Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan Security and Reconstruction Act, 2004

EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION ACT, 2004

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I listened with great interest to my friend from Missouri. There is much that he had to say with which I agree. Except I wish we would, as they say in my home State—he was using Missouri phrases—I wish he would get real and others would get real about the connection between the likelihood of America's being struck by another terrorist attack and our fighting in Baghdad.

I don't know one security expert who will tell you, including, as quoted by Senator Reid earlier today, General Abizaid, that the folks we are fighting in the streets of Baghdad and in Iraq are the ones most likely to strike the United States of America. That is not what our officials tell us.

General Abizaid said, and I am paraphrasing him, that any attack would be organized internationally. It will come from other places. As a matter of fact, the argument can be made, because of a requirement of being so preoccupied and having to devote so many resources to Iraq, we are unable to spend the money we need to spend on homeland security.

For example, we have 106 nuclear powerplants, none of which are secure, in the United States of America.

We have train tunnels in New York where 350,000 people today will ride through them sitting in a car. Those tunnels are not secured; there is no escape, no ventilation, and no lighting.

We are cutting the police program, so we are not going to supply money for local law enforcement. It is not going to be a special forces guy with night vision goggles who is going to come across a terrorist who is about to poison the reservoir in a city or about to plant a bomb in a movie theater or about to do anything else—it is going to be a local cop.

That is not the reason I rose to speak today, but I wish we would get it straight about terror. In the larger sense, we have to deal with the war on terror by dealing with the situation in the Middle East. I don't disagree with that.

As was said in an article written not too long ago by Timothy Ash and how the west could be won, I quote him:

To emerge ultimately the victorious against the war on terrorism it is the peace we have to win first in Iraq and then in the wider Middle East.

In the broad sense of the word, it is affected by what happens in Iraq. But the idea that because we are fighting in Baghdad, we are not likely to be attacked again in the subway, or an aircraft, or whatever, because they are preoccupied is as our British friends say, poppycock.

Many Members in this Chamber and millions of Americans did not support the war in Iraq. The same goes for the millions of people around the world. But I did. I voted to give President Bush the authority to use force in Iraq. For me, the question was not whether we had to deal with Saddam Hussein but when and how, and what we were going to do after we brought him down.

I believed then and I believe now it was the responsibility of the United States and the international community to enforce the solemn obligation Saddam Hussein made when he sued for peace in the gulf war in 1991. Those of us who understand the value of international institutions and rules must also understand that when rules and institutions are flouted, they must be defended, and by force if necessary. That was, in my view, the underlying rationale to go to war in Iraq, a rationale enhanced by the fact that the one flouting the rule was a homicidal tyrant who murdered hundreds of thousands of people and who, if left alone, would have eventually acquired weapons of mass destruction, although he had none and there was no evidence he had any. But he would have gotten those weapons. That was the reason—not some idea of preemption. We didn't need a new doctrine of preemption to go after Saddam Hussein. He violated essentially a peace agreement he signed in 1991. Had it been 1919 when he was defeated in Kuwait, he would have been in Versailles, in France, signing a peace agreement. Instead, he was representing the United Nations and he signed on to United Nations resolutions, none of which he kept and I believe needed to be enforced.

But I also believed then, as I believe now, that this administration got the when and the how and the what we do the day after dangerously wrong in Iraq. This administration wrongly painted Iraq as an imminent threat to our society, something many of us at the time—not just now—said was not the case. It hyped the intelligence most likely to raise alarm bells of the American people. In speech after speech, television appearance after television appearance, the most senior administration officials told us Iraq was on the verge of possessing a nuclear weapon.

Indeed, at the same time I was on a show, the Vice President on a similar show on a Sunday told us Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. I didn't believe then, I don't believe now, and there is no evidence that that is true.

We are told that Iraq had UAVs—unmanned aerial vehicles—that could drop lethal payloads on our shores—payloads of chemical and biological weapons; that Iraq could weaponize its chemical and biological arsenal in just 45 minutes; that the regime had a clear and present tie to al-Qaida, and they implied that they were complicit in the events of 9/11—none of which I believe to be true. Yet I still voted to go into Iraq because it wasn't about if but when we dealt with this guy.

The administration stated each of these allegations as accepted facts when in fact there was deep debate on each and every one of them within our own intelligence community. I believe the administration did this to create a false sense of urgency about the need to act immediately and that as a result we went to war too soon.

There is no reason we could not have waited a month or even 6 months or whatever time it took to build a true international coalition without in any way jeopardizing American security. And we went to war without the rest of the world.

