Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: Connecting the Dots

Floor Statement by Sen. Joe Biden on "Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: Connecting the Dots"

I thank the Chair.

Before I begin speaking in support of the Kennedy amendment, I would like to make just one generic point. I find it fascinating that the United States of America, of all countries in the world, feels the need to increase its nuclear arsenal at this moment—low-yield, high-yield, no-yield, any yield.

It is fascinating that, at this moment in the world's history, in our relative strength and power, we are the ones who think we need another nuclear weapon in our arsenal. But that is just, as a friend of mine named Arlen Mekler used to say, a random thought.

Let me get to the heart of this. I obviously support the Feinstein-Kennedy amendment which would keep the 1993 Spratt-Furse amendment in place. That amendment, as we all know, bans all work on low-yield nuclear weapons, those with a yield below 5 kilotons. We had a lot of reasons to do that. It is sometimes useful to remember why we did these things in the first place. I might add we enacted that amendment at a time when the Russians had a whole heck of a lot more weapons than exist now; at a time when things were actually a little more dangerous, when our vulnerability to nuclear attack was greater than it is today.

But the question now is, Why should we oppose the repeal of that ban? After all, section 3131 states:

Nothing in the repeal ..... shall be construed as authorizing, testing, acquisition, or development of a low-yield nuclear weapon.

So why stop our nuclear weapons labs from just thinking about these low-yield weapons?

One answer is that the current law doesn't restrict research and early development on these low-yield weapons. It only prohibits later stages of development and engineering that are geared toward the production of low-yield nuclear weapons.

Obviously, what we would do by lifting this ban is to be in the position of being able to move toward production of those weapons, a notion that will not be lost on the rest of the world. The other answer is that low-yield nuclear weapons are not like regular ones. Regular nuclear weapons are designed to deter adversaries. The massive destruction and civilian casualties that they can cause make nuclear weapons unlike even other weapons of mass destruction. Low-yield nuclear weapons are different. They bridge the gap between conventional weapons and the city-busting weapons of the cold war, and they offer the lure of a better way to destroy point targets. Supporters of low-yield weapons argue they could deter an adversary, and that is true. All nuclear weapons have a deterrent function. But the deterrent benefits that low-yield weapons provide are far outweighed by both the risk that they will actually be used and the dangerous signal they send to other countries, whether intentional or not, that we intend to fight a nuclear war. Low-yield weapons also blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional war, and they begin to make nuclear war more "thinkable," as Herman Kahn might have said. Herman Kahn's book was titled "Thinking About the Unthinkable." He understood that nuclear war was unthinkable, even as he demanded that we think about how to fight one, if we had to.

Looking at the foreign defense policies of the current administration, I fear they fail to understand that very vital point. They want to make nuclear war "thinkable." Section 3131 of this bill could make it "thinkable" that we could use these low-yield weapons—as if we needed to have these low-yield nuclear weapons, despite the overwhelming conventional deterrent we have. Had we had them, I wonder if anyone might have suggested that we use these low-yield nuclear weapons that we may produce against any of the bunkers Saddam Hussein was in. I am sure we could hear a voice today that if we had a low-yield nuclear weapon, we could have used it that first night and guaranteed he was gone. The fact that we would have been the only country for the second time in world history to use a nuclear weapon, in this case unlike the first, without any real need, would have been lost on some people. But, I wonder what that message that would have sent to India and Pakistan, which are cheek to jowl with nuclear capability.

The administration's failure, in my view, to understand that nuclear is still "unthinkable" is, I think, the most fatal flaw in this approach. That failure to understand could lead to bigger failures—a failure to understand how to keep other countries from developing nuclear weapons, a failure to view nonproliferation as a vital and a workable policy objective, and perhaps even a failure to avoid nuclear war which would do horrible damage to any country involved, including ourselves.

Consider what the administration has said regarding nuclear weapons. We parse out what the administration says a piece at a time. I don't think we understand that the rest of the world, friend and foe alike, takes it in its total context. Let us look at the whole range of what they have said so far about nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Posture Review of December 2001 spoke of reducing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. But it also reportedly listed not only Russia and China but also North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya as potential enemies in a nuclear war with the use of nuclear weapons. I emphasize "reportedly listed"—I have not looked at the classified document. I am referring to what has been printed on the Web and what has been in the press. The Nuclear Posture Review spoke of possibly needing to develop and test new types of nuclear weapons, and gave that as a reason for increasing our nuclear test readiness, and further said nuclear weapons might be used to neutralize chemical and biological agents.

