House International Relations Committee - Afghanistan Drugs and Terrorism and U.S. Security Policy - Part 1

Federal News Service February 12, 2004 Thursday

February 12, 2004 Thursday

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN DRUGS AND TERRORISM AND U.S. SECURITY POLICY

CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE (R-IL)

LOCATION: 2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

WITNESSES: PANEL I:

MARK STEVEN KIRK (R-IL);

PANEL II:

ROBERT B. CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS;

WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, JR., COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE;

KAREN P. TANDY, ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION;

THOMAS W. O'CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE;

BRIGADIER GENERAL GARY L. NORTH, USAF, DIRECTOR OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS FOR ASIA-PACIFIC, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

BODY:
REP. HENRY J. HYDE (R-IL): The committee will come to order. Today's hearing continues this committee's oversight of the U.S. global war on terrorism, including efforts by the U.S. government to eliminate financial support for terrorism. We have learned much. In testimony before this committee last July, Ron Noble, the secretary- general of INTERPOL warned publicly that al Qaeda and other terrorist groups operating in Kosova, Syria, Lebanon, Chechnya and Northern Europe were materially benefiting from the sale of counterfeit goods such as music, popular goods, videos, jewelry, designer clothes similar to those items sold openly on the streets of every major city in the world.

The theft of intellectual property and its link to international terrorism will receive further attention from the committee this year, but today we turn our attention to a phenomenon that both derives benefits from and provides benefits to terrorists: the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan. This hearing will examine among other things how opium production in Afghanistan not only undermines Afghan reconstruction, but also fields Islamist terror groups including the Taliban, HiG and, according to recent reports, al Qaeda itself.

President Karzai has warned of the links between Afghan heroin and terrorism and has publicly stated that Afghan drug money is feeding terrorism. In testimony before this committee in April of 2002, the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration spoke of the presence of narco-terrorism in Afghanistan, which senior Afghan government officials have echoed. The administrator also noted that DEA had received multi-source information that bin Laden has suspected involvement in the financing and facilitation of heroin trafficking activities.

According to the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, opium production accounts for over 50 percent of Afghanistan's gross domestic product, generating an estimated $2 billion annually in economic activity. The Afghan government believes that 30 percent of families are involved in some form of opium cultivation and production. This production and associated crime and terror undermine security and pose a grave potential for massive, drug-related corruption at all levels in the fledgling government in Kabul. With national elections looming and a small national police force and army still in training, an expanding drug economy threatens to defeat the stability of Afghanistan and the region for which we and our allies have sacrificed so much.

The numbers are staggering. An estimated 70 percent of the world's opium production originates in Afghanistan, with an annual production of 3,600 tons. This generates 360 tons of morphine and heroin and vast amounts of illicit monies ripe for the taking by al Qaeda, the Taliban and their terrorist allies. For instance, recently reported seizures of several vessels carrying Afghan drugs in the Persian Gulf had an estimated street value of $11 million. Earlier seizures of Afghan drugs in Turkey worth hundreds of millions of dollars may also have been linked to al Qaeda and the Taliban.

We don't know how much al Qaeda can clear from facilitating or sponsoring any given drug transaction, but certainly the possibility of immense illegal profit exists with the significant strategic consequences. Al Qaeda is nothing if not flexible as it raises funds and, as I hardly need add, it respects no law, including Islamic law. It should be evident to everyone that we and our allies neglect the Afghan drug problem at our peril. We clearly have a possible narco- terrorist state in the making in Afghanistan, with all that means for our short and long-term strategic and security interests.

On October 30th, I wrote secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to express my growing concern about Afghanistan and the impact of illicit drugs on the fight against global terrorism. I am particularly grateful to have DOD representatives here today to provide testimony on this difficult and challenging problem. Let me make clear that I do not want our military forces, already tasked with the vital counterterrorism and stability operations, to become Afghanistan's anti-narcotics police. Responsibility for law enforcement eventually will fall to the new Afghan police, army, and judicial authorities we're helping to build, along with the valuable assistance from the DEA headed by its able administrator.

We need to first set priorities in this struggle against illicit drugs. Crop substitution programs and aggressive poppy eradication programs must be a part of a long-term strategy to curb the flow of Afghan opium onto the world market. But with so many livelihoods in Afghanistan dependent upon opium cultivation, and given the strength of regional warlords relative to the central government, an aggressive crop eradication program like the one underway in Colombia is likely to yield mixed results at best in the short term. Not until the central government is able to extend effective political control to more of the country will a crop substitution program be effective.

Nevertheless, we must ask if there is a way to more effectively fight the flow of opium in the near term. Permit me to suggest I believe we can. Now is the time for the Department of Defense to treat these labs and opium dumps as legitimate military targets, and to utilize DEA's narcotics-related intelligence to locate other such targets. Because of the brazen openness of the opium trade in Afghanistan, the locations of some of the numerous and massive opium processing labs and depots are well known to Afghans and coalition forces alike. It's my hope that until there is a viable Afghan national police and military in place, coalition forces will find the will to destroy these drug-related targets of opportunity.

