Menendez Offers Amendment to Strengthen Port Security, Increase Container Scanning

MENENDEZ OFFERS AMENDMENT TO STRENGTHEN PORT SECURITY, INCREASE CONTAINER SCANNING

New Jersey Senator Outlines Port Security Plan in Speech to Center for American Progress

In a speech to the Center for American Progress, United States Senators Robert Menendez today outlined a plan to strengthen security at the nation's ports by developing an international program to ensure that 100 percent of containers entering the nation through ports are scanned for weapons of mass destruction. He will offer an amendment to the federal budget, which is being considered by the Senate today, to take the first step in that plan by increasing port security funding for the next fiscal year by nearly a billion dollars.

"If we could roll back the clock ten years and spend a few billion dollars to raise the levies in New Orleans to be able to withstand a Category 5 hurricane, we could have saved hundreds of lives, as well as the billions of dollars it will take to rebuild that city," Menendez said in the speech. "I don't want this country to look back in hindsight a few years from now with the realization that had we spent a few billion dollars to improve the security at our ports, we could have prevented a major terrorist attack."

Menendez's amendment will provide $965 million for port security to fund technology capable of scanning containers for weapons of mass destruction, increase the number of inspectors available to physically review containers, help developing countries scan and inspect containers, and triple port security grants.

"When it comes to port security, we need to do more than think outside the box. We also need to think inside the container," Menendez said.

"The bottom line today is that we don't know what is inside the vast majority of containers entering this country, because despite repeated warnings from security experts from both within and without our government, ninety-five percent receive no inspection, other than a cursory review of the cargo manifest," he said.

Menendez also called for passage of legislation he has introduced with Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton to ban companies owned by foreign governments from controlling operations at U.S. ports.

"It simply runs contrary to the national security interest of this country to turn over control of critical security assets such as port operations to a foreign nation," he said.

The Senate is expected to vote on Menendez's amendment to increase port security funding on Tuesday.

The full text of Menendez's remarks and a detailed summary of the amendment are below.

Ports, Politics and Priorities: A Common Sense Plan to Strengthen our Security
Senator Robert Menendez
Remarks to the Center for American Progress
As prepared for delivery
March 14, 2005

A little over a month ago, Americans began to pay attention to a barely-noticed merger that had previously been followed only by a few business reporters and industry analysts. Almost overnight, the bid by Dubai Ports World, a company owned by the government of Dubai, burst into the national consciousness as the media, members of Congress, and an angry public began to ask questions about both the company's plan to take control of operations at six major U.S. ports and the process by which the Bush administration approved it.

In the month since that transaction leapt onto the front pages of the nation's newspapers, Americans have been exposed to story after story about the security or lack thereof, of our nation's ports.

Problems with Port Security

I opposed the DP World transaction for reasons I will discuss, but whatever your opinion on the merits of the deal, the failings it exposed in the way our government protects its citizens from the dangers of a weapon of mass destruction smuggled through our ports has created a rare opportunity to fix a system that today relies on a weak security apparatus largely cobbled together by the hodgepodge of government agencies and private companies that together bear the responsibility for securing ports.

It is unfortunate of course that it has taken so long for the country to focus on this debate, but now that the glare of the spotlight shines brightly on our ports, we must seize the opportunity to enact reforms that will make us all safer.

Each year more than two billion tons of cargo passes through U.S. ports. Jobs at U.S ports generate $44 billion in annual personal income and $16.1 billion in federal, state and local taxes. The Port of New York and New Jersey, which I represented for thirteen years in the House and now represent in the Senate, handled more than $132 billion in goods in 2005. This work takes place every day in cities across the country, yet it happens without most Americans giving it a single thought. But with everything from toys to food to electronics to cars passing through our ports, the odds are that if you eat it, wear it, or drive it, there is a good chance it came through one of our ports.

Unfortunately, the attention the administration has paid to securing those ports only slightly surpasses the attention most Americans pay to their existence. And that mistake could bring deadly consequences.

On September 11, 2001, nineteen men armed only with boxcutters turned commercial airplanes designed to transport people around the country for business or pleasure into the most deadly weapons of mass destruction ever deployed on American soil. A few months later, someone turned a common envelope sent through the mail into a delivery device for a deadly poison.