As many of us said at the time—and the record will reflect—we didn't believe we needed a single soldier from another country to win the war. I stood on this floor and said I thought we would win this war in terms of defeating Saddam's government in much less than a month and maybe as little as 2 weeks. I said it at the time. My fight was never with the need for other troops to help us fight the war. But it was absolutely clear from every expert we spoke to in my committee and folks on the Council on Foreign Relations, folks from Rand, folks from all over this country who are experts on foreign policy, that we were going to need other countries to win the peace—to win the peace—which was going to be considerably harder.

Just to put in perspective what we all know, we have had 313 men and women killed, 1,600 wounded—138 to win the war and 175 dead just starting to win the peace.

On this floor I said if we did not have the support of the international community, somewhere between 2 and 10 body bags a week would be coming home. But this unilateralism, this idea that we didn't need anybody else, was not only misplaced but, for some in the administration, arrogance.

So we went to war with the Brits and a coalition—a coalition which was the most anemic coalition with whom we have ever gone to war, after the Brits; the one without the rest of the world. And as many of us said at the time—and I wasn't the only one. Senator Lugar said it; Senator Hagel said it; a number of other Republicans said it—we didn't need a single soldier to win the war, but we needed tens of thousands of soldiers to secure the peace—tens of thousands.

The chief of the Army got sacked because he dared to suggest we were going to need a couple hundred thousand troops to secure the peace when Mr. Rumsfeld—or at least the administration—was implying we wouldn't need more than 30,000 folks and we would be out of there in 6 months.

Just as bad, we went without a plan for the day after.

Don't just take my word for this. Keep in mind that I have been supporting the President, and I will support this appropriation. But there was no serious planning. General Garner said he didn't begin planning and wasn't asked until January 6. I was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and we held hearings in July of 2002. And witness after witness after witness—former Commanders of NATO, former Commanders of CENTCOM—said the plan for peace should be running parallel with the plan for war. During those hearings, we wanted to know what was going to happen not just the day after but the decade after.

The President, I am told, has told people and I have told people. He asked me in front of a half dozen of my colleagues in the Cabinet Room back in September why I wasn't with him enthusiastically about going in and why I was insisting on him going to the United Nations. I went in the Oval Office with him and said, Mr. President, I want to remind you there is a reason your father did not go to Baghdad. And he looked at me like I was going to insult his father, for whom I have great respect. I said, Mr. President, the reason your father didn't go to Baghdad, he didn't want to stay for 5 years. Are you ready to stay? Obviously, I did not say it in that tone to the President but I asked, Are you ready to stay, Mr. President?

What was the impression given to the American people? The impression was Johnny and Jane were going to come marching home by Christmas. Why are you National Guard folks so angry? Is it because you are not patriotic? Why are the reservists so angry? Is it because they are not patriotic? Heck, no, they are angry because they were led to believe it was not going to cost much, it was not going to take long, and we would be out of there.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, my committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, pleaded with the administration, month after month, beginning well over a year ago, to share with us plans for reconstruction. We got obfuscation upon obfuscation, a rosy scenario about oil revenues and being greeted as liberators, with most of our troops coming home by Christmas.

When we really pressed—a certain word has worked its way into the lexicon of this administration—we were told the answer was "unknowable." I have never heard that word used as many times anywhere, let alone by the administration.

In fact, the problems and prescriptions of postwar Iraq were absolutely knowable. From the many hearings Senator Lugar and I convened over this year as well as the Armed Services Committee, and the work of our leading think tanks and policy experts from within the administration itself, thanks to the State Department Future of Iraq Project, whose detailed postwar plans were apparently ignored by the Department of Defense, much of this was knowable.

We are paying a very high price for those mistakes now. I share the widespread dismay at the miscalculations of this administration. I share the shock of many that the reason the administration says it took us to war, weapons of mass destruction, no longer is of any apparent interest to the most senior administration officials. I share the frustration of Members of Congress that because of the administration's many miscalculations leading up to war, the good options are gone and we are now left to find the least bad of the remaining options.

I understand the sticker shock many of my colleagues feel about the $87 billion. I suspect my friend from Oregon, who was on this committee, I know for my friend Senator Lugar, I know for my friend Senator Hagel, I know for my friend Senator McCain, it came as no shock, none whatever.

To be blunt, the reason there is such consternation in the Congress and the country at the moment is not about the $87 billion, notwithstanding that is an enormous amount. It is that we have lost faith in the President. It is that we lost our confidence in his ability to prosecute the peace. It is that we have great doubts since there were so many fundamental miscalculations made about what would happen after the regime fell. There is reason people are upset in the Senate. They doubt this administration has its act together.

My Republican friends will deny what the whole world knows publicly and privately acknowledge there is a giant rift in this administration as broad and as deep as the San Andreas Fault. On one side of the administration there is Mr. Cheney, a fine man, Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Wolfowitz, Mr. Feif; on the other side there is the State Department and the uniformed military.

