WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2007--MOTION TO PROCEED -- (Senate - May 10, 2007)
Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. President, I salute the Senator from Colorado for his leadership, initiative, and patriotism, and the way he is approaching the foremost issue facing our country: Where do we go from here in Iraq?
There is too much partisan game playing on the issue of Iraq. We owe it to our country and our troops to find a bipartisan consensus to support where we go from here. We need a political solution in Washington, DC, as much as we need one in Baghdad. We need to get out of the combat business in Iraq and into the support, training, and equipment business as soon as we honorably can.
That is why Senator Salazar and I have drafted legislation to implement the recommendations of the bipartisan Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group.
As the Senator said, we will introduce our legislation after Congress and the President have worked out the Iraq supplemental appropriations bill. We invite our colleagues--both Democrats and Republicans--to join us. We believe the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group offer the best opportunity for a bipartisan consensus on a new course in Iraq.
In fact, these recommendations seem to already be guiding the President's efforts and the efforts of those on the other side who were calling for change.
For example, the administration has begun to act on these recommendations by increasing the number of troops embedded with Iraqi forces, using milestones to help chart progress, and by meeting with Iraq's neighbors, including Iran and Syria. The President's national security adviser has pointed to the Baker-Hamilton report as authority for the surge of troops in Baghdad.
Just last week, the President himself told the Associated General Contractors of America at their convention that he liked what Baker and Hamilton had to say. ``It is something we should seriously consider. Their idea was that, at some point in time, it makes sense to have a U.S. presence configured this way,'' the President said. ``It is an interesting idea.''
At the same time, Democratic proposals in Congress have also been guided by the ISG report, for example, working on milestones for improvement in Iraq, limiting the role of the United States to one of training, equipping, and counterterrorism operations, and stating as a goal a drawdown of combat forces by March of next year.
In short, the seeds of bipartisan consensus about how the United States should go forward in Iraq are best found in the Iraq Study Group report.
Former Secretary of State Jim Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton prefaced their report by saying this:
Success depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political polarization. Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate within a democracy. Yet, U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure--as is any course of action in Iraq--if not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus.
Yesterday and today, I talked with Secretary Baker and Congressman Hamilton. Each said the Salazar-Alexander legislation accurately reflects the recommendations of their report.
I have learned that sometimes a Senator has to say something two or three or more times on the Senate floor before anybody pays much attention.
For example, on March 14, I said that it was time for the President to take the Iraq Study Group report down off the shelf and use it for something other than a bookend.
I ask unanimous consent to have my statement of that date printed in the Record at the end of my remarks.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See Exhibit 1.)
Mr. ALEXANDER. Today, I am making that same suggestion again, and I am going one step further. The Senator from Colorado and I are offering to our colleagues on both sides of the aisle--and to our country--a way to go forward on a bipartisan basis.
I was surprised and disappointed that the President didn't take advantage of this opportunity during his State of the Union Address in January. He knew then that a majority of Americans didn't support his strategy. Fewer do today. He knew then his strategy cannot be long sustained without that support. That is still true today.
The President could have invited the distinguished members of the Iraq Study Group to sit in the gallery during his speech and, as Presidents often do, introduced them, 10 of America's most distinguished citizens from the Reagan, Carter, and George H.W. Bush administrations, and the U.S. Supreme Court. One of these is now the Secretary of Defense. They are ideologically and politically diverse. They spent nine months, met nine times, went to Baghdad, interviewed 171 individuals, and made 79 recommendations. They are all in this book. They didn't shy away from the unpleasant facts.
They told us 79 percent of Iraqis have a mostly negative view of U.S. involvement in their country. Then they said 2,900 American lives were lost, and another 21,000 wounded; $400 billion was spent, with estimates as high as $2 trillion for the final cost. They said this is not a perfect option, but it is the best option.
The President could have said in January: This isn't my recommendation, it is theirs, and I accept it for the good of our country, and I ask the American people to accept it.
That is not Presidential weakness, that is Presidential leadership. The President's job is not only to see urgent issues and lay out a strategy. It is the rest of his job--at least for a sustained military strategy--to persuade half of the people he is right. It is not too late.
The President has the option before him today, and we are trying to make it easier for him. What we are respectfully saying in our legislation is, if the President should choose to develop a way forward based upon the Iraq Study Group's recommendations, we will support that plan and we will encourage our colleagues and our country to do so on a bipartisan basis, so that Iraq, the Middle East, our troops, and the world will know that in the United States we are unified in our purpose.
Such a plan will not satisfy everybody. It will not pull out our troops tomorrow. It will not get us out of the combat business immediately. It won't add 100,000 or 200,000, or 300,000 troops for ``victory'' in Iraq. It will get us out of the combat business in Iraq and into the support, training, and equipping business, in a prompt and honorable way. It will reduce the number of forces in Iraq. Because there will still be a significant but limited military presence in Iraq, it will signal to the rest of the Middle East to stay out of Iraq. It will give support to General Petraeus and his troops, who are in the midst of a surge. It will expand diplomatic efforts to build support for Iraq national reconciliation and sovereignty. It will recognize, as Prime Minister Blair said, it is time for the next chapter of Iraq's history to be written largely by the Iraqis themselves.
As a Republican Senator, my message with respect to the President is that I hope he and the White House seriously consider this.
We are not introducing this bill today. It will be introduced in 2 or 3 weeks. Then, we hope other Senators will support it. I hope the President will embrace it. There is plenty within this report that gives him the opportunity to continue our mission in Iraq. The difference is that this is not the President's report, and that is its advantage. It has a better chance of success, in terms of developing bipartisan support here and in our country.
Finally, there are some issues that are simply too big for one party to solve. Iraq is, as the Senator from Colorado has said, the foremost among these.
