Hearing of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - the Crisis in Zimbabwe and Prospects for Resolution

SEN. FEINGOLD: Good morning. The hearing will come to order. And on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs I welcome all of you to this hearing on the crisis in Zimbabwe and prospects for resolution. I'm pleased to be joined shortly by my colleague and ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Isakson, and I will invite him to deliver some opening remarks when he arrives.

I had hoped that today's hearing would not be necessary. The March 29th elections offered a chance to turn the page on what has become a very long and very tragic chapter in Zimbabwe's history. Although it fell short of international democratic standards, the African Union observer mission reported that the first presidential election in Zimbabwe expressed the general will of the people. But it took five weeks after significant bloodshed and violence to learn that Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Opposition Movement for Democratic Change had won 47.9 percent of the vote while the incumbent, Robert Mugabe, won 43.2 percent.

And then, rather than respecting the will of the people, the Mugabe regime chose, as they have done time and time again, to repress it. In the weeks after the election the Mugabe regime launched a deliberate campaign of state-sponsored violence against the MDC's members, supporters and their families in an attempt to cling to power. The reports of killings, abductions, torture, and sexual violence are staggering. The MDC reported just last week that 129 of its supporters have been killed, 1,500 detained, and another 5,000 remain missing since the March elections.

It is no wonder that Mr. Tsvangirai decided to withdraw from the run-off of the presidential election on June 27th and take shelter in the Dutch embassy. Unsurprisingly, in a climate of fear and sheer terror, Mugabe reportedly won 90 percent of the vote. Once considered a liberator of his people, Mugabe has become increasingly despotic and his reign increasingly disastrous.

According to the best estimate, Zimbabwe's gross domestic product has decreased over 40 percent in the last decade. Unemployment has risen over 80 percent and inflation is believed to be over 10.5 million percent, yes, 10.5 million percent. Food shortages, land grabs and repression have led more than four million people to flee into neighboring countries, destabilizing the wider region. And as Secretary Rice said in April, Mugabe has, quote, "done more harm to his country than would have been imaginable," unquote.

There are some who suggest that now is the time for caution to avoid escalating the violence and unleashing civil war. However, Zimbabwe's dissent has been underway for over a decade. And such a wait and see approach has only allowed this nightmare to grow. In the year 2000 I actually remarked on the Senate floor that we must act before Zimbabwe's problems become more complex and deeply entrenched. Eight years later this remains the case.

Now, I respect those who have been involved in genuine efforts to mediate a peaceful settlement in Zimbabwe, but open-ended dialogue has largely been manipulated by Mugabe and his inner circle. Any serious negotiation between Mugabe and the opposition party will require a more robust mediation effort backed by united international support and leverage. I believe the current mediation team must be expanded beyond South Africa to include representation from regional and international bodies, and I now call on the administration to press strongly for this expansion.

The unwillingness of a few key regional leaders to criticize the regime for its abuses or consider punitive measures against those responsible has been deeply disappointing. This has led some to speak of a divide between the West and the rest, an unhelpful divide that Mugabe exploits through his rhetoric. China and Russia's veto last Friday of a robust U.N. Security Council resolution imposing an international arms embargo and multilateral sanctions exposed the poisonous nature of this divide, and I am, of course, deeply disappointed by their veto, especially considering China's increasing role on the continent.

I also find it discouraging that this veto was one of the new Russian president's first actions in Africa. Until we have a comprehensive, coordinated action by both regional and international leaders, including a combination of incentives and punitive measures, I fear the situation will only get worse. And I welcome the efforts of the Bush administration thus far, but think more has to be done to overcome this divide as we press for tighter sanctions on those individuals responsible for this crisis.

Now is the time to scale up, not give up on global action. We must not allow Zimbabwe to fall out of the international spotlight as it has many times before. On Friday, Senator Isakson, the ranking member who just joined us and I along with 16 of our colleagues introduced a resolution encouraging the administration's continued efforts and calling for more robust efforts by all regional and international actors to bolster efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to Zimbabwe's crisis. I am pleased that the Senate has now passed this resolution which occurred yesterday.

Today's hearing will assess the volatile situation there and what is needed to resolve the crisis. We'll explore how U.S. policy can be strengthened to maximize leverage and expedite a negotiated agreement that respects the will of the people.

Now I would like to introduce our two distinguished panels so we can begin that discussion. First we'll hear from Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, who has been actively and directly involved in trying to bring an end to this crisis.

