Lieberman Delivers Major Address on Afghanistan and Pakistan Policy

Lieberman Delivers Major Address on Afghanistan and Pakistan Policy

Senator Joe Lieberman (ID-CT) today delivered remarks on "Preventing the Unthinkable in South Asia: Rolling Back the Taliban's Gains in Pakistan and Afghanistan" at a conference hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC.

In his address, Senator Lieberman said:

"Yesterday, Secretary Gates announced that Stan McChrystal will become the new four-star commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, with Lieutenant General Rodriguez as his three-star deputy. Both General McChrystal and Lieutenant General Rodriguez are innovative, impressive officers with significant counterinsurgency experience, and I have great faith in the new leadership and new ideas they will bring to our war effort.

"To begin with, I hope they will carry out a top-to-bottom, joint strategic assessment of our counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, together with Ambassador Eikenberry—just as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker did when they took charge in Iraq in the spring of 2007.

"I also hope they will immediately carry out an overhaul of the military command structure they have inherited, which is plainly inadequate. Lt. Gen. Rodriguez should be supported by a full three-star corps headquarters in Kabul, to serve as an operational command for the nationwide war effort. This would replicate the successful structure we have in Iraq, in which there is both a four-star headquarters responsible for overall strategy, and a three-star corps headquarters beneath it responsible for running the day-to-day war."

Senator Lieberman also stressed the need for American aid to be matched by Pakistani political will and determination:

"The events of the last few weeks must be a wake-up call to the Pakistani security establishment. It is past time that the Pakistan Army and the ISI, in particular, recognize that it is regional Islamist extremist groups that pose the real existential threat to the survival of their country.

"Over the last thirty years, unfortunately, elements of the Pakistani security establishment have grown accustomed to seeing these extremist groups not as enemies of the state that must be decisively defeated, but as potential instruments of the state that can be managed and controlled.

"That strategic outlook is a terrible mistake and must be rejected—not as a favor to the United States, but because tolerating or maintaining linkages to these extremist groups no longer advances Pakistan's own vital national interests. On the contrary, it jeopardizes them. Far from helping Pakistan to protect itself or secure strategic depth beyond its borders, they are instead making Pakistan less safe and eroding the Pakistani government's control of its own territory."

Below is the full text of his remarks, as prepared for delivery:

Thank you, Ashley, for that kind introduction.

There are few people in Washington who are as broadly and deservedly respected for their expertise as Ashley Tellis.

Ashley is a brilliant scholar and strategist, whose knowledge and understanding of a critical part of the world, at a critical moment in our history, is unsurpassed. I am delighted to be here today to mark the release of the important and insightful report he has written, "Reconciling with the Taliban? Toward An Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan."

This report—and the broader discussion it has inspired today here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—could not be timelier, as recent events have reinforced why Afghanistan and Pakistan are now the central front of the worldwide fight against Islamist extremism. These are two unique countries in one theater of conflict, but the conflict in each country is different, and each must be understood on its own terms.

In Pakistan, the world has watched with alarm over the past month as the Taliban has gone on the offensive, first consolidating control over the Swat Valley and then striking into the neighboring districts of Dir and Buner, just sixty miles from Islamabad.

The spread of the Taliban from the FATA into the settled areas of the North West Frontier Province has been described by some as a "wake up call." I certainly hope so, and in several different respects.

First, it should be a wake-up call to the Pakistani people about the nature and intentions of the Taliban, the intolerant, totalitarian vision they seek to impose over the entire country, and the danger of affording them sanctuary or safe haven anywhere on Pakistani territory—whether in the FATA, or Baluchistan, or the NWFP. Indeed, I suspect that the brutal and fanatical behavior of the Taliban during their occupation of Swat has probably done more to discredit their cause and galvanize Pakistani society against them, than anything we could ever say or do.

Second, the events of the last few weeks in Pakistan should be a wake-up call to us that there really is a moderate majority in Pakistan that rejects the violent extremism of the Taliban, and that is waiting to be mobilized. We see graphic proof of this in the angry denunciations of the Taliban's brutality by the refugees who are fleeing their oppressive rule in Swat, and who are desperately looking to their government for help and protection.