Those deadly attacks should have taught us the need to be creative in improving our homeland security. The 9-11 commission told us that to prevent a terrorist attack we had to think outside the box. If an ordinary envelope could be turned into a biological weapon and a passenger airplane into a weapon of mass destruction, then it takes little imagination to see how a container could be used to transport a nuclear weapon to the Port of New York/New Jersey, or any other sea port, where it could cause tens of thousands, if not millions, of casualties.

When it comes to port security, we need to do more than think outside the box. We also need to think inside the container.

The bottom line today is that we don't know what is inside the vast majority of containers entering this country, because despite repeated warnings from security experts from both within and without our government, ninety-five percent receive no inspection, other than a cursory review of the cargo manifest.

In 2002, an ABC News team shipped a suitcase containing 15 pounds of depleted uranium from Istanbul, Turkey to New York, without any detection from any authorities. In 2003, they tried again, and succeeded again, this time sending 15 pounds of depleted uranium from Jakarta, Indonesia into the port of Los Angeles. Even more disturbing than ABC's report, however, was the government's response: instead of investigating how ABC was able to sneak the uranium through undetected, they instead attacked ABC and launched an investigation into whether its reporters had broken any laws.

That response is the sort we have come to expect from the Bush administration on a host of issues. Deny any problems, no matter the evidence to the contrary. Proclaim that things are fine, even when they are not. And if anyone stands up and shows you are wrong, attack them mercilessly.

But the demise of the Dubai Ports World transaction shows that their tried-and-true strategy to squelch dissent and paper over their mistakes may be beginning to fail. The American people now know that our ports are not secure, and even the administration's own experts are agreeing.

This past weekend, the Associated Press reported on a study conducted by the Department of Homeland Security that traced 20,000 containers that arrived in the U.S. from Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The study showed that lapses by private port operators, shipping lines or truck drivers could allow terrorists to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States. As the AP reported, the study "undercut" the administration's claim that private terminal operators play no role in port security.

That claim was one of the administration's main selling points in defending its approval of the DP World transaction. Stewart Baker, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security, told the Senate Banking Committee, on which I sit, that private terminal operators do little more than manage a pier, a crane and a parking lot. He made this claim even though his own Department was preparing a study that directly contradicted it.

Clearly, terminal operators do have responsibility for a piece of the security puzzle at ports. Terminal operators develop port security plans that contain sensitive security information. They are responsible for securing the perimeter of the terminal and determining how drivers who move cargo to and from the port are identified. They conduct security training for dockworkers and communicate with federal authorities in the event of a security problem. They are involved in background checks for their employees, personnel screening, recordkeeping and identification. They play an essential role in port security.

Menendez Government Ownership Legislation

That is why I believe Congress needs to pass the legislation I introduced with Senator Clinton and others at the outset of the debate over the DP World transaction to ban companies owned by foreign governments from controlling operations at U.S. ports.

It simply runs contrary to the national security interest of this country to turn over control of critical security assets such as port operations to a foreign nation.

The Bush Administration ducked this debate by disingenuously claiming that there was no difference between the British company P&O Ports, and Dubai Ports World. But that claim is simply wrong on its face. There is a vast difference between a publicly-traded foreign company that answers to shareholders and a state-owned one that answers to a foreign government.

Publicly-traded companies exist for one reason, to make money for their shareholders, and every action they take is designed to further that goal. Nations, however, act for a variety of reasons - in some cases to make money through state-owned companies, and in other cases to project power, secure strategic interests, or defend their own borders. One need only study the way Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez has used his state- owned oil company to further the interests of the government of Venezuela to understand that state-owned companies behave very differently than publicly-traded ones.

Nations have no permanent allies or enemies, only permanent interests. No matter Dubai's relationship with the United States, and they have undoubtedly provided crucial assistance in the war on terror since 2001, it is simply an abdication of our responsibility as a nation to let them, or any other foreign government, control the operations at our ports. The terminals they would have acquired are responsible for 40 percent of the equipment sent to our soldiers in Iraq, and even if Dubai is an ally of ours today, we cannot simply take the chance that they will continue to be one in the future. If they made the decision, for whatever reason, to stop allowing supplies to pass through their terminals, it could have enormous ramifications for our security.

