Hearing of the House Committee on Appropriations' State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee - Assessing an Effective Diplomatic Program in Iraq
Interview
Hearing of the House Committee on Appropriations' State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee - Assessing an Effective Diplomatic Program in Iraq
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REP. ADAM SCHIFF (D-CA): Thank you, Madame Chair.
And gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony. And please extend our thanks to your staffs for the hard work that they're doing. We really depend on you, and you have not let us down. We appreciate your candor, even when it's hard things to hear.
I wanted to follow up on a couple of points. One, I think my colleague from New Jersey alluded to, and that is one of the key conclusions that you reach in terms of the PRTs -- and I'll quote from your report -- is that despite the best efforts of PRT civilian and military officials who are working under dangerous conditions and austere conditions to accelerate the Iraqi transition to self- reliance, resolving these problems will likely be a slow process, will likely require years of steady engagement. And the pace of progress will depend heavily on the security environment and the political settlements at the national level.
It seems like we're operating on separate tracks without thinking about how the tracks are going to be related to each other. By that, I mean, as my colleague fro New Jersey pointed out, General Petraeus in his testimony indicated that he wants to start drawing down forces next year, at least 30,000, dictated, in my view, not so much by the facts on the ground as by the facts in our own military that we just don't have the manpower to continue to sustain the current levels. So the numbers are going to have to come down one way or another. At the same time, your report is saying that we need years of these PRTs to make progress, not months but years. And that that progress will depend on the security environment, and we're already planning on drawing down our security forces. And it will depend on political settlements at the national level, very little of which we have seen.
So here we are trying to ramp up the PRTs. We want 300 new positions; we've filled only half of them. But at the same time that we're planning on ramping up the PRTs and saying it's going to take years for the PRTs, we're already planning to ramp down our security forces. And I'd like to get your thoughts on how those two can coexist successfully. And if they can't, then we need to know it.
Beyond that, if you could extrapolate a little for us. You're mentioning that part of what we're presupposing is that the Iraqi security forces will take full charge in July of next year. That's an aspiration. It may be a plan, but it's a plan with a lot of hope as an ingredient. Have you extrapolated, based on where we've been in the past in terms of our projections on the security forces and how long it's actually taken us to get where we are, at our present rate, looking over the last two years, for example, of our training up of the Iraqi security forces -- if you use that as the growth of proficiency, when will they be able to take over all of Iraq? Is it really July, or is it two years from July?
So if you could address those two questions.
MR. BOWEN: Thanks, Mr. Schiff. As to your second question, you're right to underscore the challenges in trying to bring Iraq security forces online. The original date for provincial Iraqi control was the end of last year, then moved up to the end of this year, then moved to March of next year, now it's July. So it has changed several times as MNSTC-I, Multi-National Security Transition Command - Iraq, has made their judgments about the proficiency. And the weaknesses have been revealed in the Jones reports submitted to Congress in September, particularly with respect to the MOI shortfalls in 2005 and 2006 in training the national police, which General Jones recommended to be disbanded. But the much larger issue in MOI is the Iraq police forces, Iraqi Police Service, IPS, and that's the key to effective provincial security across the country. And those challenges are there, and I think that's why continuing to invest in the Iraq security forces fund makes sense, because that's the keystone to passing the security baton off completely by next July.
As to the PRT issue, let me clarify --
REP. SCHIFF: Well, I don't think we're done with the first question. Can you do an analysis for us, if you haven't done it already, that shows the growth of the proficiency of the Iraqi security forces, how long it has taken? And if you're on that same growth proficiency, how long it will take to get to the point where they're controlling the whole country?
MR. BOWEN: We're doing that now in fact. And we've been continuing to follow the development of the Iraqi security forces, because we have access to the classified transition readiness assessments. So we know the readiness assessments of all the battalions. And unfortunately, that information is classified. But consistently, we have not met any of the goals for trying to turn over control of the entire country, even particular provinces, to the Iraqis.
REP. SCHIFF: Would you be able to tell us, either in public forum or in classified forum, that based on your analysis on the current rate of growth of proficiency, the security forces, if you project out, when we're talking, realistically, about their having that capability?
MR. BOWEN: Yeah. A lot have to do with what are we going to be satisfied with. Do we want to have all the units able to, quote, "operate independently?" If that's the goal, it's probably not going to be achievable for quite a long time.