When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, decrees against opium were issued, creating the impression that the Taliban were serious in the war on drugs. However, in fact, Taliban were merely regulating the drug trade in order to increase their share of the profits. Moreover, al Qaeda members often provided security for the drug trade. Both then and now, people have found it easy to move between terrorism and drug trafficking. Only by addressing the Afghan drug challenge can we make Afghanistan more secure.

In a synergistic fashion, we will learn more about the Taliban, HiG, and al Qaeda so that we may bring the fight to them and thus help reduce Afghanistan's transformation into a narco-state. DEA needs to develop an Afghan drug kingpin strategy, setting its sights on approximately 20 of the biggest drug dealers who threaten the emerging Afghan economy and democracy.

It's my hope that at today's hearing we'll learn that the U.S. government is developing a comprehensive strategy to combat Afghan drugs as part of its larger Afghanistan strategy. It is also my hope that the administration will explain why individual farmers fall prey to the exploitative terms of the opium traders, and in particular, how the United States intends to address the economic factors and the security void that have enveloped much of rural Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, however, the DEA's Operation Containment, now underway to stem the flow of drugs from Afghanistan, urgently needs support. In Turkey, Pakistan and Central Asia, the DEA has developed long-term allies. We compliment the DEA and DOD on the recent massive morphine and heroin seizures in Turkey and in the Persian Gulf, but we want to ensure that the Afghanistan anti-drug monies which Congress has provided are not used in isolation, but instead will be used to support the broader regional containment strategy.

On numerous occasions in recent years, this committee has expressed concern about the State Department's narrow view on linkages between drugs and terrorism. That we have an opium crisis in Afghanistan should not come as a surprise. It has been 28 months since the start of the campaign in Afghanistan and valuable time has been lost. A comprehensive and unified strategy addressing the connection between drug trafficking, security and terrorism is overdue.

To start with, the State Department can play an indispensable role in the success or failure of the DEA's expanded Operation Containment strategy for Afghanistan. I urge greater support on the ground from our U.S. diplomats in these countries for the terrorists reward program and stepped up communications with Afghanistan and regional governments about the broader threats posed by drug-related corruption and terrorism.

I am reminded of the long and debilitating internal debate on an appropriate U.S. response for Colombia. For years, we in Washington struggled over the questions of whether or not the FARC, ELN and the AUC were trafficking in narcotics to support their terrorist activities. When we removed our blinders, we learned they were and they still are. For too long, we focused U.S. resources separately on Colombia's drug trade and ignored the political insurgency.

In Afghanistan, we may make the same mistake, fighting pieces of the problem rather than the whole problem. In President Karzai's words, we're dealing with narco-terrorism in Afghanistan just as we faced it in Colombia. Working with the central government, the coalition needs to put forth a unified economic, political and security strategy for Afghanistan. I hope this hearing will help foster a consensus on such a strategy.

Let me now turn to my friend and colleague, Mr. Engel, for any opening statement he may wish to make.

REP. ELIOT L. ENGEL (D-NY): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me first of all thank you for holding this very important hearing and let me identify and associate myself with all of your excellent comments in your opening statement. Mr. Chairman, heroin and opium production in Afghanistan have skyrocketed in the last year. Twenty-eight of 32 provinces now grow opium poppy, and Afghanistan provides fully 70 percent of the world's heroin and opium supply.

It has long been suspected that al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups finance themselves whole or in part through drug trafficking. A recent committee investigation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other drug transit countries found ample evidence and near consensus by U.S. drug enforcement officers and the most senior host country officials on this point. On Tuesday, the head of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime told the conference in Kabul that hundreds of millions of dollars from narcotics are going to terrorists groups each year. He also said that drug trafficking can get so powerful, perhaps forming cartels much like the cocaine industry in Colombia, that it could become the primary power base within Afghanistan. It is impossible for anyone to credibly deny that drug trafficking does not fund al Qaeda, Taliban and other terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, if Afghanistan becomes as the interior minister warned last spring and as you mentioned in your opening statement, a narco-mafia state, we will have lost the war on terrorism there. Even if we capture Osama bin Laden and his henchmen, even if we capture Mullah Omar, Hekmatyar and the other terrorist leaders, we will still have failed in our mission. So long as Afghanistan's narco-warlords are allowed to grow, process and traffic heroin and opium, millions upon millions of dollars will end up flowing into terrorists hands.

We may have ended Afghanistan as a training ground for al Qaeda and other global terrorist groups, but until we go after the drug labs, the open air drug markets and the traffickers themselves, terrorism will still be nurtured. Mr. Chairman, the poppies growing today, the heroin and opium gum being processed in well known and apparent open air labs, may next year fund another September 11th. We hope not, but this is a reality.

I'm very concerned over the apparent reluctance of the Department of Defense to engage drug labs and other targets. The argument apparently is that they don't do counternarcotics, only operations against purely military forces. I believe this is woefully shortsighted. In early January, there was a British raid against a notorious drug lab in Northeastern Afghanistan, a firefight ensued and a British soldier radioed for air support. A U.S. A-10 ground attack aircraft answered the call and bombed the lab.

