful under this section.".

SEC. 113. CONSTRUCTION.

Nothing in this subtitle, including any amendment made by this subtitle, shall be construed to limit the scope of the class of persons who may be subjected to civil actions under the covered civil rights provisions.

SEC. 114. EFFECTIVE DATE.

(a) IN GENERAL.-This subtitle, and the amendments made by this subtitle, are retroactive to June 22, 1998, and effective as of that date.

(b) APPLICATION.-This subtitle, and the amendments made by this subtitle, apply to all actions or proceedings pending on or after June 22, 1998, except as to an action against a State, as to which the effective date is the date of enactment of this Act.

TITLE II-UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT OF 1994 AMENDMENT

SEC. 201. AMENDMENT TO THE UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT OF 1994.

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Federal Government has an important interest in attracting and training a military to provide for the National defense. The Constitution grants Congress the power to raise and support an army for purposes of the common defense. The Nation's military readiness requires that all members of the Armed Forces, including those employed in State programs and activities, be able to serve without jeopardizing their civilian employment opportunities.

(2) The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, commonly referred to as "USERRA" and codified as chapter 43 of title 38, United States Code, is intended to safeguard the reemployment rights of members of the uniformed services (as that term is defined in section 4303(16) of title 38, United States Code) and to prevent discrimination against any person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service. Effective enforcement of the Act depends on the ability of private individuals to enforce its provisions in court.

(3) In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Supreme Court held that congressional legislation enacted pursuant to the commerce clause of Article I, section 8, of the Constitution cannot abrogate the immunity of States under the 11th amendment to the Constitution. Some courts have interpreted Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida as a basis for denying relief to persons affected by a State violation of USERRA. In addition, in Alden v. Maine 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999), the Supreme Court held that this immunity also prohibits the Federal Government from subjecting "non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts." As a result, although USERRA specifically provides that a person may commence an action for relief against a State for its violation of that Act, persons harmed by State violations of that Act lack important remedies to vindicate the rights and benefits that are available to all other persons covered by that Act. Unless a State chooses to waive sovereign immunity, or the Attorney General brings an action on their behalf, persons affected by State violations of USERRA may have no adequate Federal remedy for such violations.

(4) A failure to provide a private right of action by persons affected by State violations of USERRA would leave vindication of their rights and benefits under that Act solely to Federal agencies, which may fail to take necessary and appropriate action because of administrative overburden or other reasons. Action by Congress to specify such a private right of action ensures that persons affected by State violations of USERRA have a remedy if they are denied their rights and benefits under that Act.

(b) CLARIFICATION OF RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER USERRA.-Section 4323 of title 38, United States Code, is amended-

(1) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the following new paragraph (2):

"(2) In the case of an action against a State (as an employer) by a person, the action may be brought in a district court of the United States or State court of competent jurisdiction.";

(2) by redesignating subsection (j) as subsection (k); and

(3) by inserting after subsection (i) the following new subsection (j):

"(j)(1)(A) A State's receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program or activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under the 11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit brought by an employee of that program or activity under this chapter for the rights or benefits authorized the employee by this chapter.

"(B) In this paragraph, the term 'program or activity' has the meaning given the term in section 309 of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6107).

"(2) An official of a State may be sued in the official capacity of the official by any person covered by paragraph (1) who seeks injunctive relief against a State (as an employer) under subsection (e). In such a suit the court may award to the prevailing party those costs authorized by section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988).".

TITLE III-AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT OF 1986 AMENDMENT

SEC. 301. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) In Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F. 3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2002), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that when Congress passed the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, adding a provision now codified at section 41705 of title 49, United States Code (referred to in this title as the "ACAA"), Congress did not intend to create a private right of action with which individuals with disabilities could sue air carriers in Federal court for discrimination on the basis of disability. The court recognized that other courts of appeals have held that the ACAA created a private right of action. Nevertheless, the court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), concluded that the ACAA did not create a private right of action.

(2) The absence of a private right of action leaves enforcement of the ACAA solely in the hands of the Department of Transportation, which is overburdened and lacks the resources to investigate, prosecute violators for, and remediate all of the violations of the rights of travelers who are individuals with disabilities. Nor can the Department of Transportation bring an action that will redress the injury of an individual resulting from such a violation. The Department of Transportation can take action that fines an air carrier or requires the air carrier to obey the law in the future, but the Department is not authorized to issue orders that redress the injuries sustained by individual air passengers. Action by Congress is necessary to ensure that individuals with disabilities will have adequate remedies available when air carriers violate the ACAA (including its regulations), and only courts may provide this redress to individuals.

(3) When an air carrier violates the ACAA and discriminates against an individual with a disability, frequently the only way to compensate that individual for the harm the individual has suffered is through an award of money damages. For example, violations of the ACAA may result in travelers who are individuals with disabilities missing flights for business appointments or important personal events, or in such travelers suffering humiliating treatment at the hands of air carriers. Those harms cannot be remedied solely through injunctive relief.

