Hearing of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics of the House Science and Technology Committee - Keeping the Space Environment Safe for Civil and Commercial Users

HEARING OF THE\, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS OF THE HOUSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: KEEPING THE SPACE ENVIRONMENT SAFE FOR CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL USERS

CHAIRED BY: REP. GABRIELLE GIFFORDS (D-AZ)

WITNESSES: LARRY D. JAMES, COMMANDER, 14TH AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND; NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CHIEF SCIENTIST FOR ORBITAL DEBRIS, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION; RICHARD DALBELLO, VICE PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, INTELSAT GENERAL CORPORATION; SCOTT PACE, DIRECTOR OF THE SPACE POLICY INSTITUTE, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

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Good afternoon, everyone, and welcome to today's hearing of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee. One of my favorite photographs can be seen in the other room, which is the Hubble's deep field photograph where you look at it from a distance and it looks like it's a photograph of a bunch of stars. But as you get closer, you see in fact it's a photo of a bunch of galaxies.

And the more you learn about this incredible photograph, you realize they just decided to take an image from Hubble into the universe, and it's approximately as large as your thumb if you were to hold it up. And it really goes to show, as Kurt Vonnegut said, this universe is a big place.

And that's why it's such a surprise to me and many others on the subcommittee when we heard the news that two satellites had collided in orbit in February of this year. It's hard to believe that space has gotten that crowded. It was equally difficult to believe that nothing could have been done to prevent the collision, given that one of the satellites was active, and by all accounts would have had the capability to maneuver out of harm's way.

But the collision did happen. And the resulting increase in space debris has made the space environment more hazardous to civil and commercial satellites and spacecraft alike for many, many years to come.

So now it's three months later, and as someone like myself who serves both on the House Science Committee and also on the House Armed Services Committee, I believe that I speak for my colleagues on both committees and others as well, that we want to know where things stand, and we want to know what we need to do in order to keep an event such as the one that happened in February from happening again.

For example, how confident can we be that we're not going to face a similar hazardous situation in the near future between a commercial satellite and a U.S. or another nation's government spacecraft? Equally important, what assurance can we have that there will be adequate warning of a potential collision before it is too late to do anything about it?

We also want to hear how DOD, NASA, the commercial space operators, and other spacefaring nations coordinate in order to minimize the threat of such occurrences, and is the information on space debris and potential collisions getting to the people who need it when they need it.

In short, was the February collision a fluke that could have been avoided, or do we need to improve our national and international capabilities for keeping the space environment safe for both civil and commercial users? If so, what is needed, and how do we go about getting it put into place? We hope to get the answers today to these important questions at the hearing, and I believe that we have a good panel of witnesses to help us in our oversight of this important issue.

One thing is already clear -- the space environment is getting increasingly crowded due to the relentless growth of space debris. Many say that if we do nothing, the problem will continue to get worse. As our witnesses will testify, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network is currently tracking more than 19,000 objects that are in orbit around the earth.

In addition, it is estimated that there are more than 300,000 pieces of debris as small as a 1/2 inch in size orbiting the earth, including most recently a small spatula and a toolkit as well. So it is clear to me that if spacefaring nations of the world don't take steps to minimize the growth of space junk, we will eventually face a situation where low earth orbit become a risky place to carry out civil and commercial space activities.

This subcommittee wants to avoid that kind of space future if we can, and this hearing is going to be an important milestone in that effort. With that, I want to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses, and I look forward to your testimony. And with that, I'd like to recognize Mr. Olson for any opening remarks he'd like to make.

REP. PETE OLSON (R-TX): Well, thank you, Madame Chairwoman, for calling this afternoon's hearing. I believe this is the first time that the committee has considered this issue -- subcommittee has considered this issue.

And my thanks to the witnesses for taking time out of your busy schedules to appear before us today. I know you've invested many hours of preparation for today's hearing, and I'm grateful for your efforts and your expertise.

Satellite collisions and the danger posed by satellite debris have captured the public's and the industry's attention. As the chairwoman alluded to, the Iridium-Cosmos collision should serve as a stark signal that spacefaring nations can no longer be complacent about the threats posed to all who use space.

Congress and the administration must also take note as we endeavor to establish future policies and programs that rely on routine access in user space. There are many issues I look forward to hearing about today and to ask questions about our path forward.

As more countries join the ranks of spacefaring nations, all of us must determine ways to prevent future collisions, to mitigate the threat of debris, how best to track debris, how to minimize debris generation during future launches, and to better understand the economic and operational effects that space debris imposes on civil, commercial, and military users.

Once again, this committee is addressing an issue that has moved from the realm of science fiction to one of science fact. Can we track a bolt that came off a dead satellite moving at thousands of miles an hour to prevent it from hitting a still working spacecraft that is critical to our daily lives or to the lives of the crew that is on board that spacecraft?

The chance of this may not be as great as the chance of me getting into a fender bender going down the Gulf Freeway during rush hour. But the consequences are much greater than a traffic jam caused in one rush hour. No other nation has heavily invested in space-based commerce, national security, and environmental monitoring research as the United States of America.

Given the critical role that space plays in our daily lives and one that is so critical to preserving our high standard of living, we simply must improve our ability to monitor and mitigate the threats posed by other satellites and space debris, and we can't stop at our borders. I think it's critical that we must also convince other spacefaring nations of the urgency to adopt similar strategies, especially as more and more satellites are lofted into more and more crowded orbits.

To the unknowing, the term "space traffic management" may sound a bit geeky, a little esoteric. But as I was preparing for this afternoon's hearing, I was quickly convinced that the term has real meaning, and describes a discipline we all need to pay close attention to.

I am aware that government-owned and operated satellites rely on intensive monitoring programs to avoid collisions with other satellites and debris. But as more and more satellites come into use, especially from commercial users many of whom are from overseas countries, the challenge of maintaining safe separation will grow.

Again, I want to thank our chairwoman for convening this timely and important hearing, and thanks again to our witnesses. I'm anxious to hear your testimony and ask you some questions later on.

Madame Chairwoman, I yield my time back.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you, Mr. Olson.

If there are members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your statements will be added to the record at this point. At this time, I'd like to introduce our witnesses.

First up, we have Lieutenant General Larry D. James who is a commander of the 14th Air Force, Air Force Space Command, and the commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space. Welcome.

We also have Mr. Nick Johnson who is the chief scientist for orbital debris for NASA. So welcome, Mr. Johnson.

We have Mr. Richard DalBello who is the vice president of government relations at Intelsat General Corporation. Glad you're here.

And finally have Dr. Scott Pace, who is the director of the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University.

As our witnesses should know, you will each have five minutes for your spoken testimony. I know that's not a long period of time, but it'll keep us on track. Your written testimony will be included for the record for the hearing. And when you've all completed your spoken testimony, we'll begin questions. Each member will have five minutes to question the panel. And I would like to begin with General James.

LT. GEN. JAMES: Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Olson, and distinguished members of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, I'm honored to be here today for my first opportunity to appear before you as United States Strategic Command's commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space.

It's a distinct privilege to address you on the challenges faced by civil and commercial space users, and to represent the men and women of JFCC SPACE who employ space capabilities around the globe everyday.

Today, I'll focus my discussion on what the current space environment looks like, how we work with commercial space users through the Commercial and Foreign Entities Pilot Program, and identify some of the challenges we face as we work to meet the growing challenges of operating safely in an increasingly complex and congested environment.

Space traffic growth today is both a challenge and a concern. In 1980, only 10 countries were operating satellites in space. Today, 9 countries operate spaceports, more than 50 countries own or have partial ownership in satellites, and citizens of 39 nations have flown in space.

In 1980, we were tracking approximately 4,700 objects in space; 280 of those objects were active satellites while another 2,600 were debris. Today we're tracking, as you said, approximately 19,000 objects, 1,300 active payloads, and about 7,500 pieces of debris. So in 29 years space traffic has quadrupled. We've made progress in improving our space situational awareness.

However, as you noted, February's collision between an active Iridium communications satellite and an inactive Russian satellite and the January (2000 ?) test of a Chinese ASAT continue to shape our future planning by tangibly demonstrating the vulnerability of our space assets.

