Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subject: Report on the Findings of the Iraqi Security Force Independent Assessment Commission

Interview

HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE FINDINGS OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION

BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT

SEN. BOB CORKER (R-TN): Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. And I want to echo the comments made when this hearing began. We are all honored that you are here, and deeply appreciative of the service you provided both in the past and today.

I've prided myself on never asking a question that's already been asked. I'm not sure I can do that today, the way this hearing has gone with votes in between, and I'm sure this actually has been asked. But when I left the hearing there was-there was discussion about the border, and discussion about-about some of the basic equipment necessary to secure the border, especially between Iraq and Iran.

I've been in General Odierno's office twice this year, and on his cocktail table in his office he has there a lot of Iranian arms, if you will, that have come in from there. And it's basically on display so that everyone who comes in to his office knows that arms, if you will, are coming into Iraq from Iran. And I just -- which obviously everybody thinks is a big, big issue. Could you expand a little bit on the border issue? It just seems so elementary, especially when it relates to the equipment pieces. We're spending $10 billion a month. I know I had conversations with General Hadley early on about making sure -- General McCaffrey had been before us in foreign relations talking about the lack of expenditures on equipment, the fact that if we just spend some basic dollars on equipment we could really lessen the effort, if you will, that we were having to do by our own men militarily, because we'd be giving them the equipment to do the things they need to do.

I wonder if you could just expand on that a little bit. And I apologize, I'm sure somebody else has asked that question.

GEN. JONES: Glad to do it, Senator. And if I could, I'd like to call on Admiral Johnson who also spent time on the border. General (Boyd ?) is also our expert. But to give Admiral Johnson a chance to respond to that very important question.

ADM. GREGORY JOHNSON (Former commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe): Thank you, Senator. And indeed, we have gone over some of this ground before.

Fact of the matter is, we got a late start on border security force. It's only been in the last year to 18 months that we've given it a fairly serious effort to help them establish a security force.

It's under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, and as has been discussed previously, that is one of the more ineffective ministries we have in the Iraqi government. The force is some 35(,000)-37,000. They are making progress. They seem very eager. We visited three different border crossing facilities. I visited one on the Iranian border. General Byrnes visited one on the Jordanian border, and one on the Syrian border.

All the forces were eager, but there is no standard operating procedure. They have a very rudimentary capability. They don't have modern-day equipment that can examine cargo, backscatter arrays that can look inside of cargo vans. There were five of them at the Iranian site that we visited; none of them worked. They don't have the more modern gamma ray facilities. They didn't even have cranes or fork lifts that would lift cargo off so they could examine it.

Furthermore, this is the primary Iranian-Iraqi border crossing, and since the end of the -- or since the war began, the Iranians made the transshipment point on their side of the border, put up berms and walls so the Iraqi trucks go over to the Iranian side of the border, behind this berm, transload the equipment from -- or whatever the goods and services are that are being imported into Iraq-onto Iraqi trucks. No one sees what takes place there, or what transpires. They drive over to the Iraqi side, and we witnessed a few people crawling over the trucks, maybe looking into them, looking at whatever manifest the driver might have. But that was the extent of the effort taking place there. That was all the capability they had.

So we have a long way to go in this area.

SEN. CORKER: You know we've been training now service men now for three or four years. This is one of those things you would think you could solve in like a week or two weeks. This is just like infuriating to know that this is happening, and that truly, I think two of you with a few folks -- one of you, probably, with a few folks could figure out a way to solve this problem like yesterday.

Is that simplifying this thing?

ADM. JOHNSON: Well, it is -- it probably is simplifying a little bit. I think there could be a much greater sense of urgency in this particular area, and it would have some impact, but this is a very long border. It's roughly equal to what we have with Mexico in the United States.

So even if you had better equipment at the border crossing points, to be able to zip up the border is a monumental task. But General Jones has referred to maybe as a transition takes place in the coming months we could help and exert a greater effort in this particular area which is of strategic importance to us to tighten up that border.

But they need a lot more training, they need SOPs, they need standard operating procedures, and they need more modern and technical equipment, the PISCES system. There is no real lists of who should be allowed into the country. Many of the passports that are used are not scannable passports anyway, even if they had a PISCES site system, and they had electrical power to run it.

