Iraq Intelligence and Postwar Planning

IRAQ INTELLIGENCE AND POSTWAR PLANNING

Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, in recent weeks, Americans have witnessed a steady stream of reports that raise grave questions about the accuracy of statements made by senior Bush administration officials leading up to the war in Iraq.

The unequivocal administration pronouncements that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, was pursuing nuclear capabilities, and had close ties with al-Qaida have not been proven or been proven unequivocally wrong.

Implications of these intelligence failures are far-reaching. While Saddam Hussein may be in prison, just this week CIA Director Tenet indicated America is still the target of terrorists who seek to kill as many Americans as possible in any way available to them.

At no time in our Nation's history has the integrity of the people who use intelligence and the people who produce intelligence been more vital to national security. Americans need to have confidence in both our policymakers and our intelligence community. To rebuild that confidence, Americans have a right to know how the administration and how our intelligence community could have been so wrong on matters of such grave import.

For a failure this massive, every aspect of America's national security policymaking process should be put under the microscope: How we collect information, how we analyze it, how it gets interpreted by administration officials, and how the Senate performs its oversight responsibilities.

Much of the discussion about our Iraq intelligence failures thus far has focused on our incorrect assessments of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. While important, there is another vital piece of this story that has been overlooked until this point. That is, the administration's failure to plan for postwar Iraq and the consequences that would arise from toppling Saddam Hussein.

The administration's myopic approach to planning for post-Saddam Iraq continues to have consequences for the safety of our troops and the long-term security of our Nation and its interests. As a result, it is critical that the Nation learn more about why the administration failed to plan for the contingencies of a post-Saddam Iraq. As officials from the Bush administration, the United Nations, and the Iraq Governing Council seek to reach agreement on the administration's third and latest proposal for forming the first official post-Saddam government, we would be wise to look back at what went wrong.

A thorough, bipartisan investigation is warranted.

What makes the unfolding evidence of insufficient post-war planning most troubling is that, in this instance, contrary to the questions of weapons of mass destruction, it appears that our intelligence was right.

There was a consensus among the intelligence community that removing Saddam would be the easiest part of our efforts to secure and rebuild Iraq.

Our intelligence community, our military, and numerous independent groups all concurred in the assessment that our gravest challenges would come in the days after Saddam was ousted.

The greatest difficulty, all agreed, would come in the days following the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Senior administration policymakers were repeatedly warned by other officials within the government, as well as a raft of independent outside experts, to plan accordingly.

Months before the start of the conflict, these officials and experts carefully examined these issues and offered concrete proposals to maximize our chances for bringing about a stable Iraq while minimizing the risks to our troops and our taxpayers.

For instance, as far back as March 2002, a year before the invasion, the State Department was working on a $5 million project entitled the Future of Iraq. Experience from previous conflicts demonstrated the importance of preparing in advance for our postwar duties.

And experience from the past gave us all a guide as to what to expect in Iraq.

Although there were many other officials and organizations making similar assessments, the State Department's Future of Iraq project provides some useful insights into the information available to the administration had it chose to listen.

In its 13-volume study plus a one-volume summary and overview, the Future of Iraq project reached some prescient conclusions.

First, the project said Iraq would be disorderly after liberation and stressed that the days immediately after liberation would be critical-to both those who seek to work with us and those who do not.

The removal of Saddam's regime will provide a power vacuum and create popular anxieties about the viability of all Iraqi institutions . . . the traumatic and disruptive events attendant to the regime change will affect all Iraqis, both Saddam's conspirators and the general populace.

Second, this report stressed the importance of restoring basic services as quickly as possible after the regime change. The report "stressed the importance of getting the electrical grid up and running immediately-[this is] key to water systems, jobs. [This] could go a long way to determining Iraqis attitudes' toward coalition forces."

Third, the report warned about the problems created by a wholesale demobilization of the Iraqi military.

The decommissioning of hundreds of thousands of trained military personnel that [a rapid purge] implies could create social problems.

Each of these conclusions should have waved a red flag to administration officials: if addressed effectively, the transition will be smoother; if ignored, the transition will be more difficult. More difficult for our troops and more difficult for the Iraqi people.

Unfortunately, the administration apparently chose to ignore these and many other similar findings offered up by other groups. In fact, news reports indicate that White House and senior Defense Department civilian officials actually worked to exclude people who worked on or shared the views contained in the Future of Iraq report-views that have proven to be 100 percent correct.