This was a great success and we could have sent a chilling message to the narcotics lords, your time is up and we're coming for you. Instead, there has been a palpable sense of embarrassment and denial from the U.S. military about this incident. Instead of seeing it as a lesson to build upon, it was clear to committee staff they did not want anything to do with it or with fighting drugs, they were only there to fight terrorists, as if there was a clear difference between them. It's obvious they're one and the same.

Perhaps part of the problem is that we have always had too few troops in Afghanistan to do the job properly. Perhaps it is bureaucratic tunnel vision of the Pentagon that believes it must only focus on fighting wars, not drugs. This administration used to believe that it wasn't the U.S. role to do nation building either, until it discovered that there can be no lasting victory, no success in regime change without civil and political reconstruction which is, of course, nation building.

So it is in Afghanistan. If we rebuild a government only to let it be taken over by drug kingpins, we will obviously fail in our mission. Eradication alone is not the answer, indeed whole scale eradication of the poppy crop is not a viable option at present. I wish it was. Without a credible alternative for poor farmers to provide for their families, large scale eradication could increase poverty and sympathy for anti-government forces. But by going after the drug labs and traffickers now, the United States would send a powerful and deadly message that the traffickers days are numbered.

Of course, it is critical to hunt down the remnants of al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist groups. I'm not advocating that the U.S. and other coalition partners redirect their forces away from that mission, but engaging, disrupting and destroying drug labs and traffickers, I believe is a crucial part of that mission. We will not be successful in Afghanistan and Afghanistan cannot become a responsible, free and secure country until we pull our heads out of the sand and deal with drug trafficking in a serious and rational way.

I look forward to the hearing, I look forward to our panelists, including our esteemed colleague, Congressman Kirk, and yield back the balance of my time.

REP. HYDE: Thank you, thank you, Mr. Engel.

Mr. Ballenger, do you have?

REP. CASS BALLENGER (R-NC): No, sir.

REP. HYDE: Very well, then.

Mr. Chabot, have you?

REP. STEVE CHABOT (R-OH): (Off mike.)

REP. HYDE: Mr. Delahunt? Thank you.

And Mr. Smith?

REP. SMITH: Well, just very, very briefly. We have to be concerned that we're not doing the job that we had planned to do, that hopefully we can do in terms of controlling drug production in Afghanistan. And so I think it's a very, very good hearing, Mr. Chairman, thank you.

REP. HYDE: Thank you.

I'd like to welcome Mark Steven Kirk, our colleague representing the 10th District of Illinois. Mr. Kirk began his career on the staff of his predecessor, Congressman John Porter, and he later served in the World Bank, the State Department, the law firm of Baker McKenzie, and the House Committee on International Relations. Mr. Kirk is here to discuss his findings from his recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan and, Mr. Kirk, if you would encapsulate your remarks into five minutes if you can. We'll be liberal of course, and your full statement will be made a part of the record.

REP. MARK STEVEN KIRK (R-IL): Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could ask consent to have the statement in the record?

REP. HYDE: Without objection.

REP. KIRK: I really appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee. As many of you know, I used to serve this committee on the staff under Chairman Gilman and so it's a great honor to be here. I'm here mainly to focus on the State Department rewards program. It has been essential in bringing the murderers of Americans to justice. I think with reforms, we can do an even better job. I recently returned from the Pakistani frontier and in Afghanistan where I reviewed the operations of the rewards program and operations with our allies. I think we can make this program more effective based on the findings of my recent mission.

Many members of this committee know the rewards program has had a number of successes in catching the killers of Americans. When Mir Aimal Kansi killed two Americans outside the CIA entrance in Virginia, he hid on Pakistan's frontier with Afghanistan. Agents form the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the FBI, our embassy staff working with Afghan and Pakistani police all coordinated a rewards program that led to the arrest of Kansi.

Program officers printed thousands of matchbook covers with pictures of Kansi giving clear instructions on how to pass information to authorities. A single tip from a matchbook cover led to the successful arrest of Kansi in this very difficult region. He was repatriated to the United States, convicted and sentenced to death. His arrest and prosecution is an example of effective interagency coordination and the work with our allies overseas to bring a murderer of Americans to justice.

In 1999, this committee helped pass legislation that would increase the reward to $25 million and also allow of the payment of information leading to the arrest of United Nations war crimes suspects. The program yielded impressive results in the Balkans where many persons indicted for war crimes, otherwise known as PIFWC's, were arrested and/or killed while attempting arrest, some of them for crimes such as the massacre of 7,000 people in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica.

This program has also been operating in Iraq. After publication of two $15 million rewards for the arrest of Saddam's two sons, Uday and Qusay Hussein, coalition authorities received a tip about the whereabouts of those two sons in Northern Iraq. The Hussein brothers resisted arrest and did not survive their encounter with coalition forces, but the program, the State Department's award program was key to generating the contacts that brought about that encounter.