In fact, every time the Pakistani people vote, they reject the Islamist extremists, as they did in Swat just last year. The Taliban offensive is an attack by an extremist minority against the Pakistani majority.

Unfortunately, our enemies in Pakistan have been far more adept at mobilizing the extremist minority than our allies have proven adept at mobilizing and protecting the moderate majority. There is reason to hope that is now changing.

Reversing this dynamic will require a sustained and robust counterinsurgency effort on the part of the entire Pakistani government, both civilian and military. And it will also require a sustained and robust strategic commitment on our part to help the democratically-elected Pakistani government to develop the new capabilities it needs in this critical cause.

This must include increased support for the reform and strengthening of the Pakistani security forces, including not just the army but also the police, so that they can defeat the militants while protecting the surrounding civilian population.

It must also include greater support for Pakistan's civilian institutions of governance, so that they can provide basic services, uphold the rule of law, and create a climate of economic opportunity for Pakistan's people. It is failures and shortcomings in precisely these areas that create a gap between the Pakistani citizenry and their government that insurgents then exploit.

Ultimately, however, American aid will only be meaningful if it is matched by genuine Pakistani political will and determination to decisively defeat all of the militant groups that have entrenched on their territory.

For this reason, the events of the last few weeks must be a wake-up call to the Pakistani security establishment. It is past time that the Pakistan Army and the ISI, in particular, recognize that it is regional Islamist extremist groups that pose the real existential threat to the survival of their country.

Over the last thirty years, unfortunately, elements of the Pakistani security establishment have grown accustomed to seeing these extremist groups not as enemies of the state that must be decisively defeated, but as potential instruments of the state that can be managed and controlled.

That strategic outlook is a terrible mistake and must be rejected—not as a favor to the United States, but because tolerating or maintaining linkages to these extremist groups no longer advances Pakistan's own vital national interests. On the contrary, it jeopardizes them. Far from helping Pakistan to protect itself or secure strategic depth beyond its borders, they are instead making Pakistan less safe and eroding the Pakistani government's control of its own territory.

Some people say that the ISI has been reluctant to break its historic ties with regional extremist groups like the Afghan Taliban, because it doubts America's staying power in Afghanistan, and consequently believes that Pakistan will one day need the Taliban as a proxy force to pursue its interests there, after the United States leaves.

This is a losing strategy for Pakistan for several reasons.

The first is that the United States isn't going to leave Afghanistan. The second is that we and our Afghan allies are going to win there. The Taliban syndicates including the Quetta shura and the Haqqani network are going to be defeated. Betting on them, and against us and our Afghans allies, is neither a wise nor principled long-term strategy to defend Pakistan's legitimate interests in the region.

In the interim, moreover, linkages with Afghan insurgent groups—rather than helping Pakistan in Afghanistan—are undermining its influence there.

A recent nationwide poll found that 91 percent of Afghans have an unfavorable opinion of Pakistan. In fact, only 5 percent of Afghans think that Pakistan is playing a positive role in their country. By contrast, according to this same poll, India enjoys a 74 percent approval rating in Afghanistan.

These numbers should not just wake up Pakistan's strategists and leaders, but jolt them from their chairs. And the message is clear: the fact that most Afghans are convinced that Pakistan is waging a proxy war against their country is weakening Pakistan's position there.

I am optimistic there is a rising tide in Pakistan that recognizes that the use of Islamist extremists as regional proxies has reached a strategic dead end, and that these groups now pose an existential threat to the Pakistani state itself.

Every day, it bears emphasizing, countless Pakistanis risk their lives to oppose the terrorists on their territory, from the soldiers fighting in Swat and elsewhere in the NWFP and the FATA, to the civil servants who go to work despite Taliban intimidation, and to the democratically-elected leaders, journalists, and members of civil society who have publicly denounced the militants and are demanding a sustained campaign to defeat them. In all of these people we see the moderate majority that exists in Pakistan, and that we must do everything in our power to strengthen, to protect, and to support.

