Levin Remarks as Prepared for Delivery, Council on Foreign Relations

I am pleased to be back at the Council on Foreign Relations, as we gather here on this anniversary of the horrific events of September 11, 2001.

I just returned from a trip to Ukraine, Iraq, and Jordan -- the type of trip that doesn't make it into the Washington Post series on congressional junkets to choice travel destinations. Current events in these countries are a direct consequence of two of the most dramatic transformations in the international environment in my 36 years in the Senate: the end of the Cold War and the rise of a virulent strain of Islamic extremism.

Russia's actions in Ukraine are a direct challenge to the post-Cold War hopes for Europe. In effect, Putin has asserted a new sphere of influence -- or re-asserted an old one -- in which he believes he can act with impunity to impose Russia's will, much as the Soviet Union did in Eastern Europe during the Cold War. In many ways, Putin's actions in Ukraine have been a wake-up call to which the Western democracies are beginning to respond in a way that they did not do in the case of Russian occupation of territory in Georgia and Moldova.

In light of Ukraine's proximity to Russia, Russia's overwhelming military advantages in the area, and Putin's apparent willingness to violate the norms of international conduct, there is little that Ukraine would be able to do to stop a direct, large-scale Russian military incursion, should Russia choose to invade openly. NATO will not go to war with Russia over Ukraine, nor should we lead the Ukrainians to believe that we will, as we tragically did with the Hungarians in 1956.

So what should the United States and our allies do in Ukraine?

First, we should continue to find ways to make it clear to the Russians that they cannot reject the post-Cold War order in Europe and continue to participate in the European economy at the same time. That is why sanctions are important, and must stay in place even if a ceasefire is effective, until Russia conforms its actions to the norms of international behavior.

Second, we should do more to help the Ukrainians defend themselves. The Ukrainians emphasized to me on my visit that they are willing to fight for themselves -- and as long as they understand that we will not be sending our own men and women to fight for them, I believe that we should provide them with the military equipment that they need. That means both lethal and non-lethal equipment, including MRAPs and other equipment that would otherwise be shredded or abandoned as we leave Afghanistan. We should do this because assisting people who are willing to fight to defend their own country and their own freedom reflects our values. Providing such equipment would enable the Ukrainians to raise the price the Russians have to pay for their aggression and hopefully make Putin think twice about further aggression.

Russia's violation of international law in Ukraine has already drawn NATO closer together, reinvigorating the alliance by providing a new challenge and a strong common interest. Putin could, as he boasted, occupy eastern Ukraine, but in the long run, he would be acting against Russia's own interest, because he cannot not prevail against a united Europe.

My Iraq visit focused on ISIS and the imminent threat it poses to Iraq, the region, and the international community. Our military leaders and intelligence experts have uniformly told us that airstrikes alone will not be sufficient to defeat ISIS. ISIS' rapid spread has been possible, in large part, because it exploited Sunni discontent with the Maliki government, which insisted on ruling Iraq on a narrow sectarian basis. If the new Prime Minister shows that Iraq will now be governed inclusively, ISIS will find fewer Sunni leaders willing either to aid and abet their terror or to look the other way.

President Obama has been cautious about resorting to military force in Iraq and elsewhere. In the Middle East, the use of military force by western nations without Arab support can be counterproductive, providing fuel for the hateful propaganda used by extremists who attack a western presence as "occupation." For instance, neither ISIS nor its predecessor -- al Qaeda in Iraq -- existed before the U.S. invasion in 2003. Indeed, al Qaeda in Iraq was created in response to the American presence in that country and fed off the resulting conflict.

So what should the United States do about ISIS?

First, just as ISIS poses a threat to international security, the response needs to be international. President Obama has begun building an international coalition to respond to ISIS. A U.N. resolution endorsing the use of force against ISIS, while not necessary, would help rally international support.

The participation of key Arab states in the region will be critical to the effectiveness of any international coalition. If western countries act in Iraq and Syria without visible participation and leadership by Arab nations, it will play into the propaganda pitch of extreme elements within the Sunni community that they are the only force willing to stand up against foreign domination. Active participation by Arab states is key, because the fight against ISIS is a struggle for the hearts and minds of Sunni Muslims as well as a military struggle.

The vast majority of Muslims oppose the brutality of ISIS, whose horrific actions may be a turning point in persuading mainstream Islam of the need to expunge this poisonous offshoot. If mainstream Muslims fail to join, and the conflict can be successfully portrayed as one of the west against Islam, the poison is likely to reappear in new and different forms, as it has in the past.

Second, within the context of a broad international alliance I believe that Congress will support air strikes against ISIS, taking on the group's leadership and infrastructure in both Iraq and Syria. The President's hand would be strengthened by congressional support, and he was wise to welcome it last night, but he already has the authority he needs, under both domestic and international law, to conduct such a campaign.

Under domestic law, the President has authority to act under Article II of the Constitution where necessary to defend the United States. The beheading of two American journalists, coupled with ISIS' threats against the United States and its training of Americans, provides sufficient basis for such action. Under international law, the President has authority to act in Iraq in accordance with the request of the Government of Iraq. He has authority to act in Syria, because the Syrian government has proven unwilling or unable to address the ISIS threat from its ungoverned territories

Third, we should train, equip and assist those Iraqis and Syrians who are willing to fight ISIS. Their boots are on the ground already, and their own countries' future is at stake.

This effort should start with the Kurds. While limited in their military capabilities, the Kurdish pesh merga have proven willing to fight in their own defense and even to take the fight to ISIS in key strategic areas near Kurdistan. Moreover, the Kurds have provided some defense for nearby areas occupied by religious minorities and have taken in refugees fleeing from ISIS assaults, providing a haven of religious tolerance that has too often been absent in this part of the world. We should do all that we can to ensure that the pesh merga have the equipment that they need, and to help train them in the tactics that will succeed against ISIS.

But training and equipping the pesh merga will not be sufficient to counter the ISIS threat outside the areas under Kurdish control.

We should provide similar training and assistance to the Iraq armed forces as the new Iraqi government hopefully demonstrates that it is prepared to govern in an inclusive manner. If anything should bring the Iraqis together in a common cause, the threat posed by the barbaric tactics of ISIS should do it. As Baghdad addresses the grievances of Iraq's Sunni communities which have helped give rise to the ISIS threat, western nations should increase the level of military assistance provided.

Finally, we and our allies should take additional steps to openly train and assist the vetted, moderate opposition in Syria, as the President is requesting. Even if ISIS is pushed out of Iraq, the organization will survive unless it is also defeated in Syria. In Syria, as in Iraq, ISIS can be set back by airpower, but cannot be defeated without an opposing force to take the fight to it on the ground. That force needs to be a moderate, well-vetted Syrian opposition force that is trained, equipped, and supported by the United States and its allies -- again including partners among the Arab States.

In Iraq and Syria and Ukraine, the fight is for their people to win -- but we can and should provide robust assistance to those who are prepared to fight for themselves against terror and aggression. It is the right thing to do, it reflects our values, and it is in our national interest. U.S. military force is not always the answer, but it can be, and often is, an essential part of the answer to terror and aggression. Equally important is an effective political and economic strategy, which in the case of ISIS must include both a broad international coalition with active participation by Arab nations and the establishment of a moderate, inclusive alternative in both Iraq and Syria.

Source