Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006

Date: May 18, 2005
Location: Washington, DC

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006 -- (House of Representatives - May 18, 2005)

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AMENDMENT NO. 3 OFFERED BY MR. KENNEDY OF RHODE ISLAND

Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

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Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Terrorism is a psychological warfare. Terrorists try to manipulate us and change our behavior by creating fear, uncertainty, and division in society. To succeed, the terrorists do not necessarily need to land an attack. Threats of an attack and failed attacks can still create fear, uncertainty, and division; and that is the terrorists' goal.

The key battleground in the war on terrorism, therefore, is in the minds of the American public. And how the government communicates about homeland security is central to how the public responds. I would argue that the communications record of the Department of Homeland Security has been an abysmal failure. The duct tape and plastic sheeting fiasco speaks for itself. The color-coded system does not work well and has undermined the Department's credibility.

The gentleman from California (Mr. Cox), chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, and I have talked about this issue over the last year, and I know he is very concerned about it. I am grateful that the committee has instructed the Department of Homeland Security in this bill to fix the problems with the color-coded terror alert system.

As the bill requires, any terror alert system must give people and organizations some indication about what steps they must take to improve their own security and assist in the Nation's security. It also requires that the alert be targeted at specific populations or regions, when possible.

What we have now is a system that tells us to be scared. That is it. We do not find out any information about the nature of the threat. We have no idea what we can do to make ourselves more secure. And this kind of vague warning inadvertently plays to the hands of the terrorists who want us to be afraid.

On the other hand, the American public possesses a great resilience and strength, and good risk communication strategies can tap into and even amplify those assets. In other words, risk communications is crucial to homeland security because it can be the difference between hardening the target and making it more vulnerable.

I have been working on these issues for several years now, and I can tell you that there is a wealth of knowledge out there about how the government should communicate in emergencies about threats. This amendment would simply require that in replacing the inadequate system we have now, that the Department draw on this expertise and research in order to help the government in its risk communications.

In particular, I think it is critical that the Department consult with the Center of Excellence in Behavioral and Social Research in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, which is already funded by the Department. We are already paying for this research, and we should make sure it is realized.

I want to thank the chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security and the ranking member, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Thompson), for agreeing to this amendment and for their leadership. I also want to extend special thanks to Dr. Mike Barnett from my office, who has been indispensable to me in crafting this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, I will just close by saying that this amendment is not controversial, it has no cost, and it is very simple: When it comes to homeland security, communications have a lasting impact. So let us make sure we get it right by tapping the best experts.

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Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, as my colleague and I have just spoken on the importance of communications and risk communications, as you know, research shows that the more the public is brought into the terrorism planning and response, particularly through social networks like churches, unions, professional organizations, and business groups, as well as neighborhood associations, the more effective we can be at limiting the impacts of terrorist acts and terrorist threats.

Not only is the inherent resilience and the strength of the American public enhanced by participating, but the American public has a critical commonsense knowledge that the government agencies and community organizations need in order to develop plans that will protect as many people as possible.

For this reason, it is a high priority of mine, as it is of my colleagues, to better integrate the public into the planning at State, local, and Federal levels. Preparedness and response efforts are likely to be far less successful than they should be if we do not have a plan and a substantial public involvement in the process.

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Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island. Mr. Chairman, in closing, when the sarin gas attack happened in Japan, 90 percent of the people who went to the hospital had no infection or exposure to the sarin gas whatsoever. People died at the hospital because the medical teams were not able to attend to them because they were overwrought with people coming in and clogging up the hospital.

If we had a terrorist attack, the way the people respond is going to determine whether that attack is just a tragedy or whether that attack becomes an all-out disaster. And that is why risk communications are so important. That is why the chairman and I are trying to work to make sure that the Department of Homeland Security does better than it has thus far and does better than the plastic sheeting and duct tape, which they once recommended in the wake of a terrorist threat, in addition to the color-coded system, which has not proven to be very successful.

So I thank the chairman for his assistance in this matter.

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