Hearing Of The Subcommittee On Clean Air And Nuclear Safety Of The Senate Environment And Public Works Committee - Three Mile Island: Looking Back On 30 Years Of Lessons Learned

Statement

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SEN. CARPER: (Strikes gavel twice.) That first rap was pretty pale, so I had to do it twice.

Welcome, everybody. My voice sounds fuzzy up here. I don't know how -- how do I sound out there? Okay. All right. Good. I don't feel fuzzy. I feel good.

In fact I've been looking forward to this hearing. We have a great line-up, two panels, and we're going to learn a lot, and we'll come back and maybe help us to look forward as well.

We're going to be joined by Senator Vitter here in a little bit. We're going to go ahead and start. He didn't want us to hold up, and so we'll just go ahead and to kick it off.

I want to thank our staff, both Democrat and Republican, for your help in putting together today's hearing and we're just grateful for all of our witnesses to be here.

Today's hearing is focused, as you know, on 30 years of lessons learned since the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident. Senators will have five minutes or so for opening statements.

Then I'm going to recognize our first panel of witnesses, the nuclear regulatory commissioners themselves, in living color. And they're all here, and we're grateful that you're here.

Chairman Klein, we'll ask you to speak for maybe five minutes or so. We'll ask each of your colleagues to try to limit your remarks to close to three minutes. And then we'll go about our first round of questions. I think we just have one round of questions for each of these panels.

And then we'll invite our second panel of witnesses to come forward, and we'll follow their testimony with one round of questions as well.

We'll probably finish up about dinner time tonight. (Laughter.) We'll finish up. We have a caucus lunch, and it starts about 12:30 or 12:45. So we will finish up in due course.

Thirty years ago a nuclear accident occurred at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania, that would shake America's confidence in nuclear power. The accident was a cooling malfunction that caused a partial meltdown of the reactor core, releasing a small amount of radioactivity.

The accident was determined to be caused by a combination of several things: equipment failure and the inability of the plant's operators to understand the reactor's condition during the event.

Unlike the Chernobyl disaster that occurred, I think, about eight years later, the Three Mile Island reactor vessel did not fail. The leaked radioactivity -- radioactive gases were vented into the atmosphere through specially designed filters under operator control.

No immediate deaths occurred, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimated that approximately one additional cancer in the area would result from the accident. Although any increases in the cancer death rate is unacceptable, I think we would all agree it could have been much worse.

But this accident had a profound impact on the public, on the nuclear industry and on the NRC. Public confidence in nuclear power generation was, if not shattered, greatly damaged. The cleanup effort took nearly 14 years and some $1 billion dollars to complete.

Three Mile Island served as a wake-up call that we had become complacent on nuclear safety.

After the accident, the NRC, Congress and the nuclear industry took a long, hard look at what we needed to do to make this industry safer and to gain back -- to regain the public trust.

Under the direction of the NRC, the industry made sweeping changes. Today our nation's 104 operating nuclear reactors maintain high levels of safety and reliability. Our plants have also become more efficient over the past 30 years, and as a result, we've been able to almost double our generating capacity -- I call it our operating capacity -- since 1979.

These changes have given the nuclear industry one of the best safety records of -- really, of any industry in the United States. Now Americans realize that nuclear power can provide reliable energy and can do it without polluting.

To reduce our country's dependence on fossil fuels, we need to do a number of things. We need to harness the winds off the shore of Delaware and other places along our coast. We need to harness the sun's rays in Nevada and other places like that. We'll need to capture the CO2 coming off of coal-fired plants in West Virginia and other places around the country. And we're going to need to build plug-in cars in Detroit and other places around America and drive them.

We're also going to need -- in the end, we're going to need, if we're going to reduce the threat of climate change, our dependence on foreign oil, harmful air in -- harmful emissions in our air, we're going to need nuclear power.

But broad support for the nuclear industry will vanish if another nuclear accident occurs. Without a safe nuclear industry, there will be no nuclear industry.

I like to tell the story of -- we have a pilot here, our colleague, Jim Inhofe, who flies his plane, I think, all over the country, maybe all over the world. But I like to -- for the record -- the plane -- (laughter) --

SEN. : The plane.

SEN. CARPER: -- the plane -- this is cool --

SEN. JAMES INHOFE (R-OK): I also have pictures of my kids. (Laughter.)

SEN. CARPER: (Chuckles.) He's got a bunch of them. You have one or two grandchildren too, don't you? But not as many as Jim Bunning. Jim Bunning has 37 or 38 grandchildren -- he and his wife -- 30 -- I say to him, "How do you remember all their names?" And he says, "If they're with their parents, I can remember them." (Chuckles.)

So -- but we'll look at your grandchildren pictures later, but thanks for sending that airplane picture.

When I was -- I was a naval flight officer, five years active duty, another 18 years Reserve, P-3 mission commander, and our jobs were hunt for Red October, track Soviet nuclear submarines in all the oceans of the world, try to catch the bad guys coming into South Vietnam to resupply Viet Cong and -- in our airplanes. And it was interesting that our command -- we did mining operations and all kinds of stuff with our planes. Our skippers, our commanding officers would always say to us, "The most important thing you're doing today is not tracking Soviet nuclear subs. The most important thing you're doing is not surface surveillance of the ocean. It's not the mining mission. It's not trying to catch the bad guys slipping into South Vietnam or Cambodia. The most important thing you're doing today is to take off safely, to fly safely, to land safely."

And we tried to create a culture of safety in my squadron. We tried to do that in every naval aviation squadrons.

And we need a culture of safety, as I've said once or twice before, including to some of you; we need a culture of safety in every single nuclear power plant that we have now and those that we're going to build.

As the oversight committee on nuclear -- Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety, it is our job to make certain that the NRC and everyone who works in a nuclear power plant knows that safety is our number one priority, because only with a safety-focused nuclear industry can America reap the benefits of clean, safe nuclear power -- not just now, but for a long time to come.

And that ends my statement. And the ending of my statement coincides with the arrival of a couple of my colleagues. They're just rolling in. They wanted to wait until I finished because they've heard me give these statements before.

But we have a new ranking member here, and it's David Vitter from Louisiana. And Senator Vitter, would you like to proceed?

SEN. DAVID VITTER (R-LA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will specifically not say it was perfect timing on our part. The thought never crossed my mind.

It is great to be with you and great to be a new partner with you on this subcommittee. We had a very good initial discussion last week, a few days ago, which I really enjoyed and look forward to this work.

I will simply say that I appreciate this hearing because we do have the opportunity, an enormously positive opportunity, for a nuclear renaissance in our country. We need to pursue that aggressively and effectively to meet all of our energy and related environmental goals, and obviously we need to pursue that in the context of safety. That's not only the right way to do it; that's the only way it will effectively happen, is to have the proper confidence of the American people in that regard.

We're very active in all these pursuits in Louisiana, and we'll continue to be in this nuclear renaissance. So I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses about this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. CARPER: Welcome aboard. We're delighted to -- delighted to have you as my seatmate here.

I -- Senator Inhofe chaired this subcommittee for a number of years, and he chaired -- began chairing the subcommittee at a time that I don't know that the Congress was providing especially good oversight over the nuclear industry. That changed under his leadership, and he continues to have strong interest to this, and I'm delighted that he is with us today. Senator?

SEN. INHOFE: Well, I appreciate this, Senator Carper.

The -- it's true too. I recall -- we were just talking back here, trying to remember just when it was I became chairman of this subcommittee, and I think it was 13 years ago. And at that time there had not been an oversight hearing in years, I mean.

And you know, the interesting thing was that the NRC was very anxious to be -- to have -- start having oversight hearings. And so we had oversight hearings, and then we kind of put down goals with deadlines, and we got at some things, really started at that time, I believe.

And of course, at that time it was just what, 17, 18 years after Three Mile Island. Our concern was always, you know, did we really learn something from that?

And you pointed out very well, though for different reasons than I would have, nuclear energy in the future is going to have to be there. It just -- we cannot run this machine called America without a nuclear component.

And it seems to me that it shouldn't take as long as it does take to get new applications working, and I hope that we're going to be able to improve that. Studying the past is useful insofar as it guides improvement for the future, and I'm glad that you are having this hearing because it's one that's certainly necessary now.

No one would be -- is -- should be pleased that the accident did happen, but I am very pleased that the commission and industry have spent the last 30 years improving the safety of our existing plants and preparing to build new reactors.

So I think that we've done a good job. I think it's -- you're certainly carrying this leadership on, Senator Carper, and it's something that is -- I can't think of anything more important that's happening in America today in terms of our future capability to run this machine than to be talking about nuclear energy.

And I'd like to also to see -- to hear in the opening statements from you, from all of you, how we can improve the time frame that it takes to get these applications handled, and perhaps something we'll be able to do to reach our goals a little quicker than we otherwise would.

So I appreciate your having this hearing.

SEN. CARPER: Senator Inhofe, thanks. Thanks so much. Thanks for your leadership and your continued strong participation.

Another former chair of this subcommittee, who has bailed on me and gone over to be the ranking Republican on that -- what is it, the Transportation, Infrastructure Subcommittee, George Voinovich of Ohio. But he's -- it's been great working with Senator Voinovich on these issues and a bunch of others.

Senator Voinovich, you're recognized.

SEN. GEORGE VOINOVICH (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Vitter.

I want to welcome Senator Vitter to this subcommittee. I've served on it for eight years, either on the chairmanship or a ranking member, and Brother Carper and I have had some fun together.

Mr. Chairman, I take great pride in the fact that this committee has helped transform the Nuclear Regulatory Commission into one of the best and most respected regulatory agencies in the world. We worked very hard placing the right people on the commission, providing the commission with the resources and tools necessary to do its job and holding them accountable for the results.

We have held more than 20 hearings involving the NRC in the past eight years. A good number of those hearings are related to the Davis-Besse incident in 2002, and we took the NRC to task as it was initially reluctant to address the issue of safety culture.

So it's no accident that we have seen dramatic improvements in both the safety records and reliability of the 104 operating reactors today compared to 2002. And I would like to take this opportunity to thank and recognize each member of the commission for the outstanding job that you do day-to-day.

Being a regulator often is a thankless job, whether it's the NRC, FAA, FDA or the Federal Reserve Board. It seems as though the only time people care about what you do is when something goes wrong, and it's almost always to criticize what you did or didn't do, and you should be very, very proud of your record.

Indeed, a regulator's job is a complex and difficult one. It's like a high-wire balancing act. You can't be too far to the left nor too far to the right, and it has to be just right. The Fed has to keep the interest rates just right; otherwise it will result in either recession or inflation. Similarly, the NRC has to be vigilant at all times to keep its regulatory threshold just right. It should be tight enough to prevent complacency from sitting in both -- within the agency and the industry it regulates, but not overly restrictive to a point stifling the growth of nuclear power in this country at a time -- the time when it's most needed.

I think today's hearing provides us with an opportunity to reflect upon the past, present and future of the industry. Clearly, the power industry -- nuclear power industry has come a long way since the '60s and '70s. The Three Mile Island accident in '79, however unfortunate, provided an experience through which both the industry and the NRC were humbled and have matured into stronger and safer entities.

There were many lessons learned from TMI, as well, as we'll hear from the witnesses today, but one that resonates with me the most as a policymaker is something that Admiral Rickover said: "The nuclear power is not to be feared, but to be respected."

I recently met with Mr. Andre Lacoste, the chairman of the French Nuclear Regulatory Agency, and he said something very interesting. He said that many European countries that adopted a policy of phasing out nuclear power following Chernobyl in '86, countries like Italy, Sweden, U.K., and perhaps even Germany, are now (re-embracing ?) nuclear power.

I was at the German Marshall Fund this last weekend and heard again that they are really putting -- thinking about really getting back into nuclear power. He thought there were two main reasons for this. One is the recognition that the newly adopted carbon reduction mandate cannot be achieved through energy efficiency and renewables alone.

And the other is the recognition of the improved safety records and reliability of nuclear power plants and maybe the jobs that are created in the nuclear power industry that nobody's talking about. They're tremendous jobs. In fact, in my opinion, we've had more jobs created in this country in the area of nuclear power than we have in windmills and solar.