(4) Unlike other civil rights statutes, the ACAA does not contain a fee-shifting provision under which a prevailing plaintiff can be awarded attorney's fees. Action by Congress is necessary to correct this anomaly. The availability of attorney's fees is essential to ensuring that persons who have been aggrieved by violations of the ACAA can enforce their rights. The inclusion of a fee-shifting provision in the ACAA will permit individuals to serve as private attorneys general, a necessary role on which enforcement of civil rights statutes depends.

SEC. 302. CIVIL ACTION.

Section 41705 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(d) CIVIL ACTION.-(1) Any person aggrieved by an air carrier's violation of subsection (a) (including any regulation implementing such subsection) may bring a civil action in the district court of the United States in the district in which the aggrieved person resides, in the district containing the air carrier's principal place of business, or in the district in which the violation took place. Any such action must be commenced within 2 years after the date of the violation.

"(2) In any civil action brought by an aggrieved person pursuant to paragraph (1), the plaintiff may obtain both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and punitive damages. The court in such action shall, in addition to such relief awarded to a prevailing plaintiff, award reasonable attorney's fees, reasonable expert fees, and costs of the action to the plaintiff.".

TITLE IV-AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT AMENDMENTS

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Older Workers' Rights Restoration Act of 2004".

SEC. 402. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Since 1974, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) (referred to in this section as the 'ADEA') has prohibited States from discriminating in employment on the basis of age. In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld Congress's constitutional authority to prohibit States from discriminating in employment on the basis of age. The prohibitions of the ADEA remain in effect and continue to apply to the States, as the prohibitions have for more than 25 years.

(2) Age discrimination in employment remains a serious problem both nationally and among State agencies, and has invidious effects on its victims, the labor force, and the economy as a whole. For example, age discrimination in employment-

(A) increases the risk of unemployment among older workers, who will as a result be more likely to be dependent on government resources;

(B) prevents the best use of available labor resources;

(D) perpetuates unwarranted stereotypes about the abilities of older workers.

(3) Private civil suits by the victims of employment discrimination have been a crucial tool for enforcement of the ADEA since the enactment of that Act. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), however, the Supreme Court held that Congress had not abrogated State sovereign immunity to suits by individuals under the ADEA. The Federal Government has an important interest in ensuring that Federal financial assistance is not used to subsidize or facilitate violations of the ADEA. Private civil suits are a critical tool for advancing that interest.

(4) As a result of the Kimel decision, although age-based discrimination by State employers remains unlawful, the victims of such discrimination lack important remedies for vindication of their rights that are available to all other employees covered under that Act, including employees in the private sector, local government, and the Federal Government. Unless a State chooses to waive sovereign immunity, or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brings an action on their behalf, State employees victimized by violations of the ADEA have no adequate Federal remedy for violations of that Act. In the absence of the deterrent effect that such remedies provide, there is a greater likelihood that entities carrying out programs and activities receiving Federal financial assistance will use that assistance to violate that Act, or that the assistance will otherwise subsidize or facilitate violations of that Act.

(5) Federal law has long treated nondiscrimination obligations as a core component of programs or activities that, in whole or part, receive Federal financial assistance. That assistance should not be used, directly or indirectly, to subsidize invidious discrimination. Assuring nondiscrimination in employment is a crucial aspect of assuring nondiscrimination in those programs and activities.

(6) Discrimination on the basis of age in programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance is, in contexts other than employment, forbidden by the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.). Congress determined that it was not necessary for the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 to apply to employment discrimination because the ADEA already forbade discrimination in employment by, and authorized suits against, State agencies and other entities that receive Federal financial assistance. In section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 (42 U.S.C. 2000d-7), Congress required all State entities subject to the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 to waive any immunity from suit for discrimination claims arising under the Age Discrimination Act of 1975. The earlier limitation in the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, originally intended only to avoid duplicative coverage and remedies, has in the wake of the Kimel decision become a serious loophole leaving millions of State employees without an important Federal remedy for age discrimination, resulting in the use of Federal financial assistance to subsidize or facilitate violations of the ADEA.

(7) The Supreme Court has upheld Congress's authority to condition receipt of Federal financial assistance on acceptance by the States or other covered entities of conditions regarding or related to the use of that assistance, as in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Court has further recognized that Congress may require a State, as a condition of receipt of Federal financial assistance, to waive the State's sovereign immunity to suits for a violation of Federal law, as in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999). In the wake of the Kimel decision, in order to assure compliance with, and to provide effective remedies for violations of, the ADEA in State programs or activities receiving or using Federal financial assistance, and in order to ensure that Federal financial assistance does not subsidize or facilitate violations of the ADEA, it is necessary to require such a waiver as a condition of receipt or use of that assistance.