With an increased use of space by a growing number of state and non-state users and the increased threats to our valuable space systems, it is paramount that the Department of Defense in collaboration with its partners in the U.S. government, work hand-in- hand with civil, commercial, and international operators to ensure a safe environment.

The DOD does have a sound relationship with commercial space providers and operators, particularly those commercial communication and remote imaging organizations that support U.S. national security activities. The relationship includes formal contractual arrangements for the provision of service to the DOD, routine strategic-level meetings between the commercial satellite CEOs and DOD senior civilians and officers, and numerous working-level meetings.

As part of the Commercial and Foreign Entity Pilot Program or CFE Program, commercial users can access the Air Force Space Command space-track.org website to obtain unclassified element set data on current catalogued objects. If a user would like more information, they must sign an agreement for CFE support via the website, and submit a specific request for specific support.

The CFE Pilot Program has been successful in transitioning the routine provision of satellite positional information from NASA to Air Force Space Command. Air Force Space Command has also developed an initial set of legal agreements.

These agreements allow for the provision of additional services such as conjunction assessments and launch support, and help identify the long-term desires of commercial and foreign entities for space situational information. The DOD intends to operationalize the support to commercial and foreign entities in the fall of 2009.

The goal is to seamlessly transition the program from an Air Force Space Command pilot program to a U.S. Strategic Command operational activity. The Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force base will be the central node for sharing of information.

We will continue to work closely with the commercial and foreign space communities to understand their evolving needs and desires for space situational awareness information, and continue to grow our cooperative relationships to share information in ways that will improve spaceflight safety.

Space situational awareness is more than understanding the space environment, tracking objects, and conducting conjunction assessments. We need to be able to discriminate between natural and man-made threats. We need to understand the location, the status, and purpose of these objects, their capabilities and their owners' intent.

This comprehensive knowledge allows decision-makers to rapidly and effectively select courses of action to ensure our sustained freedom of action and safety in what is a contested environment. To get there we require more networked sensors and information systems that seamlessly share information to more effectively use our current resources.

The U.S. must continue to lead the community of spacefaring nations and encourage responsible behavior in the space environment. The United States' dependence on space across our military, civil, and commercial sectors requires improved space situational awareness and command and control capabilities to ensure our ability to safely and effectively operate in a dynamic and contested environment.

Working in collaboration with other departments and agencies in the U.S. government, DOD must continue to build relationships, processes, and capabilities within the global space community that allow us to operate effectively together to meet the needs of national defense.

Thank you for inviting me here today, and I look forward to your questions.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you.

Mr. Johnson, please.

MR. JOHNSON: Madame Chairwoman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the important topic of space debris.

While the adage "what goes up must come down" still applies in the space age, most satellites take a very long time to fall back to earth. In many cases, this descent can take hundreds or even thousands of years.

Thus, the numerous operational satellites as well as the human- occupied international space station now circling the globe performing vital functions of communications, navigation, earth observation, science and research, exploration, and defense are accompanied by a much larger population of defunct spacecraft, derelict launch vehicle orbital stages, intentional refuse, and the products of more than 200 satellite explosions and collisions.

For 30 years, NASA has led the world in scientific studies to characterize the near-earth space debris environment, to assess its potential hazards to the current and future space operations, and to identify and to implement means of mitigating its growth. Since 1988, the United States national space policy has specifically addressed the need to limit the growth of the space debris population.

The current national space policy, signed by the president in 2006, charges U.S. government agencies and organizations with seeking, quote, "to minimize the creation of orbital debris by government and non-government operations in space, in order to preserve the space environment for future generations." End quote.

The policy also states, quote, "The United States shall take a leadership role in international fora to encourage foreign nations and international organizations to adopt policies and practices aimed at debris minimization." End quote. In 1995, NASA was the first U.S. government organization to establish formal space debris mitigation guidelines.

In 2001, the U.S. government orbital debris mitigation standard practices, based upon the NASA space debris mitigation guidelines, was adopted after a lengthy and thorough intergovernmental review and coordination with the aerospace industry.

The fundamental elements of these standard practices were adopted in 2002 by the major spacefaring nations under the auspices of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee whose members represent the space agencies of 10 countries, as well as the European Space Agency. In 2007, the United Nations, through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, adopted a similar set of space debris mitigation guidelines.

While NASA continues to promote the curtailment of the generation of new space debris, we must also operate in the existing debris environment. To this end, NASA designs spacecraft to withstand small particle impacts, and the agency works with the U.S. Space Surveillance Network to avoid collisions between our space assets and the known resident space objects.

NASA procedural requirements call for conjunction assessments or close approach predictions to be performed for all our maneuverable spacecraft. During 2008, NASA twice maneuvered robotic spacecraft of the earth observation system in low earth orbit, and once maneuvered a tracking and data relay satellite in the geosynchronous orbit to prevent potential collisions.

Twice since last August, the International Space Station has conducted collision avoidance maneuvers. The recent collision of two intact satellites underscores NASA's 1970s' era finding reiterated more recently in a NASA study published in Science in 2006, that the amount of space debris already in earth orbit is sufficient to lead to more accidental collisions, which in turn will lead to an unintended increase in space debris and increased risk to operational space systems.

In the future, such collisions are likely to be the principal source of new space debris. The most effective means of limiting satellite collisions is to remove non-functional spacecraft, and launch vehicle orbital stages from earth orbit. However, the remediation of the near-earth space environment presents substantial technical and economic challenges.

The threat posed by orbital debris to the reliable operation of space systems will continue to grow unless the sources of debris are brought under control. The international aerospace community has already made significant strides in the design and the operation of space systems to curtail the creation of new orbital debris, but more can be done.

Currently, the Department of Defense' Commercial and Foreign Entities Program is the principal means of distributing space situational awareness data to space system operators and the general public. Enhancements of this program, both to serve a larger number of users and to increase the variety of services available, especially conjunction assessments, offer the greatest near-term and lowest cost improvement to space safety.

I'll be happy to respond to any questions you and the other members may have. Thank you.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. DalBello.

MR. DALBELLO: Chairwoman Giffords, Ranking Member Olson, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for this opportunity to discuss the role that the commercial satellite industry plays in keeping the space environment safe for the civil and commercial users.

The commercial satellite industry has been providing essential space services for almost as long as humans have been in space. Today Intelsat operates a fleet of over 50 satellites. In response to business opportunities and changing market needs, we routinely replace satellites and relocate them in orbit.

To change the orbital location of a satellite, we must delicately move a minibus-sized object, multi-ton object traveling thousands of kilometers an hour through the crowded geostationary arc, avoiding the potential for collision with or for disturbing the radio communications of, any one of the hundreds of commercial and government satellites in that orbit.

By and large, this process takes place without government regulation or oversight, using rules developed through experience and implemented by consensus among the commercial operators themselves. This remarkable example of international and inter-company cooperation and self-reliance is premised on a simple realization that the results of a collision could be catastrophic.

In flying our satellites, Intelsat relies on data from our own spacecraft and information derived from the U.S. Air Force' Commercial and Foreign Entities Program. During special activities such as satellite relocations and transfer orbit missions, we also exchange data with other satellite operators whose satellites are operating near or adjacent to our satellites.

There are, however, drawbacks to relying on the CFE data. These data do not have the required accuracy for credible collision detection. The data also lack the spacecraft maneuver information that is necessary to properly predict the orbital location of active satellites.

An operator that is relying on the CFE data alone must increase the calculated collision margin to avoid potential close approaches. This wastes fuel and satellite life and introduces uncertainty into the equation. Because of the relatively imprecise nature of the publicly available data, the U.S. Air Force has also established the Interim CFE Data/Analysis Redistribution Approval Process, more commonly known as the Form 1 Process.

Through the Form 1 Process, operators can request additional, more precise information on specific close-approach situations.

However, the current Form 1 process is difficult to incorporate as an operational tool. There is no approved, DOD approved From 1 guidance document that articulates the boundaries of the program, nor is there any written specification of the operational procedures that a compliant operator should follow when using the process. This lack of clarity also creates uncertainty.