More recently, civilian Pentagon leaders ordered a task force to consider possible requirements for new low-yield nuclear weapons, even while assuring the Senate that no formal requirement has yet been established.

A Presidential strategy document reportedly stated the United States might use nuclear weapons against a country with chemical or biological weapons. Then, in a runup to the war in Iraq, the administration proclaimed (but never explained) a new doctrine of preemption against any potential foe that acquired weapons of mass destruction.

All that taken individually is understandable. Taken collectively, it could give someone a very foreboding picture. And do those statements increase our leverage over potential foes, and with a world community at large, or do they only give the rogue states the argument that they really are threatened and, therefore, really need nuclear weapons? Do our statements enable the rest of the world to "blame the victim," as the neo-conservatives would say—and I would agree with them on the outrageousness of that—instead of blaming those responsible for setting disorder in motion?

If you are North Korea, or Iran, or Libya, or Syria, which part of the reports I just referenced are you likely to rely on to make your specious case to the rest of the world?

We have seen the willingness of the rest of the world to engage in the suspension of disbelief. As a friend of mine said, never underestimate the ability of the human mind to rationalize. We have seen our friends, from the French on, rationalize why we shouldn't do what needs to be done.

Which part of the administration's strategy statements, which I briefly outlined, do you think the bad guys—North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Syria—are likely to rely on? The part where we say we reduce our reliance on nuclear bombs, or the part that names those countries as a possible target for nuclear preemption?

As long as you are already listed on the possible target list, what are you going to say, and what are you going to do?

Obviously, they are going to say, "We have to do this because of what the United States is doing."

There is no one in the world who doubts our capacity to annihilate, by conventional weapons alone, any other country in the world. There is no doubt in anyone's mind. And now we are saying that for our defense, we need another nuclear weapon. How do you think the world will interpret that? Some will say it doesn't matter what the rest of the world thinks. But it surely matters, in 1,000 different ways, whether it is a matter of deciding you will not let us sell chickens in your country or deciding whether you will allow businessmen to operate in your country or deciding whether you will cooperate in any other 500 ways we need cooperation on.

What do our statements say, if you are North Korea or Libya or anywhere else? Do you say the United States is getting a low-yield nuclear weapon, so it is time we gave up our efforts to get nuclear weapons? Or if you think we are getting a low-yield nuclear weapon, might you decide it is time to accelerate your efforts? So far we have one clear answer, from North Korea. It is not the one we wanted. Iran appears to be accelerating its nuclear weapons program as well. I am not suggesting they would not be doing that if we weren't enunciating the policies of this administration. I suspect they would anyway. The whole question here is, How do we keep dangerous weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, out of the hands of the most dangerous people in the world, be they terrorists or those who would support them? That is our policy; that is the President's policy; and I agree with it. But obviously, we haven't quite gotten it right. So far, I don't think the administration has the answer to the question of how to achieve our objectives.

For a while, it seemed as though the administration's answer was to declare war on every adversary that dared to go nuclear. But do we really intend to go to war with North Korea, if the price is the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of South Korean civilians? Do we intend to go to war with Iran, when we cannot guarantee security in Iraq?

The list of countries that we accuse of having weapons of mass destruction is long; will we take them all on? And what do we do when Indian officials cite our Iraq war arguments as justification for a possible Indian attack on Pakistan that could risk a nuclear war? Is this the world we want?

The Administration has refused to negotiate directly with North Korea, so we have yet to really test North Korea's claim that it would be prepared to meet all our security concerns in return for truly normal relations with us. Instead, we have demanded that North Korea first renounce its nuclear programs and take tangible steps to dismantle them.

I sympathize with the concern not to be bullied or blackmailed. Nobody likes to be seen as backing down. I even sympathize with the President's intense dislike of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il. There is much to dislike in the man, and even more to dislike in his regime. But what have we achieved through this policy? So far, we have gotten the end of the 1994 Agreed Framework—which had kept North Korea from reprocessing more of its spent nuclear fuel to get plutonium for nuclear weapons. We have seen international inspectors kicked out of North Korea. And now North Korea may be reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel, which could give it enough material for a half dozen more nuclear weapons.

We may be making some progress, with China engaging North Korea. If we are lucky, North Korea's posturing will lead China and Russia to finally support us and bring some pressure on North Korea. But we don't know whether they can really influence a North Korea that sees itself already in the American crosshairs as part of the "axis of evil."

The administration talks of stopping North Korea from exporting its nuclear weapons. That worries me a little bit because it implies we have already given up on stopping them from producing them.