Think about this one little piece, talking about the plan. What was the plan announced in great detail by Mr. Rumsfeld as to what would happen immediately after Saddam fell? There was guy named Jake Garner, a retired general, who was going to be dropped into Iraq along with a guy named Ahmed Chalabi, whom I know well, spent an hour with him alone in my office last night, the head of the Iraqi National Congress, that Garner announced when he hit the ground there would be elections within a couple of months and that he was going to run the show.

How long did it take the President to figure out that was a gigantic mistake? About 2 weeks. And he should be complimented for it.

All this malarkey about the planning, where is Garner? Where did he go? What happened to the election that was going to take place in a couple months?

The administration got on the ground and realized they did not have a plan. So they got a guy named Bremer, first-rate guy, diplomat. Guess what. That diplomat does not report to the Secretary of State; he reports to the Secretary of Defense. Isn't that kind of interesting?

Assume we have gone in and the planning post-Saddam was as successful as the planning to take down Saddam. Assume we had gone in and the international community was doing what they do in every other circumstance where we are building the peace: We usually supply 25 percent of the money, they supply 75 percent of the money—Bosnia, Kosovo, even Afghanistan, NATO is now in. Assume we were not losing Americans at the rate we are losing now. Assume this guy named Bremer, a former official at the State Department, former comptroller, sent to Iraq by the Secretary of Defense, did not come back and say the window of opportunity to win the peace is closing rapidly in Iraq. Assume he came back and said, the window is wide open. We have time and things are moving. Would people in the Senate be flyspecking the $87 billion? No.

My friend from Missouri has been in politics as long as I have. Presidents get pretty broad support when what they propose is working. What is happening here—and again, keep in mind, I'm for this money. But I am angry about what happened. I am angry about the refusal to listen. I am angry that we are there alone when we did not have to be.

The administrations's assumptions were dead wrong, and the President told the American people our mission was accomplished when he landed on that aircraft carrier. And it had not even begun. It has not even begun. And you wonder why the American people are mad. You wonder why, when you go home—and those of us who supported it going in are getting our brains kicked in at home—Democrat and Republican, we are wondering why the polls show—what?—57, 58, 60 percent of the American people say: Don't vote for this money.

The reason is, they were not leveled with. It seems to me that explains why there is so much concern on both sides of the aisle about this supplemental. That explains why it is so important that we do more than simply vote yea or nay on this $87 billion, why we need to have clear assurances from this administration that it understands—not acknowledges—just understands its mistakes to date and has a sensible plan to rectify them.

So for all the errors of the past, we must confront the reality of the present and the imperative of the future. The reality of the present is that the window of opportunity is closing on our ability to bring peace to Iraq.

As I said, that is not just my conclusion. It is the conclusion of the former Deputy Defense Secretary, John Hamre, who was sent there by the Defense Department. The imperative of the future is that we cannot afford to lose the peace in Iraq.

Losing the peace in Iraq is not about terror alone. It is so much bigger than that. Losing the peace in Iraq would condemn the United States to deal with the consequences of Iraq: chaos, not just in more terrorism but what will happen.

If we lose Iraq, Iran becomes an incredibly empowered nation; Syria becomes more emboldened; Turkey, an Islamic government, seeing a failed state on their border, becomes more radicalized; Iran, surrounded by the failed states of Iraq and Afghanistan, puts in jeopardy the very existence of Pakistan.

Doesn't it occur to you a little bit why all of a sudden the accusations are the ISI is cooperating with the Pastun warlords in southern Afghanistan? These guys have figured it out. They are hedging their bets. They are hedging their bets. And if the Musharraf falls in Pakistan, we are not talking about an Iraq, we are not talking about an Afghanistan, we are talking about a nuclear power that my friend on the Intelligence Committee knows, as well as I do, is seething—seething—with terror.
There is a whole province in northwestern Pakistan that is totally uncontrollable, where most people think bin Laden is and Omar is, that they will not go in and we cannot go in.

So I wish to heck we would stop this stuff about: We are fighting terror in Baghdad. We are, but it is so much bigger than that, and the American people have not been told it.

So we cannot afford to lose the peace.

I will make another outrageous prediction. If we lose the peace in Iraq, you will see at least two of the following countries fall—Jordan, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia. How will King Hussein stand with Iraq in shambles? How will that happen? How will any voice of moderation be willing to speak up anywhere in the Middle East if Iraq falls? And you know why Iraq may fall, beyond our mistakes? Because we have not leveled with the American people, and they may very well say: Bring the boys home.

I know my colleagues think I am a broken record on the Senate floor saying this so many times, but the one thing we all learned from the Vietnam generation—no matter whether we were for or against it, went or did not—is that no foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent of the American people, their informed consent before we act.

In short, losing the peace would reinforce the view held by the extremists in the Arab and Islamic world that while the United States can project power, we have no staying power, and that all they have to do is wait us out.

