IMPROVING GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT -- (House of Representatives - October 03, 2007)
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Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I again want to thank Mr. Cooper for introducing this legislation and working with us as it moved its way through the subcommittee and committee process; Mr. Towns for his leadership; and the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Waxman, for his leadership as well.
Today, we take up H.R. 928, the Improving Government Accountability Act of 2007. This legislation is intended to enhance the independence of Inspectors General throughout the government to improve their ability to monitor and oversee executive branch operations.
Since the enactment of the Inspector General Act of 1978, Inspectors General throughout the government have played an integral role in identifying waste and mismanagement in government. IGs have also been instrumental in aiding Congress and the executive branch to make government more efficient and effective.
We all agree IGs should operate independently, free from political interference. After all, both agency heads and Congress often rely on IG reports to provide frank assessments of the effectiveness of Federal programs.
However, Inspectors General should also be part of an agency's management structure, part of a team, albeit with some independence, rather than a ``fourth branch'' of the Federal Government. If we separate the IGs from the day-to-day operations of the agencies they oversee, IGs will cease to perform a constructive, integrated role and instead will become Monday morning quarterbacks with their function solely second-guessing decisions made by agencies.
Many of the provisions in H.R. 928 will help to enhance the effectiveness of the IGs in overseeing Federal agencies and programs. I am concerned that certain provisions of the legislation go further than I would like in isolating IGs, removing them from the agency decision-making process.
For example, during committee consideration of the legislation, I offered an amendment to exempt smaller agency IGs from the ``for cause'' removal provision in the bill, thereby reserving the ``for cause'' removal threshold only for Cabinet-level agency IGs. The purpose of this amendment, which was adopted, I might add, with the help of my friends on the other side, was to strike an appropriate balance between the need to ensure independence of our Inspectors General while at the same time preserving the President's authority over employers and officers of the executive branch.
I also have concerns with a provision that's in the current bill authorizing IGs to independently submit their budget requests to Congress outside of the traditional Federal budget process. My concerns with this new authority pertain more to the logistical nightmare this creates rather than any particular objection to increased IG independence. After all, having 60 separate budgets for individual offices accompanying the President's annual budget submission to Congress will only add unnecessary confusion to the already confusing Federal budget process. So when Members get the President's budget, under the way the law is currently written, they get the Federal budget submitted by the President and then 60 separate requests from IGs.
Now, I intend to offer an amendment, which I am hopeful the other side will accept, which goes at least part of the way toward addressing the legitimate concerns raised by the administration but getting to the points that the author of this bill wanted to get as well.
In closing, I believe the underlying legislation improves the laws governing our IGs. I think some additional changes need to be made as it moves forward, but I very much appreciate Mr. Cooper's efforts on this bill and his initiative in trying to identify these problems as we move through.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
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Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, let me talk, first of all, about what the legislation does. It establishes a 7-year term of office for the over 60 Inspectors General in the Federal Government. This gives them continuity from administration to administration, so they're not political lackeys, they are professionals. It limits the President's authority to remove a Senate-confirmed IG, and that's about half of them, except on certain grounds; for example, permanent incapacity, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, conviction of a felony, or conduct involving moral turpitude. That gives the IGs independence from pressure from the appointing administration.
At the smaller agencies, a different standard applies. There, an IG can be removed, but it will require 30-day advance notification to Congress before an agency head removes the agency's IG.
The legislation also authorizes IGs to submit their budget requests to Congress independent of the President's budget submission. This is something that I'm going to have an amendment on later that I think will clarify it.
This also codifies an executive order establishing the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. This is a coordinating council of Federal IGs, as well as an integrity committee to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by IGs. And unfortunately, we see that; these people are human beings as well.
It increases the salary of IGs and prohibits IGs from receiving bonuses. It enhances IG power by granting limited personnel authority, expanded subpoena authority, and increased ability to deputize IG agents.
It strengthens the GAO's authority to conduct investigations, for sworn testimony it requires congressional notification of agency noncooperation, and it expands IG ability to pursue false claims and recoup losses resulting from fraud.
