A Hearing of the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education of the Senate Appropriations Committee
Interview
A HEARING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION OF THE SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE UTAH MINE DISASTER AND PREVENTING FUTURE TRAGEDIES
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
SEN. ORRIN G. HATCH (R-UT): Well, thanks you, Mr. Chairman. It's so nice of you to do that. I hadn't planned on making any opening statements, but both Senator Bennett and I are very pleased that you and Senator Specter have invited us to participate in this hearing today because we're very concerned.
Let me just, if I can, take a few moments -- just congratulate those who have tried to save these miners and express my heartfelt gratitude to the three brave rescuers who gave their lives in an attempt to rescue the six trapped miners in the Crandall Canyon Mine. I am honored to serve the people of Utah, as is Senator Bennett, who are among the most selfless individuals in the country. Mr. Brandon Kimber, Mr. Dale Black and Mr. Gary Jenson, the three rescuers that bravely gave the ultimate sacrifice in an attempt to free the six trapped colleagues who are all examples of the best Utah has to offer. And out thoughts and prayers continue to be with their families at this difficult time, as well as with the families of the six miners who were lost in the tragedy and others who have been injured. On behalf of all of our fellow Utahans, I'd like to say thank you to the thousands of people who have expressed kind words, thoughts and prayers on behalf of these affected by the accident.
And I also would like to extend some praise to the officials who responded so aptly to the crisis immediately following the mine collapse. Like only Utahans can do, we came together as a community to respond as one. Leaving aside title and agency designations, we had federal, state and local officials working seamlessly together to do all they could to rescue the six trapped miners. Personally, I'd like to publicly thank Mr. Richard Stickler, who joins us today, for traveling to Utah almost immediately after the collapse and remaining at the mine site for most of the days that this went on. Utah's able governor Jon Huntsman was there every day, and his dedicated team of professionals -- they deserve special recognition for their immediate response to the mine collapse. And I'd also like to thank the mayor of Huntington, Mayor Hilary Gordon, as well of the mayor of Price, Joe Piccolo and the hard work of Sheriff Lamar Guymon and his team of law enforcement officials who continue to secure the mine site. And these are people that are heroes in my eyes. And Mr. Stickler, I was there with you a number of times and I can say is that what I saw from you was as much caring and consideration as I've ever seen in any of these situations. So I want to personally express my gratitude to you again.
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
SEN. HATCH: Well thank you. Mr. Stickler, if I recall this correctly, between 1992-- there were seismic events around there. But between 1992 and this tragedy there were a limited number of bumps with some small injuries, but there were not any major injuries. Am I correct on that?
MR. STICKLER: That is correct --
SEN. HATCH: If I recall correctly, really about eight months -- any bumps in the mine itself.
MR. STICKLER: The majority of those that resulted in injury occurred on long wall mining section.
SEN. HATCH: And this was not a long wall.
MR. STICKLER: Right, correct.
SEN. HATCH: I see. Now I know that you and your team responded quite quickly to the events regarding the Crandall Canyon Mine. Can you please just run through the major events that you oversaw upon arriving in Utah?
MR. STICKLER: Well, like you said, I believe MSHA did respond very quickly. Within two hours of when we received the call we had a mine inspector on site. Prior to the mine inspector arriving at the mine site, he verbally issued a K order, which ensures the safety of the people at the operation and puts control on the activities of the mine operator to ensure that MSHA approve any activity the mine operator takes after that K order has been put in place. It is about 45 minutes from the Price field office to the mine, so when you take that into consideration, the response, I think, was very timely from MSHA.
Also, the mine rescue teams arrived there very quickly. The first two teams were from Murray Energy and also the neighboring mine, Deer Creek Mine, which was and adjoining mining operation responded and the first two teams went underground at a little after six o'clock in the morning. So I do not have the time they arrived on the mine site, but I am sure they were briefed and I think that response was also very timely.