We will also hear testimony from Katherine Almquist, the Assistant Administrator for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development, who will specifically address the humanitarian and development challenges faced by Zimbabwe.

With more than four million Zimbabweans having fled the country, the humanitarian dynamic is directly linked to the political concerns.

And both of these witnesses have, of course, testified before the Africa Subcommittee, and so it's my pleasure to welcome you back. I appreciate your willingness to testify today, as I know this is a particularly busy day at the State Department. I look forward to a frank and productive discussion.

Our second panel features two non-governmental experts who offer unique perspectives on the dynamics in Zimbabwe and potential for transformation. Mr. Thomas Melia is the Deputy Executive Director of Freedom House, an organization that has reported on political and human rights violations in Zimbabwe for many years. Mr. Melia has long worked on issues of democracy in Africa, and will provide us with his analysis of how the U.S. can best contribute to security, stability and democracy in Zimbabwe and the wider region.

We'll also hear from Ms. Michelle Gavin, Adjunct Fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations. Most recently, Ms. Gavin offered the Council's special report on Zimbabwe titled "Planning for Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe," and has been a leading analyst of U.S. policy in Zimbabwe. Prior to her work with the Council on Foreign Relations, I was lucky enough to have Ms. Gavin as my foreign policy advisor here in the Senate. Ms. Gavin and I worked together for six years, and I am indebted to her for her work and her analysis on a very broad range of issues related to Africa and beyond.

And I can tell you that she and I met with President Mugabe in December of 1999. It had to be one of the most surprising and difficult meetings I have ever experienced in my career. This was before this all happened. And we were able to come back and say something really bad is about to happen here, and we've never forgotten it. So it's particularly pleasing for me, of course, to have her here to get her expert insights on how U.S. tools and leverage can best be used to address the situation in Zimbabwe and to thank her again for her fabulous work for me.

Thank you to all our witnesses for being here. I look forward to your testimony and our subsequent discussion. And now before the panel begins I'd like to turn to the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Isakson, for his opening comments.

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SEN. FEINGOLD: Secretary Frazer, with the unfortunate veto by Russia and China of the U.N. Security Council resolution, how do you intend to generate support for an international arms embargo and multilateral sanctions against those responsible for these recent abuses? And what is the strategy moving forward to secure greater international pressure on Robert Mugabe, the individuals who are listed in the U.N. resolution, and more broadly, the relevant ZANU PF?

MS. FRAZER: Thank you, senator. Right now we are focused on the regional effort. We will continue to work very closely with the European Union on increasing our sanctions. We're looking at additional new sanctions, both in terms of -- on individuals, but also on government entities as well, so moving beyond the targeted sanctions. We are working with European countries to do the same. We are working with like-minded countries within Africa to increase their engagement with their sub-regional bodies as well as with the African Union to try to bring that additional pressure.

We will have to work at the foreign minister and head of state level in Asia. Right now we don't see a lot of interest on the part of China and, of course, Russia, but in general in Asia or in the Middle East to have true international sanctions, but we think that the government has been oriented more towards the European Union economies, and so we can probably bring greater pressure by Africa, the U.S., and Europe.

SEN. FEINGOLD: And then can you say more specifically about your particular efforts to engage African governments and secure their support? I mean, this is an area where, you know, some positive things -- certainly the Zambian approach, Botswana approach, others -- I understand the Angolan approach is more moderate and helpful than it used to be. And then there would be other obvious, relevant countries.

But I fear that a perceived divide, again, between the West and regional leaders could undermine a coordinated response. So could you say a little bit more about that?

MS. FRAZER: Yes, I do believe that there has been significant -- there's been a sea change in the attitudes of African governments, especially in the specific sub-region, Southern Africa, where there are many more countries in SADC who are openly criticizing President Mugabe. And that's critically important to bring the necessary pressure. But across Africa you have many -- especially countries that have themselves gone through turmoil and civil war, speaking out, saying to the Zimbabwean government that it must stop the violence and have a credible electoral process to prevent a decline into civil war. Countries like Sierra Leon and Liberia and even Nigeria, which had its own flawed election, is saying that they're trying to take responsibility for that flawed election through their legal process.

So I do think that there have been significant voices, and it matters for our policy because without the support, especially of the sub-region, but of Africa as a whole, it's very difficult to mount the necessary pressure to have a democratic transition in Zimbabwe.

SEN. FEINGOLD: And I appreciate your reference to the sea change, which is largely in words, but it also has to be reflected obviously in actions. What actions do you think you can expect from these countries?