One of the most comprehensive reports about this issue can be found in James Fallows' article in the January/February 2004 Atlantic Monthly entitled "Blind into Baghdad."

I highly commend this article to my colleagues.

Unfortunately, the many warnings about post-war Iraq fell upon deaf ears in the administration. For a variety of reasons, senior administration officials in the White House and senior civilians in the Defense Department ignored these warnings, instead apparently opting to rely on dubious sources to back up their rosy predictions about how our troops would be received by Iraqis and how smooth the transition would be.

For example, the administration was repeatedly pressed for an estimate before the start of the war on the number of troops and the cost of the operation.

Even though press reports indicate administration officials had signed off on a war plan in November 2002 that spelled out the size of the forces necessary for an Iraq mission, the administration persistently claimed not to know the size of the forces needed or their cost.

As late as February 2003, 2 months after the President had authorized the deployment of 200,000 troops to the region and less than 2 months before the start of the conflict, Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz said, "Fundamentally, we have no idea what is needed unless and until we get there on the ground."

Even worse, the administration suggested that there would be no cost at all.

Administration officials stated that the proceeds from the sale of Iraqi oil would be used to pay for the American military presence.

On March 27, 8 days after the war had started, Wolfowitz was again pressed on a figure and indicated that whatever it turned out to be, Iraq's oil supplies would keep it low: "There's a lot of money to pay for this. It doesn't have to be U.S. taxpayer money. We are dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction and relatively soon."

In April, after more than a month of conflict, Andrew Natsios, the director of USAID, said the total cost to the taxpayer would be no more than $1.7 billion. "We have no plans for any further-on-funding for this."

The administration either knew better at the time or should have known better.

And our troops and the American people certainly deserved better. Over 500 Americans have been killed and over 3,000 wounded in Iraq. Unfortunately, these numbers are likely to continue to grow before our mission there is complete.

We have already appropriated over $150 billion for this operation, and this cost could easily double before we are through.

Let me take another example-the administration's statements about the post-war environment we would encounter and the challenges we would face.

Although there are a few instances where administration officials went on the record before the war warning that a war with Iraq could require a lengthy commitment, administration officials repeatedly painted the most optimistic portrait possible in order to gain support for its strategy.

Vice President CHENEY's remarks 3 days before the start of the war typify much of what the administration was telling the American public.

When asked if the American people are prepared for a long, costly battle with significant casualties, the Vice President said, "Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way . . . because I really do believe we will be greeted as liberators."

This tragic miscalculation allowed the administration to abandon the intelligence-based, analytical process needed to plan successfully for the occupation of Iraq. The administration sent a smaller force than our senior military officials initially recommended.

Our personnel were not suitably prepared for the immense economic, social, and political complexities that we should have known would inevitably arise after the fall of Saddam Hussein. And our troops and the American people were not adequately equipped for the guerrilla tactics that have become all too common since President Bush declared an end to major combat operations.

Overall, the administration's overly optimistic attitude about post-war Iraq has contributed to a far more costly and arduous effort than needed to be the case.

Mr. President, not long ago, many of my colleagues and I had the honor of having dinner with more than 100 soldiers and their families at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. These soldiers had all been wounded while serving their country in Iraq. I hope my colleagues will take the opportunity to visit these young men and women. After seeing first-hand the kind of people our country has produced, I have never been more proud to be an American.

As I think of my night with these brave men and women who have sacrificed so much and asked for so little in return, I cannot help but think: Did we do right by them? Did we do everything possible to put them in a position to succeed at the least possible risk? Did we provide them with a plan for success and the tools needed to carry it out?

In a statement last year, General Anthony Zinni, one of the most respected and distinguished military leaders this country has produced, commented on what we owed those who we placed in harm's way.

He said:

They should never be put on a battlefield without a strategic plan, not only for the fighting-our generals will take care of that-but for the aftermath and winning that war. Where are we, the American people, if we accept this, if we accept this level of sacrifice without that level of planning?

The administration based its post-war planning on blind hope, and hope is not a plan. We owe it to our troops and ourselves to determine whether we did everything we could to succeed in Iraq. Our success in Iraq and future conflicts depends on it. Our need to ensure that we do right by our troops demands it.

I yield the floor.