And for the benefit of my colleagues on this committee, I'd like to share with you a portion of a speech given by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown last week. The speech is entitled, quote, "Nuclear Energy and Proliferation."

And I quote Brown's speech. He said, "Because whether you like it or not, we will not meet the challenges of climate change without far wider use of civil nuclear power. Given the scale of global emissions reductions required and the likely cost, no cost-effective low-carbon technology must be off limits. And the International Energy Agency estimates that we must build 32 nuclear reactors globally every year -- every year -- if we're going to meet the emissions standards that they've laid out for 2050." He goes on to say, "So, however, we look at it, we will not secure the supply of the sustainable energy on which the future of our planet depends without a role for civil nuclear power."

Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is exactly the message that you and I have tried to convey to the Senate during the climate change debate last year. We conducted four roundtables in the last Congress to identify solutions to making the nuclear renaissance a reality in this country, and I hope we continue this effort during this Congress through the formation of a Senate Caucus on Nuclear Energy.

We've got to do that if we're going to continue to have this nuclear renaissance that I think is so necessary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. CARPER: Senator Voinovich, thank you so much.

Our first panel of witnesses. I think you folks have been here once or twice before. It's good to see again. We're grateful for your service and grateful for your preparation and participation today.

Chairman Dale Klein will speak first and will be followed by each of his three colleagues -- Commissioner Greg Jaczko, Peter Lyons and Kristine Svinicki. Did I get it? Svinicki, yes. I should say it about 12 times. And it's great to see all of you. Thank you for being here. Please proceed.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me and my fellow commissioners to appear before you today to discuss the lessons learned from the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant 30 years ago.

My written testimony provides some historical background on the accident, addresses the NRC's response, and outlines some of the regulatory improvements that have been implemented, and mentions one ongoing challenge.

In my brief summary, let me just say that the NRC has come a long way in 30 years. We have an excellent team of highly competent staff who are very focused on the agency's mission. In fact, I should draw your attention to the results of the Office of the Personnel Management Human Capital Survey of 2008 which were reported in The Washington Post on March 13th. The NRC ranked first in leadership and knowledge management, second in results-oriented performance culture, first in talent management, and just for the sake of completing this, let me also mention first in job satisfaction.

On the matter of Three Mile Island, let me assure you that the commission has not forgotten about the accident that occurred there. Last week, we distributed to all members of the committee a recent paper by NRC's historian, "Three Mile Island After 30 Years," which was developed as part of an effort to ensure that current and future NRC employees learn from what happened.

In addition, the agency will hold a seminar tomorrow for NRC employees to explain what happened and what lessons the agency learned. A number of our presenters, including former Pennsylvania Governor Richard Thornburgh and former NRC Director for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Harold Denton, are participating at this hearing during the second panel of witnesses.

One of the most important changes that has occurred over the last 30 years is an intensive focus on what we call a strong safety culture, both in industry and internally within the NRC.

The agency's wide-ranging safety improvements include personnel training, internal processes and procedures, infrastructure and planning, technological upgrades, oversight and risk-assessment methodologies, and safety culture expectations.

The results of these efforts by the NRC and by industry are evident in the handout, which show in the quantifiable terms significant improvements in safety at nuclear power plants that have been achieved. And these are shown on two posters to my right and to my left.

In addition to safety improvements, the agency has also implemented a variety of enhancements in the area of security, especially since 9/11. In recent years, the NRC has required increased patrols, stronger and more capable security forces, additional physical barriers, enhanced emergency preparedness and response plans and many other heightened security measures.

With all this, however, the NRC still faces one ongoing challenge, which is something that confronts every industry and every regulator that is concerned with safety. And I'm referring to the danger of complacency. Guarding against complacency must involve a vigorous and conscientious commitment to maintaining high standards of safety and security. That effort includes remembering the past, learning from where we have been, and ensuring that past mistakes are not repeated. This hearing contributes to all of these goals, and I appreciate the committee's interest in understanding the lessons that have been learned and implemented at the NRC.

To answer Senator Inhofe's question about efficiency, I should point out -- and we can talk more of this -- we are looking at Lean Six Sigma to make sure that we can be more efficient with no compromise on safety. And we can talk more about that as we go forward.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this concludes my opening statement. Thank you for having me and my colleagues today, and I look forward to your questions.

SEN. CARPER: Chairman Klein, thank you for your testimony. Thank you for your leadership at the NRC, as well.

Commissioner Jaczko, welcome. Thank you. Please proceed.

MR. JACZKO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank you for having us here today to discuss the lessons of the accident at Three Mile Island.

I would like to focus on what I see as the larger lesson learned from this event, which, as the chairman indicated, is complacency. Three Mile Island and Davis-Besse, which happened decades later, happened in large part because of complacency. There was a fundamental belief at the time of these accidents that they could not occur. The challenge that remembering Three Mile Island raises for us is the need to continue to work to minimize risks, never rest on success, and always be on the lookout for new information and for the unexpected.

We did learn important lessons from Three Mile Island. And I would like to briefly mention three areas where tremendous progress has been achieved. Those would be in the areas of performance assessment, emergency preparedness and enforcement.

After the accident at Three Mile Island, we developed methods of measuring the performance of operating reactors in making our assessments accessible to the public. We first developed a systematic assessment of licensee performance, and now have the reactor oversight process, which was an improvement on the original systematic assessment of licensee performance.

The ROP was developed to look objectively at licensee safety performance across three broad areas: reactor safety, radiation safety and protection of the nuclear power plant. While I think the ROP is a very strong program for oversight, we must remember not to get complacent, but rather to look for opportunities to further improve how we assess plant performance, and in particular to continue to look at new ways to measure performance to ensure that we're truly getting an understanding of what safety is at any particular facility.

Another area that I think has shown dramatic improvements directly from the aftermath of Three Mile Island is in the area of emergency preparedness. Following the accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission now works closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with licensees, and with state and local officials from around the country to better prepare and respond to any kind of incident at a nuclear facility. These programs and the partnerships between all levels of government built the foundation upon which all hazards preparedness work is done in this country. And almost any time the commission talks about these issues with any members of the public, we are often told by people who live in the communities that have nuclear power plants that their emergency preparedness initiatives are better than any other community because of the preparedness activities that they do with the nuclear power plant.

Finally, I'd like to turn to one area, which I think was a very important change that came out of the Three Mile Island incident, and that was in the area of enforcement. Substantial changes were made in the NRC's enforcement authority, and I think this continues to be an important change and an important area as we continue to execute our mission of being an effective regulator.

I would just like to close with a comment and a quote from one of the reports that was issued following the Three Mile accident. And this is from the Rogovin Report, which was a study that was commissioned by the NRC following the Three Mile Island incident, and it stated, "Before March 28th, 1979, an attitude of complacency pervaded both the industry and the NRC, an attitude that the engineer- designed safeguards built into today's plants were more than adequate; that an accident like that at Three Mile Island would not occur -- in the particular jargon of the industry, that such an accident was not a credible event." I think that is a statement that can be as true for us today as it was in 1979, and true in the sense that those are the lessons and the things we need to keep our focus on as regulators.

And briefly then, if I could just add, in response to Senator Inhofe's question, I think an area where we can improve the process for new reactor applications, and one in which I think the industry has made some comments to the agency about, is in trying to prioritize perhaps better the applications that we review. Rather than an approach right now where we review all applications that come in, perhaps we could take our resources and focus on those applications that are most likely to be completed in the near term, and focus our work there to complete those, and then the other applicants at a subsequent time.

Thank you.

SEN. CARPER: Mr. Jaczko, thanks so much for that testimony.

Is it Dr. Lyons? Dr. Lyons? It is, isn't it?

MR. LYONS: Yes.

SEN. CARPER: Dr. Lyons. Is it Dr. Klein? It's not Dr. Jaczko, is it? All right, Dr. Svinicki? All right. All right, one mere mortal among all these doctors. That's good.

SEN. INHOFE: Is it Dr. Carper?

SEN. CARPER: No, no, I don't think so. I don't think so.

All right, we've got plenty of doctors here. Dr. Lyons you are on. Thanks. Thanks for joining us.

MR. LYONS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of you for holding today's hearing to discuss the 30 years of experience in applying the lessons learned from TMI.

These vital lessons, fundamental to safe reactor operation, must never be forgotten if we are to maintain the hard-earned confidence of the American public and the safety of the nation's nuclear power plants. I support Chairman Klein's testimony, and I'd like to offer just a few additional comments.

Evaluating events and learning from them is a simple concept, but an enormous challenge. Until I studied the TMI event, I had not realized that virtually the same situation occurred at the Davis-Besse plant in September of 1977. Then, the operators correctly diagnosed the problem. Unfortunately, information from that occurrence was never shared with TMI. If it had been, and if the TMI response had duplicated the operator response at Davis-Besse, the nation would not have experienced TMI.

I visited TMI and discussed the event with Mr. Ed Frederick, who was the controller and operator during that accident. Prior to that visit, I believed that a simple explanation of operator error largely covered the event, but by hearing his explanation of the actions he took that evening, it became clear to me that the design of the control room and the instrumentation available to him dramatically limited his ability to comprehend the situation.

After TMI, far more attention was given to the interface between operators and the reactor. Today's operators have a clear understanding of key plant parameters. After TMI, the operational experience program was strengthened, and the industry and the NRC thought that we had a solid program. Nevertheless, in March of 2002, the cavity in the reactor vessel head at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant was discovered. Although this was a near-miss and not an actual event, the magnitude of the cavity and the potential significance of that event again sent shockwaves through NRC and the industry.

That corrosion also had precursors, such that the industry and the NRC, which were aware of this area of concern, should have been even more alert to the potential for that type of problem. Much like the event at TMI, Davis-Besse once again suggested that the NRC and industry failed to adequately use operational experience.

Today, our operational experience program is a strong, solid contributor to reactor safety. Through discussions with operators at our plants, I'm assured that the reports generated by our program are viewed as very important and taken very seriously. It's my hope and expectation that no future event will be partially ascribed to a failed opportunity to learn from our experiences.

We've come a long ways from TMI. Safety at our nuclear plants has improved dramatically because of TMI and other NRC and industry initiatives, but the recent Davis-Besse incident shows that we must remain ever vigilant that the TMI lessons are never forgotten.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

SEN. CARPER: You bet. Thank you so much, Dr. Lyons.

Commissioner Svinicki, welcome. Please proceed.

MS. SVINICKI: Thank you, Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Vitter, Senator Inhofe and Senator Voinovich, for the opportunity to appear before you at today's hearing. I support Chairman Klein's testimony as well and add my voice to those of my colleagues, in supporting the commemoration of this significant event in our nation's nuclear history.

Today's hearing and the seminar to be held tomorrow, for all employees at the NRC, are important opportunities for the community of nuclear safety professionals to pause, reflect on this historic event and remain vigilant against technical complacency or overconfidence.

Since I am one of the NRC employees who was not involved in the nuclear profession, at the time of the Three Mile Island event, in preparation for this hearing, I have studied a number of the written histories and other critical reviews.

The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island is mentioned in Chairman Klein's written testimony. In developing its final report to President Carter, on the event, that commission took more than 150 formal depositions and interviewed an even larger group of individuals. At public hearings, it took testimony and collected documentary material that, it estimated, filled about 300 linear feet of shelf space.

In analyzing all this detail however, their strongest conclusions were sometimes startlingly simple. Among their conclusions was the following statement, which I would like to conclude by quoting briefly from their report. It's as follows.

In the testimony we received, one word occurred over and over again. That word is mindset. At one of our public hearings, the director of NRC's Division of System Safety used that word five times in a span of 10 minutes. The most serious mindset is the preoccupation of everyone, with the safety of equipment, resulting in the downplaying of the importance of the human element in nuclear power generation.

We are tempted to say that while an enormous effort was expended, to assure that safety-related equipment functioned as well as possible and that there was backup equipment in depth, what the NRC and the industry has failed to recognize sufficiently is that the human beings who manage and operate the plants constitute an important safety system.

Chairman Carper, in my work at the NRC, over the past year, I've found an organization of dedicated safety professionals, who are ever- mindful of this important fact and who are committed to its enduring lessons. I thank you again for this opportunity. And I look forward to answering your questions.