Menendez Port Security Plan

But passing that legislation only addresses a potential threat to our security. We also need to address the existing threat posed by the porous security system at our ports.

As I said earlier, only five percent of containers entering this country are currently inspected, a number that would shock most Americans. Even the system that we use to determine which containers to inspect is riddled with flaws. Customs inspectors rely on manifests and intelligence data, both of which can be either unintentionally incorrect or even manipulated, to develop algorithms that tell them which containers to open.

If you've ever seen a 90-year old grandmother pulled out of line for special screening at the airport, you know just how logical the Department of Homeland Security's algorithms can be.

We cannot take the risk that complex mathematical equations relying on faulty inputs will catch a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon shipped into our ports.

We need to create an international inspection system and international standards that will eventually ensure that 100 percent of containers bound for this country are inspected - either physically or through technological scanning that will find and detect weapons no matter how they are disguised. That is why this week in the Senate I, along with Senator Clinton, Lautenberg, Durbin, Boxer, and others, am offering an amendment to the budget for Fiscal Year 2007 to start us down the road to 100 percent container scanning. We need to take advantage of existing technologies that can scan the inside of a container before it even leaves a foreign port and create a down-loadable image of what's inside. That image can be viewed in real time by security officials here in the U.S. so we know exactly what the container holds before it even sets sail for our shores. By combining this technology with scans for radioactive materials, we can find dangerous materials before they arrive in our ports. And by scanning containers that leave our ports for foreign destinations, along with adopting the green-lane system proposed by Senators Patty Murray and Susan Collins, we create incentives for other countries to participate.

My amendment provides $105 million to operate this dual technology here in the United States and another $50 million to help developing countries which may not have the funds to buy it. In fact, these ports could be the weakest link in our international port security chain, so we must take extra efforts to prevent them from becoming easy targets for terrorists looking for lax security practices.

Once containers leave foreign ports, we must also use the latest technologies to track them as they make their way across the seas. By investing in seals and monitors that would show whether a container has been tampered with after it was scanned and black boxes or GPS trackers that keep track of containers so we know if a ship stops at an unknown port, we strengthen another link in the chain.

Adoption of this system will not happen overnight, so our government must set yearly goals both for domestic ports and the international community and monitor progress until we reach the goal of 100% inspection.

But while we are waiting for this new international scanning system to become fully operational, we must make sure that we increase inspections through our existing programs and that we improve on-the-ground security at our ports.

So my plan also provides $100 million to hire 400 additional inspectors both here and abroad. The General Accounting Office has pointed out staffing deficiencies as one of the most pressing problems for the Container Security Initiative, or CSI, the program DHS designed to target and inspect high- risk cargo before it leaves ports. The report specifically noted that "staffing imbalances" are one of the factors which "limit [Customs'] ability to successfully target containers to determine if they are high-risk..." and that "as a result, 35 percent of U.S.- bound shipments from CSI ports were not targeted and not subject to inspection overseas-the key goal of the CSI program." The GAO has also found that staffing problems have kept Customs from validating security information provided by foreign participants in other security initiatives.

My plan will also provide $600 million for the Port Security Grant program, more than tripling last year's budget. This money would do directly to the ports, which sit at the front lines of the security equation, and would be used to comply with the requirements of the Maritime Transportation Security Act. For reasons that defy logic, the administration has proposed that grants for port security be eliminated entirely, and that they money previously allocated to ports be instead turned into "Targeted Infrastructure Protection Grants" available to mass transit, rail and other critical infrastructure sectors, as well as ports, which means that ports will be forced to compete with others for scarce resources. While I strongly believe that we must improve the security of our bus, rail and transit systems, and have introduced legislation to do so, that investment cannot come at the expense of our nation's ports. The American Association of Port Authorities has noted that their recommendation to double the funds is only a "modest investment." In fact, doubling these funds would only cover a little over a third of the Coast Guard's projected cost of facility improvements, leaving the remainder to local port authorities as an unfunded mandate and creating the risk that many would simply fall by the wayside. I believe we must do better than that.

