Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions

Date: March 9, 2005
Location: Washington, DC


STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS -- (Senate - March 09, 2005)

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

By Mr. AKAKA (for himself and Mr. DURBIN):

S. 572. A bill to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to give additional biosecurity responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security; to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

By Mr. AKAKA (for himself and Mr. DURBIN):

S. 573. A bill to improve the response of the Federal Government to agroterrorism and agricultural diseases; to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce two bills to increase the security of the Nation's agriculture and food supply: the Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act and the Agriculture Security Assistance Act. Both measures build on legislation I sponsored in the 107th and 108th Congresses. I would like to thank my good friend, Senator Durbin, who cosponsored my agriculture security bills last session, for continuing his support of this legislation.

The first bill, the Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act, will enhance coordination between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other Federal agencies responsible for food and agriculture security. The Agriculture Security Assistance Act will increase coordination between Federal and State, local, and tribal officials and offer financial and technical assistance to farmers, ranchers, and veterinarians to improve preparedness.

The Nation's agriculture industry represents about 13 percent of GDP and nearly 17 percent of domestic employment. Yet, this critical economic sector is not receiving adequate protection from accidental or intentional contamination that would damage our economy, and, most importantly, could cost lives. Such contamination could be devastating to states such as Hawaii which generates more than $1.9 billion in agricultural sales annually.

Just last week, the President of Interpol warned that the consequences of an attack on livestock are ``substantial'' and ``relatively little'' is being done to prevent such an attack.

The introduction of my bills coincides with the release of a report I requested from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) entitled ``Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain.'' The report reviews the current state of agriculture security in the United States and makes recommendations. While GAO reported some accomplishments, such as conducting vulnerability assessments of agricultural products, establishing the Food and Agriculture Sector Coordinating Council, and funding two university-based Centers of Excellence to research livestock and poultry diseases, GAO found that critical vulnerabilities still exist.

Even though veterinarians may be the first to spot outbreaks of diseases, Department of Agriculture (USDA) certified veterinarians are not required to demonstrate any knowledge of foreign animal diseases. This is short sighted given how easily animal diseases can travel from country to country as we have seen with the avian flu over the past few years. It is important that veterinarians, who will be our first responders in the event of an agroterrorist attack, be able to identify symptoms of a foreign disease in U.S. livestock.

GAO also highlights USDA's inability to deploy vaccines within 24 hours of an animal disease outbreak as required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9). According to GAO, the vaccine for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), which is the only animal disease vaccine that the United States stockpiles, is purchased from Britain in a concentrate form. To use the vaccine the concentrate must be sent back to Britain to be activated, which adds at least three weeks to the deployment time.

According to a scenario from Dr. Tom McGinn, formerly of the North Carolina Department of Agriculture, FMD would spread to 23 States five days after an initial outbreak and to 40 States after 30 days. By the time the vaccine is deployed, FMD could spread across the country. We cannot afford to wait three weeks to start vaccinating livestock. Why is the United States outsourcing this critical security function? USDA should either store ready-to-use vaccines in the U.S. or examine ways to activate the vaccines in this country.

Equally troubling is that over the past 2 years, the number of agricultural inspections performed by the U.S. has declined by 3.4 million since DHS took over the border inspection responsibility from USDA. Mr. Kim Mann, a spokesman from the National Association of Agriculture Employees (NAAE), expressed similar concerns at a February 10, 2005, hearing conducted by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia (OGM). Mr. Mann testified that of the approximately 2,100 Agriculture Quarantine Inspection positions that were transferred from USDA to DHS in 2003, only about 1,300 of those positions are currently filled. According to Mr. Mann, agriculture inspectors have left DHS to return to USDA because of DHS's lack of commitment to its agriculture mission, and DHS is not filling these vacancies. I recently wrote Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security Asa Hutchinson expressing my concern over these reports because agriculture inspections are crucial to the economy of Hawaii which is home to more endangered species than any other State.

GAO also reported a lack of communication between DHS and states regarding the development of emergency response plans, grant guidance, and best practices. States agriculture officials were given as little as three days to provide input on the National Response Plan and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. In addition, the State Homeland Security Grant Program grant guidance puts little emphasis on agriculture as a sector eligible for assistance. In fact, agriculture only became eligible in fiscal year 04 and many states are unaware that funds can be directed towards agriculture security. In addition, State and industry officials reported that there is no mechanism to share lessons learned from exercises or real-life animal disease outbreaks.

GAO further notes that shortcomings exist in DHS's Federal coordination of national efforts to protect against agroterrorism. Federal officials claim that there is confusion in interagency working groups as to which responsibility falls with whom. DHS reportedly also has been unable to coordinate agriculture security research efforts government-wide as is required by HSPD-9. While some program staff from DHS, USDA, and Health and Human Services have engaged in preliminary discussions, there is no overall departmental coordination of policy and budget issues between the various Federal agencies.

My bills address many of the concerns raised by GAO. The Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act will: increase communication and coordination between DHS and state, local, and tribal homeland security officials regarding agroterrorism; Ensure agriculture security is included in state, local, and regional emergency response plans; and establish a task force of state and local first responders that will work with DHS to identify best practices in the area of agriculture security.

The Agriculture Security Assistance Act will: provide financial and technical assistance to states and localities for agroterrorism preparedness and response; increase international agricultural disease surveillance and inspections of imported agricultural products; require that certified veterinarians be knowledgeable in foreign animal diseases; and require that USDA study the costs and benefits of developing a more robust animal disease vaccine stockpile.

The United States needs a coordinated approach in dealing with the possibility of an attack on our food supply, which could affect millions. While improvements have occurred since I first voiced my concerns over food and agriculture security in 2001, critical vulnerabilities remain. I urge my colleagues to join me in protecting America's breadbasket and support these vital pieces of legislation.

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

http://thomas.loc.gov

arrow_upward