Floor Statement: Changing the Model in Iraq

Thursday, November 6, 2003

Three days ago, Congress completed action on the President's request for an additional $87 billion for military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the President will sign that significant supplement to the budget into law.

The debate we had here in Congress reflects more than understandable sticker shock at the $87 billion. It reflects the fact that there is a crisis in confidence in the President's leadership in Iraq. The American people have grave doubts about whether we have a strategy for success - and so do many members of Congress.

I voted for the $87 billion because I believe we cannot afford to fail in Iraq - and because I believe we can succeed, if we act wisely.

What do we have to do to succeed? The first step is to understand the situation on the ground in Iraq.

There are two realities in Iraq right now. The Administration is right we've made real progress opening schools and hospitals, starting reconstruction projects, setting up local councils etc.

But all that progress is being undermined by the other reality: our failure so far to get SECURITY right, especially in the Sunni Triangle and Baghdad. Security is the foundation for everything. If you don't have it, the house crumbles. Then we'll lose the support of the Iraqi people, the vast majority of whom are happy to be rid of Saddam and want to build a better future. We'll lose the support of the American people.

So Job #1 is getting security right - controlling the streets, securing the weapons depots, getting better intelligence. That's always been job number one - and it's always been the Administration's responsibility, not Congress', to figure out how to do it right. But I am increasingly concerned we're on a downward spiral in terms of getting the security job done - we're stuck in neutral and we are running out of time. That's not the fault of our remarkable men and women in uniform, who are remarkably brave and doing an outstanding job. But they need a better plan to succeed.

Let me lay out what I believe we must do to succeed.

The bottom line is pretty simple: three groups can provide security in Iraq: the Iraqis themselves; U.S. troops; or a real international coalition of forces.

Over the long term, the single best way to get security right is to have the Iraqis provide it with an Iraqi police force and army. That's the goal. It should be their responsibility. And they can tell the good guys from the bad guys much better than we can.

But here's the rub: it takes time to build effective indigenous forces. When I was in Iraq in June, I was told it would take 5 years to recruit and train 75,000 police and three years to recruit and train a 40,000 strong army.

Well, we can and we are putting that effort into overdrive. But let's understand the risk: the faster we go, the poorer trained and less legitimate the police and army will be. Putting them in charge prematurely is a recipe for failure. And even on steroids, we are going to need a year at least before we can hand over the keys.

So what do we do in the meantime to buy time?

That brings us to option two: flood the zone with more U.S. troops. Putting in more troops now would allow us to get them all out faster later. We especially need MPs, Special Forces, Civil Affairs experts.

But this is hard stuff - our forces are stretched way thin in Iraq already, and in Afghanistan. We'd have to bring folks back to Iraq for second and third tours. That's a decision no one wants to make, but we have to at least consider it if it would make all our troops safer and increase the chances for success.

Short of bringing in more U.S. troops, there are things we can do with our forces in place to get a better grip on security:
We've got to deal with the ammo depots. There are more than 600,000 tons of ordnance and arms in Iraq. That's 1/3rd of all the munitions in the U.S. Of that, less than 100,000 tons has been destroyed. There are also thousands of shoulder-fired missiles on the loose in Iraq, one of which probably brought down that helicopter this week. We're offering to buy them back for $500 a pop - more than 350 have been turned in. But the black market price is $5000 a missile. It's hard to compete with that.
If we had more forces in place, we could do a better job guarding these depots. But even without the forces, we should be getting Iraqis to fence off the depots, put censors on the gates and put more UAVs in the air to patrol them.
And now we've got to destroy the weapons faster. Let me acknowledge this is not a simple task. There are hundreds of depots, many of them huge, and we have to be very careful destroying them. We need to protect civilian populations. And we lack enough demolition experts who know how to destroy this stuff without starting a California-sized fire. But the Administration must make securing and destroying the loose weapons in Iraq its top priority.
We also need better intelligence on the ground. It's really hard for our folks to tell the good guys from the bad guys. That's where intelligence comes in. But the Army itself is finding that our intelligence specialists and the reserves trained in civil affairs and psychological operations don't get the training they need before they are sent into Iraq, so they're not producing good intelligence. We don't have enough competent interpreters. And we've got to help Iraqis rebuild their own intelligence networks. Here, too, we need a real sense of urgency.

There's another way - a third option - to buy time until the Iraqis can fend for themselves. And that is to make Iraq the world's responsibility, not just our own. We've had many opportunities to do that - before the war, in its immediate aftermath, and at the end of the summer, when it became clear the security situation was not getting better. This Administration has squandered each one.

I am convinced we have one last chance at bringing the world into Iraq. We must do everything in our power to seize it.

I'd like to see President Bush go to Europe, call a summit, and ask - ask - for more help. We might have to give up some more authority to get it. But as I keep saying, we've got to stop treating Iraq like some kind of prize.

There are three things we can and should do to get more countries invested in Iraq with troops, police and resources. First, we should make Iraq a NATO mission, but "double hat" General Abizaid to put him in charge of a new NATO command for the region. Second, we should create an High Commissioner for Iraq who reports not just to President Bush but to an international board of directors of which the U.S. would be the chairman. Third, we should transform the Iraqi Governing Council into a Provisional Government, with greater sovereign powers.

Putting NATO in charge of security in Iraq offers the possibility of building a truly multinational force, with far more participation from European, Asian and neighboring countries. More countries would take part because they would be reporting to the North Atlantic Council, not to the Pentagon. It's a model that has worked in the Balkans, and also in Afghanistan. In the Balkans, for example, many non-NATO countries, including Russia and some Arab states, joined the effort.

But the United States would retain operational control on the ground with General Abizaid as head of the new NATO command. And we would retain effective control in NATO, where the United States is the lead player.

Creating an international High Commissioner for Iraq and putting him in charge of reconstruction would also attract far more international participation. The recent donors conference is a painful example of the price we pay for doing everything ourselves. Typically, as in the Balkans, the U.S. covers about 25% of reconstruction costs aftera major conflict. By that ratio, the $20 billion Congress just approved for Iraq's reconstruction should have generated about $60 billion from the rest of the world. Instead, we got $13 billion, of which $9 billion was loans. As long as the CPA is the sole deciding authority for how Iraq will be rebuilt, other countries will be reluctant to fork over real money. They want a real say in how it will be spent.

Again, it's a model that has worked before. In Bosnia, the High Commissioner reports to a special steering committee led by the United States and the E.U. In Kosovo, the Secretary General of the United Nations designated a Special Representative, who reports to the U.N. Security Council.

Here too, Ambassador Bremer could be dual hatted for the job, retaining tremendous authority for the U.S., but giving other countries a real say in how their money is being spent.

Finally, we should turn the Iraqi Governing Council into a true provisional government, with more sovereign powers. This transfer of sovereignty should not be held hostage to the very important but also very complicated and time consuming process of writing a new constitution. And it may require some changes to make the provisional government more representative.

But nothing would send a clearer message to the Iraqi people that the future is theirs to build and to inherit. And nothing would make it clearer to them that the enemies of that future are the Saddam loyalists and international terrorists who are killing our troops.

Simply put, it is long past time to change the model we're using for securing and rebuilding Iraq and moving from a unilateral effort to a truly international one.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.