In response to the shortcomings of the current program, a number of global satellite operators have begun a dialogue on how to best ensure information-sharing within the industry. One proposal currently being discussed is the creation of a global data center that would allow operators to augment data coming from the CFE program with precision orbit data and maneuver plans from their respective fleets.

Today a prototype of the data center is operating with seven of the largest global operators regularly contributing data from over 120 satellites. Although there's still significant work left to refine the process, the initial results from the data center prototype are promising.

Although such private initiatives have great value, it is essential that the U.S. government continue to play a leadership role on the issue of space traffic control. In pursuit of this objective, we would offer the following specific recommendations -- and these are detailed more completely in my written testimony, but just in bullet form -- provide adequate funding for space situational awareness.

The space situational network that we have today was developed during the Cold War mostly for looking for missiles coming over the horizon. There's a lot of opportunity for good productive investment in upgrading that capability.

Maintain and expand the U.S. Commercial and Foreign Entities Program. As Lieutenant General James pointed out, the program is currently a pilot, and it's important that we mature that program to an operational status.

Third, develop new mechanisms for sharing space traffic information between and among nations. Several other countries, including France and the U.K. and Australia, there are -- Russia, I'm sure, has a network -- there are many countries who have networks monitoring space. The question is how are we going, in the future, to share information between those networks.

Fourth, take advantage of the data readily available from the private sector. We all monitor all of our satellites all the time. It's information that is more precise than the information the government can have by sensing us in space. We would gladly share this information in the interests of creating a safer space environment.

And finally, be creative in the development of new data sources. We have offered to fly a sensor on every one of our commercial satellites that's going to space. And if you were to put a sensor on every commercial satellite and every scientific satellite that went up over the next five years, you would have -- for almost no investment -- you would have an amazing view of the heavens.

So in conclusion, within the next decade, many more countries will gain the ability to exploit space for commercial, scientific, and governmental purposes. It's essential that the world's governments provide leadership on space management issues today, in order to protect the space activities of tomorrow.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you.

Dr. Pace.

MR. PACE: Thank you, Madame Chairman.

And Ranking Member Olson, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today.

Long-term sustainability of the space environment from lower orbit out to the moon is, of course, of fundamental importance to many national interests from national security to the global economy. So I commend the committee for holding this hearing today and appreciate it.

The space environment, as has been pointed out, is very different today from what it was in 1957 when the first satellites were launched, and the concerns about sustainability today arise not so much from the activities of traditional spacefaring nations like the United States, but from new entrants and potential entrants such as Iran and North Korea who have virtually no capabilities to monitor and control space objects.

So if you will, there are certainly some new irresponsible drivers on the highways these days. It is easy to understand the appeal of terms like "space traffic control," "space traffic management."

But these can be misleading on a variety of both technical and political grounds; that is, the space environment is not like aviation or the highways, satellites cannot maneuver as easily as cars or airplanes might, and of course operating in an international regime, questions of sovereignty are much different than they are for the highways.

Where the analogy of traffic management does work is in the idea of having common understanding of definitions, standards, operating procedures, and practices for space operators to communicate with each other. As with the civil aviation, of course, I'm hopeful they'll communicate in English. This has been helpful to us.

A good example of evolving international norms with these standards and procedures can be found in the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee guidelines, as Mr. Johnson mentioned, on minimizing orbital debris. These guidelines deal with the breakup of space systems, end-of-mission-life satellite disposal, and avoiding intentional harm.

The IADC guidelines on orbital debris emerged from discussions of best practices among technical experts rather than legal arguments among international lawyers. IADC discussions included government, academic, commercial experts from many countries with a focus on what made operational sense. And we should continue to encourage efforts that look at best practices in real-world space operations and develop further voluntary guidelines.

I should point out that the former head of the French space agency, Gerard Brachet, is currently leading international discussions along this line that have included the United States and other major space powers. And it's my understanding that the U.S. has found this constructive.

To support these norms and other national interests, there is a clear need for better space situational awareness for all sectors -- civil, commercial, and national security. A first step in improving monitoring is to enable better, faster, standardized information exchange among satellite owners and operators. And some good news here is that international, open standards are close to approval.

The Consultative Committee for Space Data Standards, which is made up of all the major space agencies in the world -- including, I would point out, China and Russia -- approved a draft recommended standard for orbit data messages in July of last year. And the CCSDS is this international body of over 400 space missions have chosen to use CCSDS communication standards. So there is a large installed base, I think, of interest there for promulgating these new standards.

At congressional direction, the Air Force operates a Commercial and Foreign Entities Program that distributes satellite positions known as "two-line elements" as you've heard, and related messages free of charge. This has been an excellent start toward improved data sharing across the different space sectors, but it's only partly satisfactory.

The two-line element data is not the most precise, and sometimes it's out-of-date or otherwise incorrect. It's perfectly fine for cataloging, it's not so fine for conjunction analyses as you've heard. This leads to false alarms about potential conjunctions due to the broad error envelopes associated with the TLE position predictions.

And such alarms, in turn, consume more analytical resources in requests for more precise and timely data to resolve potential concerns. The commercial satellite industry, as you've heard, propose increased data sharing. And this is, I think, again another excellent start, but there are some natural concerns. For example, we may not want to say where some satellites are even if they exist.

We may not want to reveal what our full capabilities are or the limitations.

There is concern about liability and the timeliness of any data provided. And there is a normal competition for public resources as we're all familiar with. So there is still an international need for independent verification of the information provided.

There are a variety of analogies for how to organize and govern these models for data sharing which I provided in my written testimony, which I'd be happy to discuss. But I think the most important thing to realize is that the core policy problems associated with this are primarily on data policy and information dissemination. It's not about technology per se. It's about what we want to do to secure our common interests.

And it's my hope that the United States will recognize the value of sustainable space environment as an international public good that in turn supports our own strategic national interests. We are more reliant on space than virtually any other country, and therefore our leadership in this area, I think, is in our national interest. Thank you.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you, Dr. Pace.

We're going to begin our rounds of questioning. We're going to try to keep to five minutes each. And I want to encourage members if they haven't had a chance to read the written testimony, it was excellent. And there's a lot of detail, of course, that you can't get into in five minutes. I guess I'd like to start off just fundamentally saying in terms of the Iridium-Cosmos collision in February.

And I'm going to start with you, General James. What went wrong, and how are we going to prevent it from happening again? Clearly, we're not looking to assign blame, but we had a major problem. We have a program in place. We're looking for solutions of what we and the Congress can do, whether it's the public sector or the private sector. But this is a clear example of a problem that we haven't heard from the panelists yet.

We're going to start with you, General, and then go to other members if we can get a clear answer. Thank you.

LT. GEN. JAMES: Certainly, Madame Chairman. In terms of the Iridium collision, I would say that at the time we were not looking at the Iridium satellite to do conjunction analysis. We track, as we said, 19,000 objects or so, but we only do a conjunction analysis or an assessment of whether they're going to come close to another body on a subset of that.

Primarily, DOD payloads certainly manned payloads that shuttle the International Space Station, and those payloads that support the U.S. government in one form or fashion. So on the day that the Iridium collision happened, we were not looking at the Iridium satellite nor the Cosmos satellite to determine if there was going to be a close approach, if you will.

So on that day, there was no data that would have told the owner operators to any degree of precision whether there was a potential collision or not. Certainly, if you look to the future, you can define which particular spacecraft you want to assess for conjunctions. And we are ramping up to be able to ultimately do conjunction analysis on the 800 or so satellites that can't maneuver.

So obviously, if a satellite can't maneuver, even if he knows that there is a piece of debris coming toward it, there's not a whole lot that that particular satellite can do. But for those that can maneuver, the intent is to do that conjunction analysis, provide that potential warning that says we have an analysis that says there will be a close approach within 100 meters, 200 meters, 300 meters, whatever the case may be.

And then the owner operator of that particular system could take action. So that's the path we are moving down in the near future to do that assessment on those 800 or so maneuverable spacecraft.

