New START Treaty

Floor Speech

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Mrs. FISCHER. Madam President, I come to the floor today to discuss the administration's decision to extend the New START treaty by 5 years.

Supporters hailed the move, with the New York Times reporting that the President's decision ``avoided a renewed arms race.'' Meanwhile, critics, who believed the question of extension had given the United States leverage to extract concessions from Russia, as well as China, described the move as a wasted opportunity and a giveaway to Putin.

As the last bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, perhaps it shouldn't be surprising that the debate over extending New START took on outsized importance, with parties on both sides seeing it as the vehicle to accomplish all of their goals. Now, with the extension decided, it comes with an opportunity to regain our perspective and consider the way forward. This begins with a clearer understanding of what the New START treaty accomplishes and what it doesn't.

To begin with, the New START treaty is not a panacea, and extending the agreement does not prevent an arms race with just the stroke of a pen; nor is it an unfair agreement that locks in Russian advantages. It is simply an agreement between the United States and Russia to limit some but not all of the categories of nuclear arms. China is not a party to this agreement.

As critics have pointed out, the treaty's counting rules obscure the true number of deployed nuclear weapons, and it has not prevented Russia's buildup of other kinds of nuclear arms not covered by its limits. Some have described these as ``loopholes'' for Russia, but they are well-known limitations that also apply equally to both sides.

Since the treaty was signed, the United States has chosen not to invest in new nuclear weapons outside of the treaty's limits. Well, Russia has done the opposite, and they continue to expand their nuclear arsenal. I disagree with my colleagues who see that as a failure of the treaty. It is a failure in the Russian Government for continuing to build up its nuclear arsenal instead of matching our restraint and lowering those tensions.

But it would also be a failure on our part if we had assumed Russia would refrain from building these systems out of the goodness of their heart. Indeed, Russia's behavior since the New START treaty was signed reminds us that it continues to seek a competitive advantage, and in order to achieve its goals, it will go around the limits, as it has done with the New START treaty, or it will go straight through them, as it did with the INF Treaty.

So Russia's nuclear capabilities continue to expand, as does China's buildup of nuclear arms. That New START hasn't prevented these from occurring reflects the fact that the New START treaty simply does not account for the full spectrum of nuclear challenges, and thus, with the agreement to extend the treaty in place, serious threats still remain that really demand our attention.

The growth of both Russia's and China's arsenals must be addressed. Some have called for the Biden administration to immediately pursue talks to this end.

While hurrying to convene another diplomatic summit may have a reassuring appearance to some, diplomacy is not an end unto itself. It is a means to an end.

It is important to remember that negotiating limits on Russia's tactical weapons and bringing China into the arms control process have long been U.S. diplomatic objectives. Indeed, the Obama-Biden administration sought these goals, as did the Trump administration, which deserves credit for elevating them to the highest levels. However, the consistent refusal of both Russia and China to engage in serious talks demonstrates that neither nation feels sufficient incentive to negotiate. New attempts at negotiations without addressing this wouldn't achieve a different result.

In truth, what is needed isn't another conference in a European capital; it is a serious effort here at home to create incentives for both Russia and China to halt their nuclear buildups and to have them choose a different path.

Congress and the administration should work together to strengthen the hands of our negotiators. To that end, we can start by rejecting calls being made by some advocates to cut our nuclear forces unilaterally or allow them to age into obsolescence by delaying their much needed modernization. These calls are not new; however, our senior military leaders have consistently advised against such courses of action, and the past two administrations have rejected them as well. They should be rejected again.

As most in this Chamber know, our nuclear forces have aged far beyond their designed lifetime. After delaying and deferring the modernization of our nuclear forces for decades, we are now at an inflection point. As Admiral Richard, the current STRATCOM commander, testified last year, ``Many of the modernization and sustainment efforts necessary to ensure the deterrent's viability have zero schedule margin and are late-to-need.''

His point is clear. Further delay will result in capabilities aging- out with no replacements available. Our nuclear deterrent would literally wither on the vine. This would have a number of disastrous consequences for our security at a time when nuclear threats are growing, and it would also dramatically undermine future diplomatic efforts to negotiate limits with Russia and China on their arsenals. After all, why would either nation agree to new rounds of arms reductions if they knew that the United States was cutting its forces anyway, regardless of whether they agreed to do likewise?

We must keep this in mind when we hear calls to dismantle the triad or cancel our modernization programs. Doing so would make our country less safe by cutting the forces needed to deter aggression, and it would make the world less safe by ensuring that the United States is never in a position again to push for real reductions to Russian and Chinese nuclear forces.

Instead of reducing incentives for Russia and China to negotiate, Congress and the administration should work together to strengthen them and set the conditions for successful diplomatic efforts in the future.

Thank you, Madam President.

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