Export Control System

Floor Speech

EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM -- (Senate - May 22, 2008)

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I wish today to discuss the U.S. export control system bureaucracy and its impact on our national interests.

Recently I chaired a hearing of the Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee entitled ``Beyond Control: Reforming Export Licensing Agencies for National Security and Economic Interests.'' Some of the issues explored in the hearing were: revising the multilateral coordination and enforcement aspects of export controls; addressing weaknesses in the interagency process for coordinating and approving licenses; reviewing alternative bureaucratic structures or processes to eliminate exploitable seams in our export control system; and ensuring that there are enough qualified licensing officers to review efficiently license applications.

Witnesses from the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security, and the Department of Defense's Defense Technology Security Administration responded to almost a decade's worth of analysis, recommendations, reports, and testimony from the Government Accountability Office, GAO. The GAO witness on the panel identified numerous instances of inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the U.S. export control system, including poor strategic management, insufficient interagency coordination, shortages of manpower, short-term fixes for long-term problems, and inadequate information systems.

Although the agency witnesses acknowledged their progress in addressing these shortcomings, they also articulated a deeper need for greater reform in response to the challenges of globalization in the 21st century. I would go one step further then the administration witnesses. The U.S. export control system is a relic of the Cold War and does not effectively meet our national and economic security needs.

Recent examples demonstrate the challenges of controlling sensitive exports. Dual-use technology has been diverted through Britain and the United Arab Emirates, UAE, to Iran. A recent attempt by two men to smuggle sensitive thermal imaging equipment to China shows that Iran is not alone in
its desire for sensitive technology. However, the effort to control the flow of dual-use technology goes beyond our borders. Working with the international community is critical as technologies which were once only produced in the U.S. are now being produced elsewhere.

The second group of witnesses, representing many decades of government and private sector experience with export controls, identified recommendations that could begin to modernize this system: eliminating the distinction between weapons and dual-use technology; reducing the total number of items on control lists; implementing project licenses that cover a multitude of items instead of relying on an item-by-item licensing process; passing an updated Export Administration Act; focusing on multilateral export controls and harmonizing them with our allies; and reestablishing high-level policy management of both dual-use and munitions exports at the White House. Mr. President, I would like to ask to have printed in the Record, following my remarks, a CRS memorandum providing an excellent overview of U.S export controls.

An opportunity to revise our ineffective and inefficient export control system will accompany the arrival of the new administration in January. I urge my colleagues to consider these recommendations for improving the management and bureaucracy of the export control system as the Congress debates and updates relevant legislation.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the two CRS memoranda to which I referred printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

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