In light of these successes, I traveled to Pakistan's frontier autonomous tribal area, where Osama bin Laden and key lieutenants are reported to be hiding. During the mission, I learned of several reforms that should be made in the rewards program to more effectively improve its operations in Central Asia. This region and the area across the border in Afghanistan is the source of three quarters of the world's supply of heroin. Under the Taliban dictatorship of Mullah Omar, Afghanistan imposed a strict Islamic code, for example, that banned all women from school.

Mullah Omar is also infamous not just for providing aid and comfort to bin Laden but also for his drug policy. Many news organizations reported that Mullah Omar banned the cultivation of poppies in Afghanistan in 2001. They are correct, and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan nearly disappeared that year. Almost all news organizations missed what else Omar did. Before banning the cultivation of poppy, he stockpiled 300 tons of refined heroin, in an attempt, la the Hunt brothers, to corner the heroin market in Central Asia. Throughout his tenure in office, he was one of the world's number one sellers of heroin.

Information in this part of the world is incomplete but the picture is now emerging regarding funding for terror in general, and for bin Laden in specific. The United Nations and allied financial control orders, it appears, have dried up al Qaeda and the Taliban's access to Wahabi donations from Saudi Arabia and the bin Laden family fortune. In response, these organizations have shifted their income to the processing and sale of heroin. In my meetings with officials of the U.S., U.K., Pakistani and Afghan governments, I learned that there are several heroin trafficking organizations operating in Afghanistan. At least three of these organizations, the HiG, the Taliban and al Qaeda, finance terror with the profits from the sale of heroin.

One organization deserves note. Operating out of the Afghan city of Kandahar, the heroin trafficking organization of Haji Bashir Noorzai reportedly provides 2,000 kilograms of heroin every eight weeks to bin Laden lieutenants in Pakistan. At the Pakistani price for heroin, this one conduit gives Osama bin Laden an annual income of $28 million a year. In total, the sale of heroin from Afghanistan yields $2.5 billion to drug traffickers and represents at least half of the economy.

There are now indications that bin Laden is attempting to boost his profits through his heroin network. On December 14th, two U.S. Navy vessels led by USS Decatur seized three dhows in the Arabian Gulf. This ships carried probable al Qaeda agents and $10 million worth of methamphetamine, hashish and heroin. If this cargo had made it to Turkey, al Qaeda would have been able to sell its heroin for five times the price it receives in Pakistan. If the network is able to reach New York, the profit would be multiplied by 40 times.

This information calls on us to update our picture of Osama bin Laden and his operations. He appears no longer to be supported by Wahabi and other foreign donations. Osama bin Laden has become one of the world's heroin drug kingpins.

In his new role, he has access to tens of millions of dollars to fund the terror network. In the frontier of Pakistan, he is one of the most wealthiest people. As we seek the arrest of people who kill Americans, especially Osama bin Laden, we need to update the rewards program to reflect the growing reliance by terrorists on the sale of heroin. I believe Congress should reform the rewards program to include the rewards for the arrest of drug kingpins and their lieutenants who are connected to terror.

There are other problems with operating law enforcement programs in this region. Most people in this part of Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot read or write. To effectively communicate a reward, we must use radio, the dominant means for most people in the region to get their news. The dominant radio program is the BBC's Pashto service. It is very important that we work with our allies in the U.K. to carry our message and the most trusted news organization in the region to where bin Laden is likely hiding.

Our new bill, the bill you introduced with Congressman Lantos, provides funding for media services and surveys to get the word out on potential rewards and how to contact authorities. It is critical that the program operate in the languages of rural people and through the media they trust to get the contacts we need to arrest the killers of Americans. Our bill also increases the total reward for the arrest of bin Laden to $50 million.

It also does this and something more important, it allows the State Department to provide rewards in commodities. For example, a tractor or farm animals, as well as cash. In this remote region, key commodities, such as a truck, can provide as much incentive as a large cash bounty. We should allow the State Department to provide flexible rewards in this area to make it more effective in this remote and rural region.

Mr. Chairman, I outlined the history of this program and the challenges it faces when operating in Pakistan or Afghanistan. I urge you and Mr. Lantos and this committee to move this legislation to the House floor as quickly as possible. It will make this program much more effective in this region. We tracked down Mir Aimal Kansi on the Afghan/Pakistani frontier border. We can do the same with other suspects with the reforms I proposed here. Thank you very much for the chance to testify.

REP. HYDE: Well, thank you, Congressman Kirk, for a very instructive, illuminating statement. We will certainly take into full consideration your suggestions and we appreciate it. Thank you.

REP. KIRK: Thank you.

REP. WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT (D-MA)(?): Mr. Chairman.

REP. HYDE: Who?

REP. DELAHUNT: I don't know whether --

REP. HYDE: We usually don't ask questions of congressional witnesses.

REP. DELAHUNT: I understand the practice, Mr. Chairman, and I want to applaud my friend for his presentation, and I agree with what he has to say. And I know he might have a busy schedule and I can always inquire of him, but if he has a moment, maybe he could respond to some questions.

REP. HYDE: Well, he's willing. Go ahead, Mr. Delahunt.