So there are some rather significant challenges there.

SEN. CORKER: I know a big -- tell me when my time is up, I'm sure you will -- but I know a big part of the problem is that people are -- she just did of course -- people are coming and going, and that's something that's very difficult to contend with.

And I understand -- look, we have the same problem here in our own country and -- been around for a long, long time.

SEN. CORKER: You were reminded of that frequently.

GEN. JONES: Yeah. The issue, though, of equipment coming and going, of arms coming and going, seems to me to be something far more simpler, if you will, to resolve. You don't have to have documents to know that there are explosive devices if you're on the back of a truck.

SEN. CORKER: Could you speak to the order of magnitude of that problem as it relates to affecting us in a -- in a negative way in what we're doing in Iraq itself -- the order of magnitude of those arms, those munitions, those weapons coming across the Iraqi border into our country -- into their country?

GEN. JONES: Well, I think the display on General Odierno's table there in his office speaks to that, the stuff comes every day. And I haven't even begun to talk about the sea border which is also very porous, particularly down in the Basra area where it's controlled by Shia militia. And so, I'm not saying that we can't make progress, and we can make a dent in it. But to be able to zip-up that border so that stuff can't get in, I think, is nearly impossible.

So what you're going to have to do is internally take away the ability of people who are so inclined, not to be able to use that stuff. And I think that's the approach we need to take at the same time we continue to build up the capacity of the border security force and professionalize them. There's also the whole issue of corruption, which we haven't discussed, which is very severe in this particular area in government capacity.

SEN. CORKER: Mr. Chairman, thank you - and I'll wait.

SEN. LEVIN: Senator Corker, thank you so much. We're going to try just a very short, brief second round. We know you folks have to be at the House, I think, at 2:30, is that correct? And we'll try to give you at least three minutes to eat lunch.

(Laughter.)

SEN. LEVIN: Senator, we'll try like a three-minute round for the few of us that are here, if we can ask your indulgence.

Senator Warner.

SEN. WARNER: Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I think you should depart with a sense of mission accomplished here, if I can use that phrase, in terms of you've fulfilled the charter that Congress has specified, in my judgment, and you did it admirably -- individually and collectively, and I thank you.

But as I look at the future, there's an awesome decision that has to be made by our president, under his constitutional authority as commander in chief, as to what changes should be made in our strategy as we look at the future. And certainly we covered clearly the troop requirements and what they'll -- how their restrictions will begin to fall if we maintain the current deployment, which I rigidly would adhere to -- no deviation in the current length of time these able soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines are sailing -- serving.

Anyway, back to my point -- and then you look at General Petraeus. I was trying to think the parallels in history when a single officer has had to make a decision that is so determining of the future, not only of this military operation in Iraq, but the determination of the future, of our nation's status in that region -- our credibility, our ability to deal with Iran on such issues as nuclear power and nuclear weapons, as they're dealing with, and all of the other decisions.

So we're at a very major pivoting point in this conflict. And I think back to Eisenhower trying to struggle with the decision of when and how we would initiate Operation Overlord to go into Europe with our forces. It really is extraordinary. And I join with you and others saying that I think General Petraeus can make that.

But the strategy of the future, it seems to me, can no longer be based on a predicate of the reconciliation, that you've emphasized, from the top on down. I see no signs of that coming into place in a timely or an effective manner to really begin to affect the strategy. It'll be a missing component of the decision-making. And that's why I'm drawn to your recommendation on pages 130 and 131 about provincial Iraqi control. Since it's not functioning at the top, at least give the provinces the measure of autonomy under the existing constitution in Iraq to govern and do things for themselves.

You say, "For the sake of Iraqi sovereignty and to lessen the perception that we are occupiers, all provinces should be transferred to Iraqi control immediately." And that's a very profound finding and I support that. I'm interested, what reaction did you get from the administration, particularly General Petraeus and others, when you brought forth that recommendation?

