Senate Democratic News Conference - Trip to Middle East

Date: March 18, 2004
Location: Washington, DC


Federal News Service

HEADLINE: SENATE DEMOCRATIC NEWS CONFERENCE RE: TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST

PARTICIPANTS: SENATOR CARL LEVIN (D-MI); SENATOR JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV (D-WV); SENATOR JACK REED (D-RI); AND SENATOR JEFF BINGAMAN (D-NM) LOCATION: SENATE RADIO/TV GALLERY, THE CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

BODY:
SEN. LEVIN: Good afternoon, everybody.

The four of us have just returned from a five-day trip to the Middle East. Senator Lautenberg was also with us. He had to return to New Jersey. We started off our trip in Israel and we went from Israel to Syria and then to Jordan and then to Qatar. And then we went basically to Iraq, where we just left a few hours ago actually. And we spent a few hours with NATO folks in Brussels this morning.

We're just going to start off by focusing on our impressions of Iraq, since that is certainly most on everyone's mind. The security challenge in Iraq is daunting, but the political challenge is as least as great, and those two challenges are clearly related. The U.S. is determined to end our occupier role at the end of June and to turn over the-to restore the sovereignty of Iraq to an interim government, a caretaker government. This is perhaps the most critical step that has been or will be taken because that government will adopt laws that will determine or set up the process for the elections for a national assembly, and that national assembly will in turn draft a constitution for Iraq. So this is a very, very critical decision as to who that interim government or caretaker government will be.

To succeed, in our judgment, we must have the support of the three main Iraqi communities as a starting point. That's going to be difficult enough in itself, but I believe, and I think we all believe, that U.N. involvement is essential to getting the support of the Iraqi communities both because of its advice and its experience in this area of nation building, but also because of the international pressure which the United Nations involvement would bring to bear on those three communities to try to reach a settlement on this critical step. Everybody that we met with, from our own civilian and military leaders to the Governing Council representative who we met with to King Abdullah, all agree that the involvement of the U.N. in the next few months is essential to achieve a political settlement in Iraq.

The administration failed to obtain U.N. involvement before the war, and we are still paying the price for that failure. We cannot fail again to get the United Nations involved. But to get them involved, we're going to have to share the political decision-making with them, and that means that we're going to have to give up some of the political power and the political clout that we have to involve the international community. That includes making the U.N. an equal partner politically in the formation of that interim government, in setting up an election process for the national assembly, for economic development and reconstruction, for development of a civil society. Equal partnership with the U.N. in the political decision-making is key to this success that is so essential.

If we restore sovereignty to some entity in Iraq without the support of the international community, this will be characterized as American occupation continuing with a new face. Violence and civil disorder will continue and, if anything, become worse. If the United Nations becomes involved in the political settlement during the period-the next period of time before July 1st, this will open the door to troops and police officers of other countries going to Iraq. It will also open the door to NATO involvement. That becomes a real possibility, as we discussed with NATO ambassadors this morning in Brussels. The United States will become less of a target if the international community becomes involved; U.S. casualties will be dramatically reduced.

There's plenty of challenges even with U.N. involvement. Getting the Iraqi army and police up to the numbers required; we have a long way to a go. Getting the Sunni community more actively engaged without losing the support of the Shi'a community. The Sunni community has basically been left out in many ways unnecessarily. Thousands of Sunnis who were teachers and civil servants, who were not ideologically part of the Ba'ath Party but who nonetheless were members in order to maintain their jobs, have been excluded.

We must find a way to involve the Sunni community more deeply, and that means inclusion of people who were not leaders in the Ba'ath Party.

So even with U.N. involvement, the challenges are great. But without that U.N. support, the coming of July 1 and the restoration of sovereignty to an Iraqi entity is likely not to be a dawn in Iraq, but just continuing darkness.

Senator Rockefeller?

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Senator Levin.

For me-we have not coordinated our individual statements here at the microphone; you have what we do agree on-it was a very disturbing trip to Iraq, a short one, but nevertheless, disturbing.

I think we've made some very good decisions there and we've made some poor ones, and we have a lot of work to do in a very short amount of time. In some ways, I'm struck by the fact that if we make good decisions or bad decisions or fail to make decisions, that there is a part of this which is already beyond our control, and that's what I would call ethnicity, religion, the community, tribalism-all those things which you associate with all the three major branches of different groups which are there. And I think they have their own life; they're already taking on their own life. And I think that good decisions will minimize chances of harm, will maximize chances of having a nation. A lot of people say that this wartime experience has in fact taken a country which was stitched together by the British and the French in 1917 and has made it a nation, that Iraq has become a nation. I am not yet convinced of that.

