Afghanistan

Floor Speech

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, let me commend the stirring and thought- provoking words of my colleague from Maine, Senator King, about our responsibility with respect to those who aided and assisted us in Afghanistan and the status of this Special Immigrant Visa Program.

I think we have to begin with the decision to leave, which puts these individuals at risk. In many respects, President Biden's hands were tied from the outset with regard to our policy in Afghanistan. He inherited a flawed agreement from the Trump administration, which required the United States to withdraw all military forces by May 1 in exchange for the Taliban's agreement not to attack the U.S. and coalition forces and to constrain al-Qaida from using Afghanistan as a safe haven.

It does not appear that the Taliban has observed many of the conditions of this agreement, but we have observed the condition of leaving promptly. The President originally set a date of September 11, but military personnel have been able to rapidly redeploy, and within weeks, we should be moving all of our military personnel.

The manner in which this agreement was reached was also deeply flawed. It was negotiated exclusively between the Trump administration and the Taliban, keeping our allies, even the Afghan Government, out. President Trump's go-it-alone, rush-to-the-exits mentality led to a deal where the Taliban emerged as the key benefactor while the United States and our allies won very little. And while the Taliban has held the condition of not attacking the United States or its allies, as I indicated before, the remaining conditions were virtually unenforceable. By any measure, the Taliban has clearly violated the spirit of the agreement as overall violence inside Afghanistan has steadily increased over the last year. The Taliban has also not made clear that it will constrain al-Qaida as required by the agreement.

During this transition period, the Taliban has gained enormous momentum on the battlefield. As the Washington Post recently reported, Taliban commanders, motivated by their battlefield gains, have ``overrun a number of Afghan bases, even as U.S. air support for the Afghan army has dwindled, and set up numerous checkpoints along the main highways leading in and out of Kabul.''

At least 24 Afghan commandos and police officers were killed in an ambush by the Taliban in northern Afghanistan just last week.

It appears that the Taliban's tactics will only continue to intensify as the transition of U.S. and coalition personnel continues, especially as our airstrikes decline. According to the New York Times, there have been multiple instances where the Taliban, taking advantage of the situation, has been able to negotiate the surrenders of Afghan forces. By their count, since May 1, at least 26 outposts and bases have surrendered after such negotiations.

Violence has increased against the civilian population as well, including a horrific attack against a school outside of Kabul, chillingly timed to target teenage girls leaving class.

The Taliban's steady gains are contrasted with peace talks in Doha that appear to be going at a glacial pace. With these dynamics, the Taliban has no strategic interest to sit down and discuss power sharing. The government of Afghanistan appears to hold a much weaker hand in these negotiations, having proven unable to govern in a way that earns the confidence of the people.

These concerning political and security developments are playing out against the backdrop of regional players that should have high incentives to cooperate to ensure stability and security of Afghanistan. However, nations like Iran, Russia, and China may in fact be working at cross-purposes to the U.S. interests, and others, such as Pakistan, could be using their influence in a much more constructive manner than they are today.

Taken together, these dynamics create a highly challenging landscape. If not addressed deliberately, they could cause a cascade of instability both inside Afghanistan and across the region. To mitigate such an outcome, we must exercise caution and plan prudently.

And again, echoing the comments of Senator King, this brings me to one of the most immediate and pressing consequences of the situation. How do we help those whose lives were put on the line because they assisted the United States?

There are many press reports of the Taliban threatening Afghan civilians who helped us. USA Today profiled one Afghan interpreter who explained: ``If the U.S. forces leave Afghanistan . . . I cannot guarantee for one minute what's going to happen with me, with my family.''

These threats cannot be ignored. We must demonstrate that we have the capacity to protect those who have a target on their backs because of their association with the United States. More than that, we must ensure that we continue to secure the irreplaceable assistance of the people who willingly risk their lives to help the United States the next time our servicemembers are in a conflict in a distant land. If we set the example of leaving those who assisted us behind, who will assist us in the future?

Currently, the processing of Afghan candidates through Special Immigration Visas or SIVs, which the State Department says is the primary focus, may prove too little, too late. While the backlog of candidates is 18,000 today, it is unclear how many potential SIV candidates will feel compelled to apply as conditions change on the ground. Processing applications has been further complicated by a long vetting process, declining security conditions, and a recent spike in COVID cases across Afghanistan, which has forced the Embassy to shut down visa interviews. In order to handle the demand, we must add at least 20,000 additional visas for the next fiscal year and do so immediately and find other ways to further streamline the process, as Senator King described.

We may also come to find that the SIV category does not encompass all those Afghans who would likely be targeted by the Taliban. We should be identifying others who may be at risk and start planning to ensure the safety of those who would seek asylum as a consequence of a potential Taliban takeover or if control of the country fractures.

Now is the time to think about creative solutions and, importantly, understand what will be necessary to ensure that we live up to our moral obligations. I know full well that the United States is capable of this. We have been publicly assured by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Milley, and Commander of Central Command, General McKenzie, that the military can carry out such an evacuation, if directed to do so. We have successfully conducted evacuations of refugee populations in the past, including a significant number of Vietnamese refugees in 1975, Iraqi Kurds in 1996, and Kosovo Albanians in 1999. It is imperative that we deliver upon our promises now.

Providing safe harbor for these Afghans who are most vulnerable is front of mind, but we must also ensure that there is a farsighted planning process across the board to ensure success following the transition of our military forces. And I would like to quickly highlight several key questions.

First, can the United States and its allies and partners continue to constrain the threat from terrorist groups like al-Qaida and ISIS that would seek to use Afghanistan as a base for operations?

The Biden administration has discussed its intent to conduct over- the-horizon operations, but we need to ensure that we have accounted for this complexity and are postured for success.

Second, how will the United States continue to distribute and oversee aid to the Afghan Government and Afghan security forces? The Afghan Government remains unable to generate enough revenue to independently fund its military operations, instead relying almost solely on foreign contributions.

We must have robust mechanisms in place to ensure the aid is provided and goes to the intended places.

Third, how can the international community assist the Afghan security forces with maintaining readiness, particularly air power--after all international contractors depart the country? Again, that is another term of the Doha agreement. After 20 years, we have not created a cadre of individuals inside Afghanistan who can independently conduct high- level maintenance on its aircraft, which raises serious questions about how the Afghans can continue air operations without international contracting support.

Fourth, does the international community have real leverage to affect Taliban behavior through political and diplomatic channels? Now is the time to understand what levers are available to mitigate a potentially disastrous situation for the people of Afghanistan, and particularly that of women and girls.

Fifth, will NGOs be able to continue activities to benefit the people of Afghanistan? There appears to be a lack of coordination, including by the Department of Defense, to ensure deconfliction methods are appropriately transitioned to the Afghan Government, which puts humanitarians at risk and could delay the delivery of lifesaving assistance to populations living in hard-to-reach areas.

The time to address these challenges is now. I urge the Biden administration to continue to work through these pressing issues, and I call upon Congress to assist where we can. The consequences of inaction are too great to risk. We must rapidly increase the number of SIV visas, and we must, along with the administration, plan for all the contingencies that I have outlined.

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