SEN. CARPER: Commissioner Svinicki, thank you very much, for your testimony and for your service.

I would just say, before I ask a question, just an observation: This is a busy time for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This is a very busy time. You have 104 nuclear power plants that require your close supervision. A number of those plants are in the relicensing process. Two will be relicensed to operate for another 20 years.

I believe there are either 16 or 17 applications, to build maybe 26 or 27 new nuclear power plants. And you have a number of companies that have designed state-of-the-art nuclear power plants and have presented them to you, for your review, to determine whether or not they are worth going forward with.

I mean, that's a lot. That's a lot. You have a great agency. It's well know that this is regarded as one of the best places, for people who are in the federal government, probably in any place in this country. I think you can be justifiably proud of that.

Chairman Klein, in your testimony, you warned against the dangers of complacency, when it comes to nuclear safety. I've said as much. Others here have said as much. Other commissioners have repeated this theme to us.

This is not a time to rest on our laurels. Great progress has been made since that day almost 30 years ago. But obviously we have to guard against complacency. And frankly we can do better. You say that overconfidence was a factor in the Three Mile Island accident and in the recent -- more recent Davis-Besse episode.

How are you ensuring -- how are you, Mr. Chairman, commissioners of the NRC -- how are you ensuring that your new generation of employees, folks who weren't around, at least not with the NRC, 30 years ago, but many of which are new -- how do you ensure that they too guard against complacency, particularly when it comes to safe operations?

MR. KLEIN: Mr. Chairman, we have a large program that reminds people about their self-responsibility and their importance. We do that every time we give our speeches. We do it in training. We do it in our knowledge-management catch-up program. And so we demonstrate by our actions that we believe what we say and that they should always be vigilant.

We also have a rotation program, where people are able to rotate within the agency. That challenges them, so they don't get locked in one mindset, as Commissioner Svinicki had indicated. And so what we try to do is continuously reinforce the importance, not only of our employees but also the licensees, that every individual has a responsibility. They need to carry out those seriously. And we monitor and maintain and check that.

SEN. CARPER: You may have said this, but I -- let me ask specifically. How are you bridging the education gap, between the older generation at the NRC and the newer generation of employees?

MR. KLEIN: We have -- a lot of our individuals that have retired still want to work. They just don't want the 80 hours a week that sometimes it seems like they do. So they come back. And they are training this next generation. And we basically have an entire cadre of people that are making sure that we keep our best practices and our best techniques available.

SEN. CARPER: I underhand that the NRC is again looking at new license applications, similar to the time before Three Mile Island. I think there are a lot of application in that time as well.

Let me just ask, how is the NRC making sure that we don't take our eye off of our current fleet, of 104 nuclear power plants, while preparing for what we hope and expect will be a new fleet in the years to come?

MR. KLEIN: Mr. Chairman, I think, one of the ways that we did that was fundamentally in our structure, we created an Office of New Reactors, separate from the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, so that individuals in the one division understand very clearly, their role is to monitor and maintain those 104 plants that are running today -- that is their full-time responsibility -- and not get distracted with the new reactors that are under way. So we created two divisions: one of which looks at the new reactors, one of which looks at the existing fleet.

SEN. CARPER: And do you feel -- two questions. Do you feel that the new license process is effective? And do you think you have got enough resources, employees, to meet all these jobs that you're asked to take care of?

MR. KLEIN: Well, Senator Carper, I appreciate yours and the committee's support on giving us the finances that we need, to make our decisions, to protect the American people, to ensure that these plants are safe and secure. And I believe that we do have a workforce that's adequate to carry out that mission.

We work at it very hard. In 2007, for example, we hired 441 people for a net of 219. Sixty percent, 60, was women and minorities. And so we have a very aggressive recruiting campaign. We have gotten very talented individuals. And I believe we have the resources that are necessary for us to do our job.

SEN. CARPER: And a question for Commissioner Jaczko, and then I'll yield to Senator Vitter.

But let me go back to the issue of transparency and miscommunication that were problems, during the Three Mile Island accident, and just ask, how has the NRC improved, made improvements in those areas? And what do you think we could do better? What do you think the NRC could do better?

MR. JACZKO: Well, I think, some of the areas where we've made real improvements, in transparency in particular, as I mentioned in my initial statement, is in the areas of emergency preparedness. We have much more clearly defined plans for the plants. We exercise those plans in a significant way with the local community.

So that provides a much better avenue for communication. Because one of the areas of tremendous challenges, for information-flow during the accident, was what exactly the response needed to be, to deal with the evacuation, and who needed to be evacuated and in what time.

So I think there's been a lot of improvements made, in that area in particular, where we have established better processes and better exercise those processes now. So that begins to share information.

We just fundamentally live in a much different world now, where information-flow is much easier than it used to be, with the Internet, with outreach to individuals. We have a much, I think, more transparent program.

I guess I would just finally add that the new oversight program that we have is also much more geared towards transparency and geared towards providing more information, to the public, about what the status is of any particular power plant or any particular facility that we regulate. So I think those are some of the specific areas where we have made real progress in that area of transparency.

I think one area that we can make improvements on, and it was an item that was addressed, I believe, in the Kemeny Commission report. And that is to continue to improve on our ability to communicate -- in plain English, I guess, is the phrase we like to use -- where we're communicating complex technical information, in a way that the public can understand, without necessarily having a public -- a background in nuclear engineering or nuclear science.

So that's an area where I think we could continue and improve, and that probably means more training and continuing to train our individuals, not just in their technical expertise, but in training them how to communicate that to an audience that's non-technically educated.

So I think those are some areas where we've done well and where we can work on a little bit better.

SEN. CARPER: Good. Thanks for those responses.

I think I've consumed seven minutes. Let's just say each of our colleagues have seven minutes, and Senator Vitter, you're up next.

SEN. VITTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This is to anyone who cares to answer. Could you give any specific examples since Three Mile Island -- not so much Three Mile Island, but since then -- of how operating experience has improved plant operations today, including your guidelines for that?

MR. KLEIN: Senator Vitter, I think there's a lot of examples that we have that can demonstrate that. I think one of those is the sharing of information. It's much more openness between the industry -- and among the industry. I think the creation of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations has helped to share good practices and good techniques, and also bad practices and bad techniques so that those are not repeated.

So I think communication is an area that we've really improved on. And the success rate, as seen by these two charts, demonstrate that we cannot become complacent, but the trends are positive.

MR. JACZKO: Senator Vitter, there, as the chairman said, could be a number of examples, but if I can give you just two. One would be an issue occurred several years ago in cracking of dissimilar welds at the Wolf Creek Plant. That has led to a concerted effort that the NRC has carried out with industry to evaluate any potential for such cracks at other plants, and that would be one example of how operational experience is being used directly to improve safety today.

I could give you one other example, which would -- is sort of a cross between operational experience, as well as addressing questions on complacency. There is now in the lobby of the NRC a model of the Davis-Besse cavity, the corrosion cavity that occurred in the vessel head. That's not only a constant reminder to our staff of the need to avoid complacency. It is also an aid to operational experience of the importance of being ever-conscious of a concern for corrosion. So those would be two examples.

SEN. VITTER: Great. Thank you very much.

Again, this is to each of you, and I'd love each of you to give at least a brief response. A lot of folks have suggested broadly speaking that in the U.S. we should have more standardization within our nuclear industry of design and operation. What would your comment be on that with regard to both safety improvements and efficiency improvements, particularly in getting new plants online?

MR. KLEIN: Senator Vitter, I think all of us have commented one time or another that standardization is very important. When I talk to the industry and I talk about standardization, I want the walls even to be painted the same colors.

And we really do need to standardize. It would make our job as a regulator easier, and it would make lessons learned easier for the industry. And the industry is moving in that direction. We have several different vendors, but within each vendor we expect standardization.

MR. JACZKO: Well, if I could add, and I certainly agree with the comments of the chairman, I would perhaps just expand on that a little bit by saying that I think standardization is certainly, I think, an enhancement for efficiencies, and ultimately in the end can allow us to deal with generic issues -- generic safety issues that may arise -- in a more straightforward manner because we don't have to tailor the solution to 104 unique plants, which is what we find ourselves in with the situation today with several generic issues that we're wrestling with; that the solutions are so unique and so specific to each plant that it consumes a tremendous amount of resources to have to analyze those individually. So there is, I think, an enhancement certainly from the safety perspective.

I think the biggest challenge is how we actually achieve that. We don't impose standardization as a safety requirement. We encourage it, and we encourage it very strongly right now because if the designs that we're reviewing are not truly standardized, we simply wouldn't have the resources to review all the applications that we have in a timely manner. So that's been a good incentive from the review perspective or the licensing perspective to get standardization.

The challenge will be, if plants are licensed and then built, how we maintain standardization among different utilities that may all have a similar design. That is not a requirement that we have, as I said, from a safety perspective. So that is where it will be much more incumbent, I think, upon the industry to police that initiative themselves, to ensure that plants that were licensed the same are operated and ultimately modified in the same ways as we go forward, so that we don't branch out and modify them in unique ways in the future. Thank you.

MR. LYONS: I'd certainly agree with the comments made by each of my colleagues. Standardization is very, very important. It's important not only to the regulator. We can be more efficient. We can better assess safety issues across the fleet.

And as Commissioner Jaczko mentioned, the main way that we can encourage standardization, and I would concur with him, is that when we tell industry that if you standardize, we can be far more efficient and effective in our reviews of your application, that is the main tool we have towards standardization, and maintaining standardization, as my colleague said is also vital. Thank you.

MS. SVINICKI: Senator, I know you don't have much time for questions if you get four answers to each, but I agree with my colleagues. Clearly, standardization holds the potential of a lot of increases in efficiency. The time frame to review that Senator Inhofe was talking about, more standardization allows us as a regulator to capture the efficiencies in those reviews.

And also as Commissioner Jaczko said, it has an enduring benefit. As new reactors would be added to the current fleet, standardization would continue to provide efficiencies for us. Thank you.

SEN. VITTER: Let me end with this follow-up question. Given all of your answers, shouldn't we or you or both of us consider actually mandating more standardization than we do at present?

MR. KLEIN: Well, Senator Vitter, I think the industry has the message. I think we as the regulator have the message. It -- (we're struck ?) in the area of the U.S. by free enterprise. It was easier for France to standardize when they had one vendor and one utility. We have multiple vendors and multiple utilities.

And so I think the way we will encourage standardization, as opposed to mandate it, is by the review process. If someone comes in with a non-standard design, it will take us a very long time to look at it.

SEN. VITTER: That's all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

SEN. CARPER: Good questions.

Senator Inhofe?

SEN. INHOFE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first of all kind of go back a little ways. I'm one of the people who actually remembers Three Mile Island and all the hysteria and the public clamor that came out of that thing.

Would you, Chairman Klein, describe to us any public health impacts that resulted from that accident 30 years ago?

MR. KLEIN: Well, Senator Inhofe, I think the concern that people typically have is concern about cancer, and there is no data that shows there has been any negative impact of cancer from that accident.

SEN. INHOFE: Is there any data that shows that there was any resultant public health impairment as a result of that accident?

MR. KLEIN: No evidence of that, Senator Inhofe.

SEN. INHOFE: You know, I think that's significant, because you talk to most people and they don't realize that. They assume that -- and yet I would have to say, and I think that each of you on the commission would agree, that because of that incident 30 years ago, that did retard our efforts to move forward with nuclear energy.

And I wonder, any thoughts about where we'd be today if that had not happened?

MR. KLEIN: You know, that's a difficult question. One could speculate that activity. But as you indicated, I think Three Mile Island should have shown that the safety systems were fairly robust and that there were no negative health impacts. But certainly the public confidence was shaken. But that also occurred at the same time that we were undergoing a transition in the baseload demand of electricity, so after Three Mile Island, there were a lot of coal- fired plants that were canceled as well, due to the baseload demand. But my guess is that had Three Mile Island not occurred, we could likely have had more reactors today than we have.