MS. FRAZER: Well, the immediate issue is the negotiation process, the transparency and the credibility of the negotiation process. I think we've all heard from the MDC that they would like that mediation to be broadened to include not only SADC, as led by President Mbeki, but also to have an African Union envoy appointed also in the mediation. So I think that that's critically important.

There is expected to be a SADC extraordinary session on Thursday of this week. We will be watching with interest to see what decisions are taken out of that SADC session. But I believe that the mediation process is probably the focal point at this point.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I understand that so-called talks about talks, as they're called, between ZANU PF and the opposition MDC resumed in Pretoria last week and will continue in Harari tomorrow. What role is the United States playing, and do you anticipate the United States -- what role will we be playing in these talks in the weeks ahead? What specific contributions can we make to the ongoing mediation efforts?

MS. FRAZER: Well, we certainly should play a role and can be very constructive. We are playing a role on the outside of the talks in the sense that -- as I mentioned, we have been pushing for greater transparency. We are clearly in touch with the MDC. We are also in touch with the foreign ministers and regional leaders of SADC and the African Union.

We have not been party to -- and we've not seen any of the negotiating documents, which is actually quite rare in Africa in conflict mediation. Normally we would be more informed of the specifics of what's taken place. So we've only heard from one side that, in fact, they are just talking about the conditions for holding talks. What we see in the South African media -- often the impression that there is more substantive discussions taking place, but we can't confirm that, and we certainly would expect for greater transparency and for more engagement of the international community in general, but most certainly of the United States.

SEN. FEINGOLD: What are the options for broadening the current mediation to include SADC, A.U., and/or U.N. representation, and sort of talk about the prospects for each of those institutions to become more involved, what role they can best play in a more coordinated mediation effort?

MS. FRAZER: Well, the African Union in its resolution took a decision that the mediation should be strengthened, but they asked SADC to go back and look at how they can strengthen it, so the meeting that's planned for Thursday will be critical. My expectation is -- it depends on the timeline. If, in fact, the South Africans are brokering a real agreement, i.e. substantive talks, which I don't believe is happening, but if that is happening, then there won't be an opportunity for really strengthening that mediation process.

But the feeling of everyone I think at the African Union, or as reflected in their resolution -- and certainly the feeling of the G-8 when they also called for a strengthened mediation and of the Security Council when it took its formal statement on Zimbabwe -- was that you need a longer -- you need a more permanent presence who can negotiate some type of transitional government or coalition government, i.e., you have a secretariat or -- it's much like Kofi Annan's mediation in Zimbabwe where you have a dedicated person who stays in Harari and works with the parties through the negotiation. I think that that's the idea of both a strengthened and expanded mediation.

SEN. FEINGOLD: I thank you very much. Senator Isakson.

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SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Senator Nelson. We'll start a second round. Ambassador Frazer, I'd like you to ask you to talk about the U.S. sanctions on Zimbabwe. I had hoped we'd hear from Treasury on this, but they're apparently unable to send a representative. Give me your assessment of the effectiveness of our current sanctions regime, how much money has been froze, where are the gaps, and how can these sanctions be more effective?

MS. FRAZER: Thank you, senator. I think that our sanctions regime is fairly robust. We have two types of sanctions on Zimbabwe; financial restrictions against individuals who are supporting the policies of Mugabe to undermine democratic institutions and processes in Zimbabwe. And those sanctions are against 135 people and 30 corporate entities. We also have travel restrictions on individuals who, again, are undermining democracy in Zimbabwe. This includes members of Mugabe's inner circle and broader members of the government and some of their family members.

We are looking to expand the category of Zimbabweans who are covered. We are also looking at sanctions on government entities as well, not just individuals.

I can't tell you how much money has been blocked. I think Treasury really has that expertise, and OFAC in particular would be able to answer that question. But I do know that any individuals who are carrying out financial transactions would be fined up to $500,000 for corporations and $250,000 for individuals, so they are fairly hefty sanctions. Also, members who are on our financial sanctions -- it's a signal to international financial institutions not to do business with them. Our banks are not allowed to do business with them, but other banks also look at that same list and decide on their own not to do so.

SEN. FEINGOLD: And specifically about investment and mining in Zimbabwe -- two weeks ago the media reported that some British-based mining firms are actually increasing investment in Zimbabwe, which either directly or indirectly benefits the Mugabe regime. What steps has the U.S. taken to reverse this trend, and will the proposed E.U. sanctions effectively regulate this investment?

