No 2H2O From Iran Act

Floor Speech

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 819, I call up the bill (H.R. 5119) to prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds available to any Federal department or agency for any fiscal year to purchase or issue a license for the purchase of heavy water produced in Iran, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

I rise in support of this bill. What this would do is prohibit the United States from spending millions of dollars purchasing from Iran heavy water. Iran--I think we should remember--is the number one state sponsor of terrorism. Heavy water is essential to the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

While this relatively rare chemical is not radioactive, it has long been tightly controlled. Why? Because of its use as a coolant in heavy water nuclear reactors. These are the types of reactors which experts call a plutonium bomb factory.

The history of this goes back. If we think back during the Second World War, the fall of Norway and its heavy water plant to the Nazis created a very real risk that Hitler could win the race to build the bomb. In response, at the time, the Allies launched several daring commando raids--the most daring of the war--and hundreds of bombers in what was ultimately their successful effort to prevent the Nazis from using heavy water to develop weapons-grade plutonium. That is how important this process has been in history in the race to that weapon.

So fast forward several decades, and now the Obama administration's nuclear agreement does not limit Iran's ability to produce heavy water. This is one of the agreement's many flaws, in my opinion. But, instead, the deal allows Iran to possess a small amount of heavy water for its newly legitimized nuclear program and requires Iran to ship any excess heavy water that it produces out of the country.

So, while this deeply flawed deal allows Iran to sell its excess heavy water on the international market, it certainly doesn't require the United States to buy Iran's excess heavy water. If there are no buyers, then Iran would have to comply with the limits on its heavy water possession by suspending production, or it could also dilute any excess heavy water that it currently possesses. That makes sense to me.

Let me be clear. Despite false claims, enacting this legislation would not cause the United States or Iran to violate the nuclear deal. What we are talking about here is something that is not in the deal, whether or not we subsidize their production of heavy water.

So what it would prevent, clearly, is it would prevent the administration from going above and beyond the agreement to deliver Iran financial rewards that were never part of the agreement that passed this House.

That is one of the reasons why the Obama administration's purchase of 28 metric tons of heavy water from Iran is so concerning. Purchases like this only--as I indicated--subsidize and incentivize Iran's continued production of this sensitive material that plays an essential role in the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

I just want to go to the words of David Albright, which I think all of us should reflect on here. He is a respected nonproliferation expert, and he said these words: We should not be paying Iran for something they shouldn't be producing in the first place.

That is my point, Mr. Speaker. So this bill is simple. It prohibits U.S. purchases, prohibits us paying Iran for heavy water from their facility, and, thus, prevents U.S. taxpayer dollars from subsidizing this rogue regime.

I also want to thank the author, Mr. Pompeo, for his work. I urge all Members to support this bill.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. ROYCE. 5119.

Again, the reality today is that the agreement was not intended to be structured in a way that would give an inducement for Iran to go forward with a production of heavy water and the export of heavy water because, as we all know, in 15 years this agreement is going to be over. At that point in time, we do not want Iran to have a full-scale industrial weapons production capability.

If we create the market for heavy water--right now under the agreement they are not supposed to have it on hand--if we create the market by continuously purchasing this heavy water, yeah, they are going to continue to produce it and, as a consequence, will further develop their capability.

It is odd to me also, since the sale represents a government intrusion into the North American heavy water market, why we would prefer Iran continue the capability of developing this as opposed to an American ally, Canada.

Why would we open the door to future U.S. purchases of Iran's heavy water, which is what the administration is doing here, and choose Iran as the supplier rather than our ally, Canada?

For these reasons, I am very concerned with that line of argument.

I think there is some confusion here. The point is that Iran is continuing to manufacture heavy water. The point is that we are making a market for their ability to export this instead of taking the legacy stock of heavy water that is in the possession of Canada.

The reason Canada quit producing it is because they have ample stock, and the presumption was they would sell that to the United States. Why? Because Canada is not in the business of trying to become more proficient in developing a market for something which can be used for nuclear weapons production.