I want to say that we all had a chance to meet with the soldiers from our states, and of course we were with soldiers in the military constantly. And they're doing an absolutely superb job. Everybody says that, and it is only because it is true. The tension under which they exist, the ferocity of their day, the intensity of their commitment is awesome. And just to be there is to know that.

I think that's very important, because regardless of how the whole sovereignty and the transition to sovereignty works out, and the national legislature, they're going to need our military. We're going to need our military. They want us out so we won't be occupiers, but they also want us there so they'll be safe. And so, whether the level is a 125 or 105, not just us, but our coalition partners, they're going to need us. The military is going to have to be there. And they didn't speak in terms of just, you know, a number of months; they talked in terms of years, our military. And I think they're exactly right.

Now, we have a lot to do in a very short period of time. I'll just mention a couple of them.

Carl Levin mentioned de-Ba'athification. There is no way to express my own frustration at the slow pace with which we've been proceeding to pick out the many, many people from that faction, that part of Iraq, who helped to run Iraq, who taught, who were administrators, who were hospital folks and doctors and others, who were not in the political machinery, and to use them. It's too late to put them into an army. I went over thinking maybe that was still possible; that's not. But I'll get to that in a moment.

I will say, I think very bluntly, that it is beyond my understanding that our administration over there, presumably under orders from here, has Chalabi in charge, who is a Shi'a, in charge of the de-Ba'athification process: in other words, who makes it and who doesn't. That is something which I simply cannot calibrate in my mind as a way of progressing intelligently.

Carl Levin also mentioned the armed forces and the police. They have made progress, but their progress is not impressive. The number of military police-I'm sorry, the regular police, and the military army-type folks, if you add the two together, who are trained as opposed to in training, who are trained, it doesn't rise much above five and a half thousand. None of them are battle-tested in the sense that you have to be in order to survive in that kind of a climate with that kind of insurgency. So that whole process has to be expedited. And in some ways, I'm not sure it can be, because it takes a long time to train a good soldier.

The-Carl also mentioned the overwhelming importance of not making a second major mistake, and that is, not using the United Nations. There's no way, in my mind, that either the international community will be involved, or that-that we can somehow bring the three-the Sunnis, the Kurds, the Shi'a-to come to believe in a process that will work, and then follow that process through and then sustain that process unless the United Nations is involved. And it cannot simply be done by having the Governing Council write a letter, as they did yesterday, to the United Nations asking for that to happen. That has to come also from our own administration, from our own White House, it has to be an American approach to the United Nations, not just to make up for past mistakes, but also to show that this is not just a group writing the United Nations in hopes.

I will end-no, I will say, finally, that the reason that all of this has to work is that we have to get out of the occupier status and they deserve a country. The Iraqis deserve a country. And they can have one, I think, if all goes perfectly. I think violence will escalate and we must understand that. And I would also say that I think we will be fortunate if we do not escalate into a civil war. But it is possible not to have to do that; but if we do, if we make mistakes, I think that will happen.

Finally, our weapons, with respect to our program-with respect to our weapons of mass destruction. They're very active, the survey group. They're spending a lot more time on this-sort of the history of what went on, millions and millions of documents, some of them perhaps yielding clues. But my general impression was that what they are finding, and the general temperament of what I felt was that what they are looking for and what they are finding, has nothing to do whatsoever with what got us into war in the first place-that is weapons of mass destruction.

Thank you.

SEN. BINGAMAN: Let me just add a few things to what Carl and Jay have already said. I do think the challenge is enormous. This is the one-year anniversary of our invasion of Iraq, or will be in a couple days here-I guess tomorrow is the one-year anniversary.

We have an enormous challenge in three basic areas.

One, that Carl discussed, I think, and Jay did as well, is the transfer of sovereignty or authority to the Iraqi people. And the process for that is difficult and challenging, and I would say Ambassador Bremer is working hard to get that accomplished and I wish him well, and I hope we can get it done in the timeframe that he has laid out. And as Carl said, it's extremely important the United Nations be a real partner with us in accomplishing that, if it's going to have credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people.

The second big challenge, I would say, is rebuilding the economy, which is in shambles; obviously in shambles for the mismanagement and corruption and general repression that the government practiced for many decades-several decades-and, of course, also, the economic sanctions we put in place.

