Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq - The Crocker-Petraeus Report

Interview

Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Iraq - The Crocker-Petraeus Report

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. JIM WEBB (D-VA): (Laughs.) Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now, gentlemen, I know you have a -- have had a long day, and you got a long day ahead of you, and actually I do, too, because I'm on Armed Services Committee as well, so regard me as a transitional interrogator here. As soon as I'm done, I'm going to step over there where Senator Vitter was and await your return.

I have three observations that I would like to make just a result of the give-and-take on the hearings, and then a question for you, General Petraeus.

The first observation I would like to make is I think that you understand, both of you, and I hope most people understand that one of the reasons we're struggling so hard with this is that there are a large number of people in this country who had long national security experience who believed that this war was a horrendous strategic blunder. I mean, people like General Scowcroft and General Zinni and General Hoar, who both commanded CENTCOM. And so we're trying to find a way to work -- you know, to work the United States out of this situation without further destabilizing the region.

And I know, Ambassador Crocker, when you were talking about the consequences of failure, there were many of us who were pointing out that those were actually going to be the consequences of an invasion if we invaded. And so that's the conundrum that we're in here, that so much of this discussion is based on.

The second observation would be, I would have to associate myself with something that Senator Obama said when he was talking about the -- all of these events that have occurred in Al Anbar province. And I think you should be careful about how much of that you actually attribute to the surge. I say that from some personal perspective.

My son fought as an infantry Marine in the worst sections of Ramadi for the last four months of last year and the first five months of this year, actually was extended as a result of the surge. But the last four months of '06 were pretty tough months for the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines. And they have been given a great deal of credit for the turnaround there, just as a point of observation.

The third is that when I was watching and reading about the hearings yesterday, something did return to my mind, and that was the hearings of '02. Watching government witnesses during those hearings was one of the reasons I decided to eventually get into elective politics. Because when the questions were being asked of them in those hearings, over a period of a year, not just the hearings leading up to the vote on going to war, the question was always, how long are we going to be in Iraq? And the answer was always a litany. It was, as long as is necessary and not one day more. I would venture that I heard that said 50 times watching different hearings. And we're looking for some specificity. That is the point.

And the other thing that occurred to me reading this morning the results of that was a statement that General Eisenhower made in 1952 when he was deciding to run for president, talking about the fact that the Korean War had gone on for two years and needed to be resolved.

And he said, "When the enemy struck, what did America do? It did what it has always done in times of peril. It appealed to the heroism of its youth.

"The answer to that appeal has been what any American knew it would be. It has been sheer valor, fresh scars, new graves.

"Now, in this anxious autumn from these heroic men, there comes back an answering appeal. It is no whine, no whimpering plea. It is a question that addresses itself to simple reason. It asks: Where do we go from here? When comes the end? Is there an end?"

And Eisenhower said, "The first task is to bring the Korean War to an early and honorable end," an early and honorable end.

And when I look at all of this debate about the surge, the first thing I would say is this is not a strategy. It was not a change in strategy, in my view, in any sense of the word, unless we were able to put into it a strong diplomatic effort and what you're calling reconciliation. I, as an observer -- Ambassador Crocker, you've spent your entire life in that region. I have enormous respect for what you've done.

I don't see reconciliation. I see maybe an attempt at conciliation somehow to bring Iraq together. But without those, this is not -- this is simply a tactical adjustment. And the one inarguable result of this surge policy has been the disruption of the rotational cycles of deployment for our soldiers and our Marines.

On the one hand, we had the viewpoint of General Casey that fewer Americans on the streets of Iraq's cities would require the Iraqis to take greater responsibility for their own future.

We had Admiral Fallon testifying before the Armed Services Committee in his confirmation hearing, essentially saying the same thing, that it wasn't the number of troops; it was the missions that they were being assigned.

On the other, we have this policy which has resulted in extended tours, 15-month deployments for soldiers with only 12 months at home, and a situation that I personally, and looking at data also, have come to believe is very perilous to the well-being of the volunteer Army, its system, the volunteer military system, and to the well-being of these people, just the plain well-being of these people.

