Hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Statement
Hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
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SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Tomorrow is the anniversary of a day that six years later still divides understanding. The loss of nearly 3,000 innocent men, women and children; the cruelty of the attackers and the courage at the Twin Towers, the Pentagon, and on Flight 93 remain beyond the ability of minds to comprehend fully or our words to express adequately.
It is appropriate that we are holding this hearing today, the eve of this somber day of remembrance. If there is one thing we fully understand about September 11th, it is that the horror of that day was made possible by what has been called September 10th thinking. What the 9/11 commission so memorably termed as a failure of imagination was exploited by our enemies with devastating effectiveness.
Events in my home state of Maine on September 10th, 2001, illustrate the collision course between innocence and hatred. On that day, Robert and Jackie Norton drove from their home in Lubec, Maine, to Bangor, the first leg of a cross-country trip to the West Coast for a family wedding. Early the next morning, a commuter plane would take the beloved retired couple to Boston where they would board Flight 11. On that day, James Roux of Portland, an Army veteran, a devoted father and a man known for his generosity and outgoing spirit, was packing for a business trip to California. He left Logan the next morning on Flight 175. On that day, Robert Schlegel of Grey, Maine, was celebrating his recent promotion to the rank of commander in the United States Navy. He was settling into his new office at the Pentagon. His office was believed to be the point of impact for Flight 77.
And on that day, Mohammed Atta and his fellow terrorists rented a car in Boston and drove to Portland. They checked into a motel, ate pizza, and made other preparations. When they boarded their commuter plane for Logan the next morning to seize control of Flight 11, they left behind a trail of dust, of financing and training, of global travel and visa violations and of known terrorism involvement that would not be connected until it was far too late. Complacency, turf battles, and intelligence failures prevented the coordination and communication that just might have allowed the 9/11 plot to be detected in time. Nevertheless the people of our great country responded to those attacks with determination, unity, and a sense of purpose.
My concern is that our response may be in danger of flagging.
If we allow ourselves to become complacent, to revert to September 10th thinking, the next attack will not be due to a failure of imagination but to a failure of resolve.
Today's hearing is held in the context of the National Intelligence Estimate on the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland. This report judged that the United States will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The key words are "persistent" and "evolving."
This committee has dedicated itself to anticipating the changing nature of terrorism and to addressing our vulnerabilities. One of our concerns is the central issue raised in the NIE. That issue is homegrown terrorism. The NIE assessment is that a growing number of radical, self-generating terror cells in Western country (sic) indicates that the radical and violent segment of the West's population is expanding.
In our own country, as the chairman indicated, the Torrance, California, case and the Fort Dix and JFK Airport plots all illustrate that we are not immune from domestic terror cells. Those homegrown terrorists, inspired by al Qaeda's hate-filled perversion of the Muslim faith, will challenge the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to respond effectively. And they pose a challenge to all Americans to be observant and to not be afraid to report what they see.
This committee has conducted extensive investigations of this phenomenon, in particular the radicalization of prison inmates, the use of the Internet as a radicalizing influence, and the lessons learned by our European allies, who also face this threat. I'm very interested in discussing with our witnesses today how we can best counter this clear and escalating threat.
The NIE also states that al Qaeda remains driven by an undiminished intent to attack and continues to adapt and improve its capabilities.
Even more disturbing is what the report further concludes, that although worldwide counterterrorism efforts have constrained the ability of al Qaeda to attack us again, the level of international cooperation may wane as 9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge. In other words, we are challenged not just by a ruthless, calculating and determined enemy, but also by our own resolve.
The names of Robert and Jackie Norton, of James Roux, of Commander Schlegel and of so many others must not become distant memories. They must always remain a vivid reminder of the terrible price that was paid for September 10th thinking. The threat that was so fully and terribly revealed on September 11th is not a matter of divergent perceptions; it is a persistent and evolving reality that we must continue to confront.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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SEN. COLLINS: Admiral, you recently said, in an interview with Newsweek, quote, "We're going to get hit again." Secretary Chertoff talked today about some of the possible lines of attack that he's working on; for example, general aviation, small boats. When you look at the intelligence, what kind of attack do you believe we should be preparing for?
MR. REDD: Thank you, Senator. First of all, there were two parts of that interview, which, as you know, sometimes get conflated. One is the heightened awareness or the heightened threat environment, in which we are right now. And the second is the statement which I also made in my oral statement, that over time, over a 40-year generational period, just statistically, batting a thousand would be very difficult, and that's where I said we may get hit again.
I mean, the short answer is you can't focus on any one of those. We look at -- we watch very carefully what al Qaeda is saying. We watch their planning. There is a certain sense at which they tend to come back and be persistent and try the same things again. As was indicated in the NIE, they are focused on large elements or large- reaction things to our transportation system. Particularly aviation has been something. But we can't just look at one of those, we have to look across the board.
SEN. COLLINS: Secretary Chertoff, if you look at the recent plots that were thwarted in this country, if you look at Germany just last week, at Scotland, London, the JFK plot, it appears that terrorists still are looking at bombs and that they're looking at IEDs as the weapon of choice. What is DHS doing in the area of IEDs?