GEN. JONES: Senator, we did touch on that in our -- in our briefings and it was received with interest and, I think, the seriousness with which something like that should be considered. And I think it's being discussed in various centers at the Defense Department, the National Security Council, so --

SEN. WARNER: All right. I think that's sufficient. They took it, did not reject it. Took it.

GEN. JONES: No. (In agreement.)

SEN. WARNER: And my last question would be, in your report you talk about transferring our forces to perform critical infrastructure security. And that translates into the very basic needs of water, removal of sewage, electricity, all of those things by which the average Iraqi citizen can judge that his nation is moving forward or remains basically stagnant as it is now. All these years, all of the investment that this country has made into trying to bring up those essential services for decency of living and existence have not materialized.

Now, how would we undertake that security operation differently than what we have to assume is the ineffective security now being provided by a combination of whatever Coalition Forces and Iraqi forces has taken place? How would we go about augmenting that such that electricity, and water, and sanitation, and other essentials can be given equally to the Iraqi citizens no matter where they live?

GEN. JONES: Senator, as the Iraqi security forces become more able, obviously the result of that would be that they would take on more of the problems associated with the internal security threats that we currently experience. Having more troops available means that some of the other issue that we have not been able to devote as much as we would like to have done to that aspect of external security, and assuring the safety and security of the most critical infrastructures of the country could be accomplished, and --

SEN. WARNER: By our forces? As they transition from --

GEN. JONES: Could be as part of the strategic overwatch.

SEN. WARNER: What would we do differently than is being done today? Is it just the size of the forces, the technology we bring, the equipment?

GEN. JONES: I think it's the availability of forces to do those kinds of things. I think Admiral Johnson and General Burns spoke about the critical situation along the borders. That's one aspect of it. Obviously, if terrorists can keep impeding the flow of progress in terms of electricity and water and other basic elements of life, that is very destabilizing and contrary to our mission. So as you get more mass and more capability you can -- we can do more of these things. And that will help, certainly, turn the attitude of the average Iraqi citizen in support, not only of the Coalition, but in support of his own government.

SEN. WARNER: I thank the witness. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SEN. LEVIN: Senator Warner.

Senator Sessions.

SEN. SESSIONS: Thank you. This is, I guess, the beginning of an important fall discussion dealing with the commitment we made in Iraq, what we're going to do, what our level of commitment will be, and what the prospects are for success. And I thank you very, very much for your wisdom and mature judgment on these issues.

I take away a few things. One, that situation is not hopeless. I think some of our constituents may have just felt like throwing up their hands, and there's no way we're going to be successful. I do not believe that and I'm pleased that you do not, because it's a -- failure would be a very bad thing for our country as you note in the report. I think it's important, General Jones, you noted that -- you conclude that the Iraqi people do want a unified Iraqi government. They would like that as a goal. I think that's important, fundamentally, as to whether or not we can be successful.

You've noted it would take a long time. I just want to pursue that a little bit. I agree, it's going to take a long time to have an established government here. But that does not mean -- when we convey that to our, the people of this country who provided the soldiers and the resources to fight it -- that we have to maintain the same level and the same expense level, does it?

And you're providing us some ideas about how we can begin to draw down that expense and that troop level commitment. Is that fair to say?

GEN. JONES: That's absolutely correct, sir.

SEN. SESSIONS: So that would certainly be my vision and hope that we could draw down our commitment, have more of the burden carried by the Iraqi people, and that we can end up with a stable, decent government that's an ally to the United States and not a base for terrorist activities and would not result in the kind of end that would embolden the enemy and would cause them to make a decision.

Where would they attack next? If they're successful here, the next thing that they would do is decide where next they're going to attack. And I think we would be on the defensive.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing. I will just -- I believe the press, who've previewed your report, are a bit more negative than I hear it today. I hear yours is a fundamental, wise evaluation that gives us a cause for belief that we can prevail here. Likewise, I think the spin on the GAO report was more negative than it deserved. But we certainly face difficult, difficult challenges. It's not an easy thing. This is a very difficult thing. But given where we are, I think your report is very helpful.

Thank you.

SEN. LEVIN: Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Corker, do you have any additional questions?