(8) A State's receipt or use of Federal financial assistance in any program or activity of a State will constitute a limited waiver of sovereign immunity under section 7(g) of the ADEA (as added by section 404). The waiver will not eliminate a State's immunity with respect to programs or activities that do not receive or use Federal financial assistance. The State will waive sovereign immunity only with respect to suits under the ADEA brought by employees within the programs or activities that receive or use that assistance. With regard to those programs and activities that are covered by the waiver, the State employees will be accorded only the same remedies that are accorded to other covered employees under the ADEA.

(9) The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that State sovereign immunity does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief brought against State officials, as in Ex parte Young (209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Clarification of the language of the ADEA will confirm that that Act authorizes such suits. The injunctive relief available in such suits will continue to be no broader than the injunctive relief that was available under that Act before the Kimel decision, and that is available to all other employees under that Act.

(10) In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized that title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) "proscribes not only overt discrimination [in employment] but also [employment] practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. . . ." In doing so, the Court relied on section 703(a)(2) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(2)), which contains language identical to section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, except that the latter substitutes the word age for the grounds of prohibited discrimination specified by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." The Court has confirmed that this and other related statutory language, identical to both title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA, supports application of the disparate impact doctrine. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).

(11) Other indicia of Congress's intent to permit the disparate impact method of proving violations of the ADEA are legion, and include numerous other textual parallels between the ADEA and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, such as in the two laws' substantive prohibitions. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (the ADEA's substantive prohibitions "were derived in haec verba from Title VII"). Moreover, the ADEA and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 share "a common purpose: 'the elimination of discrimination in the workplace,' ". McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)). Interpreting title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in a consistent manner is particularly appropriate when "the two provisions share a common raison d'etre.". Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973).

(12) The ADEA's legislative history confirms Congress's intent to redress all "arbitrary" age discrimination in the workplace, including arbitrary facially neutral policies and practices falling more harshly on older workers. Such policies continue to be based on the kind of "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices" which cannot be "adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis," and thus, require application of the disparate impact theory of proof. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). As the Supreme Court has noted, these prejudices are "the essence of age discrimination.". Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, n.15 (1993).

(13) In 1991, Congress reaffirmed that title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 permits victims of employment bias to state a cause of action for disparate impact discrimination when it added a provision to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to clarify the burden of proof in disparate impact cases in section 703(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)).
(14) Subsequently, several lower courts and Federal Courts of Appeal have mistakenly relied on language in the Supreme Court's opinion in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), to suggest that the disparate impact method of proof does not apply to claims under the ADEA. Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073, 1076-77 (7th Cir. 1994); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1996); DiBiase v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995); Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass'n and Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995). Congress did not intend the ADEA to be interpreted to provide older workers less protections against discrimination than those protected under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As a result, it is necessary to clarify the burden of proof in a disparate impact case under the ADEA, and thereby reaffirm that victims of age discrimination in employment discrimination may state a cause of action based on the disparate impact method of proving discrimination in appropriate circumstances.

SEC. 403. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this title are-

(1) to provide to State employees in programs or activities that receive or use Federal financial assistance the same rights and remedies for practices violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621 et seq.) as are available to other employees under that Act, and that were available to State employees prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);

(2) to provide that the receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for a program or activity constitutes a State waiver of sovereign immunity from suits by employees within that program or activity for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;

(3) to affirm that suits for injunctive relief are available against State officials in their official capacities for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; and

(4) to reaffirm the applicability of the disparate impact standard of proof to claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.

SEC. 404. REMEDIES FOR STATE EMPLOYEES.

Section 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(g)(1)(A) A State's receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program or activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under the 11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit brought by an employee of that program or activity under this Act for equitable, legal, or other relief authorized under this Act.

"(B) In this paragraph, the term 'program or activity' has the meaning given the term in section 309 of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6107).

"(2) An official of a State may be sued in the official capacity of the official by any employee who has complied with the procedures of subsections (d) and (e), for injunctive relief that is authorized under this Act. In such a suit the court may award to the prevailing party those costs authorized by section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988).".

SEC. 405. DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS.

Section 4 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 623) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(n)(1) Discrimination based on disparate impact is established under this title only if-

"(A) an aggrieved party demonstrates that an employer, employment agency, or labor organization has a policy or practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of age and the employer, employment agency, or labor organization fails to demonstrate that the challenged policy or practice is based on reasonable factors that are job-related and consistent with business necessity other than age; or

"(B) the aggrieved party demonstrates (consistent with the demonstration standard under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) with respect to an 'alternative employment practice') that a less discriminatory alternative policy or practice exists, and the employer, employment agency, or labor organization refuses to adopt such alternative policy or practice.

"(2)(A) With respect to demonstrating that a particular policy or practice causes a disparate impact as described in paragraph

(1)(A), the aggrieved party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged policy or practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the aggrieved party demonstrates to the court that the elements of an employer, employment agency, or labor organization's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one policy or practice.

