Hearing of the Constitution, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Subcommitee of the House Judiciary Committee - From the Department of Justice to Guantanamo Bay: Administration Lawyers and Administration Interrogation Rules, Part V

REPRESENTATIVE MIKE PENCE (R-IN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to apologize to you and to our distinguished panel for my tardiness. I was attending the funeral of a friend, Tony Snow, this morning. But I appreciate very much your written testimony and am grateful for your time.

General Ashcroft, I'd like to direct my questions to you in the time that I have. Thank you for being here today, and more importantly, thank you for your service to the United States of America.

MR. ASHCROFT: It was a privilege.

REP. PENCE: I must say to you, I have been through many hearings on the topic of the day, policies of the Department of Justice, and the decisions that were made in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. I want to concede that all of my thinking about that day is colored by the fact that I was here, like you were. I was standing on the Capitol grounds at 20 minutes after 10:00, which as my wife and children and I paid respects at the now-under construction memorial to Flight 93 this summer, we did the math. Had Khalid Sheik Mohammad had his way, I would be seven years dead -- of that I'm convinced -- but for the courage and sacrifice of those on that flight. And so while legal arguments are fascinating to me -- have been since law school -- while semantic arguments -- ticking time bomb and the like, interesting -- I was here, and, General, you were here that day. And I remember your service in stepping into the gap and your calm demeanor, and I don't know that I've had an opportunity to thank you publicly for your steady hand at the tiller that day, but I'll thank you now.

In the course of many of these hearings we have heard suggestions from witnesses in the academic world, authors, and others, many who believe that simply by asking terrorists nicely, the United States can obtain the information that it needs to wage the war on terror and protect our country from the advent of another day like that day. Can you explain to this panel why it is that some terrorists do not respond to the so-called rapport-building approach, the non-coercive approach to questioning? And secondly -- not pulling you in to specific methods and tactics that were approved and utilized -- I'm sure that's been well covered today -- but rather have valuable was the information that we were able to extract from Khalid Sheik Mohammad and others to prevent that kind of violence against this country in the intervening seven years? So if you can speak to me about the value of those techniques and what we profited from --

MR. ASHCROFT: I get a little bit emotional to have you describe where you were that day because it brings that day back to me rather dramatically.

The information is only valuable if you care about the lives of American citizens, and then it's extremely valuable. And the idea that all prisoners would respond to the same approaches is naive. The idea that we can arrive at a single way of interrogation, in flexible, would be totally absurd. And what's even more, I think, important is to understand that some detainees would respond to the rapport building only after they had been shocked out of -- I don't mean to use the electric shock analogy, but shocked by some more aggressive techniques, so that techniques are not necessarily uniform or appropriate in one area or not in another, or not even individual- specific. There has to be an expertise. That's what it's important that our people be well trained and trained and that they have reasonable boundaries, and it is important that they know what the law says.

And if I misspoke earlier, it is important that they have communicated -- and they should be able to rely on the protection of an opinion by the department which says certain things are permissible; certain things aren't. That's why I was so pleased when I re-issued one opinion that was able to say that the conclusions remained intact because we didn't expose our people to additional jeopardy on the account of -- that was very important to me. However, we let the chips fall where they may on the reissuance.

So it's very important to take very seriously and to understand in the context of reality. And, Professor -- I think -- I don't know, are you both professors?

MR. BELLINGER: I'm not.

MR. ASHCROFT: Oh, pardon me; Mr. Wittes. The ticking time bomb may not be something we're pleased with, but I tell you, we ought to think about it. And there may come a day when it's there. I think there was too much we didn't think about prior to 2001. I wish I'd have thought more carefully about terrorism prior to 2001. I think all of us need to think about these scenarios. And so let me just say that I'm very grateful for the fact that we had people who were willing to use enhanced interrogation techniques -- sometimes shouting, sometimes grabbing the shirt, maybe, of someone, sometimes going beyond that within the limits of the law, to save lives. And I think that's -- you know, it is not a sacrifice of liberty to protect it and to enhance it.

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