The funds that have already been appropriated by Congress are about to become available. Most of those funds have not yet been available, but they are about to become available. That will help substantially. Oil production is increasing slowly. That obviously will help. Some other things may help as well, but it's important that Iraqis believe that they have the opportunity for a better life under a new government and a new regime.

And the third big challenge, of course, is dealing with the terrorist threat, the insecurity that is constant there because of the continued bombings and other actions that we've seen here in the last day or two, unfortunately. That is something that our troops are working full-time on, of course, our intelligence community is working full-time on to identify these terrorist cells so that they can be dismantled and eliminated. We can do a great deal to accomplish that. It is also going to require that the Iraqi people participate and that the Iraqi military-not military, but police and civil defense force play a larger and larger role. As Jay said, we are trying to train people to fill that role and to take that role over from the U.S. and the coalition forces. It's a long slog to get it done, but clearly that has to happen as well.

I guess I'd just finish by saying that there is an enormous amount still to be done. We are not near where I had hoped we would be at this stage in the progress toward a new Iraq, but hopefully that will happen soon and particularly will happen soon if we are able to make this transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people.

SEN. REED: We all had the opportunity to meet with American servicemen and women, witness their service and sacrifice. It was both impressive and inspiring, and we thanked them for what they're doing every day.

For the United States today in Iraq, the stigma of occupation has become almost unbearable. As a result, there is a rush to transfer sovereignty by July 1st, even though there is no political structure in place other than this interim government, and what is happening is ad hoc and improvisational at the moment. My sense is that the violence will-likely to increase. Indeed it could become more sophisticated and perhaps even more lethal.

There are two critical issues. They've been mentioned before by my colleagues.

First, we need a U.N. resolution. We need first to legitimize this new government. Sovereignty is one thing; legitimacy is something else. We need legitimacy as well as sovereignty. We also have to provide the Shi'a community and particularly al-Sistani with assurances that these elections will take place, as scheduled, early in 2005, and a resolution will do that.

And then we have to provide the international community with a justification for continued presence in Iraq. It's encouraging that the interim Governing Council sent a letter to the U.N. requesting their advice. Frankly, we need more than advice, we need their active participation.

The key issue, given the fact that Iraq, on July 1st, will be a sovereign, that it's defenseless, and without a clear path to elections and autonomous rule, we have to decide who will be the mentor; who will help guide them ahead. Will the United States alone, or a partnership with the United States and the U.N.? I suspect that this will be the heart and substance of the debates in New York City in the United Nations about a resolution. Clearly, the military role must be played by the United States. But issues of economic development, elections, social policy is an area where the United Nations can play a prominent role.

The next major issue is the reintegration of the Sunni community into the political and cultural life of Iraq. My view, the de- Ba'athification process is broken. First, as Senator Rockefeller mentioned, with Chalabi as the head, he's the most divisive individual in Iraq. That does not inspire confidence, certainly among the Sunni community, and indeed, among many others. This de-Ba'athification process is seen by the Sunni community as a way to suppress them, not to identify those who committed crimes under the old regime. As a result, there are thousands of teachers that can't teach, thousands of professionals that can't participate with their skills in the economic and social life of Iraq.

I was there last November with Senator Clinton. I received the same complaints. Four or five months later, we're receiving the same complaints.

What we need to do and need to do right away is establish a list of those individuals who clearly cannot participate because of their behavior, and then presume that others who had Ba'ath affiliation can participate as teachers. That can be done, and it should be done immediately by Ambassador Bremer while he is still in control in Iraq.

There are a number of critical tasks ahead. Let me just list a few. We have to plan for the absorption somehow of these militias into the security forces of Iraq. If they are out on their own loyal to political parties or individuals, they will be a potential powder keg in the future of Iraq.

We also have to provide a clear definition for the role of the United States military after July 1st. And there's two specific areas. First, we have to clarify the status of the detainees. Military leaders are concerned that after July 1st, those they hold or those they may capture could be a question about their authority to hold these individuals. And the second point is today we have representatives of the CPA working with our division commanders and local military commanders. When we put an embassy in place on July 1st, there has to be a similar political/military adviser with these units, otherwise the many tasks that befall our units simply can't be discharged by a military commander alone.

We have to fully equip and train the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. It's doing very well, but the contract's been held up for months. They don't have the equipment, the radios, the vehicles to do the job they have to do.

And then we have to provide additional international support, particularly to the police. And as Senator Bingaman said, the best way to end this insurgency is to provide employment and opportunity for Iraqi citizens.

Thank you.