And North Korea could just export plutonium with which to make nuclear weapons; they will be able to become the plutonium factory of the world if they keep on the road they are on now. How are we going to stop that? The plutonium needed for a nuclear weapon can fit in a briefcase. It does not even need much shielding because it is not very radioactive. The whole shipment might be bigger than a bread box, as Steve Allen used to say, but it wouldn't be much bigger. It certainly wouldn't be bigger than a trash can. Can we really stop and search every trash can leaving North Korea? What will we do if a year from now North Korea claims to have provided weapons plutonium to groups in other countries that will destroy major cities unless we do what it wants?

What are we going to do about Iran, which has North Korean medium-range missiles and is moving toward the ability to enrich its own uranium? Nobody ever said that nonproliferation was easy. I don't have a silver bullet, and I don't expect the President to have one either. But don't we have to keep our eye on the ball? When conservatives opposed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, they said countries would build nuclear weapons for their own strategic reasons.

That's right. It means if we want to prevent proliferation, or roll it back, we have to affect those strategic calculations.

Nonproliferation policy gives us a framework for those efforts. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty gives us international support and may affect the calculations of countries whose neighbors sign and obey the treaty. The Nuclear Suppliers Group buys us more time by restricting exports of nuclear and dual-use materials and equipment. But in the end, it still comes down to influencing a country's strategic calculations.

How can we influence those countries? Deterrence is one big way to influence them. Any country that builds nuclear weapons knows if they use them on us, they will very quickly cease to exist. But deterrence is still a mind game. It didn't help when the administration belittled deterrence in order to press its case for missile defense. And deterrence may not work if we say: By the way, we may still target you, even if you don't build nuclear weapons.

For countries that are not our enemies, security assurances are a big way to influence them. The U.S. nuclear umbrella offers a country a lot of security at a low cost; but that umbrella may not look so good if the United States is threatening nuclear war against a large number of countries. At that point, our friends may question whether we will really be able to protect them, when we are taking on all those other countries. That is the question you hear people asking in Japan.

To achieve lasting nonproliferation, we must treat the regional quarrels that drive countries to seek nuclear weapons. We did that with Argentina and Brazil. As South Africa moved away from apartheid, we were able to do that there as well. We are making a real effort to help India and Pakistan step back from the brink and have to continue that effort. But we also have to address security concerns in east Asia, including North Korea's concerns, if we are to keep that whole region from developing nuclear weapons, weaponizing the peninsula, and Japan becoming a nuclear power. We have to pursue peace in the Middle East, if we are truly going to take advantage of our military victory in Iraq.

Nor is there really any alternative to working with the international community. We don't have the ability to inspect sites in Iran; the Atomic Energy Agency does have that ability.

Our forces in Iraq don't have a great record in their hunt for weapons of mass destruction; the IAEA and the U.N. could help in that hunt, both by providing detailed information from past inspections and by helping to monitor sites they have visited in the past.

We cannot close down proliferation traffic by ourselves. The cooperation of other countries, especially Russia and China, is essential.

These are the paths to nonproliferation. They are long and difficult. We don't know whether they will succeed, but we can see where we want to go, and we can see how working these issues will help us get there.

But building low-yield nuclear weapons is not a path to nonproliferation; neither is a program to do R&D on such weapons, while Defense Department officials tell people to come up with reasons to build them; neither is a program to test these weapons, which would surely be necessary to develop a new low-yield weapon, and which would just as surely be the death knell not only of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty—which I think is the objective of some—but of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT.

Frankly, neither is nonproliferation served by the administration's plan to field a nearly worthless missile defense system in Alaska next year, just so the President can say he did it.

The push to deploy that system has been at the expense of making an effective defense. The defense will lack the radar it needs for several years, and the space-based infrared collection it needs for even more years. And the funds and equipment to deploy it are coming out of the funds and equipment needed to test it, to improve it, and to make sure it works. You have to wonder what the administration's priorities are.

The path of deterrence, security assurance, nonproliferation, diplomacy, and sensible weapons development is difficult, but at least it is headed in the right direction.

The path of hasty deployment of a missile defense that cannot be useful for years to come is simply foolish. The path of new nuclear weapons, new nuclear testing, and looking at nuclear weapons as something "normal" may be a highway paved with good intentions, but as the nuns used to make me write on the board after school when I misbehaved: The road to Hell is paved with good intentions.

This is a road to disaster. We should know better than to go down it.

The Feinstein-Kennedy amendment, in my view, will keep us off that dangerous highway. It deserves our support.