MS. FRAZER: Well, OFAC and Treasury under Treasury's direction are looking into this very issue, and we are certainly considering in our next round of sanctions, which we are preparing now, to have an impact on any such investments.

SEN. FEINGOLD: State Department officials have said publicly that we do not recognize the outcome of the June 27th runoff election, and thereby do not recognize the Mugabe government. What tools exist to formalize that non-recognition, and would they be helpful?

MS. FRAZER: Well, we consider the outcome of that election as illegitimate, and so we will not accept the legitimacy of Robert Mugabe on the basis of that election. Our lawyers, however, are looking at issues of recognition and non-recognition and the impact that that would have on our ability to carry out our policy in Zimbabwe. And so we haven't taken any decision as far as formal government recognition.

But we have been very clear that the election itself was illegitimate, and therefore has led to a constitutional crisis within Zimbabwe that needs resolution in favor of democracy.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Now, when the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s, the Clinton Administration announced that it would not recognize the regime. The State Department even ordered the Afghan Embassy here in Washington D.C. to be shut down in 1997. Do you think such high level statements from the White House or diplomatic actions, such as the revoking the credentials of the Zimbabwean ambassador to the United States would be helpful?

MS. FRAZER: Well, again, I think we are clearly looking at all of these options, but I think that we do not want to do anything that prevents our ability to support the people of Zimbabwe, so our direct engagement is going to be necessary, and so we're trying to look very carefully at what options of recognition, non-recognition, recalling ambassador, revoking ambassador would do on our ability to operate.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Well, I hope it's understood that these options are at least being considered.

Ms. Almquist, there's been substantial increase in U.S. humanitarian assistance in Zimbabwe in the last two years. Can you tell me specifically where that increased assistance is being directed, and how would you assess its effectiveness?

MS. ALBQUIST: Yes. Last year we provided 72 percent of all food assistance to Zimbabwe. In years prior to that, we were about 40 percent, sir, so of the total food aid for the country -- this year already in fiscal year 2008 we've provided $120 million in humanitarian assistance. Approximately $114 million of that is food assistance, and about $6 million is in non-food assistance. Now, our support is for the most vulnerable and affected by the current political crisis and the economic deterioration in the country. We're considered with mobile and vulnerable populations. We're concerned with school feeding, with programs that compliment our HIV/AIDS programs, et cetera.

So when our partners can work, we think our assistance is very effective. It does not go through the government. It is all handled by NGO partners and U.N. agencies. And so we have a high degree of confidence, when they can work, that it gets to needy populations. Right now, they can't work and so our concern for the humanitarian situation is growing daily.

SEN. FEINGOLD: The State Department's Congressional budget justification has said that if a changing government does not take place in 2008, increased aid resources should be directed towards supporting opposition efforts to press for reforms. I'd like to know what would this increase would consist of, and how is USAID currently working with the opposition MDC to strengthen that political party?

MS. ALMQUIST: You know, we have -- our democracy and governance program is, outside of humanitarian assistance, our largest sector of support in Zimbabwe. In fact, we feel that most other areas of development assistance are too problematic at this point to engage. If we had the transition to a reform minded government of some sort, we would further strengthen our democracy and government programs.

We're working right now on democratic political prophecies. We're supporting democratic political parties, which is primarily the MDC, of course and institutions of governance. We've provided critical support to the elections for March 29th, in particular, the Zimbabwe Election Support Network and the parallel vote tabulation, which allowed us and the world to know that Morgan Tsvangirai did outstrip Mr. Mugabe in that poll, that election.

We have support for civil society organizations. Right now, we've been supporting about 25 organizations. We will probably move to narrow our focus a bit on those organizations which can particularly work and operate in rural areas, because we think that's most critical going forward and to increase the demand for accountability for responsible governance, to work on civic participation and legislative processes.

We're also working on parliamentary strengthening, as the assistant secretary mentioned. The MDC did win a majority of seats in parliament, and so there are many new parliamentarians for training as well as the engagement of civil society in parliament. And then lastly, we're working on free and independent media. USAID provides support to DOA programming and broadcasts, which are critical for transmitting independently information about what's happening in the country as well as supporting for local township level newspapers and training for journalists.

We're also providing support for victims of the politically motivated violence in terms of legal assistance, psychosocial supports, and medical care, and also for documenting the human rights abuses that are taking place.