"(B) If the employer, employment agency, or labor organization demonstrates that a specific policy or practice does not cause the disparate impact, the employer, employment agency, or labor organization shall not be required to demonstrate that such policy or practice is necessary to the operation of its business.

"(3) A demonstration that a policy or practice is necessary to the operation of the employer, employment agency, or labor organization's business may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this title.

"(4) In this subsection, the term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of production and persuasion.".

SEC. 406. EFFECTIVE DATE.

(a) WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.-With respect to a particular program or activity, section 7(g)(1) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(g)(1)) applies to conduct occurring on or after the day, after the date of enactment of this title, on which a State first receives or uses Federal financial assistance for that program or activity.

(b) SUITS AGAINST OFFICIALS.-Section 7(g)(2) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(g)(2)) applies to any suit pending on or after the date of enactment of this title.

TITLE V-CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDIES AND RELIEF

SUBTITLE A-PREVAILING PARTY

SEC. 501. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the "Settlement Encouragement and Fairness Act".

SEC. 502. DEFINITION OF PREVAILING PARTY.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

"§ 9. Definition of 'prevailing party'

"(a) In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, or of any judicial or administrative rule, which provides for the recovery of attorney's fees, the term 'prevailing party' shall include, in addition to a party who substantially prevails through a judicial or administrative judgment or order, or an enforceable written agreement, a party whose pursuit of a nonfrivolous claim or defense was a catalyst for a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the opposing party that provides any significant part of the relief sought.

"(b)(1) If an Act, ruling, regulation, interpretation, or rule described in subsection (a) requires a defendant, but not a plaintiff, to satisfy certain different or additional criteria to qualify for the recovery of attorney's fees, subsection (a) shall not affect the requirement that such defendant satisfy such criteria.

"(2) If an Act, ruling, regulation, interpretation, or rule described in subsection (a) requires a party to satisfy certain criteria, unrelated to whether or not such party has prevailed, to qualify for the recovery of attorney's fees, subsection (a) shall not affect the requirement that such party satisfy such criteria.".

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:

"9. Definition of 'prevailing party'.".

SUBTITLE B-ARBITRATION

SEC. 511. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the "Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2004".

SEC. 512. AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.

Section 1 of title 9, United States Code, is amended by striking "of seamen" and all that follows through "commerce".

SEC. 513. UNENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.

(a) PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any clause of any agreement between an employer and an employee that requires arbitration of a dispute arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States shall not be enforceable.

(b) EXCEPTIONS.-

(1) WAIVER OR CONSENT AFTER DISPUTE ARISES.-Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to any dispute if, after such dispute arises, the parties involved knowingly and voluntarily consent to submit such dispute to arbitration.
(2) COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS.-Subsection (a) shall not preclude an employee or union from enforcing any of the rights or terms of a valid collective bargaining agreement.

SEC. 514. APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.

This subtitle and the amendment made by section 512 shall apply with respect to all employment contracts in force before, on, or after the date of enactment of this subtitle.

SUBTITLE C-EXPERT WITNESS FEES

SEC. 521. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this subtitle is to allow recovery of expert fees by prevailing parties under civil rights fee-shifting statutes.

SEC. 522. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) This subtitle is made necessary by the decision of the Supreme Court in West Virginia University Hospitals Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). In Casey, the Court, per Justice Scalia, ruled that expert fees were not recoverable under section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988), as amended by the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-559; 90 Stat. 2641), because the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 expressly authorized an award of an "attorney's fee" to a prevailing party but said nothing expressly about expert fees.

(2) This subtitle is especially necessary both because of the important roles played by experts in civil rights litigation and because expert fees often represent a major cost of the litigation. In fact, in Casey itself, as pointed out by Justice Stevens in dissent, the district court had found that the expert witnesses were "essential" and "necessary" to the successful prosecution of the plaintiffs case, and the expert fees were not paltry but amounted to $104,133. Justice Stevens also pointed out that the majority opinion requiring the plaintiff to "assume the cost of $104,133 in expert witness fees is at war with the congressional purpose of making the prevailing party whole.". Casey (499 U.S. at 111).

(3) Much of the rationale for denying expert fees as part of the shifting of attorney's fees under provisions of law such as section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988), whose language does not expressly include expert fees, was based on the fact that many fee-shifting statutes enacted by Congress "explicitly shift expert witness fees as well as attorney's fees.". Casey (499 U.S. at 88). In fact, Justice Scalia pointed out that in 1976-the same year that Congress amended section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988) by providing for the shifting of attorney's fees-Congress expressly authorized the shifting of attorney's fees and of expert fees in the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.), the Consumer Product Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 2051 et seq.), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-580; 90 Stat. 2795), and the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976 (Public Law 94-477; 90 Stat. 2073). Casey (499 U.S. at 88). Congress had done the same in other years on dozens of occasions. Casey (499 U.S. at 88-90 & n. 4).