SEC. CHERTOFF: Well, Senator, I think you're correct that the attack weapon of choice still is the IED, and we're doing a number of different things, all of which I think will soon be captured in a strategic document directed both by Congress and the president. But let me go through some of the major elements of what we're doing.
Of course, we begin with detection.
We want to detect and prevent something from going off. One element of that of course is technology. Through our Science and Technology Directorate, we are doing research in such things as technology that will enable us to detect liquid explosives, even when they are in a container, and to detect those liquid explosives rapidly and accurately in an operational environment.
With respect to other kinds of technological issues, of course the Defense Department is doing a lot of work based on what on they're seeing in Iraq and other places overseas; we get the benefit of that. And then through our Office of Bomb Prevention, which is part of the Directorate of Infrastructure Protection, we actually educate state and local bomb detection and bomb prevention units in what they ought to look for and how they can deal with these threats.
A second element of course is detecting someone who's trying to bring a bomb into an airplane or into a transit or some other part of infrastructure. Part of the process of doing that of course is deploying the existing technology; part of it is the enhanced use of what we call VIPER teams, which are teams with K-9s and other hand- held detection equipment that we can surge into mass transit. We do that in response to a particular threat, we do it in response to a high-profile event like the Super Bowl or something of that sort, and we do it on a random basis.
A third element is the use of behavioral observation. This is a technique which we see overseas sometimes at airports. The Israelis use a version of this. We actually use it at the border; we train people in how to observe behavior in a way that tips off somebody who might be planning to do us harm. And so as we have increased training and deployment of behavioral units at our airports and other locations, that's given us another element.
So we use the whole spectrum of tools, whether it be advanced scientific research, widespread deployment of existing technology, the use of dogs and training of our screeners and of state and local officials in how to detect different kinds of components and suspicious behavior.
SEN. COLLINS: Director Mueller, there was a report last week by the inspector general at the Department of Justice that was very critical of the terrorist watch list that is maintained under your direction. On the one hand, the IG found that there were several known or suspected terrorists who were not listed appropriately, and the IG was also critical that there were innocent people on the list and that it was very difficult for them to be removed from the list. All of us have had examples of constituents who have been on the list because their name is similar from someone -- to someone who should be on the list. What is your response to the DOJ IG's criticism of the watch list? This obviously is an important tool, but its usefulness is lessened if it's not accurate and complete as possible.
MR. MUELLER: Well, we absolutely agree with that, that it has to be, you know, as up to date as possible with the latest information. The IG's report gave us some credit for having made substantial strides since his previous report but still focused on two areas in which we've still got a great deal of work to do.
The first is in terms of redress; since his last report we've established an Office of Redress.
It is operating. I think both the IG as well as ourselves would like it to operate faster, but it is operating successfully.
The second area is in the quality assurance of the information that we get, assuring that it is updated so that persons who may have been on the list at some point in time, when we have additional information, are removed from the list. And again, as is often the case, it's a question of money and personnel, and we are putting money and personnel into assuring and upgrading our quality assurance. The IG made 18 recommendations; we are following up on every one of those recommendations. I pointed to a computer glitch called a computer glitch writ large in terms of the individuals that in a particular instance -- but it was over a period of time -- did not make it on a list, and that has been remedied. So we have taken each one of the recommendations from the IG and are working on those recommendations.
One more recent example is we have been able to go through and scrub the no-fly list and cut it in half, and so we are making progress in terms of the goals that we share with the IG in assuring the quality assurance on the list. But it is and has been exceptionally successful in terms of doing what it was established to do, and that is identifying persons whom we do not want to let into the country, identifying persons who may be in the country and giving us some indication as where they are and what they're doing.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
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SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Thank you, Senator Sununu, for bringing up that very important issue. That is a major issue in both Maine and New Hampshire, as the secretary's well aware. I think the department went a long ways by setting up the new process, but I also hope that the department is following through on a more collaborative approach, bringing in state officials, privacy experts and technological experts to make sure this is being done in a way that will minimize privacy concerns as well as the rather extraordinary costs.
So is that process under way as well, sort of a negotiated rulemaking after the fact before you get to a final rule?
SEC. CHERTOFF: Well, we have done a lot of consultation in the run-up to the final rule that's going to be issued in the fall, and that includes with state officials, the Motor Vehicle Association, privacy people. I might add as well, this kind of complements the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and in particular our efforts to get states to come up with enhanced driver's licenses that would satisfy that.
I have in -- myself in the last few months dealt with governors of Arizona, California, New York, Michigan, Minnesota and Vermont on all these issues, and states are increasingly signing up for enhanced driver's licenses, which will actually operate along a system that's very similar and scalable to a real ID.
So what I think we're now beginning to see is not only are we -- do we have increased engagement with the states, but we have increased enthusiasm on behalf of most states for biting the bullet to get involved with this process.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Director McConnell, I want to bring up the issue of information sharing further with you. I think you have made real progress. But this was a major recommendation of the 9/11 commission, and when the commission did its report card, it gave the government's efforts only a D as far as improving information sharing. Now, that obviously is before your time.