But when I arrived at the mine, the first thing I did was meet with MSHA's folks that had been on the ground; our district manager -- his office is in Denver -- it took him approximately six or seven hours to arrive at the mine. So they provided me a briefing of everything they knew about the situation. I arrived at same time as our administrator that is in charge of coal mine safety and health, Kevin Strickland.
So we jointly reviewed what everyone knew about the situation. We looked at what was going on at the operation, the plans for the rescue effort. The mine operator had already made arrangements to drill the first hole on the surface. That hole was started one day after the accident occurred.
There were no roads within eight thousand feet of the surface area where the drilling had to take place, so the mine operator arranged for a helicopter to bring the first drill unit in and it started drilling on the seventh, the day after the accident. That was a small diameter hole. We could guide that hole -- the driller could not guide that hole, and we were lucky that it drilled into an open entry because it drifted eighty-seven feet from where it was intended to drill into the mine.
The second hole was started the following day, on the eighth. It was within about 130 feet of the first hole, but it was eight and five-eighths inch in diameter would provide enough space that we could drop a camera into the mine and get pictures of the underground operation. But the drilling process on the surface was conducted in a manner that I think was expedient considering what had to be done to get started. The second hole could not be started until an 8,000 foot road was built, and in the Rocky Mountains, that is quite a challenge to carve out a road for 8,000 feet to get a large drill rig in.
But the holes that were drilled, primarily we followed a priority basis. The first two holes were located in this area outlined here; that is where we thought the miners were working. There was an electrician in this section just a couple of hours before the event, and he had traveled out of the mine. He was able to give people on the ground there information, and his indication was that the miners were working at cross-cut 139.
The belt tail where the coal was dumped to transport it out of the mine was located at cross-cut 138, so that generally would be where the miners' normal activity would be located. And the first whole went in at cross-cut 138; the second hole went in at 137. When we got the air analysis of seven and a half percent oxygen that was certainly a blow to everybody's hope, because at that level of oxygen would not sustain life.
So the planning process was to determine, well, what area could we look, perhaps the miners could have survived. And whenever the bump occurred, we believed it reached this barrier between the sealed area to the north and the active section, and the oxygen in that area was less than one percent. And that air was blown into the active section.
It traveled out of the mine and dislodged the ventilation walls for several thousand feet out the cross-cut 95.
But when we looked at this area of the mine, there was a solid barrier of coal, and the belief was that fresh air would have been trapped in this area. So the third hole was drilled here, and it did, in fact verify, that we had 16 percent oxygen, which would support life. Again we dropped cameras in; there was no indication of life.
We drilled the fourth hole in that same entry since we had a good air in there, good oxygen. Well, I shouldn't say good, we had minimal oxygen, at least enough to support life. But the miners may have barricaded themselves in this area, and therefore the fourth hole was drilled at cross-cut 142, and Number Four Entry. Again, we did not find any signs of life, but either the microphone, the seismic equipment, or the cameras that were dropped in.
Then hole number five was drilled in Number One Entry, because there was some discussion with the families that the miners would have tried to escape out the intake escape way, which was located at Number One Entry. And that hole drilled into mostly rubble, there was just a few inches of clearance on top of the coal rubble. So there was not any likelihood that anyone would have survived in that area.
The sixth hole was drilled where the continuous mining machine was believed to be located. Again, that hole just verified what we already knew. There was rubble almost all the way to the roof.
Meeting with the families, they -- they felt pretty strong that they would like to see a hole drilled at what's called the "kitchen." It's like a picnic table where the miners eat their lunch. So a hole was put in at number three entry, crosscut 137 1/2, in the kitchen area where the miners would have left their dinner buckets, and their extra SCSRs -- self-contained breathing apparatuses would have been located there. None of that was visible because the entry was mostly filled with -- with rubble. There was only space of a couple feet from the roof.
But that's a general review of the -- the drilling activity. This map also shows the advance that was conducted in number one entry from crosscut 120 up to crosscut 127; over 900 feet was rehabilitated. The heavy ground support was installed in that area. It shows the seal that was breached just hours after the initial accident. Rescue -- mine rescue teams under apparatus believed that they could breach this seal and find a route through these entries to get down closer to where the miners were located but, again, conditions would not allow them to proceed in -- in that area.
