Energy And Water Development And Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2008

Floor Speech

ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2008 -- (House of Representatives - June 19, 2007)

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Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Chairman, I want to bring to the attention of the House something that is being done in this bill that I think has received insufficient discussion and debate.

This Energy and Water appropriations bill includes in it the most radical shift in U.S. policy on nuclear weapons that I have seen at least since the mid-1990s, that will lead us either to be forced to return to nuclear testing or to abandon nuclear deterrence because we stop maintaining the stockpile.

Without any debate, we have made this drastic change in this bill that is devastating to American nuclear weapons capabilities and will significantly change our policy on nuclear weapons without any discussion at all of any substance.

In 1992, the United States stopped nuclear testing. In 1996 we joined the moratorium on nuclear testing and said we will continue to maintain the stockpile through something called science-based stockpile stewardship. It is kind of like if you had a car that was a 1980s car and you said okay, we are never going to turn the key, but every year through science and engineering we are going to be able to tell the President, if we turned the key we believe it would be safe, secure and reliable.

The car would go on. It won't be turned on unless we turn the key; and, Mr. President, we are confident of that.

This bill devastates that capability with respect to our nuclear weapons. It has a 20-percent reduction in 1 year in the engineering laboratory that is solely responsible for over 6,000 parts in our nuclear weapons. It has a 40-percent reduction at Los Alamos National Lab's nuclear weapons program. And 80 percent of the existing stockpile is designed by Los Alamos. They are responsible for being able to tell us if these weapons are safe, secure and reliable.

What does this mean? It means we will not be able to achieve the stockpile reductions we're trying to achieve because the labs will not have the sense of reliability of the stockpile. Your percentage of reliability determines how low you can bring the stockpile.

Second, we are increasing the likelihood of the need to go back to underground testing, because at some point in the future, the lab directors will not be able to certify the reliability of the stockpile. There will be a problem, as there is every year; and they won't have the tools to be able to assess that problem without nuclear testing.

And, third, you are undermining allied confidence in the American nuclear umbrella. Mr. Obey, my colleague, said they're devastating this program because there's been no strategy for post-Cold War nuclear weapons. That is a complete fallacy. It is rubbish. We signed the Moscow treaty to reduce the size of our deployed stockpile. We have gone to a policy of no underground testing. We have gone to a policy of science-based stockpile stewardship and the majority in this House is moving toward a nuclear freeze and unilateral disarmament without any debate whatsoever.

I would urge my colleagues to oppose this bill.

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