Recently, several technology companies have told my staff that there are technological solutions to the barriers that prevent intelligence agencies from more easily sharing information. And there have been recent reports that the NSA, for example, is linking databases to encourage information sharing. But unfortunately, we've also heard from the program manager for information sharing environment that the barrier is not really technological, that it's cultural, and that although a lot of progress has been made, that there still is a hesitation to share information, particularly with state and local law enforcement. Do you still believe that there are significant cultural barriers to be overcome before we have the kind of seamless system that will encourage the sharing of information that could be absolutely vital to thwarting and uncovering a terrorist attack?
MR. MCCONNELL: Yes, ma'am, there are still significant cultural issues, and where we find ourselves is attempting to create a situation that would adapt to the current needs. And by that, we have a responsibility to protect sources and methods; we have a responsibility to protect those who've agreed to cooperate with us in spying on someone else, whose lives would be at risk if the information were compromised.
So -- and the way I try to describe it, when we're having this dialogue and debate in the community, is we're committed to information sharing, but we also have a responsibility to protect sources and methods.
We have a responsibility to protect those who've agreed to cooperate with us in spying on someone else, whose lives would be at risk if the information were compromised. So the way I try to describe it when we're having this dialogue and debate in the community is, we're committed to information sharing, but we also have a responsibility to protect sources and methods.
So we want to try to create a situation where there's tension in the system -- we can't be prescriptive to get the perfect answer for every situation, but if we can create a culture where the analytical community's not thinking about need-to-know -- I have information, you have to demonstrate a need to know it -- but my attitude as an analyst is, I have a responsibility to provide. That puts tension in the system to share. Now, for those who recruit spies or operate very sensitive systems or capabilities that if compromised we would lose -- a loss of life or lose a capability, they're people who want to not be as willing to share.
So it's managing that cultural dynamic that's the big challenge. We recognize it, we're addressing it, and we're being very aggressive in attempting to transform this culture to get us to the right place.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
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SEN. COLLINS: This committee has worked diligently to try to identify shortcomings and gaps in the legal authority that you have as we try to fight this war against terrorism. Last year, for example, Secretary Chertoff, you told us that we needed authority in the area of chemical security, and we passed legislation giving you that. More recently, Admiral, you came to us on the FISA issue. I'd like to ask each of you to identify any legislative reforms or authority that you need to more effectively do your jobs as we battle terrorism.
Secretary Chertoff, we'll start with you and we'll just go down the panel.
MR. CHERTOFF: I did mention the issue of waste water and water treatment and I think we are contemplating what we might do to address that issue and whether we ought to make a suggestion to Congress.
If I might, I'd like to request the opportunity to actually come back and think about that and come back with a little bit more of a comprehensive answer to that and give off, just off the table.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Admiral?
MR. MCCONNELL: Like Secretary Chertoff, I need to give you a more deliberate answer, but I've been back only a few months as you're aware, and the title is Director of National Intelligence -- I think Director may be a little bit of a misnomer, I'm more of a coordinator. So when I want to make a hard decision, it's a little bit like this body. As opposed to deciding, you get to engage in dialogue and debate and so on. It was made reference earlier that it's interpersonal skills. Well mine's been tested quite a bit --
SEN. COLLINS: (Laughs.)
MR. MCCONNELL: -- to try to get hard decisions made. So at some point I'll formulate some recommendations about, do we need to make some adjustments to how we're organized. We did not create a Department of Intelligence; we created a Director of National Intelligence who has the responsibility of coordinating a community of 15 of 16 agencies who work for another cabinet officer. So there's a challenge or two embedded in that.
SEN. COLLINS: Admiral, thank you.
MR. REDD: As you know, I wear the two hats. On the intelligence side obviously, in fact, I'm actual part of the DNI and the DNI's actually used his authorities to help us out in some cases. And so I think I would certainly identify with everything Admiral McConnell said.
I think there's a question which is not but is probably a year or so down the road is on the other issue of strategic operational planning. As you know, when the 9/11 commission came out, they had in mind a much more, shall we say, aggressive or directive view of that. I don't think we're far enough down the road to know whether that's desirable or even doable. We're working together but I think that's something in a couple of years that, you know, the Congress may want to come back and look at.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
Director?
MR. MUELLER: One of the areas that we're concerned about and have been for some time is, first of all the lone wolf actor who is not tied in with any particular group overseas, and we addressed that in legislation a year or so ago. But as you have self-radicalization growing, and regulization (sic) in the United States, where it does not have any foreign components, we are still, we operate under the Title III, on the criminal side of the House. And over a period of time as technology has improved, and the statutes focus on facilities, particularly facilities as opposed to the target. One of the things I'd like an opportunity to get back to you on is the possibility of making modifications to make it easier with appropriate safeguards to do interceptions of those individuals might be self-radicalized and intent on undertaking terrorist attacks as opposed to other criminal activities within the United States, without any foreign nexus.
SEN. COLLINS: Thank you.
And let me just conclude by thanking you all for your extraordinary service. Thank you.
SEN. LIEBERMAN: Thank you, Senator Collins. Those are important answers.
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