REP. GIFFORDS: And do you have a timeframe for that, General?

LT. GEN. JAMES: Certainly within the next year, and ideally before the end of the year.

REP. GIFFORDS: Okay. And I know that from a budgetary standpoint you can't get too detailed, but do you believe that you'll the resources necessary in order to do the job?

LT. GEN. JAMES: Yes, we have been working with our headquarters to get additional processing capacity as well as personnel to implement that capability.

REP. GIFFORDS: Okay. Would other panelists -- yes, there's Dr. DalBello.

MR. DALBELLO: Yes, I think this raises an important issue as to what we as a nation want to happen. And we had this debate -- was it -- maybe 10 or 15 years ago when we decided what were we going to do with the GPS system; are we going to have it as an exclusive system for the U.S. government, or were we going to make it available globally.

And recognizing, at that time, there were all sorts of people who were arguing that making GPS more generally available introduce significant risk, national security risks in terms of our potential adversaries using the GPS system against us. I think we're in a similar place now in trying to decide as a nation where are we going with space traffic control.

I think that Lieutenant General James and the JSpOC are doing a great job. But I also think that as a nation we haven't decided whether we want to be in the space control business or not. Is this something that we want to take on either alone or with other countries for the world? Inherent in your question was the assumption that someone should have been watching that Iridium satellite.

The system today is not set up that way. The operators are -- you're on, basically, your own. We have our own internal management system. Now we operate in a different orbit, a less cluttered orbit than the Iridium satellites do. But the operators are responsible for their own safety.

So we actually request -- when we see a potential issue we do make requests. Occasionally we do get comments and calls from the Joint Space Operations Center. But the situation we are in today is we do not have something that approaches an operational space traffic control system. And I think that's a policy decision that this nation needs to make.

REP. GIFFORDS: Speaking of policy, Dr. Pace.

MR. PACE: Certainly. Well, and this is where analogies, I think, can be dangerous thing. Everything that my colleague said is quite correct. But, for example, you can imagine how the maritime world developed. There wasn't a central sea control facility that was guiding and tracking, you know, every ship. And again, pardon the strained analogy.

But operators both in the military and the civilian side develop rules and procedures for navigating with respect to each other. They adopted certain procedures about separation of ships based upon long operational experience to develop navigation aids. They became laws that arose to admiralty law in courts for adjudicating and handling liability in these environments.

So I think that when you're looking at the policy and governance for how space traffic might evolve in the future, I suspect you'll see really two separate streams, and that will hopefully merge. One is expansion of the CFE program to involve a number of our allies who we already have security relationships with.

So we will become more capable and broader and more inclusive, including commercial input. And the second part is the operators themselves have large investments at stake. And so you would imagine that they would be exchanging information in and amongst each other, and they would be watching out for each other.

And so between the two of those, a bottom-up sort of approach by the commercial community which is increasingly at risk, as well as expansion and strengthening for the new environment of traditional military functions to involve greater number of civil and international actors you'll likely see. I don't think you'll see a centralized master plan. I think you'll see growth and expansion in both areas.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you.

Mr. Olson, please.

REP. OLSON: Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.

And my first question is for General James. General, in your testimony you state that the long-term solution for the provision of high fidelity orbital data includes integrating commercial and foreign entity advance services in the joint space operations missile system with the ability to adjust data directly from the entities on a voluntary basis.

And what new resources will be required for you to provide this -- to implement such a service? Has a concept been discussed with foreign and commercial operators? And do you have any concerns about the joint space operations missile system taking on an expanded role outside of its charter?

LT. GEN. JAMES: Well, thanks, sir. Looking at the resources required in terms of ingesting data, as Mr. DalBello said, we think that is a worthy goal. In other words, if there are data coming from the satellite owners themselves, we should have mechanisms to bring that data into our systems.

And frankly, that frees up our sensors because we know where those satellites are, and I don't have to task a telescope or a radar to go look for a particular satellite. And there's things we have to work there, because we have to verify that the data is valid. Before I put that into the Space Surveillance Network, I've got to know that that's indeed good data. So there needs to be processes and procedures that allow us to do that.

But the resources to do that, I think, are not great because it's more a process, it's more taking the data that they are putting together for the commercial entities and determining how to put that into the right formats and verify that it's good data. So from a resource perspective in that capability, I think we can move down the path, but it will take some time.

I would say this is not necessarily outside the Joint Space Operations Center mission area. But it will require assessment in terms of manpower, in terms of processing, the things that I discussed earlier, to allow us to continue to improve these processes. And again, the CFE program, as we said, it's a pilot program.

I mean, we're learning this year and exactly, okay, what are the processes, how does a commercial entity need to request, what legal agreements do we need to have. And we're making great progress so that by October-November timeframe we will say these are all the processes, and we can transition this to U.S. Strategic Command successfully.

REP. OLSON: Thank you for that answer, General.

And this is a question for all of you, and we'll start with Mr. DalBello, involving space traffic. Since all the spacefaring nations and commercial entities have an interest in keeping the space environment as pristine as possible, what is (impending ?) the widespread adoption of the data center concept that you mentioned in your testimony? And what is impeding nations and commercial entities right now from sharing overall data today?

MR. DALBELLO: I think when the Space Age started and up until very recently, I think most operators had an attitude, I'd characterize perhaps as the big-sky approach, which is space is vast and the odds of two objects intersecting in space, the odds are still quite low. So I think up until very recently there was a perception among operators that this wasn't something that they had to worry about.

And we even find even today among smaller operators that they will say to us, well, if I'm flying in my box -- box being an assigned location in space from whatever regulator licensed your launch to space -- if I'm flying in my box, why do I have to worry about anyone else, which is really, I think, got it exactly backwards.

So one answer to your question is that we have -- it's only recently that people have been worried about the complex interaction between debris, dead spacecraft that were not removed from orbit, and maneuvering spacecraft. And I think as we look out forward, it's clear that the environment is going to get more complex rather than less.

So I think that the idea like the data center which started out with one group of operators -- there are large operators in geostationary orbit, those operators who -- all who are used to working with each other could adopt a common set of protocols that they could use to exchange data.

There are still many other operators who do not -- who are either in different orbits or who are not part of that group, who don't perhaps yet see the overall value to it. And I think other people take an assumption that they shouldn't have to worry about it, that this is something the government should worry about.

So I think a variety of reasons. And it is part of the maturing approach -- I think it started out with Dr. Johnson's great work on space debris -- what is it -- almost a decade ago now. And it raised the awareness that we couldn't just do anything we wanted in space. And so we have taken baby steps since then, I think, to get to where we are today.

REP. OLSON: Thank you.

Dr. Pace, would you care to comment, sir?

MR. PACE: Yeah, I would agree with that. I would also say that there are -- we are focusing on orbital debris, but I'll say, though, there's a couple of other factors that need to be taken into account in terms of keeping with the hearing's title about keeping space sustainable and safe for civilian and commercial operators.

And we are not really probably going to spend a lot of time talking about it. But understanding of the space weather environment which perturbs these satellites and which monitoring of that environment is sort of a long-term interest of all the operators.

Better understanding of the radio frequency environment being part of the reason why the large satellites are spaced the way they are across the geosynchronous arc is not just physically because space is vast, but because of how they radiate. And so how they radiate and potentially interfere with each other.

So the radio frequency interference, space weather environment, better modeling of all of those characteristics, and then getting standardized data to exchange with each other, those are things that are the foundation for any sort of future decisions. And so right now people, I think, are still working on the standards part.

The awareness is there, the standards are still developing to even talk with each other. And people are trying to look at, okay, what are the right operational practices so we don't make hard and fast rules too early, but that we get moving on it and not make them too late.

REP. OLSON: Thank you for that answer.

Mr. Johnson, would you care to comment? You don't have to say yes.

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah -- (laughs) -- I don't think I have much to add. The situation in low earth orbit is dynamically different than GEO. So we'll have to find some other method of communicating data positions for a low earth orbit.

REP. OLSON: Thank you for that answer. I'm out of my time.

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you, Mr. Olson.

Congresswoman Fudge.