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
SEN. HATCH: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's so nice of you to allow us to add here.
Let me just say that I've appreciated the testimony of all three of you.
Mr. Roberts, particularly your testimony.
All I can say is that I may be wrong on this, but my understanding is almost half of the bumps our bounces that have occurred throughout the country have occurred in Utah. So it's something we're not unfamiliar with, something that has happened, and yet we've had some of the very, very effective both union and non- union mines in Utah. You know, it's always easier after the fact to come in and find fault. On the other hand, we appreciate your testimony, because we've got to protect these miners the best we possibly can.
And maybe I could just ask Mr. Watzman -- this recent mining act, how have the major mining companies implemented that act since we passed it?
MR. WATZMAN: Well, Senator, I think all of the companies have worked aggressively to implement it. And as I noted earlier, I will submit for the record a chart that reflects only the member companies of the National Mining Association. We conducted a survey of them to see what they have done since February 2006.
SEN. HATCH: Do you feel you're in compliance with the act throughout the country?
MR. WATZMAN: Yes, even pre-dating the act. And you know, 125,000 new self-contained, self-rescuers have been introduced into the mines. But we still have a backorder of 100,000 of them. Communication technology is being introduced into the mines. But today, there's only a leaker feeder system approved by MSHA.
The approval process takes some time to get systems to the approval stage. So the technology has not advanced quick enough for any of us. None of us are satisfied with that to allow further enhancements and further compliance with the act. But in those areas where companies have been able to -- mine rescue teams, SCSRs, breathable air provisions for 96 hours of breathable air -- all of those are being met by the industry to the degree that there is technology available that allows us to meet it.
SEN. HATCH: Okay. Mr. Roberts, do you agree with that?
MR. ROBERTS: I think that the MINER Act from last year, in my testimony I point out where there's been some problems with implementing the full act itself. I think Mr. Watzman is correct. There's a backorder on the oxygen. There was an August of last year, 2006, mandate to get the emergency evacuation plans in place that was not met. It was extended. I think there was both a good reason and a bad reason for that. I think most of the companies got a plan in, and MSHA rejected many of those plans and forced them to go back and reevaluate those. We still --
SEN. HATCH: Was that good or bad that MSHA --
MR. ROBERTS: I think it's good that they were forced to go back and come forward with a plan that protected the miners.
SEN. HATCH: So you felt MSHA actually did its job in that instance?
MR. ROBERTS: I think that we have indicated it publicly from time to time where we think that MSHA's done its job. And we've been credible when we think they haven't. The 96 hours of oxygen, we publicly stated that that was the correct thing to do. The position that MSHA has taken on the seals, we publicly said that was the correct thing to do. When they haven't done what we think they should do, we've been critical.
And we think that's a role we should play.
SEN. HATCH: Well, that's the role you should play.
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
SEN. HATCH: Over the last year, since the passage of the act, how would you characterize MSHA's enforcement activity? Has it been more, less, whatever?
MR. WATZMAN: I think, Senator, our members would say that their enforcement has been vigorous.
SEN. HATCH: What does that mean?
MR. WATZMAN: Their inspection --
SEN. HATCH: Double the --
MR. WATZMAN: Their presence at the mine sites is more robust. There are more citations being issued. There is more inspector presence at the mines than there was prior to the MINER Act. But that is a trend that has been continuing over the last several years. It didn't occur just following the tragic events of Sago and Darby and Alma. That was something that had started before that, and we're seeing a continuation of that now.
SEN. HATCH: Compared to before the act was passed, could you give a percentage? Is it 25 percent more strict, double, whatever?
MR. WATZMAN: I think, Senator, and I may be off by a little bit here, not in terms of the number of inspections, but I think the inspection actions, meaning the citations and orders that are being issued, is up, I believe, 10 percent or 12 percent if memory serves me correct. So they have a bigger presence at the mines.
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Source