SEN. INHOFE: Well, and we didn't anticipate back at that time 30 years ago that we would be having the energy problems that we have today and that -- I mean, here we are with 20 percent of our energy coming from nuclear, and some of the Western European countries, France, I believe, is 80 percent. I've never heard anyone talk in any of these hearings about the performance of whatever the counterpart is called in one of these other countries like France.

Are they going through about the same things that we are right now, even though they are way in advance of us? Are they as concerned with safety? Are they concerned with the same concerns that you folks have? How do you compare us to them?

MR. KLEIN: I think, Senator, if you look the performance of the plants, in general our plants perform better than a lot of countries. I believe that as the regulatory body, we are still viewed as the world's best regulator. We have more people, a lot more technical details, but we also have things we can learn from other countries, and so we share.

And we have a very large international program where we try to share information among various regulators. And so I know Andre Lacoste, the head of the French regulator, is also going through and trying to beef up their regulatory capabilities.

But I think for most countries, they're similar.

I think our job as a regulator in an international arena is to share best practices worldwide, because as we learned, even though we have no reactors like Chernobyl in the United States, there was still a lot of uncertainty and apprehension from Chernobyl. So we need to be proactive in the international community.

SEN. INHOFE: Commissioner Lyons?

MR. LYONS: Senator Inhofe, France certainly has a very strong safety regulator, a very effective one. But I think it is interesting to note that within the last, I'd say, two years, there have been legislative changes within France that have moved their regulatory system much closer to ours; in that their regulator now has a substantially greater degree of independence and basically is now an independent regulator as we are and, in addition, has mandates for transparency and public information.

If I were to look across the world, I think that two important trends would mirror what has happened in France: that more countries are recognizing the importance of an independent regulator, of strong public input and public information as we have. And in addition, a quest that I would say that we have been on in many of our international discussions is to encourage more countries to look at both safety and security as two integrated functions, two very important integrated functions; whereas most countries -- many countries -- handle them completely separately.

SEN. INHOFE: You know, I hesitate even getting into the thing on the five years that it takes -- the NRC has indicated to this committee that it takes about five years reviewing new reactor designs before granting certifications -- because safety is the most important thing. I understand that.

Commissioner Jaczko, you said, when I was saying, you know, if there's a way that we could reduce that five years down, move a little bit faster, you talked about prioritizing applications.

I'd like to ask each one of you in my time remaining, of any ideas you might have that might shorten that five-year period of time and maintain the same level of safety that we enjoy today. I'll start with you, Commissioner Svinicki.

MS. SVINICKI: Senator, one of the practices that Chairman Klein brought from the Pentagon was referred to as Lean Six Sigma, which is the -- it's a process whereby our staff has gone through and looked at all of the procedural steps for reviewing these applications.

The commission has received some suggestions from the staff of how to better coordinate their internal work and the coordination that needs to occur between offices. And so they are looking at it, Senator, if they could take some months off of that process. And the commission has received some recommendations that we're looking at now.

SEN. INHOFE: Good, good.

Mr. Lyons?

MR. LYONS: Senator Inhofe, at least one suggestion I would make would be the hope that industry in the future could follow more directly the path that we anticipated when Part 52 was created. We anticipated that a site would go first for an early site permit; that they would be using a certified design, and only then would be going for the construction and operating license. I believe it's correct that no licensee -- no applicant right now is following that exact path. There certainly are other areas where we can look for efficiency, but having that process followed would help us.

SEN. INHOFE: I see.

Commissioner Jaczko?

MR. JACZKO: Well, as I talked about, I think the area of prioritization. As Commissioner Svinicki mentioned, the staff has talked about areas where we could improve our review a little bit, but we're talking about months, perhaps. And the biggest challenge that I see right now is really getting the design reviews completed. And for most of the designs that we have right now, there are some challenges in getting those reviews completed.

SEN. INHOFE: Yes.

MR. JACZKO: And so once we can have that completed, the licensing review will be a much more straightforward process. But right now, there are challenges, I think, with getting the design review complete. And as I said, I think our focus would be better on taking a few -- maybe a smaller number of those designs and a smaller number of licensees or applicants, focusing on getting those through the process once, demonstrate how it will work effectively, and then turn to the other applications.

SEN. INHOFE: So it would be effectively getting them online faster by doing that, but not as many of them?

MR. JACZKO: But not as many, I think.

SEN. INHOFE: Yeah. Chairman Klein, any last comments on that?

MR. KLEIN: Well I think, Senator Inhofe, on the design certifications, those are fairly unique. And one thing I have learned is that a good application takes less time to review than an incomplete one. And so it's a two-way street, I think. I think industry needs to give high-quality applications, and we need to be responsive in the review of that application.

I think on the license applications, once we go through a few of those, and we practice the Lean Six Sigma activities, I think we will become more efficient, with no compromise on safety.

SEN. INHOFE: Good. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. CARPER: You're welcome. Thank you.

Senator Voinovich?

SEN. VOINOVICH: Mr. Chairman, I'd be remiss if I didn't say a few words on the Davis-Besse incident, because that facility is located in the state of Ohio. I was chairman of the subcommittee when that occurred and, as I said in my opening remarks, we took the NRC to task, as well as First Energy. We devoted three oversight hearings to follow up on the NRC's corrective actions stemming from the GAO and inspector general reports. We also met with Nils Diaz, the NRC chair at the time, and Ed McGaffigan, privately on a quarterly basis to get updates. It took a little while and some pushing, but I was pleased to see NRC formally incorporating safety culture into its inspection and regulatory oversight process.

As you all know, we're trying to launch the nuclear renaissance in this country. We need to get into it for reducing -- providing baseload energy. We need it also to meet the emissions caps that we'll be seeing probably with new legislation being passed to deal with climate and global warming. And also, it's an area of large job creation.

But I still run into people out there that are saying, well, what about safety? What about the security of these plants? Aren't they, you know, vulnerable right now to terrorist attack? That's one thing. Then you hear another story out there about all this nuclear waste that's all over the United States being held in dry and wet storage, and how safe is that stuff? And also, if something would happen, you know, what kind of insurance do they have? They have no idea about Price-Anderson and the way the insurance -- if something would happen, all of the insurance carried by all of the 104 would be used to deal with a situation.

And I still think -- and it's a complaint I have, is that you're not doing a good enough job at getting information out there in the country. There is still a lot of stuff that's floating around. And these same people that are out there, you know, talking about this are the ones that are standing in the way of our moving forward right here in Congress on some areas that we should be going forward with. And I would be interested in your commenting on these.

MR. KLEIN: Well, Senator Voinovich, I believe that, as an agency, we can be more proactive in education. We have to walk that fine line, as Senator Carper indicated. We have to remember we are the regulator, and not a promoter.

I would like to see the Department of Energy be more proactive in their roles and responsibilities. And the area of communication, though, is one in which I believe the NRC can do better. I think we would like to modernize our web sites, so that we become the site of first choice if someone has a question.

As Commissioner Jaczko indicated, we do need to train our individuals to communicate clearly and succinctly. As I oftentimes say, I am an engineer, and so if you ask an engineer what time it is, they will tell you how to build a watch. So I believe we can do a better job on communication, and we are working on it.

SEN. VOINOVICH: How about the whole issue of the nuclear waste that we're generating and the fact that we continue to have it located in dry and wet storage? And people are concerned about that all over the country. What do we say to them about that? How long can that last?

MR. KLEIN: Dry cask storage is safe. We license those facilities. We currently have made a determination that we can safely secure and store that material on-site for as long as 100 years. But as a nation, it would be good to come forward with a long-term waste solution.

For us as a regulator, we make sure that the dry cask storage is done safely and properly and securely. As you know, we have application before us for the Yucca Mountain site. We by law are required to look at that application, and we will do that in a very effective manner, depending on the resources that we have available.

SEN. VOINOVICH: So you're -- what you're saying to me and saying to the public is that the current way of holding that waste among the -- at the facilities around the country is safe, and second of all that there -- that there's some extended life in terms of it being stored in that fashion. Because most people today believe Yucca ain't going to happen. And so there's a concern about that. And some of us are considering doing something as an alternative to that.

So you're telling me and telling the public that the waste that's out there today being stored in dry storage is safe, and that we can continue to do this for some time in the future without being concerned about it.

MR. KLEIN: Yes.

MR. JACZKO: The -- Senator, if I could add, the NRC did a study about dry cask storage several years ago. And that study found that the risks from any of the spent fuel, particularly in dry cask storage, was about a million times less than the risk from the power plant itself.

So what you often find is, communities that are very accepting of the power plant may have concerns about the waste. And in fact, I think the waste, we've shown through our own analysis, is much, much, much less of a risk.

And so I think that's a message that we can communicate. I think the licensees themselves can do a better job communicating that message as well, in the communities that do have facilities, about, really, what the areas of focus from our perspective really should be, from a safety standpoint.

SEN. VOINOVICH: And also security --

MR. JACZKO: And security as well.

SEN. VOINOVICH: -- in terms of, you know -- from terrorist attack. You hear that: oh my goodness, if something happens there, that, you know, we'll have a calamity. And do you want to comment on that, the security aspect of this? We're talking about safety and security.

MR. JACZKO: Well, Senator, the Nuclear -- I'm sorry -- the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has one of the most long-standing programs in security. It goes back to the '70s, our ideas of how we deal with facilities and deal with security.

And I think the agency was in a very good position in particular following September 11th, because we had a well-established program; that we were able to quickly make changes, make modifications to deal with that new issue. We have a very rigorous program right now where we do exercises at facilities on an -- on an ongoing basis to test their security programs.

We've put in place new requirements for the existing fleet of reactors to ensure that they can mitigate the effects of any kind of 9/11-type incident. And we put in place very strong requirements for new reactors to ensure that they'll be able to deal with some of the 9/11-type incidents and things that could happen in the future.

So I think we have a -- we have a very robust program in security. We're continuing to make that better. We're continuing to improve our communication in our work with other members of the federal family, including the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, to ensure that we have security cover from all the different angles, whether it's from the facility itself, whether it's from responding to an event at a facility or developing the emergency preparedness and training and interface that's necessary to successfully deal with an incident.

SEN. VOINOVICH: Thank you.

MS. SVINICKI: Senator, if I could just draw together your last two questions on communications and security, I would like to add that one of the unfortunate outgrowths of the enhanced security at reactors post-9/11 is that so many had to close their visitors' centers and their information centers.

And as I visit reactor sites now, I often notice that along the roadside, the entrance to the plant, they have large signage for a visitors' center with a big placard across it that says, "now closed to the public."

I'm heartened that some of the new reactor applicants are considering how they're able to site some sort of public information center that they can put far enough away from the reactor at new sites so that they could once again be communicating with the public.

SEN. VOINOVICH (?): Thank you.

MR. LYONS: If I could just suggest, Senator, that one way of perhaps reinforcing in the public's mind the safety and security of dry cask storage -- and this would be something that, probably, industry could do -- would be to make some of those casks available for public inspection. I think anyone who's had the opportunity to view those casks, to simply stand beside them, realize the number of tons of concrete and steel that are in those things, I think they would develop a very healthy respect for both the safety and security of dry cask storage.

But I also agree with your point that, certainly, I personally would hope that Congress would be looking towards development of a long-term spent-fuel policy that would give the American public a clear view of where we would be going far into the future.

SEN. CARPER: Senator Voinovich introduced me to the concept of roundtables, as opposed to committee hearings, several years ago, and I like them a lot. And we're going to hold a roundtable in Cambridge, Massachusetts on Monday morning May 18th, and invite some very smart people up there to come and share with us what they know about spent fuel.

And we talk about it as nuclear waste, but I fair -- understand it's a fair amount of energy still unrealized and unextracted from the spent fuel. And so we're going to find out their ideas. We're going to hear a little bit of what's going on in other places around the world. We're going to tap the brains (system ?) -- those are very, very bright people -- and also have an opportunity to bring in maybe a person or two to talk with us about clean coal and sequestration of CO2.

And the responsibility of the subcommittee is dual in purpose. One is clean air, and the other is -- nuclear safety. And they're related, but we want to make sure we have an opportunity while we're there that morning. And my hope is that Senator Vitter and Senator Voinovich and others on the subcommittee, Senator Merkley, can join us for that time.