And we are the stewards of these people. Our traditional policy from the time that I was in the Marine Corps was two for one. If you're gone a year, you're back two years. If you're gone six months, you're back a year. The British in Iraq had a policy of four to one -- six-month deployment, two years back.

The policy right now, particularly on the Army side, is three- quarters to one. General Petraeus, what is your view of that policy, that -- (inaudible) -- time policy?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Senator, my view is that I obviously would like to see our soldiers and our Marines and other, all forces, have more time with their families between deployments. It's one reason that, on the record in a confirmation hearing, I believe I stated that our ground forces, in fact, because of the strain and so forth, needed to be larger.

In this mission, though, I am the Multinational Force Iraq commander. And what I've been charged to do, and I think what all of you want me to do, or what Americans should want a commander on the ground to do, is the best he can to accomplish the military tasks associated with the policy that has, in fact -- from which that mission is derived.

SEN. WEBB: So what is your view of a one-to-one floor for troops?

GEN. PETRAEUS: Senator, again, just as a general proposition, the more time that our soldiers can have at home with their families obviously is the better. And as I mentioned, I also am acquainted with that personally. And I'm also very keenly aware of the stress and strain that this has put on our ground forces in particular, and as I said, some of the other high-demand, low-density assets.

SEN. WEBB: Here's the difficulty that I have, and it's the reason that I put this amendment into the system. When the Army went to 15 months, General Casey, as chief of staff, called me to inform me. And I said, "How can you do this? How can you cause people to serve 15-month deployments with the supposed good news that they're going to get 12 months at home? It just violates everything that I've ever heard about from the day I was born being around the United States military."

He said, "We feed the strategy. They tell us the number of people that they need, and we feed the strategy." And then, from the strategic side, it's "We build the strategy and they feed us the troops." And somewhere in here, in my view, there has to be the notion that after four and a half years in Iraq, we need to be shaping the operational environment to the well-being, on a floor, for our troops.

GEN. PETRAEUS: Senator, as I mentioned, that is something that very much informed my recommendation. In fact, as I mentioned, several of the brigades will, in fact, come out before the 15-month mark because of the way that we will be withdrawing brigades without replacement. And the strain on the force, again, was very much one that informed the recommendations that I have made. And it will inform the recommendations that I made for the point beyond which we've already made recommendations on.

SEN. WEBB: My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I may want to revisit this a little bit in the next hearing.

SEN. BIDEN: Senator, I hope you do.

Gentlemen, I appreciate your testimony. And I think it's long past time we level with the American people. You know, General, you talk about the ORA, whether it's one or two. That doesn't mean anything to the American people. What they want to know is what they were promised, and that is when an Iraqi force is going to be able to supplant an American force.

And with all due respect to both of you -- you're not setting the overall strategic doctrine here -- I don't see anything that leads to an early and honorable end to this war. The truth is we're going to be down to pre-surge levels next summer.

And the truth is, if you listen to all the testimony, it's going to be at least a year after that before you're going to have Iraqi troops, at a minimum, be able to replace American troops. You're talking about American troops being there in the numbers like they're in now, 130,000, for a couple more years if you level with the American people. And there is no clear political plan the administration is pushing -- none whatsoever.

And my conversation with my chairman here, Senator Lugar, and others, the idea that we have a generic plan other than stand up the Iraqis and bring together the folks in Baghdad for a government that is not engaging in a competition for power among ethno-religious groups is -- I don't see any of it.

And I think the obligation we have is to bring this to an early and honorable end. And I don't see -- I respect you both very much. You've given great tactical judgments here about what's going on. But I don't see any plan, in terms of leveling with the American people, where we're going to be able to tell them their kids are coming home, being able to replace either because you have a unity government in Baghdad and the end of the sectarian violence or Iraqis who can take over for all the American forces there.

But you have a long day. You've had a long day. I look forward to being able to continue to talk with you fellows. I wish you luck in the next hearing. And God love you. I don't know how your physical constitution is going to handle this, going straight through. I hope you get a few minutes to get -- someone bought you a sandwich or something.

So thank you both for your testimony.

We're adjourned.

Source