REP. DELAHUNT: Okay. And, again, I think Mr. Kirk's presentation was a good one. I support the legislation. And we've had discussions about this issue in the past and I share the concern that you've articulated. But I wonder if the fundamental answer here is a recognition that we need to have here the political will to recognize that there should be a commitment that's far more substantial in terms of support and assistance for the Karzai government than currently exists.

There was an interesting article-I don't know whether you saw it Mark-in the Wall Street Journal by Barnett Rubin and he indicates that upon analysis now, $28 billion over seven years is necessary, because we all know that we can capture these individuals these drug pins, and we can even hopefully at some point in time capture Osama bin Laden. But the-if there is unavailable a livelihood for the people of Afghanistan, if there is no security, then we're simply going to find others willing to replace them.

And I don't know whether you're familiar with the article, but upon my own review of it and review of other information, it appears-I think it's obvious that the amount of assistance is absolutely totally inadequate. And while we can pass measures such as the one that you've put forth here, we're never going to get there until we recognize that we have to upgrade our commitment in terms of resources if we're going to do what we want to do. Because in the end, I think it was-I had a quote here somewhere. This was President Karzai's brother, who says, "The Taliban are gathering again in the same places from where they started. It's like a rerun of an old movie."

What we don't want to do is to abrogate or to allow this opportunity after two years to escape, and have a rerun of al Qaeda bases and a Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan. I don't know if you have any comment or whatever,

REP. KIRK: I read the article, I agree with it. I think that the American people largely believe that we cannot neglect Afghanistan, as we did in the 1990s. That then allows it to metastasize into a narco-terrorist state. I think we had a bipartisan concern about assistance to Afghanistan. The administration originally did not request funds last year. Led by Chairman Kolbe, the Congress made the decision to provide additional funds to Afghanistan. I think that was a very wise choice and we need to increase that. We also need to update our picture of what's going on there.

I think, you know, we need to call somebody like Osama bin Laden. This is the new matchbook cover that's come out, what he is. The more accurate description of him is now narco-terrorist, because narco- terrorist describes not only his objective but it also now describes his funding. And so the recognition of that then gives us an understanding of how large this problem is. In my statement I talked about $2.5 billion of drug profits coming into Afghanistan. That is what President Karzai is up against. And so it's up against the international community, led by the United States, to give them the resources he needs to make sure that we do not devolve into another narco-state.

REP. DELAHUNT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HYDE: I would like to point out-Mr. Kirk, just before you leave, I'd like to point out in the supplemental appropriation for the defense and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, the International Narcotics Control received $170 million, and the military, the Department of Defense, received $73 million.

REP. KIRK: That's right. And --

REP. HYDE: And that was in the bill that some members did not vote for. And I appreciate Mr. Delahunt's suggestion that this is inadequate.

REP. KIRK: And we're looking forward to how the $73 million from the Defense Department will be committed. That's right.

REP. HYDE: Thank you very much.

REP. ENGEL: Mr. Chairman, if I just might, I want to just thank our colleague for testifying. It certainly was very enlightening testimony. I was going to make a remark before when you said you were going to be liberal with him. And I was glad to hear you say that you're liberal.

REP. HYDE: Small "L."

(Laughter.)

REP. ENGEL: And I want to tell-I want to tell our colleague that I'm always in awe of his knowledge in that. You know, when you're a former staffer of this committee, I think you have more knowledge than the members. So Congressman Kirk has the benefit now of being both.

REP. HYDE: Mr. Kirk comes from a great part of America.

(Laughter.)

REP. ENGEL: Okay. I agree, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HYDE: Thank you very much.

I'd like to welcome Karen P. Tandy. Ms. Tandy was confirmed as administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration in July of 2003. Prior to becoming DEA administrator, she was associate deputy attorney general and director of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces. She's a graduate of Texas Tech University and Law School.

Thomas W. O'Connell is the assistant secretary of Defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict. Prior to his appointment in 2003, Mr. O'Connell served as a senior manager for the Raytheon Company's intelligence and information systems. He is a distinguished military graduate from the University of Rhode Island, and holds an M.A. from the Naval War College. We welcome Mr. O'Connell.

He's accompanied by Brigadier General Gary North, direct of politico-military affairs for Asia-Pacific for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We welcome General North.

Robert Charles is assistant secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at the State Department. He previously served as chief counsel and staff director to the House National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, and as chief of staff for the speaker's Task Force on Counternarcotics. He holds a B.A. from Dartmouth College and M.A. from Oxford University. We welcome Mr. Charles. He is accompanied by Ambassador William Taylor, the Afghanistan coordinator for the U.S. Department of Defense. We welcome Ambassador Taylor.

Ms. Tandy, would you proceed with a five minute-give or take five-minute summary of your statement. And each of the witnesses' statements will be made a part of the record, without objection. Please proceed, Ms. Tandy.