It would confirm the concerns of many moderate Arab regimes expressed before we went to war with Iraq that we would not finish the job.

I think it is fair to say I met with every Arab head of state as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I traveled to the region; I traveled to Afghanistan; I traveled to northern Iraq—all before the war. I did not meet one Arab leader who defended Saddam Hussein. Yet I did not meet a single one who said anything other than what I am about to paraphrase: If you go, make sure you finish the job because if you do not, I am dead.

Our credibility in Iraq and the region and across the globe will be at rock bottom if we do not successfully secure the peace. America and Americans will be far less secure to boot.

We have to show the wisdom and the commitment to help Iraq write a different future so we can have a different future.
And this supplemental request is critical to that effort. We have to succeed in transforming Iraq into a stable, unified country, with a representative government. And success in that effort would begin the process of redrawing the strategic map of the region. It could boost the reformers in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and elsewhere who have put Syria and its allies and Hezbollah on the defensive, and improve the climate of Israeli-Palestinian peace. It would deal a significant setback to those who argue that the only future for Arabs and Muslims is one of religious extremism, perpetual conflict, economic stagnation, and autocratic governments.

So we are faced with a real choice. I say to my colleagues who opposed the use of force in the first place, who believe there is nothing this administration can do to win the peace, and who have concluded that the dire consequences I have just predicted if we cut and run are outweighed by the consequences of being dragged down into a long, protracted war, I respect their vote to say no. I disagree with them, but I respect it.

I have concluded that the peace is winnable but not without a change of attitude and direction on the part of this administration.

I am convinced that winning the peace is possible if the President keeps to the new course he seemed to set two weeks ago
when he finally addressed the American people.

He vowed to make Iraq the world's problem, not just our own, by going back to the U.N. and seeking support of its members for troops, police and money.

And the President began to level with American people about the hard road ahead to win the peace in terms of time, troops and treasure.

If he sticks to that course, tells us how we are going to pay for the $87 billion, and shows us a clear and coherent game plan,
I believe we should give him, and all of us, one last chance to get it right in Iraq.

Since the President addressed the Nation, I have to admit I have been given many new reasons to be skeptical that the administration has genuinely changed course.

The President's speech to the U.N. missed a crucial opportunity to rally the world to our side, just as he missed opportunities to get the world with us before the war and in its immediate aftermath.

He should have made clear our willingness to bridge the differences with our allies on a new U.N. resolution and to grant the U.N. real authority. He should have laid our some specifics, and asked—asked—for help.

So I am left questioning the sincerity of the President's midcourse correction.

If we want the world to share the burden, we have to share authority in Iraq in meaningful way.

The payers want to be players.

And I can't believe we can't find a compromise that meets our rightful concerns about the premature transfer of power. But that also empowers the U.N. and starts to put more power in the hands of the Iraqi people.

I am also skeptical that the President will continue to level with the American people about what it is going to take to win the peace. Being open and honest about the commitment we must make to Iraq is the only way to sustain public support.
But the administration's approach to the supplemental concerns me on this account too.

The administration itself estimates the total cost of reconstruction in Iraq to be about $60 to $70 billion over the next 4 to 5 years. And I and others predict the final tab will be higher still.

The supplemental request covers $20 billion of that total. That begs a critical question: Where is the remaining $40 to $50 billion coming from? Will it come from the international community? Normally, that would be a reasonable expectation. The United States typically covers about 25 percent of postconflcit reconstruction costs. By that ratio, we could expect about $60 billion from the international community for Iraq.

But we so poisoned the well in the lead up to this war and in its aftermath that no one expects the international community to provide more than $2 to $3 billion at the donors conference next month. That is a terrible indictment of our foreign policy and a harsh example of the price of unilateralism.

Will the missing money be generated by Iraq's oil revenues? That is what the administration led the American people to believe, and unfortunately even some Members of Congress now believe that is true.

In fact, if we are lucky, oil exports will generate about $14 billion next year—just enough money to pay for the government's operating costs and salaries for public sector workers, the police and the army. Forget about oil paying for reconstruction.

Will the missing money be generated by others parts of the Iraqi economy? Secretary Rumsfeld recently promoted the potential of Iraq's tourism industry. The banks of the Tigris may replace the Outer Banks as a destination of choice someday, but not any day soon.

Or maybe the missing money will come from taxpayers when the administration comes back to Congress next year or the year after to ask for more. If that is the plan, tell us now.

For today, this Congress must deal with the money that is being requested.

Let me be clear, we must invest more in the effort to secure the peace in Iraq. I support the supplemental request. It is necessary and it is in our national security interest.

But that does not mean we should accept it on its face. The large number of proposed amendments to the supplemental are evidence that Republicans and Democrats alike don't have the confidence to take the administration at its word.