So we'll continue to do those activities in the current environment. If there's a move and a transitional government that we can engage with much more broadly, then we'll work on issues of constitutional reform, electoral reform, and restoring democratic institutions of governance, in terms of our democracy and governance program. And we'll also focus on economic stabilization and recovery with complementary humanitarian support in the meantime and then expanding our health programs to complement the current HIV/AIDS work but much more broadly work on the health care system, which is literally falling apart right now.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you.

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SEN. FEINGOLD: Ms. Gavin, thank you for your excellent testimony. And your comments remind me of the meeting you and I attended of the Zimbabwean civil society, which the people of enormous courage and ability, and how critical it is that they be central to the future.

I'll start with a seven-minute round. Mr. Melia, your organization, Freedom House, works extensively with civil society and countries throughout Africa. And I know that domestic electoral observers, such as the Zimbabwean Electoral Support Network played a courageous role in reporting on the March 29th elections and subsequent events. Is there still a need to protect domestic observers? And if so, what steps should be taken to do that?

MR. MELIA: Yes, the brave people of ZESN, that election network which was itself a coalition of a number of preexisting civil society groups, went into the March elections with a fair amount of trepidation. They were afraid of being beaten and abused and losing jobs, et cetera. What was interesting, and that was the period when I was in Zimbabwe just before the March 29 election, was that they were out doing their thing. They were out educating people on how to vote, because there was some reapportionment of districts that made it a little bit complicated on knowing where to vote on election day.

And there was a lot of people in church groups and civic groups and women's groups, et cetera, out there telling people how to vote properly to make sure they got their vote cast and counted. And that made a big difference on election day and the fact that they were present in those places. And we and others supported those efforts with money, training, and provision of material goods.

But they were waiting every day for the other shoe to drop.

And what people told me, just as MDC leaders told me, civil society leaders were waiting for the other shoe to drop. They said the surge in violence that we were expecting from the regime hasn't arrived yet. And that was, in those days, before March 29. The surge in violence didn't really come until three or four days after March 29th.

In June, it was all about the surge in violence by the regime against these people. So their efforts were severely disrupted. There were some efforts at monitoring, but mostly they were not able to implement their monitoring program. The voter education groups mostly did not implement the plans they had in June, and ZESN did not issue a statement after the election.

So those people are at the ready. They took it on the chin, quite literally, from the Joint Operations Command and the militias, the veterans, the groups that were out beating people who were supporting a legitimate process. So efforts by the international community to provide some protection to them would be very important.

SEN. FEINGOLD: What role does the Zimbabwean Diaspora play in the current situation? How can they best contribute to a negotiated agreement, Mr. Melia?

MR. MELIA: Well, as you know, 2 to 3 million Zimbabweans have left the country in recent years. The Zimbabwean Diaspora is a huge, significant portion of the population, only recently departed from Zimbabwe. Most of them are in South Africa. A lot of talent is in that community. A lot of the people who will be necessary to rebuild Zimbabwe are present in that Diaspora community in Southern Africa and worldwide, but mostly in South Africa and the region.

Those are among the people that could be brought together for planning the transition arrangement to put together the plans for the future of Zimbabwe. And the international community could play a role in convening these Zimbabweans, both those in country and those out of country to work together to plan for the reconstruction of their country.

SEN. FEINGOLD: There's some concern. We've heard that the opposition MDC is facing internal strains, largely as a result of the overwhelming repression by the security forces. What could be done by the committee, by the United States, and others to ensure the cohesion of the MDC in its ability to negotiate effectively?

MR. MELIA: A lot of effort is put in -- has been invested over the last 8 or 10 years in working with MDC to develop strategies and organizational coherence. In a democratic movement, people are going to disagree. It will not always be possible to have everybody on the same page.

But I think that the consultative process that the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute have embarked on, working with the MDC in its different factions to keep venues for dialogue alive and working has been important in this process, just as the work that we've been doing on a parallel track with civil society to keep them talking with each other to realize that they're on the -- fundamentally on the same side and on the same page. I think international groups have a role to play in convening meetings where they can discuss and strategize together.

But I think if we over focus on a particular result, this is consistent with what Ms. Gavin said, in that if we over focus on particular outcomes or particular leaders getting into a particular position, we may lose our focus, which should be on the broader population of Zimbabwe and a broader process in which Zimbabwean voices can be heard. So I think there's a degree of modesty we should retain in going into these kinds of consultative efforts. It's not up to us to direct them to come to a predetermined plan or a plan of action but to facilitate their learning process and their consultative process.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Ms. Gavin, you mentioned in your testimony that international pressure on the Mugabe regime should aim to give leverage to political negotiations and a negotiated agreement. How can the U.S. government maximize its leverage to bolster current mediation efforts?