REP. SCHIFF: Well, now, how --
MR. BOWEN: We only have about 10 right now.
REP. SCHIFF: When our coalition forces say that in July they'll be ready to take over, I would assume that they have some content to that aspiration. In other words, they expect Iraqi security forces to reach a certain level of self-reliance. So using their own metric, can't we identify, looking at the last two years of rate of growth, how long that will really take?
MR. BOWEN: We can look at, through the TRAs, exactly how many units are actually progressing to the higher levels of readiness. At the top level of readiness, we have not made much progress over two years. And it oftentimes comes down to how do you determine and define whether or not the Iraqi security forces are ready. Those definitions, based upon what we've been following for three years, are constantly changing within the Department of Defense.
REP. SCHIFF: Well, I guess I would ask if you can provide to us --
MR. BOWEN: Yeah. We have classified information that we can provide.
REP. SCHIFF: But what will be very specific about what I'm interested in --
MR. BOWEN: No, I understand.
REP. SCHIFF: -- is using whatever metrics they're using today, our coalition forces, for what state of readiness we want the Iraqi security forces to be in in July of next year. But looking at the trajectory over the last two years or the last four, can you give us a date -- we don't need to know anything more publicly than that -- using that chart, when do we get to full capability as they're defining it for all 18 provinces? That's my question.
MR. BOWEN: We certainly can discuss more of this in a classified setting.
REP. SCHIFF: Yeah. I don't know if --
REP. LOWEY: I know Ms. Lee is waiting so patiently --
REP. SCHIFF: Okay.
REP. LOWEY: -- but we may have time for a few more questions before votes if you want to wait.
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REP. SCHIFF: Thank you, Madame Chair. I wanted to follow up with a question that I'd asked earlier -- that, Mr. Bowen, I don't think you had a chance to respond to it, but it's very similar to what the chair just commented on -- and that is, how do we reconcile the likely draw-down of forces next year, with the ramping-up of the PRTs? How is that going to work?
MR. BOWEN: And you also asked about the phrase in our audit of the years -- "it takes years of engagement" to build the capacity. And how it's going to work, versus the security question, is contingent upon the success of Minsticky's (MNSTC-I) training of the Iraqi security forces, and the transfer to provincial Iraqi control of all 18 provinces to those forces. And that thus requires those forces to ensure that the provinces are secure, and thus, the PRTs, or whatever their successors might be, are able to carry out their aid program.
What I meant by "years of engagement" is these provincial councils are new -- new creatures in Iraq. The Provincial Powers Law has not been passed yet so, you know, once they actually get their mandate, that will be another iteration of capacity-building in exercising those authorities. And whether it be through the PRTs or other mechanisms, I expect that assistance and aid will continue to them to ensure that democracy continues to grow at the local level.
REP. SCHIFF: I guess the two questions are -- that I asked are more unrelated than maybe I knew. It seems just wildly optimistic, though. I mean, if we're going to be drawing-down of necessity in July of next year; but the work of the PRTs will be going on at least as great, if not greater, level; and if the history of our standing-up of the Iraqi security forces continues along its very long, rather flat trajectory, not as, you know, as our hoped-for plan -- the numbers just don't add up.
We're going to get to July of next year; we're going to draw down our forces; the PRTs aren't going to have the security they need; the Iraqi forces are very unlikely, if history is a guide, to be able to provide on that security -- so where does that leave us?
I would think if you are planning on more than hopes, that you have to expect that it may look exactly like what the history has shown us over the last two or three years. And if that's true, where does that leave the PRTs, and where does that leave the reconstruction effort?
MR. BOWEN: Well, Mr. Schiff, you pose a challenging question there. I think the thing that's different between now, and the history that -- the history of limited progress in training-up the security forces, particularly the police forces, has been the weak leadership at the Ministry of Interior that preexisted the current leadership.
And I think that there is -- there is hope in an effort, that sectarian influences that's pervaded and that General Jones pointed out, are being remedied. In fact, Minsticky, (MNSTC-I), is carrying out now something called a "re-blueing" program, which is taking all of the Iraq security forces and retraining them, sort of a reeducation, to ensure that: one, that militia are filtered out; and two, that the forces are committed and properly capable of carrying out this mission.
REP. SCHIFF: Again, thank you gentlemen.
MR. BOWEN: You're welcome.
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