REP. MARCIA L. FUDGE (D-OH): Thank you, Madame Chair.

I actually have two questions. The first one I'd like to address to Mr. Johnson. You alluded to the whole concept of there being some international discussions about orbital debris. My question is do you believe -- is there an international treaty on orbital debris, and if not should there be one?

MR. JOHNSON: We do have -- the primary way of communicating with international environment is through the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee I had mentioned earlier. We've been very successful. It's considered the preeminent world body for technical assessment of the debris environment.

Now, we have provided information to the United Nations which enabled them to adopt space debris mitigation guidelines in 2007. So they are guidelines only. They are not legally enforceable. It's not a treaty status.

But what we're looking for is allowing the individual members of the United Nations to implement these guidelines to their national mechanisms and to watch their compliance. The current agenda in the United Nations is to review the implementation of these guidelines on an annual basis when we meet in Vienna every February.

REP. FUDGE: I guess that really is my question. Should there not be something that is enforceable --

MR. JOHNSON: Yeah.

REP. FUDGE: -- internationally? Anyone can answer that. If you'd like to, Mr. Johnson, but any panelist can.

MR. JOHNSON: Actually it's been my experience for the last 25 years that talking with industry and, of course, government operators that they've always been very responsive. This has been one of those rare instances where legal requirements are not always necessary. And we have time.

The environment is certainly degrading over time but at very relatively low rate. If we find that voluntary measures are not working to the extent that we would like, other options are certainly possible in the future. But so far we found very good reception at the voluntary level. Thank you.

MR. PACE: I would just simply add a particular example of that. Under the Outer Space Treaty 1967, state parties are responsible for persons under their jurisdiction or control which would include, for example, registered satellite operators or people licensed, say, by the United States, whether remote sensing or commercial satellites.

And one of the ways the U.S. has responded or carried out that obligation to the Outer Space Treaty for things like these technical guidelines is to then write domestic regulation in place for how those regulations, those guidelines are enforced. So, for example, the Federal Communications Commission has part of its licensing requirement discussions about how does the licensee propose to deal with the end of life of the satellite, how are they going to dispose with it.

And they had a full regulatory review and hearing and public comment and so forth on that -- so for FCC licensees. When people go to the Commerce Department for commercial remote sensing license, there is a section in there that deals with end-of-life disposal. So the State Department, when it reports back to the U.N. S&T committees, it says here are the domestic regulations we have adopted in implementing these guidelines in our own way.

And that -- and then we encourage other countries to do that. So in lieu of a master kind of one-size-fits-all treaty, the U.S. proposes that other sovereign administrations adapt the guidelines, you know, to their own environments. And so far it's said that's worked out, I think, fairly well without triggering a larger international treaty debate which, as you can imagine, can be quite contentious.

REP. FUDGE: Thank you.

Mr. DalBello, I just want to follow up on our chair's question. You in your prepared statement indicated that there should be some dialog on rules of the road, how we develop guidelines or protocols that would inform other operators when one of their spacecraft could potentially cause damage to another. How do you propose we do that?

MR. DALBELLO: Well, it's -- this is the kind of issue where you're going to have to have partnership between government and the commercial industry. I think we can do part of that ourselves. I think that we are -- we routinely share information, we routinely discuss protocols and flight operations procedures. We obviously -- we can't do anything to instruct or to coordinate with governments or smaller companies flying from other countries.

So there is -- part of the job can be done by large operators cooperating on a set of what you just say would be commonsense procedures, but there will be a role for governments. And I think it can look -- that process can look something like the process that Dr. Johnson outlined with the IADC, the debris coordination where you start out by saying what are best practices.

So if you're going to move a satellite or if you know that you will pass near a satellite as you're either putting a satellite in orbit or relocating a satellite, what are your obligations with respect to other operators? Those are the kind of issues that we can't wrestle with. And there may be a process whereby beginning that international dialog, we can end up with something that looks like the debris mitigation guidelines.

REP. FUDGE: Thank you, Madame Chair. I yield back.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

REP. DANA ROHRABACHER (R-CA): Thank you very much, Madame Chairman. And I offer my praises well to the chairman -- the chairwoman I should say, pardon me, for calling this hearing. It's a very important issue and has not been given the attention it deserves.

General, about the Cosmos and Iridium, you know, collision. We, of course, knew what the Iridium orbit was and did we -- was the Cosmos one of the objects that had been traced before, or was that an unknown object to you?

LT. GEN. JAMES: No, sir. Both those objects were tracked and were in our space catalog.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Okay. Well, if they're in the space catalog, have we not -- did their orbit change in some way? Have we not run out the orbit so we know that after certain number of years they're going to cross, or do they change their orbit in space?

LT. GEN. JAMES: Sir, kind of a two-part answer. The Iridium constellation does maneuver their orbit occasionally. And in fact they had done a maneuver, as I understand it, prior to the collision. But again, in reality when we track something, all we do is we produce basically what we call an element synthesis. This is the characteristics of that orbit.

We do not then for all objects do an assessment, that is, is that orbit going to intersect with any other orbit. We only do that on a subset of objects today.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Let me suggest that in an era of computers that it is not that costly for us to simply task -- maybe you could task any intern to go and put all these orbits into the cell -- into your computer and find out if any of them are going to cross. It seems to me that that is not -- let me put it this way, to be more responsible, I think it would -- that would have been a responsible course of action if your officers indeed tasked with this issue.

About China, China intentionally demonstrated their great capabilities by blowing up one of their satellites in orbit. Now of course there is no one here to speak for the administration, Madame Chairman, so I can't ask the question that should be asked today.

So let us note that there is no one here from the administration, and let us hope that perhaps the administration will pay some attention to NASA and give us a new leader of NASA so that we can actually interact with them. I think that might be a good recommendation. I certainly would yield to the chairwoman.

REP. GIFFORDS: And Mr. Rohrabacher, thank you for brining up obviously a very important issue. We are hoping that the House Armed Services Committee will pick this topic up and also have a committee hearing, because there is a defense side to the problem as well. And we look forward to hearing from the administration in the future.

I yield back.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Right, and -- but it would help to have a new leader of NASA here or at least an official representative of that leader rather than someone who may or may not have the leaders here whenever that administrator is chosen. But let us just say that China intentionally created massive debris.

But yet the administration, from what I now understand, is supporting permitting American satellites to be launched on Chinese rockets. I guess that's the way to prove to them how upset we are with their creating massive space debris.

About cooperation in space, do -- are any of you aware that the Russians have presented a plan to try to deal with space debris? What I've heard today is only ideas about how we track space debris. The Russians actually have presented something a few years ago of how we might be able to actually deal with it and take some of the space debris down. Are any of you aware of that proposal? Yes, sir.

MR. JOHNSON: Yes, sir. The Russians as well as several other individuals and organizations have proposed different techniques for removing debris from orbit, either small debris or large debris. As I said earlier, it's a challenge and requires a substantial amount of research and of course later funding, and none of that has taken place.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Yes. I would suggest, Madame Chairman, that this subcommittee might take a leading -- play a leading role in, let's say, promoting cooperation with other countries to deal with this, not just to identify debris, but perhaps in finding a real solution, because the Russians have presented a plan. It would take international cooperation and international effort. And maybe the subcommittee might be able to play an important role in that. Thank you very much.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. And I fully agree with you.

Next we're going to hear from Mr. Griffith.

REP. PARKER GRIFFITH (D-AL): Madame Chair, thank you for the opportunity. But my questions have been asked. Thank you.

REP. GIFFORDS: (Off mike.)

REP. OLSON: Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.

I'd like to ask another round of questions here, gentlemen, just a couple more for you. And this is for all of you, sort of building on some of the comments we've heard earlier today. Implicit in the suggestion that the rules of the road need to be more uniformly advocated and encouraged is that some nations or commercial operators are not fully observing best practices.

And is this the case? And are there nations and operators continuing to generate large amounts of debris with each new launch? Mr. Johnson, you seem to be the one who raises the hand.