MS. KAREN P. TANDY: Thank you, Chairman Hyde, and I want to thank the committee on behalf of the men and women of the Drug Enforcement Administration for your support for our efforts on behalf of this country. It is an honor to appear before you today. This is my first appearance before you in the capacity that I now serve as the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

The situation in Afghanistan presents DEA with a unique and enormous challenge. Afghanistan, as the chairman has noted, is the leading opium producer. However, the Afghan Counternarcotics Directorate is in its infancy stage of development, which leaves DEA with no viable national or local counterpart drug agency for us to work with. The country also lacks most of the basic elements of a criminal justice infrastructure. No developed police force, no prosecutors, no judges, no prisons. Moreover, security constraints restrict our in-country movement and the capability of our drug enforcement special agents to conduct traditional drug investigations.

Less than 48 hours ago, I was in Afghanistan, where Assistant Secretary of State Charles, Robby Charles, and I met with senior representatives form that country, form the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, from the European Union and the U.S. ambassador regarding Afghanistan's drug problem. I saw first hand the extent of the challenges that law enforcement faces in Afghanistan. But what I also saw were our opportunities, where we do have a chance to contribute more so to the reduction of drug production and contribute to the stabilization and the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

Let me first discuss briefly the current state of opium production and trafficking, and then discuss why I am cautiously optimistic about the future of drug enforcement efforts in Afghanistan. After the one-year ban on opium poppy cultivation imposed by the Taliban, Afghan growers have resumed business. In fact, production has returned to previously high levels, although not yet at the level reached in its peak year of 2000. Afghan heroin is primarily destined for Europe, but United States serves as part of its downstream market. Of course, any heroin reaching the United States is too much and there are opportunities now to disrupt that heroin and opium trade, and DEA's taking advantage of them.

First and foremost, as Chairman Hyde noted, DEA is continuing operation containment, and we are focused on regional and global investigations targeting the networks used to distribute Afghan heroin and its proceeds. This strategy has been very effective and I want to particularly thank the committee for its support for this initiative. Since January 2003, Operation Containment has led to 23 significant seizures of narcotics and precursor chemicals, and the dismantlement and disruption of several major transpiration and distribution organizations that are involved in the Southwest-Asian drug trade.

Most notably, it led to the disruption in Istanbul of one of the most significant trafficking organizations in Turkey, and led to an all-time record seizure of 7.4 tons of morphine base. This operation also resulted in the seizure of more than 1,000 kilograms of heroin in Turkey, and the arrest of several traffickers. This has been reported as the largest heroin seizure in Turkey's history. Further, Operation Containment has enhanced DEA's capability to gather intelligence regarding drug trafficking in this region, and to disseminate this information to both U.S. and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Program funding also has enabled DEA to step up its efforts to provide drug enforcement training to our counterparts in this region.

Our meetings this week in Afghanistan gave me reason for cautious optimism about the future of our drug enforcement efforts in Afghanistan. In particular, the Counternarcotics Directorate is continuing to increase its capability to interdict drugs and other contraband by employing mobile interdiction teams and programs such as the Kabul City Gates initiative. The Afghan authorities also are beginning to conduct raids in an effort to destroy morphine base and heroin processing labs.

To support these efforts, I have directed my agents to aggressively focus their intelligence collection on identifying heroin processing labs and sharing that information with our Afghan authority counterparts and our coalition partners. In addition, our offices in Kabul and throughout the region are working with our partners to identify the major heroin trafficking organizations and their money flow so that we can strategically attack them where they are most vulnerable.

As a result of my trip to Kabul and my discussions with the U.S. ambassador there, I intend to seek enhancement of DEA's resources in Kabul, at least threefold. In addition to Afghan opium production and trafficking, the committee also asked me to address the potential links between opium trafficking and terrorist groups in Afghanistan. DEA has identified a number of drug traffickers and money launderers with suspected ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda. One such example involved a joint DEA/FBI investigation targeting two heroin traffickers in Peshawar of Pakistan that led to the seizure of 1.4 kilograms of heroin in Maryland and the identification of two suspected money launderers, one with suspected ties to al Qaeda.

In another investigation conducted by the FBI in 2002, undercover agents negotiated with Pakistanis to exchange heroin and hashish for Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that were allegedly to be sold to al Qaeda. Other than these investigations, the quality of DEA's information regarding direct links between terrorist groups and activity and narcotics trafficking groups in Afghanistan at this time is generally uncorroborated or anecdotal. We know there are associations between the two groups, and there is fertile ground for these sinister relationships to flourish.

Raw intelligence and uncorroborated statements from confidential sources continue to indicate these relationships exist between drug traffickers and terrorist groups within Afghanistan. However, clear, corroborated evidence of these sources has been very difficult to obtain because of the restrictions on our ability to conduct full law enforcement investigations in Afghanistan. DEA, however, will continue to view as a pressing priority the investigation of further information linking drugs to terrorism.

In my written testimony I have addressed these topics in greater detail and will be happy to entertain the questions of this committee at the appropriate time. Thank you.

REP. HYDE: Thank you, Ms. Tandy.

Mr. O'Connell.

MR. THOMAS W. O'CONNELL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Hyde, distinguished members of the committee, it's my honor to appear before you today to discuss the problem of illegal narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan, its relation to narco-terrorism, and the programs we're developing to defeat this problem. I am particularly pleased to discuss these issues with you because the Congress has been very responsive in supporting my office's initiative in requesting funding for counternarcotics programs for Afghanistan in last year's Supplemental Appropriation Act. I have a statement that I will submit for the record in detail, summarize my statement now, with your permission, sir.