SEN. CORKER: I'll be brief, because you'll make me be brief. These gentlemen and gentleladies need to eat. But the gentleman said that we haven't delved into even the issue of corruption yet. Has there been much discussion of that as it relates to security today in this hearing? Would you want to --

MR. HAMRE: Not specifically.

SEN. CORKER: Would you want to -- I'd like for you to expand a little bit on that and how that is affecting what's happening on the ground. And I'd like to begin by asking if the oil that is coming out of the ground in Iraq, is it metered?

MR. HAMRE: Sir, the estimate is that about 400,000 barrels a day is pilfered every day.

SEN. CORKER: Four hundred thousand barrels --

MR. HAMRE: Four hundred thousand barrels.

SEN. CORKER: -- is pilfered. Are there meters -- which, again, is sort of a basic elementary step -- are there actually meters on those wells?

MR. HAMRE: I don't know the answer to that.

MR. JOHNSON: I can't speak for the wellheads, but I visited the offshore loading platform. The modern one, the new one that we have just poured a considerable amount of money in, is state of the art. It's one of the top six in terms of capacity in the entire world. It does have modern-day metering capacity on it, with telemetry back to the Ministry of Oil in Baghdad, so they can see precisely how much is being shipped every day.

Now, I might add that while we were there, the U.S. Navy security folks that were resident on this platform told us, as a sidebar, that the SOC, Southern Oil Company, Iraqi Southern Oil Company people who are also resident on there, are urging the construction company who has put in this telemetry and metering equipment, as they finish up the project, to shut it off before they leave. So that speaks to some element of corruption, and what have you, as an example.

But right now I can tell you that there's very good telemetry. Now, the northern rig does not have telemetry, and there's some conjecture of where that oil that gets shipped out of there -- it's a very small amount compared to the southern facility, but that doesn't have telemetry. So they don't have a good feel for exactly what's being shipped except the modern one today, which they have very good --

SEN. CORKER: And the estimate of the number of barrels of oil that are being pilfered is what?

MR. HAMRE: Between 200,000 and 400,000 a day. It's been steady at that rate for --

SEN. CORKER: And are those funds, that are obviously being generated by someone, are those also funds that are being used to counter our efforts there, or are they funds that are being used -- I hate to say this -- to help our efforts there? I mean, what is happening with those 400,000 barrels?

MR. HAMRE: You'll see a combination -- and actually General King should speak to this, but I think you'll see a combination of criminality and insurgency that gets blended unevenly. Some of this is just pure criminal activity, and some of it is definitely flowing into the hands, into the resources, of insurgent and militia elements.

Jim, do you -- why don't you come up here? Why don't you come up here and speak to that? I think it's important.

MR. KING: Sir, I think we could just define also that an amount of this does lead itself into terrorism being financed and to be used against, inimical to the coalition forces. However, because of the criminal element being so tightly tied in with Shi'a-on-Shi'a or Sunni and various factions with it, it is hard for us to give an accurate assessment about the flow of funds, although we do know that the flow of funds that go out of the country do enable forces to come back in.

SEN. CORKER: May I ask one more question?

SEN. LEVIN: Sure.

SEN. CORKER: It would seem to me that figuring out how much oil was coming out of the ground is sort of like the border question a minute ago. Figuring out the amount of oil that was coming out of the ground and where it was going would be a more elementary solution than some of the more difficult issues of sectarian violence that we are dealing with that involve human behavior. Again, these things are mathematical and can be metered.

Is there a reason that we've not employed methods, if you will, to keep 400,000 barrels of oil, which is indicated to be the case, from going into the wrong hands or into hands that are not legally holding those oil reserves?

GEN. KING: I'm not capable of answering that statement fully or accurately. But I would offer that in regards to, just as the way that the coalition forces have been now, it depends on where you have to use your forces, and what would it take to be able to do that? I think that we would find that in partial with some of the oil and other things that are going out, that would be simultaneous with the border security, both going out through Turkey as well as through other areas.

SEN. CORKER: That's something contractors, though -- I mean, those don't have to be Army personnel. I mean, we have, I'm sure, people around the world in civilian activities that figure out how much oil is coming out of the ground and who's paying for it.