We have ample opportunity to purchase this from our ally. It is still a requirement under the agreement that Iran cut back its reserve of heavy water. If we are going to enter an ongoing program to continue to purchase this from Iran, what we are doing is enabling them, enabling them as they prepare 15 years from now, as I said earlier, to have that turnkey operation where they can then have industrial-size capability for the weapons program.

The other point I would make is that the reason the Iranians have a favorable disposition towards the United States--and that is reflected in the polling that shows that two-thirds of Iranians want a western- style democracy without a theocracy--is because they don't happen to agree with the policies of the Ayatollah and what happened in 1979 with the revolutionary regime grabbing control of that government.

The consequences of that government nationalizing companies is that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps actually controls the economy. When we put money into that regime, what we are actually doing is aiding and abetting the efforts of those that go to the streets and yell ``Death to America'' and ``Death to Israel,'' and that is exactly what the Ayatollah does.

We should have had a tilt to Iran, yes; but that tilt to Iran should have been to the people of Iran who had that election stolen from them.

That is where our tilt should have been. Instead, we are walking on eggshells, and every time there is a new demand like this one, that we now purchase and aid and abet their ongoing development of capability on heavy water, it is beyond me. We have an annual report that was published last month by the German Intelligence Service, and this is what it reads:

The illegal proliferation-sensitive procurement activities by Iran in Germany, registered by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, persisted at what is, even by international standards, a quantitatively high level last year. This holds true, in particular, with regard to items which can be used in the field of nuclear technology.

Iran is violating this agreement as we speak. It is not being enforced. The debate here should be how we enforce this agreement, not how we augment activities to further encourage the regime to avoid what it agreed to.

Iran remains a center of illicit procurement, anxious to find ways to circumvent U.S. export controls and sanctions. The nuclear deal acknowledged this in annex I, which states that Iran intends to apply nuclear export policies and practices in line with internationally established standards for the export of nuclear material, equipment, and technology.

Now, Iran has done absolutely nothing to implement this provision of the agreement, and the administration appears content to allow them to get out of doing so. That is what is concerning.

Finally, the components for the heavy water plant were illicitly procured. Essentially, the United States Government is buying pirated heavy water because the components for that heavy water plant were illicitly procured.

A clarifying point is that they cannot sell it to North Korea. Iran would not be able to do that because North Korea is under sanctions on just that point.

I would also just make the argument that there is no scientific or medical breakthrough that is dependent upon purchases of heavy water from Iran; and, if there were, I have no doubt that we could work with our ally, Canada, to make it happen because Canada, in particular, has been creating a reliable, long-term heavy water supply that is able to meet the projected increased needs in North America and elsewhere. Canada stopped producing more because they have too much, and they anticipated that we would purchase this from them. The United States should support our ally, Canada, in this effort rather than in subsidizing a state sponsor of terrorism's production of sensitive material.

I have a concern with the administration's decision on this issue over Iran, not necessarily my colleagues here. My concern is that, regardless of how we perceive the Iran deal that we voted on on the floor, my concern is that the administration is now going beyond that deal. It is the administration's conduct here that gives me pause.

When I hear the Secretary of Energy for the President, Mr. Ernest Moniz, he made it clear that the U.S. purchase of this heavy water, in his words, ``will be a statement to the world: `You want to buy heavy water from Iran, you can buy heavy water from Iran. It's been done. Even the United States did it.' ''

Why are we giving the seal of approval to Iran's heavy water production? Why is the administration doing that? This is beyond me. It is beyond many experts.

I previously quoted nonproliferation expert David Albright, who has said we shouldn't be paying Iran for something they shouldn't be producing in the first place.

With this policy of purchasing Iran's heavy water, the Obama administration is achieving two things. And neither of those two things, in my opinion, are good. It is legitimatizing Iran's nuclear program, and it is putting more money into Iran's pocket.

More buyers for Iran's heavy water means it will continue to produce this sensitive material. And in just 15 years, when the President's flawed nuclear deal expires, Iran can use this heavy water to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

The Obama administration's latest effort to go above and beyond to accommodate Iran should be rejected.

So I would urge all Members to support this bill.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

Source