The narcotics problem in Afghanistan presents, indeed, a special challenge. The international community and the Afghan leadership, with the support of the United States, are addressing this challenge. The United Kingdom has the lead in providing international assistance, and the Afghan leadership, including President Karzai and Minister of Interior Jalali, is beginning to take action. This is the appropriate course to take, because this problem requires a long-term effort that the Afghan government must lead, and assistance from the United States and the rest of the international community is essential.

The Defense Department counternarcotics program for Afghanistan is being developed in coordination with and in support of the State Department's efforts to increase security and law enforcement. Our plan includes a mix of short and long-term actions. We will focus short-term efforts on ways that provide direct assistance to the Afghan government in coordination with the United Kingdom. At the same time, we are integrating our long-term aid to build an Afghan counternarcotics capability with the State Department's programs to train and field a new Afghan police force.

But we must do more than attack the immediate problem. We must also provide resources so that Afghan authorities can establish a more effective national police and counternarcotics capability. In that area, we intend to equip the police with communications gear and some surveillance and detection equipment. These efforts will be coordinated closely with the State Department. We're also examining different ways to increase border security, including constructing some border facilities.

As we develop and begin to execute this program, we understand that the narcotics program in Afghanistan is different from that problem in Latin America. In Afghanistan, the illegal narcotics industry is comparatively fragmented, with numerous organizations and smuggling networks involved in the trade. In addition, the extremist and terrorist elements in Afghanistan, which are also fragmented, including the Taliban remnants, the al Qaeda operatives and leaders, and other extremist groups, like the HiG, do not, by themselves, control narcotics networks.

So in Afghanistan, the problem we see consists of linkages and cooperative arrangements between disparate trafficking elements, extremist groups, and sometimes local leaders and even militia commanders. Poppy cultivation and the revenues generated from different aspects of the narcotics trade provide fresh resources for extremists and terrorists. The infrastructure of smuggling that supports narcotics trafficking also services terrorist transportation and logistics needs. Local leaders and commanders can use profits from narcotics to oppose a unified Afghan government that hopes to provide full security to its citizens.

We see illegal narcotics as a critical component of the challenge to political and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, and we see our counternarcotics program there as a very important part in our campaign against terrorism. In fact, we believe our counternarcotics efforts will bring additional weapons to bear in the fight against global terrorism. By making it more difficult for smugglers to transport illegal narcotics, we will also constrain their ability to support terrorists and extremists. By disrupting trafficking networks and reducing poppy cultivation, we will deprive terrorists and extremists of a potential new source of financial support.

I'd like to thank you, Chairman Hyde, and the members of the committee for the opportunity to testify before you. I look forward to discussing any questions you may have. Thank you, sir.

REP. HYDE: Thank you, Mr. O'Connell.

General North.

GEN. GARY L. NORTH: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Engel and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the link between drugs and terrorism in Afghanistan and the U.S. military's roles. I'd also like to thank you for your continued support for the men and women of our Armed Forces. As you know, that gracious support is critical to our operational successes.

In pursuit of our United States goals, the U.S. Central Command is fully engaged in building the Afghan security sector, and that enables reconstruction in Afghanistan. The security situation in Afghanistan varies from province to province. The primary areas of instability are in the east and in isolated areas of the south. In these areas, U.S. and coalition forces continue to face opposition from al Qaeda, Taliban and other anti-coalition elements.

In addition to reconstruction efforts, U.S. Central Command continues to conduct operations in the combined joint operating area of Afghanistan in order to destroy these groups and to prevent the re- emergency of international terrorist organizations. Under mission taskings, U.S. Central Command and its operational unit, the Combined Joint Task Force 180, do not directly conduct counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan. Their core military missions are substantial. They include security sector reform, reconstruction and combat operations to capture, kill and deny sanctuary for anti- coalition forces, the enemy.

Central Command is very aware of the role that narcotics plays in the overall security picture, and provides guidance for coalition forces that discover drugs, drugs paraphernalia, or drug labs during the course of normal operational military missions. Additionally, U.S. Central Command, working with the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and with other U.S. government agencies and the government of Afghanistan, is developing plans to establish better border controls and continues to share intelligence with other U.S. agencies, the United Kingdom and Afghan law enforcement entities. We will continue to provide support to the United Kingdom interdiction terms per current arrangements.

Mr. Chairman, in the sense of brevity, I will conclude my remarks and stand ready to answer questions at the appropriate time.

REP. HYDE: Thank you, General.

Mr. Charles.

MR. ROBERT B. CHARLES: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am both grateful for the chance to be here and grateful for your leadership on this issue. As you know, just hours ago, DEA Administrator Tandy and I were on the ground in Kabul, meeting with President Karzai and the United States ambassador, but also talking with young Marines, with INL and DEA agents on the ground, and with those who work every day among the Afghan people. As a result, I'd like to ask that my formal testimony be admitted to the record, but I would also like to put it aside and share with you some thoughts that washed over me on the plane on the way back.