(4) In the same year that the Supreme Court decided Casey, Congress responded quickly but only through the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-166; 105 Stat. 1071) by amending title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) and section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988) with express authorizations of the recovery of expert fees in successful employment discrimination litigation. It is long past time to correct, in Federal civil rights litigation, Casey's denial of expert fees.

SEC. 523. EFFECTIVE PROVISIONS.

(a) Section 722 of the Revised Statutes.-Section 722 of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1988) is amended-

(1) in subsection (b), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee"; and

(2) by striking subsection ©.

(b) Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.-Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 216(b)) is amended by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee".

(d) FAIR HOUSING ACT.-Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.) is amended-

(1) in section 812(p), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee";

(2) in section 813©(2), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee"; and

(3) in section 814(d)(2), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee".

(e) IDEA.-Section 615(i)(3)(B) of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B)) is amended by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fees".

(f) CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.-Section 204(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(b)) is amended by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee".

(g) REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973.-Section 505(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a(b)) is amended by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee".

(h) EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT.-Section 706(d) of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. 1691e(d)) is amended by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee".

(i) FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT.-The Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.) is amended-

(1) in section 616(a)(3), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fees"; and

(2) in section 617(a)(2), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fees".

(j) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.-Section 552(a)(4)(E) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney fees".

(k) PRIVACY ACT.-Section 552a(g) of title 5, United States Code, is amended-

(1) in paragraph (2)(B), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney fees";

(2) in paragraph (3)(B), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney fees"; and

(3) in paragraph (4)(B), by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney fees".

(l) TRUTH IN LENDING ACT.-Section 130(a)(3) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(3)) is amended by inserting "(including expert fees)" after "attorney's fee".

SUBTITLE D-EQUAL REMEDIES ACT OF 2004

SEC. 531. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the "Equal Remedies Act of 2004".

SEC. 532. EQUALIZATION OF REMEDIES.

Section 1977A of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), as added by section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is
amended-

(1) in subsection (b)-

(A) by striking paragraph (3); and

(B) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (3); and

(2) in subsection ©, by striking "section-" and all that follows through the period, and inserting "section, any party may demand a jury trial.".

TITLE VI-PROHIBITIONS AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION

SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.

This title may be cited as the "Paycheck Fairness Act".

SEC. 602. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Women have entered the workforce in record numbers.

(2) Even today, women earn significantly lower pay than men for work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and that are performed under similar working conditions. These pay disparities exist in both the private and governmental sectors. In many instances, the pay disparities can only be due to continued intentional discrimination or the lingering effects of past discrimination.

(3) The existence of such pay disparities-

(A) depresses the wages of working families who rely on the wages of all members of the family to make ends meet;

(B) prevents the optimum utilization of available labor resources;

(D) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce;

(E) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce;

(F) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce;

(G) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce; and

(H) in many instances, may deprive workers of equal protection on the basis of sex in violation of the 5th and 14th amendments.

(4)(A) Artificial barriers to the elimination of discrimination in the payment of wages on the basis of sex continue to exist decades after the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq.).

(B) Elimination of such barriers would have positive effects, including-

(i) providing a solution to problems in the economy created by unfair pay disparities;

(ii) substantially reducing the number of working women earning unfairly low wages, thereby reducing the dependence on public assistance;

(iii) promoting stable families by enabling all family members to earn a fair rate of pay;

(iv) remedying the effects of past discrimination on the basis of sex and ensuring that in the future workers are afforded equal protection on the basis of sex; and

(v) ensuring equal protection pursuant to Congress's power to enforce the 5th and 14th amendments.

(5) With increased information about the provisions added by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and wage data, along with more effective remedies, women will be better able to recognize and enforce their rights to equal pay for work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and that are performed under similar working conditions.

(6) Certain employers have already made great strides in eradicating unfair pay disparities in the workplace and their achievements should be recognized.

SEC. 603. ENHANCED ENFORCEMENT OF EQUAL PAY REQUIREMENTS.

(a) REQUIRED DEMONSTRATION FOR AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.-Section 6(d)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1)) is amended by striking "(iv) a differential" and all that follows through the period and inserting the following: "(iv) a differential based on a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training or experience, except that this clause shall apply only if-

"(I) the employer demonstrates that-

"(aa) such factor-

"(AA) is job-related with respect to the position in question; or

"(BB) furthers a legitimate business purpose, except that this item shall not apply where the employee demonstrates that an alternative employment practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing such differential and that the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice; and

"(bb) such factor was actually applied and used reasonably in light of the asserted justification; and

"(II) upon the employer succeeding under subclause (I), the employee fails to demonstrate that the differential produced by the reliance of the employer on such factor is itself the result of discrimination on the basis of sex by the employer.
An employer that is not otherwise in compliance with this paragraph may not reduce the wages of any employee in order to achieve such compliance.".

(b) APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS.-Section 6(d)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following: "The provisions of this subsection shall apply to applicants for employment if such applicants, upon employment by the employer, would be subject to any provisions of this section.".