MR. JOHNSON: (Laughs.) I would say that on average, most spacefaring organizations and countries are creating very small amounts of orbital debris on each mission, typically one debris or less, sometimes maybe three or four. It's the accidental explosions which are leading to growth in the environment, and of course, the most recent collision.

REP. OLSON: Dr. Pace, do you have a comment? It looks like you're going for the microphone.

MR. PACE: Sorry. And Mr. Johnson can maybe correct me if I'm wrong. As I recall the history of it, the Chinese initially were actually quite a bit dirty in their initial launches. They created a fair amount of debris. And their -- some effort -- and then were -- got involved in the IADC and got involved in this international technical discussions.

And Chinese practices then improved over the years such that the amount of debris they were producing in their routine launches became noticeably less. And people felt this was good example of technical- technical cooperation.

That's why the -- their ASAT against their weather satellite was so shocking, I think, to many people was not simply the military capability, but the fact that they intentionally created a large amount of orbital debris when their technical experts had been involved in the IADC and their operational practices had, in fact, improved over the years.

So it points out that there is a sort of an international norm side of it. I think the Chinese were somewhat surprised at the amount of international reaction that occurred as a result of that, in part because people recognized that an international norm about what was proper hygienic practices, if you will, in orbit, had been violated.

And so these international discussions are really quite valuable. But they have a political component as well as a technical component. And so that's one of the reasons why we should keep supporting them.

REP. OLSON: Anybody else? Any other comments?

(No audible response)

Okay, one more question sort of coming at this problem from another angle in terms of hardening our satellites to prevent them from being damaged if they're impacted by orbital debris. What measures are currently out there being employed to harden satellites? And obviously, this has to be with very small debris, whether it's manmade or natural.

And what are the limits? What's being done to do that, and what are the limits with hardening our satellites to protect themselves? And that's for all of you.

General James, if you'd like to start, please.

LT. GEN. JAMES: Well, certainly, as I think was mentioned earlier, as you look at the very small particles that we encounter -- you know, quite often frankly, most satellites have sufficient protection against, you know, micrometeor micromillimeter-type objects. But as you get into the larger particles, 1 centimeter and larger, that's a more difficult problem.

Certainly within the Air Force we are looking at that from a space protection program point of view to assess what needs to be done in the future to protect our systems from those type of objects, but that's an ongoing work. And again, there's always trade-offs between cost and weights and size and protection and probability. So all that has to be weighed in the analysis as we look to the future.

REP. OLSON: Thank you, General, for that comment.

Mr. Johnson?

MR. JOHNSON: The International Space Station is the most heavily protected vehicle currently in earth orbit. And the best we can do is to guard against particles 1 centimeter and less. It's a technology issue. Actually, 10 percent of the entire mass of the International Space Station is devoted to shielding.

Robotic spacecraft can't afford to do that. Most robotic spacecrafts are vulnerable to particles 3, 4 millimeters in diameter, and there are many, many of those.

REP. OLSON: Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. DalBello?

MR. DALBELLO: I think what Dr. Johnson pointed out is correct, that the challenge of protecting something against anything but the smallest particles. We in the commercial satellite industry, we simply couldn't -- we couldn't commit that amount of weight on the satellite to protection.

Luckily, our experience -- and where we operate our satellites, our experience has been that -- I don't think anyone -- there's no recorded loss of a satellite in geostationary orbit from debris. So I guess I would have to answer is that we don't do anything on protection specifically, other than normal structure of the satellite that, you know, needs to be a certain robustness to survive launch.

But other than that, we don't take any extraordinary measures. And that's purely driven by our assessment of the risk and the realization that there really are no good technologies for protection.

REP. OLSON: Thank you.

Dr. Pace?

(No audible response)

REP. OLSON: Thank you very much.

Madame Chairwoman, I yield my time back.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you, Mr. Olson.

My apologies for getting a little bit out of order. We're starting the second round. I'm going to go, and then we're going to shoot over to Mr. Rohrabacher, then we're going to hear from Mr. Griffith.

So, General James, I'd like to get back to what you talked about with the CFE. In your prepared testimony, you stated that the DOD intends to operationalize support to the commercial and foreign entities by the fall of 2009. But I'd like to hear in concrete terms what that means, if you're simply going to extend the current CFE program. Do you plan to expand it, its budget, or are you planning on making additional changes to it?

LT. GEN. JAMES: Yes, madame. The first piece of that is to, as I said earlier, work out the processes that we are currently doing to make sure that the commercial entities understand and the foreign entities understand how to engage in the system, what are the legal forms that have to filled out, what are the agreements that have to be reached, and make sure that process is all in place.

And that's where we are headed right now. But we are looking to expand capabilities. One option that we are looking at is to push more out on the web, if you will, so that there's automatic information that's pushed out to those who have signed up for the Commercial and Foreign Entities Program.

We're also looking at additional capabilities. For example, if there is an anomaly on a spacecraft, if an operator comes in and says, hey, I need this potential support for end-of-life, those sorts of things, we would add that to the Commercial and Foreign Entities Program. And then, again, providing that high accuracy data that Mr. DalBello talked about.

Essentially, those who signed the agreements today would get that high accuracy assessment of their satellite. So we are continuing to look at ways to improve, ways to more automate the processes, ways to push the data out to the individual end-users that have signed the agreements, and make this a better program.

REP. GIFFORDS: Mr. DalBello, if you can please -- you've heard what the general has said, you've heard the description for the plans for DOD and the CFE program. But I'm curious whether or not those plans address the commercial space sector's needs, and if not, what more is needed.

MR. DALBELLO: I think they don't, today. And again, I don't mean that as a criticism, but just a judgment on where we are as compared to where we would all like to be. I think as a first measure we need to do the simple things that -- you have hundreds of space objects from the commercial sector. And we know where all those objects are, because we are constantly ranging those objects with our ground antennas.

So we know precisely where they are. So there should be a way to incorporate that data. And why is that important? Well, it's important because the Air Force network can't constantly monitor spacecraft. It sort of takes a picture of a particular point in time, and then it says I think that object should be here based on where I last saw it.

We are actually constantly monitoring. And what you miss when all you're doing is taking a snapshot of the heavens, is you miss maneuvers. And as General James pointed out, that may have been what resulted in the Iridium crash. So if someone maneuvers, then your past information is no longer accurate, because it changes significantly.

So number one, we need to incorporate the data from the operators that are willing to give it. We need to -- and this goes to Congressman Rohrabacher's concern -- we do need to develop the computer capability to run what they call "all against all." So we're running the data, the entire data set. And this is just purely a computer limitation issue. I mean, we need to have the computing power to run all against all on a regular basis.

We need to have the rules and the procedures for getting high accuracy data to the commercial sector at a minimum for those objects that are not maneuvering, at a minimum for spent rocket stages and parts of -- and components of dead satellites.

I understand their sensitivity. We are trying to walk a line here that's somewhere between safe operations in space. On the other hand, we don't want to give away the store on what our military is doing in space on every single program. So we are actually trying to do a complicated thing.

We don't want complete transparency of the heavens, but we want them to be opaque in a safe direction. So it's a challenge, and again, I think we aren't there yet. That's not meant as a criticism. I know there are a lot of folks working really hard at the JSpOC. I think it starts with a fundamental -- with a national policy decision that we do intend to do this. As Thoreau said, "In the long run, men only hit what they aim at."

REP. GIFFORDS: Following along those lines, we've heard a lot today about space situational awareness. But I'm curious -- as the cost to monitor space debris increases, who exactly should pay for the services provided to both commercial and also to foreign users? I'm interested about pushing out more information on the web, but obviously, this is going to cost U.S. taxpayers increasingly more money.

I'd also like to hear whether or not the U.S. government or the United States' people derive sufficient benefits from the information, and whether again, we should be charging for the services, and if so, how much.

So, Mr. DalBello, if you can just make a stab there and --

MR. DALBELLO: Yeah. Congresswoman Giffords, obviously, this is something that we've spent a lot of time thinking about, because it's one of those be-careful-what-you-ask-for situations. We think there's a good middle ground. What we are offering is to be able to explain where we are all the time, and that will reduce the U.S. or perhaps other countries' burdens substantially.