Q Senator Levin and Senator Bingaman, do you agree with Senator Rockefeller and Senator Reed that violence is likely to increase? And if so, is it coming from the sort of outside elements that the administration has talked about, people coming into the country, or from the internal frictions between the groups and former members of the regime?

SEN. LEVIN: Most of it comes from the internal friction. We think that perhaps, from the estimates we got, that 95 percent of the attacks and attackers are Iraqis, and perhaps 5 percent outside jihadists who cross borders in and out of Iraq. That's as good an estimate as I've seen.

But I do believe also that the level of violence will at least continue. And in my judgment, unless the international community becomes involved and we're willing to take the necessary steps to get it involved, it will become worse if sovereignty is transferred on July 1 to an entity which comes not have the support of the people of Iraq and does not have international support. So I would think a continuing level is-at least a continuing level is likely and that is is also likely to be heightened if that event occurs without the full support of the international community and the credibility which it gives and without the support of the three groups inside of Iraq.

Q (Including ?) today and yesterday's violence in that description?

SEN. LEVIN: I think this is a newer level of violence, actually.

Q But it comes from the internal friction, today and yesterday?

SEN. LEVIN: I don't know whether they've identified the people, but-I just don't know. I don't want to speculate. There was too much speculation going on in Spain as to who caused that damage. I'm not about to engage in that speculation.

Q Can Senator Bingaman address the question about the violence too?

SEN. BINGAMAN: I agree with Senator Levin that it is likely to continue. I think the question of whether it increases or not after July 1st, I think, will depend on how successful we have been at putting together a transition government for this short period leading up to the elections, that has the support and inclusion of all three groups. I think the Sunnis are the group that has been left out to significant extent, and I think we have to find some way that those Sunni leaders who were not intimately involved with the last administration, with the Saddam Hussein regime, can see this as something that they have a stake in seeing succeed.

Q If we include the Sunnis, wouldn't we be sort of rewarding people not only who dominated the last regime but who may be responsible for a lot of the violence going on now?

SEN. BINGAMAN: Well, obviously, we're not going to include the ones who are responsible for the violence going on now. But I think that you cannot have a very large segment of the population, maybe a third of the population, feel that they are being excluded from participation in a new government and expect a successful experiment in establishing democracy. That's just not going to work.

SEN. LEVIN: And of course, we're only talking about the former members of the Ba'ath Party who are not ideologically Ba'athists, who are leaders in the party, we're talking about thousands, probably tens of thousands of people who were forced to join in order to maintain employment as a teacher, as a civil servant. That's the only people we're talking about. Clearly not the leaders. And this process, by the way, is underway, and I would predict that you will find coming from Jerry Bremer some real move in this direction to make it possible for former members who were not leaders or ideologues in that party to participate in the reconstruction of Iraq.

Yes.

Q We have an election coming up in this country. What role will the situation in Iraq play in the U.S. election?

SEN. LEVIN: I don't know, and frankly, I don't think that I feel like commenting on it at this particular point, when we've just returned and feel that Iraq has got to be dealt with without partisan considerations. And I wouldn't want to predict what role it will play. If others want to comment on it, they're free to do so.

Yes.

Q Regarding the reports of Osama's top deputy, how important is his capture, and what information would he have, what does the U.S. need to get from him?

SEN. LEVIN: Well, there's the number two person. It would be important. It may also lead us to Osama himself. The information that he could give us is unknown, depending on what he's willing to say and what-the material he has with him, and that's hard to predict. But frankly, the problem is a lot deeper. Our military pointed out, and many other experts have pointed out, that this problem of terrorism is going to continue with or without the capture of Osama bin Laden. We want to capture him, obviously, but it's not the solution. It's important and helpful, but the fight must go on, and he's a very visible object of our effort. But we can't put all of our-we can't say that if we can capture him or his number two, that that means that the level of violence will be reduced, either in Afghanistan or Iraq or in other places, because I don't think it will.

Yes.

Q Senator, to that end, do you think, though, that his role has been marginalized some by keeping him on the run?

SEN. LEVIN: Probably. But that's what our experts tell us, that's what our intelligence people tell us. But we have-to the extent we want to rely on our intelligence folks and their estimates these days, that's the best I can do.

Just jump in --

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: The Zawahiri thing-the prospects of closing in-we heard on our way in just a few-just an hour or so ago coming in the from the airplane.

I think after our time in Iraq, we'd feel pretty good if somebody would get Zarqawi.

