Illegal Occupation of Island of Cyprus By Turkish Troops

ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF ISLAND OF CYPRUS BY TURKISH TROOPS -- (House of Representatives - July 22, 2004)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bilirakis) is recognized for 5 minutes.

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Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, as I have done every year, I rise again today to reiterate my fierce objection to the illegal occupation of the island of Cyprus by Turkish troops and declare my grave concern for the future of the area. The island's three decades of internal division make the status quo absolutely unacceptable.

In July 1974, Turkish troops captured the northern part of Cyprus, seizing more than a third of the island. The Turkish troops expelled 200,000 Greek-Cypriots from their homes and killed 5,000 citizens of the once-peaceful island. The Turkish invasion was a conscious and deliberate attempt at ethnic cleansing. Turkey proceeded to install 40,000 military personnel on Cyprus. Today, these troops, in conjunction with United Nations (U.N.) peacekeeping forces, make the small island of Cyprus one of the most militarized areas in the world. Over a quarter of a century later, approximately 1,500 Greek-Cypriots remain missing, including four Americans.

The Green Line, a 113-mile barbed wire fence, separates the Greek-Cypriot community from its Turkish-Cypriot counterpart. For thirty years, the Turkish Northern Republic of Cyprus (TNRC), recognized by no nation in the world except for Turkey, has prohibited Greek-Cypriots, until recently, from freely crossing the Green Line to visit the towns and communities of their families. With control of about 37 percent of the island, Turkey's military occupation has had severe consequences, most notably the dislocation of the Greek-Cypriot population and the resulting refugees.

Thirty years later, the forced separation of these two communities still exist despite efforts by the U.N. and G-8 leadership to mend this rift between north and south. The U.N., with the explicit support of the United States, has sponsored several rounds of proximity talks between the former President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr. Glafcos Clerides, and Mr. Rauf Denktash, the self-proclaimed leader of the occupied northern part of the island.

In March 2003, the United Nations-sponsored Cyprus peace talks at the Hague between the President of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, and Mr. Denktash came to an abrupt halt. Responsibility for this unfortunate setback in the peace process rested largely with Mr. Denktash, who rejected U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's plan to end the 29-year division of Cyprus. It was shameful that the Secretary General's personal diplomacy was met by this kind of flat-out rejection. A large share of the blame also rested with the Turkish military and hard-line nationalists in Ankara, who have maintained the illegal Turkish military occupation of Cyprus since Turkish forces invaded the island in 1974. If the Government of Turkey was sincere about settling the Cyprus problem, it could have put the necessary pressure on Mr. Denktash to say "yes" to the U.N. Plan at that time.

Nearly a year later, the Turkish government finally expressed interest in renewing negotiations using the Annan plan as a basis. However, the clock was ticking toward Cyprus becoming a full member of the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004. The goal was to have a completed and agreed-to settlement plan by the week before so Cyprus could enter the EU as a united island. Even though both sides knew they were not going to get everything they wanted, each side was guaranteed a fair plan and one that would be immediately functional. Unfortunately, the final version of the Annan plan which was submitted for a referenda vote to both communities was unbalanced and biased against the Greek-Cypriots.

On several occasions, my colleagues and I strongly voiced our serious concerns with the Annan plan through letters, meetings and floor statements. We wanted to make sure that all those involved in the negotiation process were well aware that unless these issues were addressed and resolved, the Greek-Cypriots would not agree to the plan. Greater efforts should have been made to address these legitimate concerns which could have secured a positive vote from the Greek-Cypriots.

On April 24, 2004, the people of Cyprus had the opportunity to speak for themselves and vote on a United Nations settlement plan. The Greek-Cypriots' rejection of the suggested settlement plan should not be interpreted as a vote against reunification, but rather, as an important statement about the fundamental principles that must be addressed in any viable and workable settlement.

The Greek-Cypriot voters have made clear that the suggested settlement plan failed because it did not provide for guarantees to ensure the complete implementation of commitments under the plan. Security was a major concern for the Greek-Cypriots.

The Annan plan did not thoroughly satisfy the condition of the removal of foreign troops from Cyprus and the elimination of the right of the guarantor powers to interview in Cyprus. Although previous versions of the Annan plan called for the complete withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces once Turkey joint the E.U., the final version of the Annan plan provided for an indefinite presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus. According to the plan, the number of troops would gradually decrease to 650 over a period of 14 years. However, their continuing presence and intervention rights would make a full and genuine independence of Cyprus impossible.

