Hearing of the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee: Findings of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE
 
SUBJECT: FINDINGS OF THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
 
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ)
 
LOCATION: 253 RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: NASA ADMINISTRATOR SEAN O'KEEFE AND ADMIRAL HAROLD GEHMAN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
 
BODY:
SEN. FRANK LAUTENBERG (D-NJ): Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. And I ask consent that my full statement be included in the record.

SEN. MCCAIN: Without objection.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: And I would just like to make a couple of quick points. And my hat's off to Admiral Gehman and you, Mr. O'Keefe, for the very tough task that you took on and the outcome that is described in your report. I think it's understandable and will have an effect on how we think about things in the future. And I would -- I hope that we will learn enough directly about the safety requirement so that something as terrible as happened in the Columbia tragedy will never happen again.

But I would go to something of the principle and make a note of the fact that the privatization program that we see in government almost began with NASA. And when we see that we have some 1,800 people, I believe the number is, who are overseeing private contractors in the multiple thousands, whether or not there is enough ability, enough structure, to make sure that they're doing what they have to do.

And I'll close with this, on Page 109 of your report, Admiral Gehman: "The major annual savings resulting from the space flight operations contract, which in 1996 were touted to be some 500 million to a billion (dollars) a year by the early 2000s, have not materialized."

And I'd just highlight that because it -- throughout that paragraph it talks to the lack of success in achieving the cost efficiencies. And what is it that permitted the costs to be overrun and still this terrible thing could take place?

And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we'll find out about the relationship of the private side of this, the force, and what impact it had. And I thank you very much and congratulate you again for the excellent work you've done.

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SEN. MCCAIN: Senator Lautenberg?

SEN. LAUTENBERG: Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I start by saying to our friend and colleague, Senator Hollings, that your commentary this morning just confirms that we listen and listen carefully -- you have good things to say. And just 'cause you're out of here doesn't mean that you have to go quiet. (Laughter.) You just remember that.

And to you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. And the hearings that we've traditionally had here have been very informative and very open.

And Admiral Gehman, I commend you. I haven't had a chance to fully read your report, but it's sprinkled with a candor that we rarely see in reports to government, because there's always a program to make sure that we don't offend this party or that party, and I think that you went right to it. And how this particular tragic accident happened is critical because of the loss of life and the loss of confidence and all of those things. But more importantly is how did we get there in the first place? And when I look at your -- the executive summary of your report, and you say that -- (reading) -- "the organizational causes of the accident are rooted in the space shuttle program's history and culture," that means there are things been going on for a long time, at least you felt so, and so did your colleagues on the report who approved this statement.

The fact of the matter is that in some ways, it was the tragedy waiting to happen, because I see in reports -- and Mr. Chairman, I want to submit a report that comes from the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers. It's their report on the effectiveness of NASA's workforce and contractor policies, and I think there's something to be learned from this. And I again ask -- request that this be included in the record.

SEN. MCCAIN: Without objection.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: One of the things that they noted in their report was that when a previous administrator -- I can't be delicate here, and it's not in criticism, it's just the information that I looked at -- Daniel Goldin, NASA's administrator from 1992 to 2001, appointed and directed to cut NASA's budget and bring fiscal discipline of the business world to the nation's premier science. The agency was then put under a management plan called FBC: Faster, Better, Cheaper.

And I wonder if you'd make a comment about the availability of resource. Did the 1,700 NASA employees have the capacity -- and I mentioned this in my comments earlier -- to supervise 18,000 contractor workers? Was there any failure, in your view, that lay heavily at the doorstep of the contractors to provide the kind of service that might have averted this catastrophe?

ADM. GEHMAN: Thank you, Senator. The board found -- and we looked at this extraordinarily hard. We interviewed hundreds of people, we walked the shop floors of all the centers all over the country where components are made, and we did not find cases where the contractors were taking short cuts or were cheating or weren't doing their job well. We didn't find any cases like that.

The board did find, however, and it's in our report, that the management level -- that is, the vertical level that the program has decided to contract to seemed to us to be a little too high. By that, I mean it appeared to us that they were contracting out management functions. They were almost to the point where they were contracting out government functions. And it appeared to us that we didn't find anything wrong -- I mean, we didn't find anybody doing anything wrong in that case, but what we found was then -- was that when the government had to make a decision, they no longer had the technical expertise, because the function that they were supposed to be supervising was being done by a contractor. And if you look at the mission management team decision-making, you see them consulting people that are experts on whether or not this is a problem, and they're all contractors. And there doesn't seem to be a government person who has the technical knowledge anymore, because they contracted it all out. So, we didn't find any wrongdoing --

SEN. LAUTENBERG: I understand.

ADM. GEHMAN: -- but we did find that perhaps in our -- it did appear to us that the government had -- because so many of the oversight functions were being done by contractors, the expertise goes with the function. And we found that the U.S. government was short -- seemed to be short-changed.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: So, if there is a blame, and I understand very clearly what you said, then structure certainly was one of the problems. And I assume, therefore, it's a continuing, or might be, a continuing problem.

The question is whether or not we're prepared to devote the resources to building this organization's capacity to the point that it needs to go on these relatively dangerous missions. We know they're dangerous, and we try our best to protect everybody involved with the program. But is there enough resource? Senator McCain's question about what earmarks do; well, it rob the program of its appropriate funds to get this job done?

Mr. O'Keefe, how do you -- what do you think about the resource on this?

MR. O'KEEFE: I think it is a very subjective matter, and it is one that --

SEN. LAUTENBERG: That's why we hired you -- (inaudible).

MR. O'KEEFE: Sure, I fully understand that. And my judgement on it is that we have the resources necessary to continue operations in a way that is responsible. The points that Admiral Gehman has raised, I think, has been echoed in a Congressional Budget Office report that if you permit me, Mr. Chairman, I'll submit for the record, as well, released just last month, that compares this effort and the resources and the way it's conducted relative to other major -- what they refer to as technologically-complex tasks performed similarly at other agencies and departments across the federal government, and find no remarkable distinctions in that regard.

Having said that, the observations -- again, the depth of this investigation is deeper than any I have ever been involved in in my public service time. And as a consequence, the observations of the board and the findings of the board are going to inform us as we got through the examination of the space flight operations contract, which comes up for renewal in a year, in order to figure out exactly how we change that alteration, based on the findings, recommendations and basic views expressed in this report. There's a lot to be learned from that.

And while the surface coverage, even from CBO, says not a lot of comparability difference between other major systems' integration programs, that's not good enough as far as we're concerned, because the findings of this board are fact, and we intend to run that to ground, to find out how we alter the contractual arrangements, as well as our own conduct, in order to do this stronger, in a better way.

SEN. LAUTENBERG: Thank you.