We need to build in strict reporting requirements—the kind Senator Lugar and I tried to add to the original congressional authorization to use force.

We need to know how the administration will pay for this supplemental. We need to know how the money will be spent.
And we need to see a coherent, detailed plan for success.

The first critical question that must be answered is: How are we going to pay for this $87 billion? It seems to me there are three options: We can turn the money for reconstruction from a grant to a loan, to be recouped from Iraq when its economy gets going again. That sounds attractive. Why shouldn't the Iraqis pay for their own future.

But here's the problem. Iraq already owes the international community a crippling amount—some $200 billion in debt and compensation claims. Adding to that debt will add to the dead weight holding back Iraq's recovery.

The creditors are mostly European and Arab countries—the very countries we are encouraging to contribute more to Iraq's reconstruction. And we are lobbying them to forgive or reschedule the debt Iraq owes them.

How can we add to Iraq's debt, put ourselves first in line to be paid back, kick the other creditors out of line—and ask them to contribute more and assume our debt? It won't work.

Second, we can do what the President is proposing: add to the deficit, which is already close to $600 billion and pass along the bill to our children and grandchildren. That, to me, is unacceptable.

Or third, we can call on the patriotism of the American people, and ask them to help finance the $87 billion the President has asked for. The President was right in saying that success in Iraq requires all of us to sacrifice. But he squandered the opportunity to rally the most fortunate among us to the cause to help provide for our troops and meet the goal of achieving security and stability in Iraq.

The bottom line is: The President doesn't seem to have a plan to pay for troop support and reconstruction in both Afghanistan and Iraq. After squandering an annual Federal budget surplus in excess of $200 billion upon taking office, and running up annual deficits estimated at nearly $500 billion in less than 3 years, it would be fiscally irresponsible for this administration to pass on the cost of our security to our children and grandchildren. That gets it exactly backwards.

We must step up to pay for our own security and that of future generations. In fact, as the President said in his State of the Union Address:

This country has many challenges.

We will not deny, we will not ignore, we will not pass along our problems to other Congresses, to other presidents, and
other generations.

We will confront them with focus and clarity and courage.

In keeping with that view, the most obvious, fiscally responsible approach is to reconsider a small portion of the $690 billion tax cuts targeted for Americans with incomes in the top 2 percent—people with incomes exceeding $360,000 and averaging $980,000 per year.

Cutting taxes responsibly in the middle of a jobless recovery, especially for the middle class, makes good sense. But never has any administration summoned Americans to war and, at the same time, pushed through the biggest tax cuts in history, all in the face of already historically high deficits.

The result is a mixed message to the American people, who are left to wonder: How can we wage the fight against terrorism without paying any price? In fact, the administration's thinking reflects a woeful misunderstanding of the character of the American people.

I this post 9/11 period, Americans have been waiting to be asked to do great things for this Nation.

Two years after that dark day, we have yet to tap into the surge of patriotism deeply felt by every American. Imagine if the President's address to the Nation had included the following request:

To all of you in the top one percent—those fortunate Americans whose average income is more than $1 million a year
.    .    .

I am asking you to forgo a small part of your tax cut.

Instead of getting $690 billion of cuts, you will have to make do with only $600 billion in cuts so we can pay for peace in Iraq, security in Afghanistan, and the war against terrorism.

Would a single American watching on television have said: "No way. That's not fair." Of course not.

Reducing a small part of the tax cuts for those in the top 1 percent of income will have no bearing on an economic recovery.
But it would restore a sense of national purpose and unity that is our country's greatest strength.

I hope the President will support an amendment to do just that—a bipartisan amendment to the supplemental that Senator KERRY and I will offer, along with Senators CHAFEE, CORZINE, and FEINSTEIN.

I think Americans would support the idea of paying for this mission from the $1.8 trillion in tax cuts enacted in the last 3 years.

Let's look at the numbers. Americans in this bracket make, on average, $1 million a year. They are being asked to give up a single year's worth of their $690 billion 10-year tax cut, and do it gradually.

For example, in a single year, 2008, the tax cuts going to the top 1 percent will total $87.7 billion—virtually the same amount of money the President is requesting.

In my view, the most fortunate Americans surely would respond favorably to such an idea. What we are saying is: They are no less patriotic than anyone else. But also they have the best ability to contribute because their tax cut is so much greater than everyone else's.

The top 1 percent will get a cumulative 10-year tax cut of nearly $690 billion. What I am proposing leaves them with a $600 billion tax cut. That is clearly not punitive. If someone proposed today that the richest 1 percent get a tax cut of $600 billion, it would sound outrageous given the circumstances we now face, with growing deficits, and growing security needs.