The plan also provided for the continuation of the Treaty of guarantee. This treaty gives the guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece, United Kingdom (UK)) the right to unilaterally intervene in order to preserve the "constitutional order" of the United Cyprus Republic and its constituent states. However, the Annan plan failed to specifically clarify that this treaty does not authorize military intervention. This was a critical point because Turkey insisted that it would continue to have the right to intervene militarily in Cyprus. This Turkish arrogance increased the Greek-Cypriot fear of a repetition of the 1974 invasion and its tragic consequences.

The Annan plan also did not provide for a property recovery system that would recognize the rights and interests of displaced Greek-Cypriots, and a property compensation system that would not force Greek-Cypriots to pay for their own restitution. The plan allowed for one-third restitution and two-thirds compensation for property owned in the north by Greek-Cypriots who
would be losing the use of their properties. The funds for the restitution would be guaranteed by the Federal State. However, nine-tenths of the Federal State's resources would derive from Greek-Cypriots and the remainder from Turkish-Cypriots. Essentially, the Greek-Cypriots, to a large extent, would be paying for their own loss of property.

In addition, compensation for the property would have been required to be paid by the constituent states. This meant that Greek-Cypriot refugees would have to request compensation from the Greek-Cypriot Constituent State. Again, Greek-Cypriot taxpayers, who were the victims of the invasion, would be paying for their own loss of use of property.

Lastly, the Annan plan ignored the right of all Cypriots to buy property and to live wherever they choose without being limited by ethnic quotas and failed to provide a viable, functional government free of built-in deadlocks and voting restrictions based on ethnicity. It set complicated and restrictive provisions regarding the right of Greek-Cypriot refugees to return to their homes in the north. More specifically, a restrictive moratorium of 6 years would be implemented for those Greek-Cypriots who wished to return and permanently live in the Turkish-Cypriot Constituent State (TCCS). For the first 19 years or until Turkey's accession to the EU, the number of Greek-Cypriots who wished to permanently live in the TCCS would not be able to exceed 18 percent of its total population. After that time period, they would not be able to exceed 33.3 percent of the total population of the TCCS. This restriction would have been permanent.

The Annan plan established a system based on permanent ethnic division, while denying fundamental democratic rights to a segment of the population. Under the plan, Greek-Cypriots permanently living in the TCCS and possessing its internal citizenship status would not have the right to participate in the elections for its 24 representatives in the federal Senate.

Since the vote on the referenda, Greek-Cypriots have been criticized for allegedly rejecting peace and the "only chance" for reunification. Many people-including the Greek-Cypriots themselves-regret that the plan presented to them did not allow both communities to respond positively. Criticism and anger, however, will only further divide the island precisely when the Cypriot people need the support of the international community to continue on the path toward lasting peace.

Greek-Cypriots should not be blamed for voting against a plan that they believed did not meet the interests of their country and their futures. It is one thing for others to comment on the terms and conditions for settlement, but it is the Cypriots who must live with whatever plan is adopted.

The Government of Cyprus continues to emphasize that it remains committed to persevering in its efforts to reunify Cyprus as a bizonal, bicommunal federation with democratic and human rights for all Cypriots. Earlier this year, the Cypriot Government announced a series of measures aimed at assisting those Turkish-Cypriots residing under the control of the Turkish occupation army. This package includes a wide range of political, social, humanitarian, educational and economic measures that will enhance the ability of the Turkish-Cypriots to enjoy many of the benefits that the Republic of Cyprus offers to its citizens-as well as to share in the benefits of European Union membership. Far beyond a merely symbolic gesture, the package is a substantive program to integrate the Turkish-Cypriot community into the larger Cypriot society.

At the same time, the Turkish occupation regime partially lifted restrictions on freedom across the artificial line of division created by Turkey's military occupation. Since then, hundreds of thousands of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have crossed the line to visit homes and areas of their own country that were inaccessible to them for nearly 30 years. It isn't clear whether opening the border was just a tactic to ease the frustrations, or a sign of a fundamental change of heart. But it has produced rare displays of human kinship, exchanges of flowers and pastries, and emotional visits to homes abandoned in the mid-1970s.

However, neither the Government's measures for the Turkish-Cypriots nor the partial lifting of restrictions by the occupation regime should be seen as a substitute for a comprehensive resolution to end the division of Cyprus.

I urge this Administration, the United Nations and the European Union to respect the democratic decision of the Cypriot people, to remain engaged in efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, and to work toward a fair and lasting reunification of Cyprus.

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