(1) by striking ", within any establishment in which such employees are employed,"; and

(2) by striking "in such establishment" each place it appears.

(d) NONRETALIATION PROVISION.-Section 15(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3)) is amended-

(1) by striking "or has" each place it appears and inserting "has"; and

(2) by inserting before the semicolon the following: ", or has inquired about, discussed, or otherwise disclosed the wages of the employee or another employee, or because the employee (or applicant) has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, hearing, or action under section 6(d)".

(e) ENHANCED PENALTIES.-Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 216(b)) is amended-

(1) by inserting after the first sentence the following: "Any employer who violates section 6(d) shall additionally be liable for such compensatory or punitive damages as may be appropriate, except that the United States shall not be liable for punitive damages.";

(2) in the sentence beginning "An action to", by striking "either of the preceding sentences" and inserting "any of the preceding sentences of this subsection";

(3) in the sentence beginning "No employees shall", by striking "No employees" and inserting "Except with respect to class actions brought to enforce section 6(d), no employee";

(4) by inserting after the sentence referred to in paragraph (3), the following: "Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, any action brought to enforce section 6(d) may be maintained as a class action as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."; and

(5) in the sentence beginning "The court in"-

(A) by striking "in such action" and inserting "in any action brought to recover the liability prescribed in any of the preceding sentences of this subsection"; and

(B) by inserting before the period the following: ", including expert fees".

(f) ACTION BY SECRETARY.-Section 16© of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 216©) is amended-

(1) in the first sentence-

(A) by inserting "or, in the case of a violation of section 6(d), additional compensatory or punitive damages," before "and the agreement"; and

(B) by inserting before the period the following: ", or such compensatory or punitive damages, as appropriate";

(2) in the second sentence, by inserting before the period the following: "and, in the case of a violation of section 6(d), additional compensatory or punitive damages";

(3) in the third sentence, by striking "the first sentence" and inserting "the first or second sentence"; and

(4) in the last sentence-

(A) by striking "commenced in the case" and inserting "commenced-

"(1) in the case";

(B) by striking the period and inserting "; or"; and

"(2) in the case of a class action brought to enforce section 6(d), on the date on which the individual becomes a party plaintiff to the class action.".

SEC. 604. TRAINING.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, subject to the availability of funds appropriated under section 609, shall provide training to Commission employees and affected individuals and entities on matters involving discrimination in the payment of wages.

SEC. 605. RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND OUTREACH.

The Secretary of Labor shall conduct studies and provide information to employers, labor organizations, and the general public concerning the means available to eliminate pay disparities between men and women, including-

(1) conducting and promoting research to develop the means to correct expeditiously the conditions leading to the pay disparities;

(2) publishing and otherwise making available to employers, labor organizations, professional associations, educational institutions, the media, and the general public the findings resulting from studies and other materials, relating to eliminating the pay disparities;

(3) sponsoring and assisting State and community informational and educational programs;

(4) providing information to employers, labor organizations, professional associations, and other interested persons on the means of eliminating the pay disparities;

(5) recognizing and promoting the achievements of employers, labor organizations, and professional associations that have worked to eliminate the pay disparities; and

(6) convening a national summit to discuss, and consider approaches for rectifying, the pay disparities.

SEC. 606. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND EMPLOYER RECOGNITION PROGRAM.

(a) GUIDELINES.-

(1) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary of Labor shall develop guidelines to enable employers to evaluate job categories based on objective criteria such as educational requirements, skill requirements, independence, working conditions, and responsibility, including decisionmaking responsibility and de facto supervisory responsibility.

(2) USE.-The guidelines developed under paragraph (1) shall be designed to enable employers voluntarily to compare wages paid for different jobs to determine if the pay scales involved adequately and fairly reflect the educational requirements, skill requirements, independence, working conditions, and responsibility for each such job with the goal of eliminating unfair pay disparities between occupations traditionally dominated by men or women.

(3) PUBLICATION.-The guidelines shall be developed under paragraph (1) and published in the Federal Register not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this title.

(b) EMPLOYER RECOGNITION.-

(1) PURPOSE.-It is the purpose of this subsection to emphasize the importance of, encourage the improvement of, and recognize the excellence of employer efforts to pay wages to women that reflect the real value of the contributions of such women to the workplace.

(2) IN GENERAL.-To carry out the purpose of this subsection, the Secretary of Labor shall establish a program under which the Secretary shall provide for the recognition of employers who, pursuant to a voluntary job evaluation conducted by the employer, adjust their wage scales (such adjustments shall not include the lowering of wages paid to men) using the guidelines developed under subsection (a) to ensure that women are paid fairly in comparison to men.

(3) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.-The Secretary of Labor may provide technical assistance to assist an employer in carrying out an evaluation under paragraph (2).

SEC. 607. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL AWARD FOR PAY EQUITY IN THE WORKPLACE.