Q Can we talk short term on violence and what it is you think needs to be done to try to protect our troops and to protect the civilians that are working there? It's-attacks of the kind of the last couple of days certainly are damaging to the U.S. support for it.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: It's very hard. First of all, I mean, just setting up broader base, trying to stitch together the Kurds, the Turkomens, the Assyrians, the Shi'as, all of the iterations of the Shi'as, those that lean towards Iran, those who don't, those who want a theocracy, those who don't, add in the tribes involved, all of those, as well as the Sunnis, all of whom are all over the country-Ansar al-Islam, obviously, was just a tiny little spot on the geography; now they're very heavily in the Baghdad-Tikrit area.

The other thing that we all I think noticed very strongly, and which was obviously involved with the bombing of the hotel, is that the technology of destruction has improved-that's the wrong word-it has advanced so rapidly that they are now coming to the point where, as Jack Reed points out, before long they'll be able to set off by a cell phone bombs that accomplish these purposes from far, far away, maybe many countries away, or even across an ocean. So the-what they call these-what is it-IEDs, innovative --

SEN. : Improvised explosive devices.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: -- improvised explosive devices, are now, you know, the talk of Iraq. Any-as we went around, you know, you never go over a piece of trash, you swerve sharply to avoid a piece of trash because that could be a bomb. Anything could be a bomb. You go under an overpass and you go under on one side of the road, sharply swerve while you're underneath so as to come out on the other side, on the other side if it's a two-lane highway, so that if somebody's waiting to drop a grenade on you. That's old technology. The new technology is truly terrifying and absolutely effective.

SEN. REED: Can I just point out, it's extremely difficult to provide the kind of comprehensive security that would result in no significant casualty either against innocent civilians or American military personnel.

And indeed there are some events in the next several months-there are religious rites, Shi'a rites, in April, that could be a magnet for increased activity against civilians, because of the number of people coming together.

There are also, as Senator Rockefeller points out, the ability to use car bombs, which is a new technique they are employing.

What the military is attempting to do, together with our intelligence service, is first to identify these small groups of people and preemptively take them out, particularly those international fighters that are sophisticated. That is a long process of surveillance, of intelligence collection. That's going on. So we're not just sitting back.

But it's very difficult in a country that size, with a population-particularly at the same time you're trying to return to normalcy. Senator Rockefeller made a reference to cell phones. We understand or I understand that, you know, a cell phone system will be up and running in the several months. That has become one of the prime ways for terrorists to detonate explosives-in Madrid, in Israel.

So these are some things that we have to be concerned about, which suggest that-again, that the violence will continue and that in fact in certain days casualties could be significant.

SEN. LEVIN: One other element we add is the training of police, which is ongoing. It's increased. We went to the academy where they're being trained. But as of a few days ago, in terms of on-duty, fully qualified Iraqi police in Baghdad, 2,300. The requirement is 75,000, and it's going to take years to get that fully staffed. And that is essential for a lot of reasons, but one of them is obviously the security reason.

Yes?

Q Some Republicans yesterday were characterizing Spain's reaction to their bombs as appeasement of terrorism. How would you characterize it?

SEN. LEVIN: I think it's a mistake to react the way they did, in my judgment. Now that we're there, we must succeed, and that success requires that we return sovereignty as quickly as we can to a legitimate government and not pull out forces at this time. Regardless of how we got in and regardless of how bad the intelligence was which was given as the reason for going in, regardless of the fact that there was totally inadequate planning for the aftermath, regardless of all of these mistakes, we are there now, and we, I believe, as a world, not just as a country, cannot just simply pull up stakes and leave without a government in stake-in place there which is legitimate. So I think that is the wrong course to take.

SEN. REED: Can I just second that by saying I think it is a mistake for the government of Spain to withdraw its forces. Every country has to be committed to this fight against terrorism. Again, regardless of how we got there, we have to prevail. That means being committed, being smart about our commitment.

But I think the other thing that might be reflected in the Spanish election and the subsequent decision is that governments have to be candid about the risks that are being run and about the threats they're facing, and I think that candor will help.

SEN. LEVIN: It also helps when they tell the truth. (Chuckles.)

Q Senator, did you learn what role the CPA envisions for the United Nations, and how does that differ with the role you think the United Nations should have?

SEN. LEVIN: I think the CPA envisions a "vital" role for the United Nations. That's probably the word that they would use and the word the administration would use. I would ratchet that up clearly to being an equal partner in terms of the political decision-making, and without that equal partnership I think it's less likely the U.N. will become involved with all of the benefits of that involvement on the political side of the equation. So if I had to put it in just a few words, I would contrast it that way.