First, for our sake and for the sake of the Afghan people, we cannot fail in this mission. If we don't tackle narco-terrorism head on in Afghanistan now, it will tackle us in places all over the region, and in time, all over the globe. That really means locking horns with five core missions: deterring future trafficking and poppy planting through more visible and aggressive interdiction, eradication, lab destruction and law enforcement support. Preventing the institutionalization of a heroin economy; that is we have to work fast and creatively to nurture a real, not false and corrupt, market economy, based on a wide range of agricultural products trading on a free market.

We have to accelerate efforts to stabilize, encourage and follow with the lead of the central government and President Karzai. He has made a clear, strong anti-drug, anti-terror commitment. And if he is willing to do that from within a palace with bullet holes in its windows, we need to put every ounce of effort behind him. We need to use all possible means in Afghanistan and neighboring countries to block the flow of heroin money to criminal warlords and known terrorists. And we need to build the justice sector, even as we train the police. We need to continue the process of bringing a non-corrupt democracy to life in a sustainable way as an example for others across the Middle East and across Central Asia.

From my perspective, these are the needs that are both-these are the primary needs, and they are both important and urgent. To some degree, they are already being met, but we must accelerate that effort. We must make measurable progress toward these goals this year, and we will bear the-or we will bear the consequences for decades to come.

So how do we get there? First, as you and your staff know and Congressman Kirk has well articulated, we must speak truthfully, openly, and without either over or understatement about the linkages that tie Afghan heroin to identifiable terrorist groups. While the information available may not rise to an evidentiary standard in every case, we can and should say that the information we have makes the nexus solid, and to some degree, actionable.

After that-after all, even when they were more inclined to bank transfers than to hawala and using heroin as a currency, terrorists-neither drug traffickers nor terrorists offered the evidentiary comfort of filing CMIRs or suspicious transaction reports. What we know about how they do, what they do, will never be complete.

That cannot be a barrier to coordinated action in Afghanistan any more than it could have been or should be in Colombia. If we do not tackle these linkages in their infancy in post-Taliban Afghanistan, the links will tighten and harden, allowing an as yet unborn set of cartels to destabilize a free Afghanistan, to corrupt nascent democratic institutions, to create a culture of hopelessness, and to export that instability westward and northward.

In short, the institutionalization of the drug terror nexus would be both anti-democratic and opportunity-crushing. To address this reality, INL is working with DEA and DOD and others, not least the Afghans and our foreign partners, Great Britain, Germany and Italy, to accelerate change on the ground. With at least 40 percent of the Afghan GDP arguably tied to heroin, the risks of an un-tethered narco- economy producing a chain reaction that reverses gains to date, ushering in some kind of corrupt and ungovernable narco-state is real.

That is why INL is building seven police training facilities and plans to have trained or retrained at least 20,000 Afghan police officers by late next summer. Several thousand have already graduated our Kabul academy and are on the job. Four of the academies are due to be complete by February 26th. Each academy will train between 500 and 1,250 police in basic police skills. In coordination with German efforts, the endgame is 50,000 border and Afghan national police in place by December 2005.

Of the $170 million in supplemental money for INL programs in Afghanistan, $110 million will press this goal. INL, which is going through a metamorphosis of its own on several fronts, is also involved in hands-on creation of a comprehensive justice sector. For all intents and purposes, that is a ground-up exercise. Prosecutors, courts, judges, prisons, and the bedrock of it all, the very laws that allow both prosecution and the protection of human rights, must all be brought online.

Finally, let me say a word again about becoming more aggressive on counternarcotics. We must now be in the business of sending strong signals on interdiction, prosecution, stockpile destruction, lab destruction, and a nationwide well-targeted eradication campaign, one that is credible, one that reinforces the religious undercurrent of disapproval about heroin production, and one that is tied to making rapidly available some legitimate alternative income streams.

Because justice sector reform and ramped up interdiction will take time, the urgency of sending a strong anti-cultivation and pro- alternative development signal is high. As we work with our Italian partners on justice sector reform, we must redouble our efforts with the British to build out provincial and then centralized eradication teams in support of President Karzai's commitment to do so.

As the head of the UNODC pointed out in Kabul two days ago, poppy farms in Afghanistan get about a dollar from the quantity of heroin or morphine that will generate $100 on the streets of Paris or New York. That money is not going to the farmers. It is going to international criminals, warlords and narco-terrorists. With the proper mix of incentives and deterrents, farmers will turn back to growing food like wheat and other legitimate products. Hospitals, roads and schools can be conditioned on village-wide eradication, which has worked very well in Peru. And farmers will learn that there is no profit in producing poppies for a warehouse or a lab that is likely to be blown up.

Intelligence will improve, government institutions will begin to function as they have in other nations, and Afghanistan, with your help, will get out from underneath the narco-terrorist threat and on with life as a free democracy under the rule of law. When that happens, Afghanistan's national security and our national security here in the United States of America will be significantly enhanced. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.