All right. And speaking of Senator Merkley, he's joined us here.

And we're delighted you're here, and -- not a new member anymore. He's an old veteran, and we're happy he's here, and welcome to our hearing.

SEN. MERKLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

And thank you for your testimony. I'll -- have a couple quick questions.

One is, I believe that there are some facilities that still have nuclear rods stored in pools, rather than in dry cask. And -- but if -- just kind of characterize, if you could, the amount of storage that is still done -- wet storage, if you will. And does that pose greater risks, and is there a strategy for moving to a dry cask system?

MR. KLEIN: All nuclear power plants use wet pools. In fact, we require the ability to offload the entire core of a reactor, if need be, into the adjacent spent-fuel pool that's in water. So every commercial reactor that's running has a dry -- a -- a wet pool. They typically want to utilize that one first, and then they only go to dry casks once that wet pool is filled. Both are safe.

SEN. MERKLEY: And why is it they want to utilize the wet pool first?

MR. KLEIN: It was a part of the initial design. That was the initial concept. It also has decay heat removal. So you will remove the decay heat from the spent fuel for several months before you'd ever consider putting it into dry casks, for decay heat removal.

SEN. MERKLEY: I had the experience a few years ago of being up at Hanford and walking on the metal grating on top of a pool. And it's a strange feeling with the nuclear rods down at the bottom.

And I asked the question, well, what happens if an earthquake comes through here and this water is lost? And the answer was just summarized as, "Well, that would be bad." And -- but could you kind of give us a better sense of kind of the safety issues related to the wet pool storage?

MR. KLEIN: Well, Senator, as you might expect, all those facilities have to meet earthquake requirements. They typically are robust. There are very thick walls. Some have liners. And so in the event that there could be a crack in that pool, that water would leak out -- and again, these are very thick pools, several feet of concrete -- there is the ability to quickly add water.

SEN. MERKLEY: Turning to another safety issue, in terms of the dry casks, above-ground storage, is there -- are there issues there related to potential terrorist actions? What happens if a dry cask is blown up, in terms of radioactivity in nearby areas, versus -- how does -- is there a -- is there a terrorist risk, and how do we address it?

MR. KLEIN: Well, Senator, we have analyzed the terrorist risk on (both/those ?) dry casks and, you know, there are lot of factors that go into that, much of which we can't say publicly, but we have analyzed a lot of "what if" scenarios, what kinds of attacks and how they might occur. These are very robust canisters, and so we believe that, from all of our analyses, that it is a minimal risk.

SEN. MERKLEY: Thank you.

SEN. CARPER: Thank you, Senator Merkley. Thanks for joining us.

Let me just conclude, as this first panel wraps up, with a couple of thoughts. One, the point I made earlier, folks at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are busy these days, very busy. You're always busy, but especially these days, saying grace over the safe operation of 104 active nuclear power plants, relicensing probably, I think, a couple dozen of them right now, reviewing the applications for, I think, 26 or 27 new nuclear power plants which could be built in the years to come, and examining carefully, closely, the new designs for nuclear reactors that are being presented to you. And you're doing it all at once and trying to provide a good working environment for people and providing diversity in your workforce.

That's a lot. That's a lot to do well, lots of managing, and we're counting on you to continue to do that work and to do it well. It's important. Our nation needs safe nuclear energy as much now as we ever have.

I've been reminded several times in this economic calamity that we are going through in the last year or so, especially the last several months, of the words of Franklin Roosevelt, who said to the American people a long time ago, "We have nothing to fear but fear itself."

We have, oh gosh, earthquakes to fear. We have terrorist attacks, I suppose, to fear. We have most, I think, to fear, complacency --complacency. If we think that, oh, we've come a long way, haven't had an accident, a major incident for all those, lo those many years, we've done a much a better job in terms of raising the operating capacity, that you realize more nearly the full capacity of the generation of electricity by these nuclear reactors, we've come a long ways in the last 10 or 20 years.

Here's what we have to do. We have to fear complacency. To sit back and rest on our laurels, that would the worst that could happen. This is the time to remain vigilant. Several of you have used that word "vigilant." And this is indeed a time to remain vigilant. If we do, then the future for nuclear energy in this country, along with it the prospect of cleaner air, the prospect of less dependence on fossil fuels, the prospect of maybe even smaller trade deficits, is actually enhanced. So all that would be great news for our country, which right now needs some great news.

All right. That's it for this panel. Again, our thanks to each of you for your service, for being with us today. We'll provide probably for the record some additional questions. We'll ask that you respond to those promptly. Thank you so much.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you for your support.

SEN. CARPER: You're quite welcome.

Gentlemen, welcome one and all. We're delighted that you're here, very much looking forward to your testimony. It's great to see some of you for the first time and to be able to welcome others back. Thank you for joining us today.

Just a real short review of your bios, and I'll start with the Honorable Peter Bradford. Mr. Bradford was an NRC commissioner during Three Mile Island accident, (served ?) at the age of 12, I think he told me, was 12 years old at the time. Today he's an adjunct professor from the Institute for Energy and the Environment at the Vermont Law School. Welcome. Is it Dr. Bradford? Yes, it is. Thank you.

He is a former chair of the New York and Maine Utility Commissions, and has advised many states on utility restructuring issues, and he's also on the board of the Union of Concerned Scientists.

I think -- on reading Governor Thornburgh's testimony, I think he alluded to calling on the Union of Concerned Scientists to help out during the time that that was most helpful.

Mr. Harold Denton, it's great to see you, sir. I read all about you in Governor Thornburgh's testimony and the kind of role, the key role that you played all those years, over 30 years ago. And I understand you were on site directing NRC staff activities and served as the federal government's spokesperson for the Three Mile Island accident. You were also in the first group of Americans allowed to visit the Chernobyl site. And after retiring from the NRC, you consulted on other nuclear safety matters and retired and currently live in Knoxville, Tennessee, where my wife went to graduate school. Welcome. We're glad you're here.

Governor Dick Thornburgh -- Governor Thornburgh was governor of Pennsylvania for -- what was it? -- 72 days or so before this incident. George, can you, and Senator Voinovich, former governor, can you imagine being governor of Ohio or governor of my state of Delaware and having something like this dropped on you at 72 days into your first term? That would be quite an experience.

But not only -- I call guys like you and Senator Voinovich and me recovering governors, but not only are you a recovering governor, but you've had a public career spanning some 25 years, including the attorney general for not one but two presidents, and currently of counsel to the national law firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart here in Washington, D.C. Thanks for joining us.

Finally, Dr. Marvin Fertel. Mr. Fertel is the president and chief executive officer of the Nuclear Energy Institute, with 35 years of experience consulting for electric utilities.

We're delighted that you're all here, and would ask you -- we've read your testimony, wonderful testimony -- and we would ask you to try to limit your comments to about five minutes. Mr. Bradford I think has to leave around 12:30. We have a caucus luncheon that starts just after that. So we'll try to get us out the door close to that time. But Mr. Bradford, if you need to leave right at 12:30 and we're not quite done, feel free to slip out. But you go first, and we're just delighted that you're all here. Thank you so much for coming.

MR. BRADFORD: Thank you very much, Senator Carper. I apologize to you and my fellow panelists for the scheduling constraint. The consolation I can offer Governor Thornburgh is that I'm inconveniencing him less this morning than I did on the morning we were on opposite ends of the phone line between Washington and Harrisburg 30 years ago.

I appreciate the opportunity to reflect on the lessons of Three Mile Island, with all of the interest in new nuclear power reactors in the U.S., as well as in extending the license lives and increasing the output of the existing plants.

Getting the lessons right is crucial, just as important as not learning the wrong lessons. A principal conclusion of the Kemeny Commission was, quote, "After many years of operation of nuclear plants, with no evidence than any member of the general public has been hurt, the belief that nuclear power plants as sufficiently grew into a conviction. This attitude must be changed to one that says nuclear power is by its very nature potentially dangerous, and therefore, one must continually question whether the safeguards already in place are sufficient to prevent major accidents."

The Kemeny Commission also found, quote, "that the NRC is so preoccupied with the licensing of plants that it has not given primary consideration to safety issues."

Occasional mishaps in the 1980s and 1990s notwithstanding, the NRC and the industry made many significant improvements after the accident at Three Mile Island. Then at the Davis-Besse plant in Ohio in 2002, complacency and excessive concern for the finances of the power plant owner very nearly cost them all to ground that they had gained.

Davis-Besse had received the NRC's highest safety ratings throughout 2001, even as boric acid was eating away the reactor vessel head. Only a three-eighths-of-an-inch-thick steel liner, performing a function for which it was not designed, avoided a hole in the pressure vessel, an event not analyzed in NRC licensing because it was considered impossible.

Among the lessons of Three Mile Island is that nuclear power is least safe when complacency and pressure to expedite are highest. A key corollary to this lesson is the importance of congressional oversight, emphasizing that safety must be the NRC's highest priority.

Of course this goal is always stated verbally, but at times the message has been mixed. Senator Pete Domenici wrote that he changed the NRC's priorities in a 1998 meeting with the NRC chair in which he threatened to cut the agency's budget by one-third if the NRC did not modify its adversarial attitude toward the industry.

If when the NRC regulates seriously it is hammered for delay or indifference to cost, as the NRC was in the weeks before the Three Mile Island accident, that message will have an impact. Today's hearing can be a very useful antidote to the dangers that lie on that road.

Finally, avoiding the wrong lessons is as crucial as learning the right ones. An oft-repeated Three Mile Island story line goes something like this: The most important lesson is that the safety systems worked as intended. Intervenors exploited the accident to tie up nuclear reactors in interminable and costly hearings. These problems have largely been solved. If Congress will further streamline the licensing process and shift financial risk from investors to taxpayers, nuclear construction can resume its rightful place in furthering national energy goals.

But this story line is a harmful fantasy, inviting the wasting of a lot of money and effort in solving problems that nuclear power never had, while repeating the cycle that caused Forbes magazine to proclaim in 1985 that the failure of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks as the largest managerial disaster in business history.

When TMI is seen together with the fire at Browns Ferry four years earlier, and with other expensive mishaps, such as fuel-cladding failures, emergency core cooling system shortcomings, seismic design retrofits, and absence of off-site emergency plans, a clear picture emerges of a technology pushed far ahead of its operating experience.

In 1968 the largest nuclear plant in operation was half the size of the smallest plant under construction. This was as if the airline industry had gone from Kitty Hawk to jumbo jets in 15 years. In 1972 the Atomic Energy Commission forecast that the country would need a thousand nuclear power reactors by the year 2000. This would have required the regulators to issue a license every week for the next 28 years -- a pace that could not possibly have been sustained. In hindsight, trouble and disappointment were inevitable.

The nuclear regulatory problem culminating in the accident at Three Mile Island was not that the U.S. had licensed too many but -- too many nuclear plants too slowly but -- had licensed too few nuclear plants too slowly; the country had in fact licensed too many reactors too quickly. That is why, within a decade of the TMI accident, we had a landscape dotted with nine-figure cost overruns.

Every state in a crescent from Mississippi to Washington and in a line across the northern tier from Illinois to Maine was touched by at least one event involving the waste of more than a hundred million dollars.

NRC hearings did not cause Three Mile Island. NRC hearings had nothing to do with the quality assurance breakdowns at Diablo Canyon and Zimmer. NRC hearings did not cause the diesel generator building at Midland to sink into the soil, or the tenfold cost overruns at the never-operated Shoreham Nuclear Plant in New York. Indeed, study after study made clear that NRC hearings had little to do with nuclear power's real problems.

The reasons for nuclear power's inability to compete in U.S. power markets are beyond the scope of this hearing, but they have not been fixed by measures that assume that they were caused by Three Mile Island or by an overly cautious regulatory process. Indeed, they have not been fixed at all.

Again, my thanks to the subcommittee for the chance to expand on some real and some wrong lessons at Three Mile Island. Undertakings such as this hearing are the way for the U.S. to learn history, rather than repeat it.

SEN. CARPER: Dr. Bradford, thanks very much for those comments and for your presence here today.

Mr. Denton, welcome. Glad to see you. Thank you for joining us.