MS. GAVIN: Well, unfortunately the answer is doing the very hard slog of diplomatic work to ensure that we don't stand alone and that we don't just stand with a cast of characters that Robert Mugabe has, in some ways, effectively painted as neocolonial or neoimperialists. So we can't sort of give up, despite the frustration, and I understand the frustration. I feel the frustration with the failure of the AU to take a more decisive stand with SADC's insistence thus far on sort of clinging to President Mbeki's mediation effort, which is simply inadequate.

One doesn't have to criticize President Mbeki to acknowledge that you can't have an effective mediation if you've lost the confidence in one of the parties. Well, there's no question that he doesn't have the confidence of the MDC. So we have to keep working to ensure that we don't stand alone. We can't sort of comfort ourselves with a coalition of the willing approach and march forward with sanctions and advice regarding a political negotiation that doesn't include these other actors.

SEN. FEINGOLD: And do you believe that the current mediation team -- current mediation can be strengthened, or is there a need to make this happen for a new mediation team and initiative?

MS. GAVIN: You know, I think that either is a possibility. I think it might be easier to finesse, perhaps, by simply supplementing as a mediation that exists. That way, no one has to reject anyone's good efforts and good offices. But certainly, I think -- (inaudible) -- was using expansion as her preferred phrase, and I think that makes some sense.

Clearly, there needs to be a new actor in the mix, ideally one with a mandate from perhaps the AU, perhaps the U.N., though that may be difficult. And I think it makes sense to talk about needing a presence on the ground, a secretariat. The U.S. can play an important role in providing resources to such a temporary institution to ensure that that can be as effective a process as possible.

But if I may just quickly say, I do think it's important not to make too many close parallels to the Kenyan situation. Zimbabwe is different. We're not dealing with this closely elected contest that -- where the integrity of the process largely fell apart in the collation and in counting of ballots. This is a situation where we had one election, that despite completely unfair pre-election conditions where the deck was stacked against the opposition, voting day went pretty well, and the opposition emerged largely victorious and then a complete sham of a runoff.

So it's a different kind of process. It requires a different sort of strategy, but I -- where the parallel with Kenya, I think, does make some sense is to point out that it was international pressure and leverage that -- that forced Kenyan actors to the table making concessions. It didn't simply spring up of its own accord.

SEN. FEINGOLD: And what steps should the United States take to increase pressure on South African President Mbeki to address the crisis in Zimbabwe in a strong, just, and efficient manner?

MS. GAVIN: I'm not sure that there are things that we can do to change President Mbeki's mind about his approach. And certainly on other bilateral irritants, I don't think that we've had much success when President Mbeki has dug into a position in resolving any kind of antagonist relationship with him on specific issues.

But I do think what we can do is make the most of the other South African voices that are making themselves heard. It's very important to recognize that South Africa is not monolithic. The ANC is not monolithic. And to talk about supplementing his efforts perhaps rather than rejecting them, it just might be more constructive.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Finally, and then I'll turn to Senator Isakson. Ms. Gavin, you have effectively said that any serious resolution of the current crisis must include Mugabe's exit and an end to ZANU-PF dominance. Under what circumstances do you believe Mugabe would exit, and how can the United States contribute to fostering those circumstances?

MS. GAVIN: Here's where I do think quiet conversations with other parts of ZANU-PF come in, because obviously President Mugabe would want some guarantees regarding his future. Ultimately, decisions about accountability should be left in the hands of the Zimbabwean people.

Ideally, they'll be able to make them. But in terms of a negotiation process, it seems reasonable to assume that some kind of arrangement to ensure his future security might be set up.

But what would it take to get him to step aside? I think it would take pressure from within the ruling party. It would essentially take an act in which those in ZANU-PF who know that they've got no lasting future, that they're investments aren't secure -- I'm not pretending these people are terribly committed to good governance and democracy.

But there's an enlightened self interest that can be appealed to here, and I do think that it's going to take a decision within the party to take a different course and to isolate the hard liners who right now are calling the shots. And that means some quiet conversations where we have access to important actors within ZANU-PF to try and encourage them to act.

SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you.

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SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Senator Isakson. I thank the panel. I regret that we have to conclude this, but I have to proceed to yet another task that Ms. Gavin sent me two years ago, the CSIS HIV/AIDS Task Force, so your legacy continues. But this is an excellent panel, and it concludes the hearing.

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