On the other hand, it's clear they want the U.N. in. That's not the issue. The real issue's going to be how much will we give up in terms of our decision-making power in order to get them in? Will we make them an equal partner when it comes to deciding what that interim government should be, that caretaker government be? Will we be willing to make them an equal partner with us when it comes to the economic reconstruction and the electoral processes and the whole-all the efforts that are involved in nation building? Are we willing to do that? And unless we are, I think it's less likely they'll come in, and that's got some very negative ramifications. But that would be the way I would describe it.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: It's interesting and important because once you're committed to participating and having the United Nations participate, than you better mean it. And secondly, I mentioned in my remarks here that our military's going to be needed.

But put yourself ahead, let's say, two-and-a-half months for a moment, past the-or whenever it is, past the date of July 1st. Iraq is no longer ours. It's its own country. So we have a military there of 105,000. They have very little to offer in the way of security and protection themselves, and so comes a question of taking either defensive actions, obviously, or-more easily handled-but an aggressive action to put down a particularly difficult situation in a certain part of the country and nobody can do it but us and the coalition forces that work with us. Who makes that decision? Who is the interim government? Who do they ask if they need to, which I suspect will be important from time to time? (Chuckles.) And the answer, when we asked Jerry Bremer yesterday, Ambassador Bremer, what do you envision the interim government is going to be, he said, "I don't know yet." That is the kind of thing that causes concern because that's called two months away.

Q Given that they're two months away, is there time at this point to get the United Nations involved in an equal partnership? That's the kind of thing that you cannot do overnight. In diplomatic circles that kind of negotiation takes a while.

SEN. LEVIN: Well, we only have a few months to do it, but if we have the will to involve the U.N. and are willing to share the decision-making power, I believe the U.N. will respond. We now have a request from the Governing Council, which is what the U.N. said they would surely need, and I think it's at least possible that if we make a decision that we are going to share that political decision-making power, not the military side of the equation, but the political decision-making with the U.N., I think it's very possible that they can act in time before the July 1 date.

Q Could you just address how difficult it was for y'all to get around, and whether were there places that you wanted to go that you couldn't or your itinerary had to be altered because of security concerns?

SEN. LEVIN: The itinerary I don't believe was altered for security reasons, although it may have been in one small regard. Obviously, we had a great deal of security getting around Baghdad. And places that we wanted to go that we couldn't? Of course we would have very much liked to do many things that we couldn't possibly do, including talking to people in Baghdad. We were unable to do that. We could meet with a representative of the Governing Council, but we couldn't just go out on the street and talk to people and sample public opinion. We do take public opinion polls, so we have some sense, I guess, from that source as to what the people of Iraq are thinking and feeling.

And by the way, in terms of the comments relative to Chalabi, he's got zero support, not just in the Sunni community but apparently in the Shi'a community as well. It would be wise indeed for us to make a change in terms of the head of that de-Ba'athification process. For him to be in that role, according to common sense, is a mistake, and according to public opinion polls, is a triple mistake.

SEN. ROCKEFELLER: Actually, I think it's below zero.

SEN. LEVIN: Okay, thank you. You've got one more?

Q You mentioned NATO. You had a meeting at NATO this morning?

SEN.. LEVIN: We did.

Q Is it possible that NATO would be involved at a stage?

SEN. LEVIN: Yes. It is. If the U.N. requests NATO, it is a very real possibility. And it would be a limited role, probably, but nonetheless an important role both in terms of possibly additional troops which could be added from countries that already have troops, possibly in terms of police forces that could be added there as well from countries, but also some new countries in NATO that may be be willing to not only send some troops or police but also in terms of financial support and commitment.

We've got to be less of a target. That's one of the major reasons we want the international community, but NATO coming in, which could happen. And it's a realistic possibility, upon the request of the U.N. It would also make the U.S. less of a target. And that would be a plus for everybody concerned. It would reduce our casualties; make it more likely that Iraq can come together.

Q Is it possible to see like French troops or German troops?

SEN. LEVIN: I would say involvement. I can't speak-neither the NATO --

Q In Germany they were against, I mean --

SEN. LEVIN: Yeah, but I think that neither the German nor the French ambassador, by the way, were at that meeting, so we didn't hear directly from them. But there was a feeling of the perhaps 10 ambassadors that we met with that they are looking for a way to be supportive, providing-and this is a critical condition-that the United Nations is in there and requesting their involvement. And we also met with General Jones, by the way, and he also was positive in terms of that possibility, if the U.N. makes the request.

Thank you.

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