MR. DENTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman -- (off mike) --

SEN. CARPER: Is your --

MR. DENTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

SEN. CARPER: There you go.

MR. DENTON: I'm glad to have this opportunity to meet with you.

On Friday morning following the accident, Chairman Hendrie requested I go to the site and take charge of the NRC response. I would be President Carter's contact and work closely with Governor Thornburgh.

A few hours later, the White House sent a helicopter to take me and members on our staff to the site. On arrival, I asked the utility to inform us in advance of any changes they made in the status of the plant, so that we could review them, and we began round-the-clock coverage of all the operations at the plant. Within a few days, we had over a hundred NRC people at the site.

The president asked during that time that to be kept fully informed and had specific times that he wanted to be called in the morning and night. In addition, he indicated that all the resources of the federal government would be made available to bring the situation to a safe conclusion. I briefed Governor Thornburgh each evening and -- as events required, and he and I held press conferences nightly for many days there.

I had never met Governor Carter or -- President Carter or Governor Thornburgh before, but their -- the -- they appreciated the gravity of the situation. They were personally involved every day. And it was just remarkable cooperation, I think, occurred during that whole crisis between the federal government and state government.

For example, I never signed any paperwork through those weeks. I didn't approve or request any formal assistance that required paperwork. The military provided logistical support. They brought in planeloads of equipment from around the country and people. The Department of Energy did environmental surveillance around the plant with all their capability.

We were not an operational agency. We were a paperwork review agency. So we had very little capability, operational capability. So if someone found -- phoned and said, "We're available for the fire service," so they served as our phones for communicating within our staff members.

I stayed there for three weeks. The event was hectic and challenging and at times surreal.

We were not sure and did not understand the full consequences of that accident for a long time afterwards. We originally knew that there had been a severe accident, which you -- that was inferred from measurements made outside the containment.

When the core was finally accessible and people were able to look inside the core, the examination showed a drastically different appearance than most people thought. The uppermost fuel assemblies were completely destroyed, and research showed that about 45 percent of the core had melted.

The critical phase of the accident was actually over Wednesday morning, in looking at this accident in retrospect. Operators turned off redundant emergency core cooling systems, although the water -- the reactor was losing water continuously through a failed valve. No core damage would have resulted if the emergency pumps, which started automatically, had been left running, instead of being shut off.

About a hundred minutes into the accident, the water level dropped below the top of the core, and the fuel began to overheat. As the water level continued to drop, more and more of the central core melted and flowed downward and solidified when it reached the bottom of the reactor vessel.

Approximately four hours later, nearly 20 tons of molten core material had reached the bottom of the reactor vessel. A circular area at the bottom of the reactor vessel experienced extremely high temperatures for about 30 minutes before cooling. At 16 hours into the accident, the operators managed to restart pumps and provided a way of getting water back in the core and provided subsequent cooling.

A robust reactor containment structure proved valuable during this accident. The off-site radiological consequences were minimal.

The history of accidents -- the history of containments is kind of interesting to me. The first containment was in use, proposed back in 1947 by a blue ribbon committee of the Atomic Energy Commission. Since that time, containment structures have always been a safety feature of commercial reactors.

During the TMI accident, the total amount of iodine released, which is a particularly hazardous material, was about 1 million times less than that released as a result of the uncontained Chernobyl accident in the Ukraine.

Also we found, as a result of studies after the accident, that the possibility of a penetration of the containment basemat by a molten core, commonly referred to the China syndrome, which had not been studied extensively prior to the accident, is very unlikely to have penetrated the containment basemat even if a hot core had reached the basemat.

A second topic that was subject to a lot of review at the time was the possibility of a hydrogen explosion within the containment. There had been hydrogen explosion in the containment that led people to start thinking about -- could there be a hydrogen explosion within the reactor vessel. Calculations had been done, but they had neglected an important factor that indicated that oxygen would recombine with hydrogen in the water, essentially as soon as they were generated. So there never was a chance for a hydrogen explosion in the reactor.

As you mentioned before, the accident was comprehensively examined by a number of investigations, including the president's commission --

SEN. CARPER: Mr. Denton, I would -- you're a little bit over six minutes -- ask you to try to wrap it up here very shortly, please. Thank you.

MR. DENTON: All right. My conclusion is that the safety of power plants today are better than ever as a result of all the lessons learned, and that the federal and state preparations for emergency planning are better than ever. Coping with the new standard designs and coping with the fact that the nuclear technology doesn't really exit in the U.S. today as it did back in those days, there will be continuing challenges for the NRC Commission.

SEN. CARPER: All right. Thanks very much. Your entire statement will be made part of the record. When we do questions, I want to come back and ask you to kind of just go back and revisit that last part of your testimony for us, if you would. Thanks so much.

Governor Thornburgh, General Thornburgh, we are delighted that you're here. I don't know how many people have been both a governor and attorney general for two presidents, but not too many. So it's a real honor for us that you're here. Thank you.

MR. THORNBURGH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.

My full written statement attempts to recount on a day-by-day, hour-by-hour basis the events of March 28, 1979, and the days immediately following from my vantage point as a newly minted governor of Pennsylvania.

SEN. CARPER: Yeah, I think we all found it just very interesting. All the testimony's very good, but it was just riveting the way you documented it. I -- so I -- it was very, very interesting.

MR. THORNBURGH: Thank you.

The statement addresses a couple of things that I want to emphasize about the emergency management side. One is the constant frustration that existed concerning the inability to acquire reliable information about what was transpiring at the damaged reactor and the difficulty in communicating between various centers of activity.

Remember that this was an era before we had cell phones, the Internet, Blackberrys, videoconferencing and the like. Landlines, which were the exclusive way to communicate, were frequently jammed, even the so-called white -- hotline which had been established between the White House and President Carter and myself.

Reliable information concerning potential threats to health and environment were equally hard to come by. Experts proliferated, but most of them were of little use. They either exaggerated the safety or exaggerated the threat of the situation.

And I would be remiss if I didn't pay particular tribute to Harold Denton, who proved to be the real hero of this episode. He had an ability to translate nuclear jargon into plain English. He had a calm demeanor that built confidence and credibility, and he served as an effective antidote to the coincidental opening of the movie "The China Syndrome" in the Harrisburg area just prior to the accident. You talk about surreal events -- that had to be one at the top of the list.

We've seen 30 years pass since the time of the event, and I want to offer some brief observations on the future of nuclear power in light of present-day circumstances. Energy independence is a byword today. A familiar litany has developed about the need to rely more on alternate sources of energy. But most people acknowledge that the prospects of substantial and timely relief from hydro, wind, solar, biomass, et cetera is highly unlikely.

As a result, there is a growing and renewed interest in nuclear energy, which is now supplying in many countries around the world more than the majority of their energy needs. And there's more and more interested in all non-carbon-producing sources, such as nuclear, even among some environmentalists, who were traditional opponents of nuclear energy. Concerns about global warning (sic) have made strange bedfellows indeed.

The predictions of a comeback for nuclear power must be tempered, however, by major concerns that exist, and I'll refer to those briefly.

Nuclear technology, as has been referred to today, has become increasingly complex and demanding, and more expensive, and we have to rely more and more on foreign component manufacturers. Even the pioneer in this area, Westinghouse Electric in my state of Pennsylvania, is now owned by Toshiba.

The costs of construction are going to go up, increased financing costs. The $18.5-billion loan-guarantee program authorized in 2005 has been underfunded and understaffed and now must compete with other priority needs.

The safety record has been adverted to this morning and has certainly improved since pre-1979 times. Emergency-management capabilities at the state and local level, while they're no doubt -- been upgraded, have not been tested, and with the passage of time no doubt have not been the high priority that they were in the immediate aftermath of TMI.

But I think the most important and sizeable barrier to a vigorous development of nuclear power in the U.S. is the inability thus far to solve the problem of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel. President Obama's scuttling of the Yucca Mountain site is only the most recent setback in the effort to tackle this vexing challenge. Surely this has to be a high priority in the expenditure of federal research and development funds, even to the point of committing to a Manhattan- Project-type undertaking to call upon our technological expertise to remove a significant barrier to helping to solve our energy problems and contribute to a better quality of life for all of our citizens.

Thirty years after the nation's most serious nuclear accident, we have yet to address many of these key issues in a systematic way. And I compliment you, Mr. Chairman and your members, in calling this hearing to spotlight some of these issues. If we continue on our present path, we threaten to deprive ourselves of a potential green source of much-needed electric power.

Many thanks. I look forward to your questions.

SEN. CARPER: Governor, thank you so much.

Mr. Fertel, Marvin Fertel, welcome. Happy that you're here. Thanks.

MR. FERTEL: Chairman Carper, members of the committee, thank you for holding this hearing today.

As you know, this month marks the 30th anniversary of the accident at Three Mile Island. Since then, the nuclear energy industry and the federal government have dramatically increased safety and reactor operating standards and developed a safety culture that we believe is demonstrably among the best in American industry and worldwide.

The accident at Three Mile Island has had profound and lasting effects on virtually every aspect of nuclear power plant safety and operations. Lessons learned from the accident are permanently ingrained in the nuclear industry's training, procedures, regulations and culture. The Kemeny Commission, which has been referred to earlier, recommended two things that we took very seriously: first, that the nuclear-power industry should establish a program that specifies appropriate safety standards, including those for management, quality assurance and operating procedures and practices, and that conducts independent evaluations; and second, that there must be a systematic gathering, review and analysis of operating experience at all nuclear plants, coupled with an industry-wide, international communications network to facilitate rapid flow of information to affected parties.

The industry took those recommendations and formed the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations nine months after the accident, and charged it with promoting the highest levels of safety and reliability in the operation of our plants. The institute drives operational excellence, open communications, and continuous improvements among all U.S. nuclear-plant operators. All U.S. energy companies that own and operate nuclear plants are members of INPO, and they are driven by INPO to continuously strive for excellence in reactor operations.

INPO has had a profound impact on the way nuclear plants are managed and operated. The proof, we believe, is in the steady improvement in plant performance over the last three decades, since the accident. To improve training, INPO in 1985 formed the National Academy for Nuclear Training to focus and unify industry efforts to continuously improve training and qualification programs and to promote professionalism of nuclear-plant personnel.

The academy reviews nuclear utilities' training programs for key positions at each plant. Since TMI, the industry also introduced the use of plant-specific reactor control-room simulators at every site. In 1979, there were only four simulators for the use of all nuclear- plant operators. The number of operating crews was expanded, and each crew spends a week in training in the plant-specific simulator every six weeks.

INPO also provides a unique form of self-regulation, and recognition that the nuclear industry standard is excellence. INPO teams conduct on-site, two-week inspections at each plant once every two years to assess the knowledge and performance of plant personnel, the condition of systems and equipment, the quality of programs and procedures, and the effectiveness of plant management.

Each year, INPO conducts meetings with all of the industry chief executive officers in which both the good and poor performance is openly discussed, providing accountability for plant performance at the highest level of management. INPO also reviews significant events at nuclear plants and communicates lessons learned and best practices throughout the industry. INPO provides assistance with specific technical and management issues in areas related to plant operations and support.

And as mentioned by the governor, although emergency-preparedness procedures had been in place prior to the TMI accident, it was clear that -- from the event that additional action was required. As a result, the industry developed comprehensive emergency preparedness and response programs in cooperation with federal, state and local leaders, and additional requirements were imposed by NRC and FEMA.

The TMI-2 accident caused no injuries to workers or the public, but there was emotional distress as a result of the event and related evacuation of -- of residents near the plant. A dozen epidemiological studies conducted since 1981 have found no discernible direct health effects to the population in the vicinity of the facility. And these studies are all summarized in my written testimony.

Since TMI, one of the nuclear industry's tenets is to never -- and this is a term you've heard from everybody so far today -- become complacent in our vigilance -- to safe operations of nuclear facilities. To prevent complacency, the industry is taking proactive actions to identify and resolve any emergency -- emerging issues promptly and effectively, and to communicate operating experience broadly across the industry.

The goal is to identify equipment or human performance problems well in advance of any significant impact on plant operations.