This also carries important implications for those here in the United States and in Europe who are pressing for deadlines for withdrawal from Afghanistan, or calling for reconciliation with top Taliban leaders.

Put simply, the more we hedge our bets in Afghanistan, the more we can expect the Pakistanis will be pushed to hedge their bets there too—in ways that will make our broader fight against extremism in both Afghanistan and Pakistan monumentally more difficult. Conversely, the more likely it appears that the United States and our allies are going to stay and prevail in Afghanistan, the weaker the case of those in Pakistan who argue for maintaining ties to the Taliban.

That is why I completely agree with the recommendations about Afghanistan that are contained in Ashley's report. As he puts it, "only a serious, long-term commitment to building an effective Afghan state—an 'invest-and-endure' strategy—will work." That is absolutely right.

I believe the Obama administration understands this. It is to President Obama's credit that he has begun to increase both the military and non-military resources that are required for a robust and comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan—a strategy that is focused on protecting the Afghan people, empowering the Afghan government, developing the Afghan economy, and defeating decisively the insurgents.

The President also spoke eloquently and strongly during the trilateral summit last week about what he called our "lasting commitment... to support the democratically-elected, sovereign governments of both Pakistan and Afghanistan." As the President rightly promised, "That commitment will not waver, and that support will be sustained."

The foremost challenge now in Afghanistan is to match words with deeds, and ensure that the President's stated strategy is implemented effectively. First and foremost, this means we need to have in place a joint civil-military campaign plan for Afghanistan, that ties together all of the elements of our national power, to defeat the insurgency.

Yesterday, Secretary Gates announced that General Stan McChrystal will become the new four-star commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, with Lieutenant General Rodriguez as his three-star deputy. Both General McChrystal and General Rodriguez are innovative, impressive officers with significant counterinsurgency experience, and I have great faith in the new leadership and new ideas they will bring to our war effort.

To begin with, I hope they will carry out a top-to-bottom, joint strategic assessment of our counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, together with Ambassador Eikenberry—just as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker did when they took charge in Iraq in the spring of 2007.

I also hope they will immediately carry out an overhaul of the military command structure they have inherited, which is plainly inadequate. Lt. Gen. Rodriguez should be supported by a full three-star corps headquarters in Kabul, to serve as an operational command for the nationwide war effort. This would replicate the successful structure we have in Iraq, in which there is both a four-star headquarters responsible for overall strategy, and a three-star corps headquarters beneath it responsible for running the day-to-day war.

There is also an urgent need for us to commit to expand the end strength of the Afghan National Security Forces—both the army and the police, under the strong and effective leadership of two great Afghan leaders, Minister of Defense Wardak and Minister of the Interior Atmar. A total Afghan national security force of 425,000 to 450,000 is required, and the longer we put off this decision, the longer we put off the day that this war can be brought to a successful end.

With all due respect, this is a decision that should have been made long ago, and there is no excuse for any further delay.

The path ahead in Afghanistan and Pakistan will be hard and costly, but it is the right path for the U.S. to take. The bipartisan consensus that now exists in support of our efforts in these countries will undoubtedly be tested in the months ahead, in particular as American casualties rise. But I remain confident that we can and will sustain the long-term political commitment that is necessary to turn the tide against the Islamist extremists who attacked us on September 11, and with whom we have been necessarily at war.

We also have genuine allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, beginning with Hamid Karzai and Asif Ali Zardari, two well-intentioned and democratically-elected presidents. They are our friends on the frontlines of the fight against terrorism. Rather than throwing barbs at them, we need to build relationships of trust with them that will help them become the transformational and historic national leaders they want to be.

As President Obama put it last week, "We have learned, time and again, that our security"—the security of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States—"is shared. It is a lesson that we learned most painfully on 9/11, and it is a lesson that we will not forget."

In many respects, Afghanistan and Pakistan are where the war on terror truly began. They are also where we and our allies can begin to bring this war to a successful end. Thank you.

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