Now, the administration has issued a negative statement of policy on this for two reasons. One, they don't like the limitation on the President's authority to remove executive branch officials. On that, I think we have gone overboard, working together, both parties, to try to put reasonable limitations, but at the same time maintaining a higher level of independence for IGs than you will find at other levels. And I think institutionally, as Members of this House, the changes in this bill I think are worth supporting, I would oppose the administration in that. The second concern is the independent submission of the IG's budget to Congress, and we are offering an amendment to try to clarify that, which I will speak on later.
Once again, this legislation was introduced by Representative Jim Cooper from Tennessee in February. It was approved by our committee by a voice vote in August. In addition to a substitute offered by Representative Cooper, which made a number of technical changes, the committee did adopt an amendment offered by me to limit the application of removal for cause in a way that I think we are all comfortable with.
So, again, I want to thank the players who have brought this to this stage.
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Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. If the gentleman has no further speakers, I will take a minute and sum up and yield back.
Let me just say again, I want to thank the author of this legislation. I want to thank Mr. Towns for moving this through subcommittee and Chairman Waxman. I just want to note, for IGs to work successfully, they need to work with their agencies. I think however we write the law, the President that appoints and the Senate that confirms, we need to look for more accountants.
Frankly, we have seen a surge of people coming out of the U.S. Attorney's offices, and they make this more adversarial than it needs to be. A good IG is going to work with their agency to identify waste, fraud and abuse, not enter into a gotcha mentality. For government to work, you need them all working together. You need an independent IG, there is no question about that. But the person in that office ought to be right there with the agency head making sure that things work. That doesn't always happen. I don't think we can write any law that makes that happen. That is going to depend on the goodwill of the people, the agency heads and the IGs working together. But I think this legislation goes a long way toward establishing that independence, giving the IG the authority that they need. But the rest is going to be up to the appointing President and the confirming Senate to get the right people in these jobs, professionals who want to be a part of government and making it work efficiently for the taxpayer.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, as currently drafted, the Improving Government Accountability Act would authorize Inspectors General throughout the government, and more than 60 of these offices exist, to directly submit their budget requests to Congress. By doing so, this legislation would circumvent the long-standing process under which Presidents submit to the Congress a budget proposal on behalf of the executive branch.
While I understand the sponsor's intent in authorizing independent budget submissions by IGs, I have concerns with the way the authority is currently constructed. Our concerns pertain more to the logistical nightmare than any particular objection to increased IG independence.
First of all, according to the Congressional Research Service, no other offices or agencies within the executive branch currently are authorized by statute to independently submit their budgets to Congress. H.R. 928 would not simply make an exception for one uniquely situated office, it would make an exception for all of the more than 60 IG offices currently in government. In other words, the President's annual budget would be accompanied by 60 separate IG budgets. This is inefficient; it is disorganized and unproductive.
Second, I am concerned that by authorizing IGs to submit their budgets independently to Congress, we are encouraging them to submit their wish lists to Congress rather than submitting budgets that take into account the limited resources that are available to agencies.
It doesn't take an active imagination to envision the increased government spending that this would cause. After all, if an IG submits its wish list to Congress, will Members of Congress have the stomach to appropriate an amount less than an IG requests? If we do, we could be painted as antioversight, a label none of us are interested in.
Because of these concerns, I have filed an amendment proposing an alternative approach to the budget issue. This amendment would authorize Inspectors General to notify Congress if the budget request submitted by the agency head would substantially inhibit the IG's ability to perform his or her duties. The President would be required to include in his budget submission the original amount requested by each IG.
This approach would give additional information to Congress, which is the intent, I think, of the legislation. It also encourages IGs to speak out if their agencies try to stifle the IG's independence by reducing the IG's budget request. But it would stop short of authorizing all 60 IGs to separately submit their own budget request to Congress outside of the traditional Federal budget process.