So we're coming to the table with a lot of data as it is. So that's the first thing. And secondly, we think if you're going to build out a total space situational awareness capability, you will want to go to space. And again, we have offered and continue to offer to make our platforms available. If the United States government can define a simple low cost, low weight sensor, we would be glad to take it to orbit. So we could become part of the network. So my first answer is --

REP. GIFFORDS: Mr. DalBello, do you find that that's the same with your counterparts or your competitors in the industry? Is that generally the position that --

MR. DALBELLO: I can't speak for anyone other than Intelsat, obviously. But I know that in our dialogues I've heard very sympathetic comments from the largest operators -- SES, Inmarsat. So some -- many of the largest operators have expressed their enthusiasm for these ideas.

REP. GIFFORDS: Okay.

General, any comments?

LT. GEN. JAMES: Yes, madame, a couple of things. First, on utilizing the data from the commercial vendors -- we certainly, as I said earlier, agree with that. And as we have the agreements that we build for the CFE program, that's one of the things we discussed with those commercial operators is their willingness to provide their satellite positional data into our engine, if you will, and that allows us not to have to task our sensors, as I said earlier.

So it's just a matter, I believe, of working out the procedures, the formats, and the processes until we can get that in place. But that's a dialogue we do have with those commercial satellite vendors. In terms of payment for this, again, I think that's a national policy decision. The Authorization Act allows the DOD to request payment for these services. At this point we've elected not to do so.

But again, I think there has to be a dialogue at levels above us in terms of policy, at the OSD and above in terms of do we want to charge for this or not to offset some of the expenses of sensors and so on. And then lastly, in my testimony I did point out that we are going to space with our sensors.

The Space-Based Space Surveillance system is a DOD dedicated space surveillance sensor that we should launch this summer that will allow us to much more actively track everything in the GEO belt which we cannot always do today due to the telescopes being weathered out and has to be night time and so on. So we do recognize the importance of space-based sensor capabilities, and we are launching one of those this summer.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you.

Mr. Rohrabacher.

REP. ROHRABACHER: Let's note that we now have the capability of determining the course of a near-earth object that is millions and millions of miles away, to determine whether or not that object is a threat to hitting the earth.

Now, if we can chart an object that's in distant space and to determine whether or not it will hit the earth or come in this direction so it's a concern, certainly we can chart the course of objects that are in low earth orbit and to determine whether they're going to hit each other, and put them into the computer.

So I think if nothing else has come out of this hearing, so I understand that we haven't been doing something that we're very capable of doing at a very -- that is not costly. So let's pay attention to that. Next time we have a hearing on that, I hope to hear how we've made some progress on that.

I think the idea that we're missing a little bit here with the chairwoman's suggestion of where perhaps someone can be charged for certain data. It's not necessarily the data from commercial operations, General. It's also the cataloging not just the, you know, actually obtaining of the data, but the cataloging of that and perhaps the actual disbursing of that for a charge.

Apparently, that's -- does the -- do you have any suggestions or any reaction to the idea of having a commercial company open up shop and start charging people for information, especially satellite -- people who will be launching commercial satellites will have to get? And perhaps the military as well would have to have the information approved and the course of their orbit charted by and approved by this, or at least certify that it will not, in some way, run into an object that's already in space.

This could be done by a private sector company, could it not, Mr. DalBello?

MR. DALBELLO: Yes, it's something that we've thought through at the very beginning stage in our data center prototype, which is you certainly could set up -- it's not technically challenging to do what you describe. The challenge you have is managing the national security issues, and what is the level of data -- and this gets into who are your customers for this information.

At some point, you do want to have a dialogue with the Russians and the Chinese and everyone else who's got objects in space, because you wish to know not only where they are but where they're maneuvering and those issues. So is it possible? Absolutely, it is possible.

REP. ROHRABACHER: What about the percentage of what you're describing? The problematic part of it is only a small percentage. Are we talking about 10 percent --

MR. DALBELLO: Small percentage, yes.

REP. ROHRABACHER: -- or 20 percent? And the rest of what can be tracked and catalogued and made available, so that we can actually start working at that problem at least at that level. We're not talking about an overwhelming percentage, are we? I wouldn't say the national security issue.

MR. DALBELLO: No, I think it would be the smaller part, definitely. Whether it's 10 or 20 I don't know that I'm competent today to answer, but it would be definitely the smaller portion. It would obviously be significant to those people who cared about it.

REP. ROHRABACHER: So we could make a significant difference without solving the whole problem. There is a -- still a national security part of it that we may not be able to handle, but a significant part of the challenge can be done and we're capable of doing that. I also might add I think that we are very capable of working with our international partners, with the Europeans and the Russians and others to perhaps even go even further and bring down space debris.

And if we can chart it, if you're already charting the course, all we have to do is get something up there that will knock it down. And that doesn't have to be something very sophisticated, just a big bulldozer in the sky, you might say. And perhaps something like that would actually be -- not be as expensive as we think, especially if we were doing it internationally.

So thank you very much for holding this hearing. These are very good ideas that we've been talking about.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. Griffith.

REP. GRIFFITH: Thank you, Madame Chair. It's an interesting discussion. I think that I would have the opposite view of my colleague that I don't think there will be a reduction in space debris. I think the idea that we're going to have a conversation with Iran, North Korea, or China and have them jeopardize their national security as they see it, is maybe a little bit naïve.

So if my premise is correct, what is the nature of space debris? Are the particles charged? Do they travel in the same orbit as they find themselves in, or is it more of a Brownian movement as you get into sub-particle? And what is their electromagnetic nature?

Because I think it's important for us to know their nature, the particles' nature, because it sounds like we're going to have to be our own BFI up there as far as our space vehicles are concerned. And if we're going to rely on Iran or North Korea to cooperate with us it can change our cataloging of debris in an instant, because the SC-19 missile 27 months ago that hit the decommissioned weather satellite, created 25 percent more that day than we would have had if we had had a catalogue.

So it seems like we need to know what the nature of this debris is. And all I've heard so far is that the physical size of it -- do we know anything else about it besides its size?

MR. JOHNSON: Yes, sir. We actually spend a great deal of effort in trying to characterize the debris not only by size, but by density, its radar properties, its optical properties. It turns out, though, that even lightweight things moving at 10 kilometers per second can do a sufficient amount of damage should you run into it or it run into you.

So to answer your question about charging, actually there's a very modest charging effect which takes place. We've looked at it in terms of maybe taking advantage of it by using some sort of electromagnetic field to perturb the orbit. That doesn't seem to be a very promising avenue.

REP. GRIFFITH: Yes, sir.

LT. GEN. JAMES: Sir, just one other comment.

As we look at tracking this debris, it's something that you can't track it and then, you know, two days later assume it's going to be exactly where you expect it to be, because there are various forces acting on it, you know, gravitational forces, solar wind, solar particles, atmospheric forces depending on where you are in the orbit.

So over time, even though we track it and say, okay, six hours from now it should be here -- generally it will be pretty close to that -- but as you go out further and further, there are forces acting on those particles, especially the smaller ones, 1 centimeter, 5 centimeters, 10 centimeters that do indeed change that orbit which require us then to go back and recalculate.

That's why I can't give Intelsat a prediction a week away that says this thing will hit you within 20 meters --

REP. GRIFFITH: Sure.

LT. GEN. JAMES: -- because it's going to change fairly significantly over that period of time.

REP. GRIFFITH: Good. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

REP. GIFFORDS: Okay. All right, well, we have time. So we're going to do another round. And I'll start -- we'll see who'll hang in there.

This question is for General James. Retired Major General James Armor recently testified that the Space Surveillance Network is not sufficiently resourced to support civil and commercial operations. He said that the Air Force does not have the resources to carry out the CFE support, and added that recent complaints by commercial operators about unwarned movement of DOD satellites and lack of support for moving commercial satellites at GEO were indications of inadequate resources and lower priority given to the CFE.

So I'm curious about your views on General Armor's stated concerns regarding insufficient resources for the Space Surveillance Network.