In making this proposal, I am not arguing about the fairness of that distribution. I have already stated my position on that when I voted against the tax cuts. But, whatever one thinks of the fairness of the tax cuts themselves, it is clear which Americans are in the best position to give up a small part of what they are getting to pay for our mission in Iraq. And that, unfortunately, is the price we have to pay for the unilateral foreign policy and the missed opportunities of this
administration.

If we give the administration the money it is seeking for Iraq's reconstruction, it must give us a clear and coherent plan for succeeding where it has failed so far.

The No. 1 priority must be to inject a sense of urgency to our efforts. I don't want to minimize how hard this is, nor do I want to minimize the successes we have already achieved: Standing up the Iraqi Governing Council, opening schools and hospitals, establishing local councils across the country. But all of this progress is jeopardized by our failure thus far to get it right in two fundamental areas: security and basic services.

If the Iraqi people do not soon see their living conditions improve, they will begin to turn against us. Once that happens, the insecurity we are seeing today will look mild by comparison.

In my judgment, there are five urgent priorities in Iraq.

We need a detailed gameplan to address them. And that plan should be developed in close consultation with the Iraqi Governing Council.

First, we must improve the security situation on the ground for our soldiers and for the Iraqi people. Over time, an Iraqi army can and should take the place of our troops. But it will take time to train such a force 1, 2, 3 years.

In the meantime, the best way to take some of the heat off of our forces is to bring other countries in on the deal.

That is one reason a new U.N. resolution is important. If we had done this right from the start, we would have been able to secure 60,000 or 70,000 foreign troops. I doubt we will get more than another 10,000. But every single foreign soldier helps.

For Iraqis, law and order has broken down in large parts of the country, especially in Baghdad and central Iraq. Murder, carjackings, theft, and rape are taking place at an alarming rate. Criminal gangs are organizing at a rate far faster than we are fielding trained Iraqi police.

We have heard a lot of talk about whether the number of foreign military forces on the ground is adequate. What does not receive nearly enough attention is the urgent need to recruit international police forces to train and work alongside the Iraqi police. Our own officials tell us that we urgently need over 5,000 international police to train and patrol with Iraqis. We should have deployed them over 5 months ago when Baghdad fell. We should have started recruiting them 12 months ago, just as President Clinton personally got on the phone to world leaders to recruit police months before we went into Haiti.
Yet, to my knowledge, less than 10 percent of the international police forces we need are on the ground.

Only Iraqis can effectively police Iraq. They know their country better than any foreigner. But we also know that the police under Saddam were corrupt and sadistic. They maintained order through fear and coercion. We have to start from scratch in recruiting and training an Iraqi police force. But that effort can't occur on a large scale until we get trainers in from abroad. And we can if the President builds an effective coalition, if he reaches out to our allies, and recruits those forces.

The second priority is to restore basic services—particularly electricity, water, and telephone service.

Ambassador Bremer set the end of September as a deadline for restoring electricity to its prewar level of 4,400 megawatts.
This is enough to meet about two-thirds of countrywide demand.

While falling temperatures will ease demand in coming weeks, toward the end of October, the month of fasting or Ramadan will begin. Iraqis will expect to have electricity available during the evening meal when they break their fast. If they don't, we should expect their discontent to grow. It will take huge investments to bring the electricity grid up to the level where it can meet full demand countrywide. Ambassador Bremer estimates $13 billion. Another official in Baghdad puts the price tag at a total of $21 billion.

The third urgent priority is a strategic communications plan. The United States has the most advanced media industry in the world, yet we are being beaten on Iraqi airwaves by the likes of al-Jazeera and Iranian TV and radio. The messages these outlets are broadcasting do not cast the United States in a positive light.

The quality of our broadcasts in Iraq makes public access TV look good. It is hard to imagine succeeding in Iraq if we cannot succeed at getting our message out.

Few Iraqis have a sense of the priorities, plans, and progress of the United States. We need to communicate effectively and directly with them. They need to hear us acknowledge their problems. They need to hear us describe our plans for fixing
them. They need to hear timetables. It is not that complicated.

Our fourth urgent priority is helping to rebuild Iraq's economy. The Iraqi economy is broken. It was destroyed by 35 years of mismanagement, wars, sanctions, and extensive looting that followed Iraq's liberation. It will take several years to recover.

Unemployment is over 60 percent. By contrast, at the height of the Great Depression, our unemployment was just over 25 percent. A hot, poor, unemployed, and well-armed population is not a good combination. We need to get people off the streets and involved in their country's reconstruction.

The final priority is to establish a clear timeline for handing power back to the Iraqis. There is a legitimate debate going on with the French over the pace of "Iraqi-ization" and the timing of elections. All of us want to see sovereignty restored to Iraq as quickly as possible. But none of us want a process that is so rushed that it ends in failure.