(a) IN GENERAL.-There is established the Secretary of Labor's National Award for Pay Equity in the Workplace, which shall be evidenced by a medal bearing the inscription "Secretary of Labor's National Award for Pay Equity in the Workplace".
The medal shall be of such design and materials, and bear such additional inscriptions, as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe.

(b) CRITERIA FOR QUALIFICATION.-To qualify to receive an award under this section a business shall-

(1) submit a written application to the Secretary of Labor, at such time, in such manner, and containing such information as the Secretary may require, including at a minimum information that demonstrates that the business has made substantial effort to eliminate pay disparities between men and women, and deserves special recognition as a consequence; and

(2) meet such additional requirements and specifications as the Secretary of Labor determines to be appropriate.
© MAKING AND PRESENTATION OF AWARD.-

(1) AWARD.-After receiving recommendations from the Secretary of Labor, the President or the designated representative of the President shall annually present the award described in subsection (a) to businesses that meet the qualifications described in subsection (b).

(2) PRESENTATION.-The President or the designated representative of the President shall present the award under this section with such ceremonies as the President or the designated representative of the President may determine to be appropriate.

(d) BUSINESS.-In this section, the term "business" includes-

(1)(A) a corporation, including a nonprofit corporation;

(B) a partnership;

(D) a labor organization; and

(E) a business entity similar to an entity described in any of subparagraphs (A) through (D);

(2) an entity carrying out an education referral program, a training program, such as an apprenticeship or management training program, or a similar program; and

(3) an entity carrying out a joint program, formed by a combination of any entities described in paragraph (1) or (2).
SEC. 608. COLLECTION OF PAY INFORMATION BY THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION.

Section 709 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-8) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(f)(1) Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall-

"(A) complete a survey of the data that is currently available to the Federal Government relating to employee pay information for use in the enforcement of Federal laws prohibiting pay discrimination and, in consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, identify additional data collections that will enhance the enforcement of such laws; and

"(B) based on the results of the survey and consultations under subparagraph (A), issue regulations to provide for the collection of pay information data from employers as described by the sex, race, and national origin of employees.

"(2) In implementing paragraph (1), the Commission shall have as its primary consideration the most effective and efficient means for enhancing the enforcement of Federal laws prohibiting pay discrimination. For this purpose, the Commission shall consider factors including the imposition of burdens on employers, the frequency of required reports (including which employers should be required to prepare reports), appropriate protections for maintaining data confidentiality, and the most effective format for the data collection reports.".

SEC. 609. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this title.

TITLE VII-PROTECTIONS FOR WORKERS

SUBTITLE A-PROTECTION FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS

SEC. 701. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) The National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) (in this subtitle referred to as the "NLRA"), enacted in 1935, guarantees the right of employees to organize and to bargain collectively with their employers. The NLRA implements the national labor policy of assuring free choice and encouraging collective bargaining as a means of maintaining industrial peace. The National Labor Relations Board (in this subtitle referred to as the "NLRB") was created by Congress to enforce the provisions of the NLRA.

(2) Under section 8 of the NLRA, employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees "in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization". (29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3)). Employers who violate these provisions are subject to a variety of sanctions, including reinstatement of workers found to be illegally discharged because of their union support or activity and provision of backpay to those employees. Such sanctions serve to remedy and deter illegal actions by employers.

(3) In Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002), the Supreme Court held by a 5 to 4 vote that Federal immigration policy, as articulated in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, prevented the NLRB from awarding backpay to an undocumented immigrant who was discharged in violation of the NLRA because of his support for union representation at his workplace.

(4) The decision in Hoffman has an impact on all employees, regardless of immigration or citizenship status, who try to improve their working conditions. In the wake of Hoffman Plastics, employers may be more likely to report to the Department of Homeland Security minority workers, regardless of their immigration or citizenship status, who pursue claims under the NLRA against their employers. Fear that employers may retaliate against employees that exercise their rights under the NLRA has a chilling effect on all employees who exercise their labor rights.

(5) The NLRA is not the only Federal employment statute that provides for a backpay award as a remedy for an unlawful discharge. For example, courts routinely award backpay to employees who are found to have been discharged in violation of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) or the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) (in retaliation for complaining about a failure to comply with the minimum wage). In the wake of the Hoffman decision, defendant employers will now argue that backpay awards to unlawfully discharged undocumented workers are barred under Federal employment statutes and even under State employment statutes.

(6) Because the Hoffman decision prevents the imposition of sanctions on employers who discriminate against undocumented immigrant workers, employers are encouraged to employ such workers for low-paying and dangerous jobs because they have no legal redress for violations of the law. This creates an economic incentive for employers to hire and exploit undocumented workers, which in turn tends to undermine the living standards and working conditions of all Americans, citizens and noncitizens alike.

