Opening statement of Chairman Jim Greenwood Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Opening statement of Chairman Jim Greenwood Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

A Review Assess Progress with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's Targeting Program for Sea Cargo

Good afternoon. Today's hearing is the fifth hearing of the Subcommittee to review the efforts of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (or "CBP") to secure our nation's ports and borders from terrorist attempts to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States.

At our last hearing in December, the Subcommittee convened at the Port of Philadelphia to review the initial findings of the General Accounting Office regarding CBP's Advanced Targeting System for sea cargo. Since that hearing, GAO has produced a final report with several specific recommendations to improve CBP's targeting strategy and its implementation at seaports. The purpose of today's hearing is to receive GAO's final report, review their recommendations, and discuss what progress CBP has made during the past several months in response to our hearing in December.

CBP has taken a number of steps to improve the terrorism risk posed by ocean going containers. With approximately 7 million sea cargo containers entering the U.S. every year, it is not possible to physically inspect every container for weapons of mass destruction. To its credit, CBP moved quickly in response to the terrorism threat. In September of 2001, the National Targeting Center was established in Reston, Virginia, as a single location for targeting technology and for distributing intelligence alerts to the ports. In August of 2002, the NTC adapted the automated targeting system - initially designed to target narcotics-to identify high-risk cargo specifically for weapons of mass destruction.
CBP moved immediately to implement these targeting programs, but it is necessary to continuously amend and improve these systems to ensure that we obtain optimal results to respond to the terrorist threat.

At our December hearing, and in its final report, GAO has identified several areas in which CBP can improve. At the hearing, there were several points of agreement between GAO and CBP on how to revise the targeting program. There were also several GAO findings and recommendations that CBP has not implemented. Today, we have Assistant Commissioner Jay Ahearn who will describe for us the steps CBP has taken-and not taken-to improve its targeting strategy in response to GAO's recommendations.

I would also like to welcome Mr. Clark Ervin, Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security. The IG has examined several seaports to review targeting and inspection activities. Mr. Ervin and his staff have identified several staffing, procedural, and processing issues that could impair BCP's ability to detect and deter weapons of mass destruction. I look forward to reviewing these findings, and hearing what actions CBP has taken in response.

We also have two witnesses from two of our largest domestic seaports-the ports of Los Angeles-Long Beach and Newark, New Jersey. These BCP port representatives will provide valuable on-the-ground perspective on how the targeting and inspection programs are working. I look forward to their testimony. Finally, we have Steve Flynn, Senior Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations to provide his experience and insight on these matters.

In closing, I would like to point out that the weaknesses identified by the GAO and IG reports can be readily addressed. I am confident that BCP's existing targeting program is functional and effective. However, BCP needs to address and implement GAO's recommendations. The Subcommittee will continue to work with BCP to ensure the best targeting systems and inspection practices are implemented. We are not there yet, but we are well on our way.