I think this amendment is a reasonable compromise which carefully balances the need for IG independence with the need for streamlined budget authority. We have enough problems enacting the Federal budget every year; we don't need to create 60 new ones. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
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Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the amendment, I think. I am not sure. Let me ask some questions and then I can make up my mind.
As I understand it, under your amendment, the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tom Davis), each Inspector General's appropriations request as originally made to his or her agency head would be noted in the President's budget submission to Congress.
Mr. Chairman, is that correct?
Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, that is correct. Let me just add, I think that was the intent of the legislation, to make sure that the IGs weren't stifled and that Congress gets their eyes on that original request, and it would allow that.
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Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would require agencies to include links on their Web pages to their IG's Web page. In addition, this amendment would require IGs to make public reports and audits conducted by the Inspector General immediately available on their Web sites, and it would require links for individuals interested in reporting waste, fraud and abuse.
To the extent any of this is not currently being done by agencies and IGs, I am fully supportive of Congress requiring such information to be made available in order to increase the transparency of Federal Government operations. We are prepared to support the amendment.
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Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, this motion to recommit would require all agency Inspectors General to report annually to Congress and to the President whether the IG believes an abolishment, reorganization, consolidation or transfer of existing Federal programs and agencies is necessary to reduce Federal expenditures, increase efficiency of government operations, eliminate overlap and duplication in Federal programs and offices, abolish agencies or programs which no longer serve an important governmental purpose, or identify reductions in amounts of discretionary budget authority or direct spending which can be dedicated to Federal deficit reduction.
The IGs would be required to accompany those reports with proposed legislation in order to encourage Congress to act on those recommendations.
This legislation is borne out of frustration. How many more times are we going to hear about redundancy in Federal programs without doing anything about it? We have the IGs. We have made them more independent as a result of this. Let's utilize that expertise for suggestions in how we can reduce waste, fraud and abuse in government.
How many more times are we going to have to hear about the 70 programs located throughout 13 Federal agencies providing substance abuse prevention services for our youth? The over 90 early childhood programs scattered among 11 Federal agencies and 20 offices? The 40 different programs in the Federal Government having job training as their main purpose? The 86 teacher training programs in nine Federal agencies? The 50 different Federal homeless assistance programs administered by eight different agencies? The more than 17 Federal agencies monitoring and enforcing over 400 U.S. trade agreements? The 17 Federal Departments and agencies operating a total of 515 Federal research and development laboratories? Or the eight different Federal agencies administering 17 different programs just in the area of rural water and wastewater systems, each with its own set of regulations?
After all, the primary reason all these Federal programs exist in the first place is because Congress has this bad habit of haphazardly establishing new programs to achieve short-term solutions whenever a problem arises.
In fact, Paul Volcker, Donna Shalala and Frank Carlucci all testified before our committee in 2003 about a National Commission on Public Service report that they had recently released. The report concluded that, over the years, the ad hoc layering of agencies, Departments, and programs greatly complicated management, expanded the influence of powerful interests and diminished coherent policy direction. The Federal Government today is a layered jumble of organizations with muddled public missions.
Congress is as much to blame for this problem as anyone else. Admitting we have a problem is the first step in recovery. I am here to help our colleagues understand we have a problem. The extent of overlap and duplication in government is an issue the Committee on Government Reform has spent years investigating. Our hearings have focused on a range of Federal program areas, from child welfare programs to intelligence operations to Federal food safety oversight.
This motion to report forthwith, so it doesn't kill the bill, it reports right back, would provide a tool which could assist the Congress and the President in identifying ways to streamline government operations and make them as efficient and effective as possible. The motion to recommit should appeal to all Members who believe there are inefficiencies in the Federal Government requiring attention. All after, Congress never has and never will be a management body. We need the assistance, and this legislation does it, of independent, outside observers to tell us what programs we created years ago are not an efficient or effective use of taxpayer funds.
We have given the Inspectors General here authority and independence to call the balls and strikes and to make government more efficient. Let's utilize that. Let's help us make government more efficient. Let's support the motion to recommit.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
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