Mr. Chairman, to conclude, I would want to assure this committee that the accident at Three Mile Island has had profound and lasting effects on virtually every aspect of nuclear-power-plant safety and operation. Today the industry is more efficient, more productive, more professional, and above all more committed to safety. We continue to share operating experience and lessons learned because we will not allow history to repeat itself.

Safety is, and will continue to be, our highest priority. The safety of our reactors today is evident in the world-class performance of the facilities and the exemplary worker safety record across our industry.

Thank you for this hearing, and thank you for your interest in our industry.

SEN. CARPER: Mr. Fertel, thank you for joining us today and for your testimony again today.

Dr. Bradford, I will just ask my colleagues to direct their first questions to you, and then we will come back and ask questions of our other three guests. And the first question I'd like to ask of you, if I could -- I am reminded, I think it was Harry Truman who used to say, "The only thing that's new in the world is the history we never learned, or have forgotten." And I like to think of Three Mile Island in the context of lessons that we learned, lessons that we didn't learn and maybe lessons that we learned but we'd forgotten.

And let me just ask you. Thinking back, take that approach: lessons learned, lessons never learned and maybe lessons learned but forgotten, and just kind of tell us what do you think in those three broad categories.

MR. BRADFORD: Well, I probably can't do much with the "learned but forgotten" category, because I've forgotten it. (Laughter.)

But in the context of the push for a nuclear renaissance, it does seem to me that one lesson that at least has faded from the forefront is the difficulty of maintaining a strong, clear focus on safety at a time when the rest of the government seems entirely focused on licensing additional plants. That was very much the concern at the time of the accident at Three Mile Island. The pace of new applications had fallen off, review times had gotten longer, and many of the congressional hearings and much of the media's focus was "Why can't we get this process started up again?" And in some ways, that pressure did contribute, I think, to the combination of complacency and haste that led to the accident.

So my concern today, in a context in which the industry is seeking your support for all of -- essentially, in financing all of the plants that they see in the pipeline -- is similar to the concern that Commissioner Jaczko echoed and -- or articulated well in the last panel: that there really is a need to prioritize, to pay attention to the pace at which the NRC can license and the taxpayer can afford to build the new plants. It may be different from the pace that the industry would like to move forward at. And that the setting of limits based on what the process can handle, rather than what the industry would like, might make a significant contribution to safety.

So that -- maybe that one lesson, in a way, answers all three of your questions. And so it seems to me to have been an important lesson at the time of Three Mile Island, and there is a danger of its being overlooked and forgotten in the climate that exists today.

SEN. CARPER: All right. Thank you. One last question from me and then I will yield to Senator Voinovich. I think you expressed concerns in your comments, or at least in your testimony, about the streamlining of the license process. And what are your views on the current new and renewal license process? And do you feel public input is adequate on those?

MR. BRADFORD: I'm glad you asked that question, Senator. In the context of your discussion with the previous panel on communication, I was running through in my mind all the areas in which I agreed that communication has improved. But there is one respect in which I think communication has regressed, and that is that the public has far less access to the licensing process today. Not just because of the one- step process -- I think in many ways that change is constructive -- but the NRC has also adopted a number of rule changes that drastically curtail the ability of people participating in our process, first to raise contentions effectively, and secondly to pursue them. Attorneys can no longer cross-examine directly in many situations; they have to submit questions through a panel chair. And that's really an area of the Kemeny Commission and the NRC's own Special Inquiry Group report that's just been ignored in the years that went by.

The Kemeny Commission recommended that the NRC create an office of special counsel to represent the public in its hearings. The Rogovin group actually went further, and recommended intervenor funding. None of that has happened, and in fact, the NRC hearing process in some ways has become almost a show trial in terms of the public's ability to be heard effectively. So I think the reforms in the direction of one-step licensing pose difficulties, but they also offer benefits. The exclusionary regulations that the NRC has adopted seem to me to be a mistake, and an unfortunate one.

SEN. CARPER: All right. Thank you, sir.

Senator Voinovich?

SEN. VOINOVICH: Yes. One of the things that we've tried to concentrate on during the last number of years is human capital. And I have found, because of my experience on the management side of government, that so often regulatory agencies aren't able to do the job that you'd like them to do because they don't have the resources to get the job done.

I'd be interested, Mr. Denton, in your reaction to what Mr. Bradford said earlier, and that is that there was a movement in the country of having too many too fast that -- by 2000, a thousand. That was -- I don't know whoever predicted that, but that was pretty ambitious. And then contrast that today with the situation where the Nuclear Regulatory Agency is probably the only federal agency that's able to replace the retirees that they have had and, in addition to that, bring on new people to take care of the challenge of the new licenses that are coming before it.

And Mr. Fertel, you're watching this, too, and I'd be interested in your comment in regard to that, because the impression that you have, Mr. Bradford, is that they're not able to get the job done. And I have to tell you that Senator Carper and I have worked very, very hard to create an environment there where they can replace their people. We've given them flexibilities that other agencies don't have. They are number one in the federal government in terms of job satisfaction with their people. We've reached out to MIT -- even Ohio State in Ohio, Cincinnati -- to get the schools back on track in terms of producing the people that we're going to need for this renaissance that we hope takes place.

So I just throw that up as a jump ball, and I give you all a chance to comment on it.

SEN. CARPER: Dr. Bradford, feel free to go first, if you'd like.

MR. BRADFORD: My concern is less with resources directly, because I agree that you've been very supportive of the NRC with regard to getting people for processing additional licenses. The concern that I have is more that, when the commission comes before various congressional committees and if the message is constantly one of, "Are you meeting the licensing deadlines? Are you avoiding delays? How can we squeeze a few more months out of the process?" and they're never asked about the resolution of generic safety issues and never asked to put resolution of these issues --

SEN. VOINOVICH: But you see, that's not the case, Mr. Bradford. Have you followed the numerous hearings that we've had, 20 of them over the last number of years? That is not the case.

MR. BRADFORD: No, sir, I've only been here this morning.

SEN. VOINOVICH: Well, I think it would have been good to maybe check in to see what's happened during the last eight years.

MR. BRADFORD: Well, you know, if you've put the same emphasis on getting a schedule for the generic issues, getting them on a track, being sure that the resources are available, that's terrific. And if all the other committees that they've come before have done the same thing, that's terrific too. But if that isn't the balanced communication that they're getting, then there is the possibility -- indeed the likelihood -- that in trying to be responsive to the Congress, people will be shifted into the areas that the Congress is most concerned about. It happened certainly at times in the 1970s. That's the era that I'm familiar with and it's a lesson that I --

SEN. VOINOVICH: Can I ask you something? Do you believe that we should go forward with a nuclear renaissance? Do you believe that nuclear energy is something that we should increase in this country in terms of baseload generation? Do you believe that nuclear power is something that's available to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions? You know, or are you just -- I mean, where do you stand on that?

MR. BRADFORD: You know, I spent 20 years in positions of responsibility for the power supply to the states. And by the end of that time, my effort was devoted to creating processes that made the wisest economic choice, essentially through the kinds of competitive market processes that we use in every other area, with the investors responsible for taking the risks and the customers responsible for paying off the costs once the plants are serving them. When those processes were put in place, nuclear power never bid. The investors would not take those risks.

I would be glad to see nuclear power be part of a climate change solution package, when it reaches the point in time that it's able to compete effectively in those power supply markets that have made -- and those markets have made sure that more than half of the customers in the U.S., in the regions that have gone to power supply markets, have had adequate electric supply for the 25 years now that we've been relying on them.

But nuclear power can't play in those markets. And it troubles me greatly to see the Congress ask to pick this one technology and favor it heavily in financial terms.

SEN. VOINOVICH: Do you know something that nuclear power has, in terms of -- if you look at solar and wind power and see where the money that we've spent during the last several years is going, that's where the money's going. I think the only thing that the industry is concerned about is the issue of loan guarantees that would be necessary to go forward, and of course a little bit more important today because of the fact that the financial markets are in such bad shape.

If you look at where we've spent money, it's amazing. And if I were somebody out there today, I'd invest in solar and wind power because of the subsidies that are coming out of the federal government in that regard.

MR. BRADFORD: They have a long way to go to catch up.

SEN. CARPER: And I am going to have to interrupt here. I'll come back to Senator Voinovich here in just a moment, but I want to yield to Senator Merkley for any questions you have of Dr. Bradford, and then you'll be free to leave.

SEB. MERKLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Professor, thank you for your service as a commissioner and the other work you've done. I find it very interesting to see the story -- the history of the Davis-Besse nuclear plant. Essentially a leaking nozzle eroded the carbon steel, multiple inches of carbon steel over a series of four years, and then there was a football-sized hole in that, and the inner lining, the stainless steel lining was deformed by the pressure of the vessel into that hole.

And the role of the NRC in this was multiple. First, they had been requested to require inspections of these nozzles because they'd been known to leak. After four years of debating that, they decided not to require those inspections.

Then fast forward from -- to 2001. They did take much stronger action to require plants to inspect those nozzles. The Davis-Besse plant was one of two plants they decided not to do that, and resist that requirement. And the NRC did relent at that point and decided it would be safe to wait until the plant inspection in 2002, then decided that, no, that it should really be done and ordered the plant shut down for emergency inspection, but the plant resisted and then they went back to the position of waiting until the safety inspection. It's when they had that February inspection they discovered this football-sized hole.

Does kind of this story give us any sense of insight into the role of the commissioners, the pressures they're under to keep plants operating? And do we have an adequate system in place to be able to address the real safety risk? Because I think this is believed by all to have been a substantial safety risk.

Do we have a system now? Have we learned from that enough to restructure the way the NRC operates in order to have them be able to stand up and really ensure that inspections take place, even when it involves shutdowns and costs and so forth? Have we figured out that balance or is there more we need to do?

MR. BRADFORD: I wish you'd asked that question to the previous panel, of course, because I am not there today and can't --

SEN. MERKLEY: But they're in the middle of it, whereas you've got the objective experience to --

MR. BRADFORD: It's clear, certainly that the licensee made its concerns known at the commission level, but -- and that would probably happen today, too. On the other hand, I assume the commissioners with the benefit of what happened at Davis-Besse would almost certainly push back, perhaps, more than occurred at that time.

At the end of the day, the public's greatest safeguard in this area lies in the process of the appointment of commissioners, the questions and decisions you make in confirming commissioners, and the practices and procedures the commissioners themselves put into place to protect the staffs' technical judgments from any political or financial intrusions.

The protection that the public will get in these kinds of situations will be just as good as the standards that you insist on in confirming and that the president insists on in making the appointments.

SEN. MERKLEY: Thank you. I think you've summarized that. It remains an inherent challenge. We've got to protect the integrity of the staff judgments and try to insulate the commission from political or economic pressures that might overrule the safety judgments of the technical staff. Is that a fair way to summarize your point?

MR. BRADFORD: It is. Yes.

SEN. MERKLEY: Thank you.

MR. BRADFORD: Incidentally, I think there's perhaps some encouragement to be had in the study that Chairman Klein cited regarding the high staff morale in the agency, because that's not suggestive of a place where the staff feels beaten down at the moment in its ability to raise concerns. At least that's my hope that that's what that study is suggesting.

SEN. MERKLEY: Thank you.

SEN. CARPER: Thank you, Senator Merkley.

And then Dr. Bradford, it's 12.30. Thank you so much for joining us.

MR. BRADFORD: Thanks very much. Again, my apologies to the committee.

SEN. CARPER: We're glad that you could come, and thank you very much for your input.

A question, if I could, for Governor Thornburgh, and perhaps for Harold Denton as well.

Governor, let me just ask, how important was -- looking back 30 years, how important was Harold Denton's ability to communicate complicated technical information to the lay public, to ordinary people during an event of this nature?

MR. THORNBURGH: It was crucial. It was crucial because this was a technology not known to the general public or to those of us in public office, and the so-called experts were beleaguering us with conflicting advice and we really -- I told President Carter, I said, send us one good person who could provide us with reliable information and upon which we could make information -- make judgments with regard to emergency management. And without embarrassing him, I have to say that when Harold showed up, it was clear that he filled the bill.

SEN. CARPER: Mr. Denton, how did you feel when you were tapped for this assignment? It's not every day that the president calls and says, "Harold, I've got a job for you."