(7) The Hoffman decision disadvantages many employers as well. Employers who are forced to compete with firms that hire and exploit undocumented immigrant workers are saddled with an economic disadvantage in the labor marketplace. The unintended creation of an economic inducement for employers to exploit undocumented immigrant workers gives those employers an unfair competitive advantage over employers that treat workers lawfully and fairly.

(8) The Court's decision in Hoffman makes clear that "any 'perceived deficiency in the NLRA's existing remedial arsenal' must be 'addressed by congressional action[.]' " Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002) (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)). In emphasizing the importance of back pay awards, Justice Breyer noted that such awards against employers "help[] to deter unlawful activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent". Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 152 (2002). Because back pay awards are designed both to remedy the individual's private right to be free from discrimination as well as to enforce the important public policy against discriminatory employment practices, Congress must take the following corrective action.

SEC. 702. CONTINUED APPLICATION OF BACKPAY REMEDIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 274A(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1324a(h)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(4) BACKPAY REMEDIES.-Backpay or other monetary relief for unlawful employment practices shall not be denied to a present or former employee as a result of the employer's or the employee's-

"(A) failure to comply with the requirements of this section; or

"(B) violation of a provision of Federal law related to the employment verification system described in subsection (b) in establishing or maintaining the employment relationship.".

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to any failure to comply or any violation that occurs prior to, on, or after the date of enactment of this title.

SUBTITLE B-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT AMENDMENTS

SEC. 711. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the "Workers' Minimum Wage and Overtime Rights Restoration Act of 2004".

SEC. 712. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following with respect to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) (in this subtitle referred to as the "FLSA"):

(1) Since 1974, the FLSA has regulated States with respect to the payment of minimum wage and overtime rates. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), the Supreme Court upheld Congress's constitutional authority to regulate States in the payment of minimum wages and overtime. The prohibitions of the FLSA remain in effect and continue to apply to the States. [Page S1308]

(2) Wage and overtime violations in employment remain a serious problem both nationally and among State and other public and private entities receiving Federal financial assistance, and has invidious effects on its victims, the labor force, and the general welfare and economy as a whole. For example, seven State governments have no overtime laws at all. Fourteen State governments have minimum wage and overtime laws; however, they exclude employees covered under the FLSA. As such, public employees, since they are covered under the FLSA are not protected under these State laws. Additionally, four States have minimum wage and overtime laws which are inferior to the FLSA. Further, the Department of Labor continues to receive a substantial number of wage and overtime charges against State government employers.

(3) Private civil suits by the victims of employment law violations have been a crucial tool for enforcement of the FLSA. In Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), however, the Supreme Court held that Congress lacks the power under the 14th amendment to the Constitution to abrogate State sovereign immunity to suits for legal relief by individuals under the FLSA. The Federal Government has an important interest in ensuring that Federal financial assistance is not used to facilitate violations of the FLSA, and private civil suits for monetary relief are a critical tool for advancing that interest.

(4) After the Alden decision, wage and overtime violations by State employers remain unlawful, but victims of such violations lack important remedies for vindication of their rights available to all other employees covered by the FLSA. In the absence of the deterrent effect that such remedies provide, there is a great likelihood that State entities carrying out federally funded programs and activities will use Federal financial assistance to violate the FLSA, or that the Federal financial assistance will otherwise subsidize or facilitate FLSA violations.

(5) The Supreme Court has upheld Congress's authority to condition receipt of Federal financial assistance on acceptance by State or other covered entities of conditions regarding or related to the use of those funds, as in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).

(6) The Court has further recognized that Congress may require State entities, as a condition of receipt of Federal financial assistance, to waive their State sovereign immunity to suits for a violation of Federal law, as in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999).

(7) In the wake of the Alden decision, it is necessary, in order to foster greater compliance with, and adequate remedies for violations of, the FLSA, particularly in federally funded programs or activities operated by State entities, to require State entities to consent to a waiver of State sovereign immunity as a condition of receipt of such Federal financial assistance.
(8) The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that State sovereign immunity does not bar suits for prospective injunctive relief brought against State officials acting in their official capacity, as in Ex parte Young (209 U.S. 123 (1908)). The injunctive relief available in such suits under the FLSA will continue to be the same as that which was available under those laws prior to enactment of this subtitle.

SEC. 713. PURPOSES.

The purposes of this subtitle are-

(1) to provide to State employees in programs or activities that receive or use Federal financial assistance the same rights and remedies for practices violating the FLSA as are available to other employees under the FLSA, and that were available to State employees prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);

(3) to affirm that suits for injunctive relief are available against State officials in their official capacities for violations of the FLSA.

SEC. 714. REMEDIES FOR STATE EMPLOYEES.

Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 216) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(f)(1) A State's receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program or activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under the 11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit brought by an employee of that program or activity under this Act for equitable, legal, or other relief authorized under this Act.

"(2) In this subsection, the term 'program or activity' has the meaning given the term in section 309 of the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6107).".

Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions - S. 2088 - Part Two

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