MR. HAMRE: But, sir, the black marketing really started during the years of embargo on Saddam. That's how he raised $400 million a year to build palaces. I mean, there's very elaborate, large black- market activity that's very mature in this country. And so, you know, a guy pulls up. He says, "Okay, only write down 1,500 gallons in my tanker truck," and you put in 3,000. And he's taken the other 1,500 off into a diversion. This is very widespread. I mean, this is big, heavy-duty black-market activity in this country.

SEN. CORKER: Are you saying the reason that we're not intervening is that that would create other issues for us to -- other revolts for us to deal with, and this is just a common practice, and to try to intervene creates other issues that we would have to deal with as a country?

MR. HAMRE: Sir, that's beyond -- I shouldn't comment on that. My sense is that we have had our hands full with a whole range of things. And this was a problem, but it wasn't as imminent and immediate as people shooting at us.

SEN. LEVIN: Let me just conclude with a few clarifying questions. I hope this will be brief.

On page 46 of your version, you've indicated again that the armed forces of Iraq are capable -- and that's present tense -- of assuming greater responsibility for the internal security of Iraq. And I think each of us have noted that and the importance of that conclusion. And that seems to be one of your thrusts, is that we want them to take over greater responsibility and that they are presently capable of assuming greater responsibility. Would you agree with that?

GEN. JONES: Correct.

SEN. LEVIN: Okay. Now on page 60 of our version -- 62 of your version -- there's a statement that "There is rising confidence that progress is being made at the rate that will enable army -- Iraqi Army tactical formations and units to gradually assume a greater leadership role in counterinsurgency operations." That's totally consistent with what you said on page 46.

GEN. JONES: In the next 12 to 18 months.

SEN. LEVIN: That's the part that's confusing. The -- page 44 is present tense, that they are presently capable of assuming greater responsibility. Am I correct that the reason that the words "12 to 18 months" are in there is because that was your mandate -- that's what you were tasked to do? Could this happen in the next 12 to 18 months? And you answer is yes. But that's not -- you're not saying that that cannot and should not occur promptly -- as soon as that capability is established. You're not saying you want to delay that --

GEN. JONES: No, we're not saying that --

SEN. LEVIN: Okay, okay. Next question.

On page 61 -- and I think this is our version, and your -- I think, printing is a little different -- a couple of pages off and that happens. That's --

GEN. JONES: I would apologize for that --

SEN. LEVIN: No, no. That's not unusual.

GEN. JONES: This is the one that --

SEN. LEVIN: Nothing to apologize. You folks have produced a tremendous document here. But anyway, I want to just -- so you can follow what I'm saying -- is page 61 of the binder, I guess. Quote, "Without continued, mentoring, training and key combat enablers from the collation, it would be difficult for the Iraqi Army to progress to a point where it can conduct effective, independent count -- independent counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Further, it is likely that hard-won progress to date would atrophy" -- that is, without continued training, key mentoring and key combat enablers.

Would the slight rephrasing also be true -- that with continued training, mentoring and key combat enablers from the coalition that the Iraqi Army will be able to progress to a point where it can conduct effective, independent counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, and that under that circumstance it is likely that hard- won progress to date could be sustained?

In other words, do you see what I'm saying?

GEN. JONES: I agree. Yes, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: And is that a --

GEN. JONES: Yes, I agree.

SEN. LEVIN: Okay, you agree with that.

GEN. JONES: Yes, sir.

SEN. LEVIN: The last question that I have has just been answered. (Laughter.)

Senator Sessions? We're all set.

General Jones, to you and your colleagues, again I -- this is a little bit of a unusual thing. The Senate's always unusual, but this is more unusual than usual because of what we had to do in and out. But you've handled it very, very well and I think my colleagues have -- some of my colleagues who clearly were here to ask questions were kind of aced out when somebody who had a prior preference suddenly appeared. I apologize to them, but I think we all understand it. We know you're old pros around here, you understand this, too and we're not only appreciative of your effort here in this report, but also of your patience with the way in which this had to be handled, given the five votes that interrupted this proceeding.

Thank you very, very much for your service. And we'll stand adjourned, and let you get lunch.

GEN. JONES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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