And instead of allocating these grants based on politics, they must be distributed based on risk. The Port of New York and New Jersey, which is the largest port on the East Coast and the third largest container port in the country, received about the same homeland security grant funding last year as the far smaller Port Memphis.

Finally, we need to look beyond current technology and develop the next generation of equipment. We must make sure that we have the cutting edge technology to safeguard our ports. This amendment provides $100 million for research and development. Up to now, we haven't focused enough on creating second-generation technologies for non-intrusive inspections which the private sector is unlikely to develop. It's time for that to change.

To coordinate these disparate programs, we need to create a Port Security Czar with the responsibility for the different programs within the Department of Homeland Security as well as programs at the Departments of Energy and State. Port security is too important to be bogged down in bureaucratic turf battles, and putting one person in charge will give both the president and Congress a means of holding agencies accountable for their success in meeting their annual goals.

I want to take just a moment to thank the experts here at the Center for American Progress who have worked with me and my staff in developing this plan. Your advice and counsel was crucial at each step of the process, and I hope you will allow us to continue to lean on you as we push forward in the legislative process. I would also like to acknowledge Stephen Flynn at the Council on Foreign Relations, whose work has influenced my thinking on this important topic.

Strengthening security at our ports will not be cheap, and given the budgetary challenges our nation faces, every dollar is hard to come by, but the status quo is unacceptable. An attack on one of our ports would not just cause a tremendous toll in loss of life, but would also shut down a port and all of the economic activity it generates, at a cost of billions of dollars to our economy.

If we could roll back the clock ten years and spend a few billion dollars to raise the levies in New Orleans to be able to withstand a Category 5 hurricane, we could have saved hundreds of lives, as well as the billions of dollars it will take to rebuild that city. I don't want this country to look back in hindsight a few years from now with the realization that had we spent a few billion dollars to improve the security at our ports, we could have prevented a major terrorist attack.

Who among us would be satisfied in the aftermath of an attack that we did not take the steps that could have prevented it because we were unwilling to dedicate the necessary resources. That is the choice Congress faces, and for the security of our country, it is essential that we make the right one.

Thank you.

Menendez Port Security Amendment

The amendment provides $965 million for port security to increase inspections and put the nation on the road to 100 percent scanning of containers. It would also add funds to improve existing programs, increase funding for research and development, and help developing countries improve their ability to scan and inspect containers. Specifically, it provides:

* $600 million for the existing Port Security Grant Program: Would triple current level of funding. This program provides money directly to individual ports, and experts say that there is a critical need for significantly more funding of this program. The Administration's FY2007 budget eliminates the port security grant program in favor of a "Targeted Infrastructure Protection Grant" which forces ports to compete for limited resources with mass transit, rail, and other critical infrastructure sectors.

* $100 million for staffing to increase inspections and security: Would provide for at least 400 new staff to increase inspections and improve the system to identify high- risk containers. These funds are specifically for ports. Funding would help both the C-TPAT and CSI programs by increasing the number of inspectors at foreign ports. The GAO has stated that, as a result of staffing imbalances, 35 percent of high-risk containers were not inspected. The GAO also reported that the security checks performed by Customs and Border Patrol (CPB) are not rigorous enough and that staffing problems have kept CBP from validating participant's security information.

* $100 million for Research and Development: It is critical to develop next-generation and second generation technologies. These technologies take us past the scanning phase and into more finely tuned technologies that can locate the contraband material in the shipping container. Such technologies are not likely to be developed by the private sector.

* $105 million for Cargo Imaging and Radiation Portal Monitors: Would provide funds for both Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and gamma/x-ray imaging technologies to detect radiation and identify high density shielding used to block radiation emissions.

* $10 million to improve technology to respond to increased scanning abroad: As we create incentives for international companies and ports to create a unified system to scan containers creating downloadable images and for radiation, the US must be able to integrate these new technologies into our existing scanning and inspection system. These funds would be to used hire new staff, provide training, and acquire new technology.

* $50 million to help developing countries scan and inspect containers. Right now, many developing countries don't have the resources or the training to purchase the necessary equipment to scan containers. We must provide additional funds to help them put these programs in place. Ports in these countries are of particular concern, as they could be targeted by terrorists as weak links in the international port security system.

Source