Today, the best organized forces in Iraq are extremist religious groups and ex-Baathists. They have the most to gain from early elections.

Building a strong, democratic center and the institutions of civil society will take time. We should seek a compromise at the U.N. that creates a representative—perhaps partially elected—body that would draft the new Iraqi constitution by early next year. That constitution should be put before the people of Iraq in a referendum, and elections should follow by next summer.

The administration should submit a detailed plan with specific benchmarks and timelines in each of these areas I have mentioned.

The administration also must show us that, in working toward these goals, it will spend the tax payers' money wisely. I have looked closely at the budget request, as have most of my colleagues. And we have a lot of questions. To cite just three examples:

Why does the administration propose to spend $33,000 apiece for pickup trucks when you can get a new pickup here in the U.S. for $14,000? Our Iraqi friends deserve AC—but not leather seats and a CD changer.

Why does the administration propose to spend $10,000 per student for a month-long business course—more than double the monthly cost of Harvard Business School?

Why does it propose to spend $50,000 per prison bed—double the average cost in the U.S.?

The bottom line is that we have an obligation to closely scrutinize the President's request, to ensure we spend taxpayer dollars wisely and effectively. But we must face up to our foreign policy and national security obligations as well. We cannot meet our national security needs on the cheap, or by playing off domestic constituencies against our need to get it right in Iraq.

The stakes are too high, and an entire region's future—one that is critical to America's security—is in the balance. Let's not take our eye off the ball. Let's do the difficult thing, but the right thing.

Madam President, I just sum up by telling you what is in my heart. We have three stark, basic choices. It is real simple.
Given the facts—the fact is, it is going to take years to build, not a democracy, just a representative republic in Iraq. Never in history—never in history—even in countries with a tradition of western values and democracy, has a representative democratic government been built in a short amount of time—never. I challenge you to challenge your staffs to give me an example where that has occurred.

So, No. 1, it is going to take a long time. It is going to take tens of billions of dollars beyond this. Mr. Bremer has begun to level, and level first with us. He says after this $20 billion downpayment for reconstruction, it is a minimum of $50 to $75 billion more—more—over the next 4 years or so to do the essentials, to rebuild Iraq. Other think tanks have said it is $100 billion. The World Bank says $75 billion or so. That is another essential fact.

The third fact is this country has never been a country—never. It was the outgrowth of a deal made after World War I. So we are putting together not a Germany, which was heterogenous, not a France, not a defeated or victor in the last war, or big war; we are putting together a country that has never been a country, other than held together by a dictator or an autocrat or a colonial power. It is going to take a lot of time.

Here is where we are. It is very simple. It is going to cost—everybody knows—billions of more dollars beyond this supplemental. It is going to take thousands of somebody's troops beyond those that are there. And it is going to take a long time.

The choices are clear. We continue in our unilateral ways to take 95 percent of the casualties, pay 99 percent of the bill.
One of the things my colleagues know is that the Poles are being paid for by us. God love them, they are there; we are happy they are there. Those other 20 nations are being paid for by us, but for Great Britain. So we get 95 percent of the deaths. We pay 90 percent of the bill, and we take 99 percent of the responsibility. That is one option.

The second option is—and which I predict this administration will do if this does not go right—declare victory and leave and see chaos ensue. Some Democrats will suggest that. Some in the administration will suggest that.

Or there is a third option. We get someone else to pay the bill with us. We get someone else to pay.

There is a fourth option that is not a real option. The Iraqis could pay. Let's get this straight about Iraqi oil. No one before the war or after the war is predicting in the next 5 or 6 years there will be more than an excess of $5 to $10 billion a year to be able to pay for reconstruction after the cost of paying for the government. Read Bremer's report. So this is poppycock about Iraqi oil will pay our way out.

We are left with the last option: We get the rest of the world to jump in the tank with us. At the beginning of this process, the President tried to importune the Indian foreign minister to send a division. The Secretary of State and others said we are likely to get that. The Turks were talking about a division. We were looking for 50 to 60,000 troops. Guess what. They ain't coming, folks.

Here is the deal, and it is real simple. The President can genuinely internationalize this by sharing not only the responsibility but sharing the authority. We continue to act like Iraq is a prize we won. We continue to challenge the world to help us.

I went to the head of the European Union not long ago and I said: Javier, what do we have to do to get your help?

He looked at me, held my shoulders, and said: Joe, ask. Not demand, not challenge, ask. Ask. Ask.

There is not a major newspaper in America that didn't think the President of the United States blew that opportunity when he recently spoke to the United Nations. I am beginning to doubt—and I hope I am wrong—that the United States is genuinely sincere about the U-turn he has made and wanting to engage the international community. I pray he means that.

Mr. BOND. Will the Senator from Delaware yield for a question.