MR. DENTON: Well, I was shell-shocked, probably, at getting this assignment. When I went up, I thought that perhaps the White House would have a staff member up there and I would report to that person, and then report to Governor Thornburgh. But I found out the moment I landed at the site, the word had come in to us somehow that I was to call the White House. And I remember turning to my secretary, who had gone up with us, saying "Call the White House." And she replied, "Well, how do I do that?" And I said, "I don't know, Doris, that's your problem." (Laughter.) And I must have been under a lot stress to snap at her like that, but she did get the White House.

And the fact that the president was so willing to commit the resources of the federal government, and so concerned about our relations with Governor Thornburgh and others, I felt pretty confident at the time that, we'd make every effort to bring things to a safe conclusion. And that's what we did, and there was just unparalleled cooperation among all the federal agencies.

I had never participated in any of the training for public affairs or public speaking sort of thing. But I did hold a press conference every day. And I think that was part of the secret that I came away with for that, is that you need both technical people, subject-matter specialists, I'll say, and elected officials to properly talk to the public.

Technical people don't really communicate well. They're not elected. They don't necessarily understand the local context. The governor brought that aspect to the communication process. So without that, people would probably still be evacuating.

SEN. CARPER: (Laughs.) The two of you made a good team.

Let me ask both Governor Thornburgh and you, Mr. Denton. Do you believe that the NRC has gone some way toward rectifying their communications problems? Doing a better job at it now, or not?

MR. DENTON: You mean in operation -- reactors or in licensing the reactors?

SEN. CARPER: Just being able to communicate their work, their role, their concerns, their efforts to focus on safety. The -- some of these issues are pretty technical. Most people in the country aren't all that good at understanding some of that stuff, and I struggle with it as well.

MR. DENTON: I don't think there has been a real advance in that area. I had wondered at times if commission meetings held out in the region of the plant might be, you know, one way to do that. That would -- not all meetings have to happen in Washington, for example.

We'd hold staff meetings in regional areas when there were problems, but not -- usually the commission didn't feel willing to move commission decision-making out to a region.

We're -- we've also been very uneasy about appearing to take sides on these arguments about should a plant be licensed or not, except through formal mechanisms. And so a lot of people who are unhappy with the commission decisions never get a chance to see their decision challenged, so to speak, outside of a courtroom.

SEN. CARPER: One last question for Governor Thornburgh and perhaps for you, Mr. Denton, but do you feel that the states are better prepared? Do you think they have more of the tools that they need to meet an action of this nature today than maybe 30 years ago?

MR. THORNBURGH: That's still an item of concern to me. Thirty years have gone by, really a whole generation has grown up without having fresh in their memory the experiences of Three Mile Island, and I think one would hope that those lessons have been learned.

I did a lot of yapping about it when I was a governor. We spent a lot of time focusing on emergency management issues. But it really bears substantial repeating because the one -- the first lesson that I set forth in my written statement was "Expect the unexpected." And I think sometimes we are not as good at that as we'd like to be.

I would just add one thing to Harold Denton's observations, and mercifully I haven't since 1979 had occasion to deal with the NRC in an emergency situation. But I don't think there's any question but what at the very least that got their attention, and I think that one of the things that both Harold Denton and I agreed upon in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island incident was, you can't manage this kind of an emergency situation away from the site.

And most of the problems that evolved during this experience resulted from a failure to observe that. And I think his observations about getting the commission and its staff out among the folks is good for any government agency, and I would second that motion as well.

SEN. CARPER: Good. Thank you.

MR. FERTEL: Mr. Chairman, could I --

SEN. CARPER: Just very briefly. My time has expired, and I want to go to Governor Voinovich. Just very, very briefly, go ahead, very briefly. Thank you.

MR. FERTEL: Okay. The only thing I would add to what the governor just said to your question is that there are exercises around every site every two years, which has gone on very, very rigorously.

And where I think there has been significant improvement not only in analytical tools, like dose assessments and communication things and siren systems, is in relationships among the site people who interface on drills and everything else with the local and the state people.

Where I actually think what we do around our sites is negative training goes a little bit the other way. You heard the governor and you heard Harold talk about how long this event took to evolve and how it went. Well, when we do an exercise, we get to a general emergency as severe, if not much more severe, than what happened at Three Mile Island, in half a day. And we're conditioning people in decision- making in the state and the local to think that this happens that fast, and it doesn't. So I think we've improved a lot, but we may be doing negative training in certain respects.

SEN. CARPER: Okay. Thanks for that comment.

Governor Voinovich -- Senator Voinovich.

SEN. VOINOVICH: I'm thinking about the security at these facilities. And several years ago someone asked, "If we were going to have a terrorist attack or something in Cleveland, where would you go?" And Davis-Besse is about 20 minutes from my house -- (chuckles) -- and I said I'm going to Davis- Besse. (Chuckles.)

It's just amazing what they're doing out there. And I've even said -- I visited other federal facilities in the United States, and the security just is really not up to what it should be. And I'd said: Why don't you get in a car or fly a plane and get out and see how we're securing our nuclear facilities around the country?

I think it's important for everyone to understand that not only has this committee -- subcommittee had 20 hearings in eight years -- that's two-and-a-half a year -- but I can tell you that Senator Carper and I have met and I personally have met with Nils Diaz and now with Dale Klein, who I believe is really doing an outstanding job, in my office.

I think sometimes people think that the oversight that's getting done by Congress is done at these hearings. And yes, they're very important, but it's that special time that a senator spends with the people that run the agency and the commissioners that make a difference.

Senator Carper, since he's taken over the chairmanship, has also had these groups of people together and getting their input. We're going to be going up to MIT to get their slant on things.

So I think it's real important that people understand that we're pretty sincere about what we're doing, and I think it's important that -- maybe Mr. Fertel, you could comment on the fastidiousness now that we've got at the NRC.

Since Davis-Besse, there's no question that they were -- they weren't getting the job done. There were lessons learned there. The industry wasn't doing their job and they weren't doing their job. But I think there's -- and I'd like to share with you some of the things that they've done since then to really demonstrate that if there's anything that looks like it's not where it should be, they just shut them down. It's just -- it's a very interesting difference of the way they're handling it.

Plus one other thing, and that is the INPO, the -- your organization -- that I think the people that run these places understand today that they really have to be on their toes. And I've had some people tell me that this peer pressure is enormous in terms of getting them to do the things that they should be doing.

So I'll -- Mr. Fertel, would you like to comment on that?

MR. FERTEL: I had the distinct pleasure of sitting here before you after Davis-Besse and saying how it was a failure not only on the company's part and the NRC's part, to some degree, but also on INPO's part and from an industry standpoint.

And INPO has dramatically modified its assessment process, with safety culture being a core portion of it now in every evaluation. We do self-assessments on safety culture annually in our industry. So from an industry standpoint, to some degree Davis-Besse had a real groundbreaking change for us, just like TMI did 30 years ago from an -- operational safety.

At the NRC, they did a very significant lessons learned. As you said, Senator Voinovich, they now look at safety culture as part of their reactor oversight process, which they didn't before. They are looking at improving how they do that. And they've implemented, I think, on the order of 18 to 20 different lessons learned that came out of the Davis-Besse experience.

So we've seen a dramatic change within our own industry in how we look at it, and NRC has implemented a pretty dramatic change within their own oversight, the way they look at it. So it has had a big impact.

SEN. CARPER: All right.

Senator Merkley, the last word here.

SEN. MERKLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Governor Thornburgh, in your testimony you noted that the added costs and increased scrutiny by regulatory authorities since the accident, together with decreasing costs from competing sources, have added up to an uncertain future for the industry.

I'm assuming you're describing a situation in which the process of responding to the risk of human error, the risk of natural catastrophe, the risk of terrorist attack have driven up costs, while some other non-carbon sources where -- we have new innovations that are reducing the cost of solar, wind or so forth.

When you see these things through the picture of a non-subsidized competition, if you will, is there a clear hierarchy in terms of the most cost-effective strategies to produce carbon dioxide-free electricity?

MR. THORNBURGH: It would take a wiser man than me to answer that question. I think it's not an area that I feel comfortable in.

I think the point that is made here is that given the enormous concern about safety and the experience of the Three Mile Island accident, the regulatory overburden is bound to be greater for the nuclear industry than for other competing sources of energy.

Now, how that breaks down quantitatively, and what kind of a box score you come up with, in making that comparison, I'm really not qualified to say. But I think it's without doubt that that regulatory overburden varies directly with the amount of public concern, over safety and threat to the environment, both of which have underscored a lot of the opposition to nuclear power over the years.

SEN. MERKLEY: Mr. Fertel, did you want to --

(Cross talk.)

MR. FERTEL: I mean, what I would say in response to your question, Senator, is that right now 104 plants are basically the lowest-cost electricity in our country, outside of hydro.

So with the burden of the regulation, which is appropriate in most cases, both security and safety, we are still, after hydro, the least expensive cost to consumers.

With regard to new plants, our capital costs are certainly higher than others. But we think the electricity will be competitive. And with regard to Peter's comments about subsidies, the loan guarantee program that we are in, we pay for.

So it's not a subsidy. We actually pay the government money for a loan guarantee that we would get, just like you'd pay the bank money for a loan that you would get. So I am not quite sure where the subsidy comes in.

SEN. MERKLEY: Could I follow up on that point?

SEN. CARPER: Go ahead.

MERKLEY: So my understanding was that the -- there was cap on liability of 10 billion, with the estimate of a single major incident being perhaps up to $300 billion. And that the private costs, of providing that kind of insurance, are so high that essentially investors would not invest, if the government didn't provide that cap.

Is that the subsidy you are referring to?

MR. FERTEL: No. That may be something Peter refers to. And he is totally wrong, to just be straight about it. Price-Anderson, which is a law that Congress enacted and has renewed, I think, five times, doesn't cap our liability. It imposes a liability.

There is no other industry in the world, chemical industry, nuclear industry, elsewhere or anywhere, that has a $10 billion liability for an accident that might happen.

The most severe accident we've ever had is Three Mile Island. And basically Price-Anderson ended up paying out money, to people around there, on the order of about 100 million.

So we have a liability of 10 billion, which is a pool of liability for our industry, no taxpayer money. There is insurance for the first primary coverage of 300 million. But you have a pool of liability.

It's not that you can't purchase liability insurance. But if you look at 64 sites, with 10 billion at each site, it's $640 billion worth of third-party liability, which I honestly have never been able to get an answer from the insurance companies. But I don't think there is that much liability capacity in the country to try and do it. So we would argue we have the best liability program in the world that other countries try to copy, as opposed to a subsidy.

SEN. MERKLEY: I will just look forward to following up with you, because my understanding was that you are required to buy insurance. But at the same time, the law caps your exposure to 10 billion. So we can follow up and get more information.

MR. FERTEL: Sure.

What Price-Anderson does is, it requires us to buy $300 million, whatever is in the market at the time. And that's what everybody has. And then it requires, escalating with inflation, each site -- if I have an accident at my site and I have to basically go into bankruptcy, all the other plants have to pay the rest of the liability, up to $10 billion.

If we ever got to $10 billion, and keep in mind, we've had no accident that gets you anywhere near it, if you ever got there, the way the law is written, Congress would then decide whether or not the industry should continue to pay more. Or Congress would intervene and decide that, no, the industry shouldn't. But it would be a decision by the Congress.

SEN. MERKLEY: Thank you.

SEN. CARPER: Well, gentlemen, this has been an enlightening morning and early afternoon. I want to really thank you for joining us today.

And Governor Thornburgh and Mr. Denton, it's just really heartening to me, and I think to all of us, to see the two of you sitting together, side by side, arm in arm, still trying to help get us through some tough, challenging times.

MR. DENTON: Mutual admiration society.

SEN. CARPER: That's a good one there.

MR. THORNBURGH: We've saved each other necks. (Laughter.)

SEN. CARPER: And you've saved some other people's necks as well.

I want to conclude just by saying, we may have some follow-up questions that we'll submit in writing. And if you could respond in a timely manner, we'd very much appreciate that.

With that being said, to my colleagues, to our staff, who worked on this hearing today, thank you all. This hearing is adjourned.

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