LT. GEN. JAMES: Most certainly. As we've looked at the programs that we have in place, I believe we do have a reasonably good plan to address some of the shortcomings that we have. First, we -- I talked about the Space-Based Space Surveillance system that is addressing our ability to map the GEO belt with our satellites to a more accurate capability and more real time capability.

So that's in place. We also have a program in place called the Space Fence which addresses one of our shortcomings which is the Southern Hemisphere. We don't have a lot of sensors in the Southern Hemisphere, and one of the components of the Space Fence will put a very accurate radar system in the Southern Hemisphere to allow us to get more tracking capability in the Southern Hemisphere.

So we're also looking, as I said, at increasing our processing capability that Representative Rohrabacher talked about. We should be able to do that, and we are moving down that path. When you talk about doing conjunction assessment on everything that is up there, that's 19,000 objects against 19,000 objects roughly. That's a lot of calculations, a lot of time, and a lot of effort to do that.

And the other piece of that is that you can automate a lot of that, but where it gets tricky is that when the analysts over the computer says I now have a potential close conjunction, then an analyst has to get involved. He looks at the data, he then says, well, the data that that was based on is 48 hours old. So now I have to go task a sensor to look at that data again and rerun the analysis.

I then have to talk to the owner operator potentially and say can you give me any additional information, do you plan a maneuver, et cetera. So it's not just a computing power. Once it identifies something, then the person has to get involved to do some additional assessment. So all those things we're addressing. As I said, I think we're on a good path to get to 800 and then 1,300.

But 19,000 versus 19,000 is something that I think frankly again, we have to decide is that what the U.S. wants to do for the world.

REP. GIFFORDS: And following up on that, obviously I'm not an expert in orbital mechanics, but you know, I've heard what was said today, and you know, I heard Mr. DalBello talk about the all-against- all computer analysis. I know that Mr. Rohrabacher has had to leave, and with all due respect to our incredible interns that we all have, I'm a little concerned again, about the complexity and the cost associated with these computer analysis.

So perhaps, General, you could talk about that a little bit more in depth.

LT. GEN. JAMES: Well, again, I don't know how much more in depth I can go. But as I said, getting to the active payloads roughly 1,300, and doing a conjunctional assessment with those payloads against any other debris that's, you know, around the earth, is doable. And that's the path we're headed down.

But if I want to take debris piece "X" and look at it for is it going to hit debris piece "Y," number one, do we want to do that? I mean, is there any value in that, because they are both just pieces of debris. And then if I do, you know, there is a fair amount of processing and computational capability that's required to do that. And we have not made that decision yet, that is, that's the path we want to go down. But it's doable. It just requires resources.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you.

Let me shoot over to Dr. Pace. You indicated in your prepared statement that the Air Force does not have the resources to look at everything, and that some risks will not be addressed until it's too late. Well, that's certainly got our attention. So can you talk a little bit more about these risks?

MR. PACE: Well, I think that you've actually heard a description of that. There is going to be a spectrum of these risks. Obviously, the highest priority items is going to be for human space flight and looking at national security payloads. And that's appropriately what the Air Force does. The question is how far down that list are you going to go?

Plainly, the Iridium and the Cosmos collision fell below the resource line in terms of what people could go look at. Now, the problem is if you go all the way over to say, well, I want everything on everything -- in orbital mechanics every object has roughly 10 orbital elements associated with it.

So 20,000 objects times 20,000 objects each with 10 orbital elements, we quickly come up with 40 billion numbers that you're worrying about, maybe $40 billion. So 40 billion things that you're now going and tracking, and then that changes with time because again, the things don't move in static orbits but the weather, how -- whether there are any maneuvers and so forth.

So it's a very, very dynamic model. So you're going to be drawing a line somewhere. And the question is can you do things that mitigate the chances of there being something bad occurring. Now, some of the IADC practices mentioned are things like venting your tanks after you're done so that there isn't a chance of accidental explosion, putting catchers on bolts so that you don't blow them off into space, pretty commonsensical sorts of things.

So with good operational practices with people not doing things like creating large debris at high altitude as the Chinese did. But if you do create debris as the U.S. did in the case of USA 193, I guess, there in the case that system cleaned itself out in the space of a few days. So there are proper and improper ways of engaging with space objects and in bringing them down.

Establishing those operational norms is sort of the first thing, making sure that you don't get any worse is the next thing. I think that there are some interesting ideas about mitigating debris out there. And as Congressman Rohrabacher mentioned -- and actually some of the French proposals have included things like ground-based lasers against small debris items.

Now, of course, there's a fine line between a ground-based laser that are cleaning orbital debris and a weapon system.

And so you would have to have an amount of international discussion as to whether or not that makes any sense. Let me pause right there.

REP. GIFFORDS: Okay. Thank you, Dr. Pace.

Mr. Olson.

REP. OLSON: Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, and I'll be brief with the questions. First of all I want to thank you for holding this hearing again -- the first time this topic has been heard from in this committee. And I think it's critically important.

Also want to thank your witnesses. I've learned a lot today, and I appreciate your time and expertise.

And General James, my last question is just for you. Building on your conversation with the chairwoman, when you go through that analytical process, how long does it typically take, or how much advance notice can you determine that there is going to be a threat of a conjunction?

LT. GEN. JAMES: Generally speaking, about four days out is where we feel that the data is reasonably accurate and won't change very much over that period of time. So that's when we do an assessment. And if we get something that says there's a potential conjunction, let's say, within a kilometer, then again, we will normally go task our sensor system to give us more updated data, we'll run the assessment again and see if that's still valid.

And we'll continue to march that down all the way up to really the point of conjunction. So certainly, for example, on the International Space Station we're very aware of that. We run those analyses every 46 hours if there's a potential conjunction. We have two NASA orbital analysts that reside at the JSpOC and are in close communication with NASA constantly whenever we get into those scenarios, and we move forward from there.

But again, there can be very small objects that may suddenly have changed from the last time we looked at them and create a conjunction that's only 12 hours, 24 hours out. And then we have to do those assessments fairly quickly.

REP. OLSON: One more follow-up question, General. When the -- what was the timeframe, the warning for the last sort of conjunction with the space station whenever the astronauts had to go into the hardened area of the station in the event of an impact?

LT. GEN. JAMES: And sir, I have to give you the exact time for the record, but again -- and you can probably add to this -- but that was the scenario where the object was fairly small, the data we had was fairly old. And then when we did an updated dataset, it essentially said we have a predicted conjunction coming up fairly quickly, which did not give NASA the time to actually conduct a maneuver on the spacecraft. And if one of you want to add to that at all but --

MR. JOHNSON: The other contributing factor was that particular particle wasn't in a relatively elliptical orbit, which mean you had fewer opportunities to track it. It was also more susceptible to perturbations in the atmosphere. And so its orbit was actually changing pretty rapidly every time it went around the world. And so it was a much more of a challenging situation than we normally are faced with.

REP. OLSON: Thank you very much for those answers.

Madame Chairwoman, I yield my time back.

Thank you all again.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you, Mr. Olson.

Mr. Griffith.

REP. GRIFFITH: I just wanted to thank the panel and then -- you guys are great. It kind of reminds me of your next science question if a 2-centimeter particle hits a 5-centimeter particle is it Wednesday or Thursday. And so I thank you all for being here. Thank you very much.

REP. GIFFORDS: Thank you. Obviously, I want to thank the witnesses for coming today. And before we bring the hearing to a close, I especially want to recognize General James. We were just speaking earlier before, and there are some models out in the anteroom. And the fact that you've seen Saturn, the space shuttle, Delta IV all launch, really speaks to your history in space and aviation. And you know, appreciate your service.

And to our other members that spoke today on our panel, thank you for your service.

We only touched on just the brief cursory beginning of what will be an increasingly important issue for all of us. And I'm pleased that Mr. Olson, we had a good discussion today. This is just the beginning. We have a lot more to cover. But I thank the subcommittee members for being here.

The record will remain open for two weeks for additional statements from the members and for answers to any follow-up questions that the subcommittee may ask of our witnesses. The witnesses are excused, and the hearing in now adjourned. Thank you very much.

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