Mr. BIDEN. Surely.

Mr. BOND. I am taken with the world view and the view of the peace by the Senator from Delaware, but when he talks about the United Nations, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I wonder if he recalls this discussion with the Secretary of State: Last week you engaged in tireless diplomatic efforts to seek such unity against Iraq. Oddly, other members of the Security Council continue to indulge the fantasy that Saddam would suddenly begin listening to reason.
Members of Congress do not share that delusion. We look forward to receiving the President's recommendations with
regard to the need to use force to contain, if not destroy, Iraq's capability to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Is my colleague familiar with that?

Mr. BIDEN. I think you are quoting one of the most articulate men who has ever served in the Senate. I wonder who you are talking about?

Mr. BOND. I am referring to the distinguished Senator from Delaware—

Mr. BIDEN. I thought that is who you were talking about.

Mr. BOND. Who I understood made this statement to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. BIDEN. The Senator is absolutely right. If he wants to read the rest of the statement, he will point out we in fact should have continued to try to get the rest of the world to come along after the fact. Can you imagine if the President of the United States had said, the day after the statue of Saddam fell, if he went on national television and made the following speech: My fellow Americans, I tell you that our fighting men and women have bravely defeated the present government, but we have much to do. It will cost billions of dollars and take tens of thousands of troops for the foreseeable future.
Toward that end, I am going to ask our valued allies who disagreed with us, whose democratic processes I respect but they disagreed with us, to now step in and help us, ask them to participate in rebuilding Iraq and share the responsibility of forming a new government and dealing with the aftermath of Saddam. Toward that end, I have convened a meeting with Mr.
Chirac, Mr. Schroeder, the European Union, et cetera. What do you think would have happened?

But what did we say? We said the same thing we said in Afghanistan. When the French offered to send 5,000 of their marines, when Schroeder risked a vote of confidence by one vote, he succeeded in voting for sending 1,000 German marines to Afghanistan, Mr. Rumsfeld and company said: We don't need them. And they stiff-armed them.
Senator Lugar and I contacted the President and said: Please, please accept their forces.

We don't need them. We don't need them.

Technically we may not need them. But I would argue that is the nadir of diplomacy that I have witnessed in this body, and
I am now the seventh most senior Member. The diplomacy has been so incredibly ham-handed that we have to continue this foolish response. We have hamstrung ourselves in a way that makes it almost impossible to do what everybody on this floor knows we need to do.

It is real simple. If you think we can secure the peace in Iraq all by ourselves without anybody else's help, then have at it.
Go to it. I don't know any reason why Bremer should not be dual-hatted like we are in Bosnia. I don't know any reason why we should not be saying to the French, the Germans, the European Union, and the U.N., you help us form this government. I don't know any reason why we didn't have them in there in the first place, beginning the electoral process, why we stiff-armed them. I don't get it.

I do know the result. Whether you agree with me or not, somebody has to pay the bill. All my friends who don't like international institutions, all my unilateralist buddies who like to eat freedom fries and engage in their little pettiness, have fun, but go home and explain to your people why only Americans are dying. Go home and explain to your people why only American taxpayers are paying the bill. Go home and explain to your people why we have close to 200,000 troops in the region and 140,000 troops there. Bravo. Bravo. Aren't we tough.

It is about time we wake up. By the way, I will be seeking the floor later today with an amendment. This President has come along and said: We need $87 billion and, by the way, just add it to the deficit. Add it to our tab. Put it on the tab. Our kids will pay for our security.

So the budget deficit is going to approach $600 billion. Can anybody name a time for me in American history when a President took us to war and, after taking us to war, a war that I supported his going to, said: It is going to be a long sacrifice, and, by the way, here is the largest tax cut in the history of the United States of America, as we go?
Can anybody name any time in American history when that has ever happened? Isn't it kind of strange?

So, Madam President, I will not take the time to talk about how we should pay for this now. But I will suggest—is there any time left?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 2 minutes 24 seconds.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, to me, this is real basic. If we want people to share the burden, we have to be willing to have people share the responsibility. Why does the administration propose—by the way, we have every right to look at the details of this $87 billion.

Why does this administration propose to spend $33,000 apiece for pickup trucks when you can get a brand new pickup in the U.S. for $14,000? Our Iraqi friends deserve AC—but not leather seats and a CD changer.

Why does the administration propose to spend $10,000 per student for a month-long business course—more than double the monthly cost of the Harvard Business School?

Why does it propose to spend $50,000 per prison bed, which is double the average cost of a U.S. prison bed?

The bottom line is we have an obligation to closely scrutinize the President's request, to ensure that taxpayers' dollars are spent wisely and, most importantly, that this administration has changed its course because literally the future of our children is at stake if they don't get it right.

I thank my colleagues and I yield the floor.