Here we are, the oldest democracy, lecturing Baghdad, an infant democracy, for not coming up with a political solution, when we ourselves cannot come up with one.
Until we do come up with one, we should spend less time lecturing Baghdad and more time working together to fashion a way forward on the foremost issue facing our country.
Coming together in support of the plan based upon the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group offers that best opportunity. We invite our colleagues to join us.
Exhibit 1
President Bush Should Take the Iraq Study Group Report Down Off the Shelf
My purpose today is to say that it is time for President Bush to take the Iraq Study Group report down off the shelf and use it for something other than a bookend.
There is a reason why we don't have 535 commanders-in-chief or 100 commanding generals each saying charge down this street or over that hill.
The founders of our country made the President Commander-in-Chief and gave to Congress the power to declare war and to pay for it.
That is why I will vote against any of the resolutions that seek to micromanage this war. Once a war is authorized, as this one was by a bi-partisan vote of 77-23 in 2002, it is the president's job to manage the war.
As an example of why we don't need 535 Members of Congress micromanaging this war, consider this: since last January, the new Democratic majority has offered 17 different bills and resolutions outlining what to do in Iraq. Undoubtedly there will be more in the coming weeks.
And I am not about to cut off funds for General Petraeus' troops in the middle of the current military exercise, which congress clearly does have the power to do but should not do.
I do have the responsibility as a United States Senator, to say what I believe is the right way forward for our country in Iraq, and my belief is this: the President would be wise to take down off the shelf the recommendations of the bipartisan Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group, to develop a strategy based upon those recommendations, and to ask Americans to accept that strategy as the way forward in Iraq.
The President would have been wise to do this in January during his State of the Union address. The country was then looking for a new way forward in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group, after nine months of careful, bipartisan work, offered such a plan.
Instead, the day after the report was announced in December, some who wanted another 100,000 or 200,000 troops to ``win the war'' said the report was a ``recipe for defeat.''
On the other side, those who wanted the U.S. out of Iraq immediately dismissed the report as more of the same.
So the report was put on the shelf. Not much was heard about it.
That is, until lately.
Lately, the President's national security adviser has cited the Baker-Hamilton report as authority for the surge of troops in Baghdad which, in fact, on page 73, the report did say might be necessary.
Over the weekend, the United States participated in meetings with Syria and Iran, perhaps the most controversial recommendation in the report.
Now, the timetable and strategy for reducing U.S. combat strength in Iraq contained in the newest Democratic senate resolution sounds very much like the Iraq Study Group report, calling for combat troops to be largely withdrawn from Iraq by March of next year. But the Iraq Study Group specifically opposed setting timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, noting that its recommendation should be ``subject to unexpected developments on the ground.''
At the same time, like one of the Republican-sponsored resolutions, the Iraq Study Group recommended that the U.S. work closely with Iraq's leaders to support the achievement of specific ``milestones'' on national reconciliation, security, and governance.
In short, if there is any bipartisan consensus emerging about how the United States should go forward in Iraq, the best blueprint of that consensus can be found in the Iraq Study Group report.
The membership and process of the Iraq Study Group is as important as the substance of what it said. It included 10 of America's most distinguished citizens from the Reagan and Carter and George H.W. Bush administrations, from the Congress and from the Supreme Court. One of its former members is now the Secretary of Defense. On its face, it was ideologically as well as politically diverse. The group spent nine months, met nine times, including a trip to Baghdad, and interviewed 171 individuals in the U.S. and in Iraq. Its report is comprehensive, with 79 specific recommendations.
Its assessment of the ``dire'' current conditions in Iraq is honest and sobering. It did not shy away from reporting unpleasant facts--that 79 percent of Iraqis have a mostly negative view of the influence that the United States has in their country, that 2,900 (at that time) Americans had lost their lives and another 21,000 wounded, that we have spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq war and that estimates run as high as $2 trillion for the final cost. The group acknowledged that its recommendations were not perfect options but seemed to be the best options.
As much as America needs a new strategy in Iraq, we also need a consensus in support of that strategy. To put it bluntly, a majority of the American people do not now have confidence in the President's course in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group offered the President an opportunity to say, ``Okay, here is a different approach suggested by a bipartisan group of distinguished Americans. It is not my strategy. It is theirs. I accept it and, for the good of our country and the armed forces fighting for us, I ask you to accept it.''
Such a statement would not exhibit presidential weakness. This would be presidential leadership--recognizing that the president's job is not only to choose the right strategy but to successfully persuade at least half the people he is right.
The president still has this option before him.
He would be wise to exercise it today--this week. Come back to Congress. Report on the last few weeks' progress in Iraq. Invite the Iraq Study Group members to sit in the gallery. Compliment their work. Accept their recommendations. Ask the Congress and the country also to accept their recommendations.
This course will not satisfy those who want 100,000 more troops for victory in Iraq.
Neither will it satisfy those who want all troops out on a specific timetable.
But it will get U.S. troops quickly out of the combat business in Iraq, and into the support business.
It will reduce the number of American forces in Iraq over the next year.
It will leave American special forces in Iraq to go after al Qaeda and troops to help guard the borders.
Because there will still be a limited U.S. military presence, it will send a signal to the rest of the Middle East to stay out of Iraq.
It will give support to General Petraeus and his troops who are in the midst of a surge to make Baghdad safer.
It will expand diplomatic efforts to build support for Iraqi national reconciliation and sovereignty, including with Iraq's neighbors.
And it will begin to recognize that America has done most of what it can do to help Iraq. As Prime Minister Blair has said, it is time for the next chapters in Iraq's history to be written by the Iraqis themselves.
Finally, this course will recognize that while the United States can and should be a shining example of democracy and does have the mightiest military force in the world, that a conservative view of human nature and our own national interest places limits on what we can do to make it possible for others to adopt our democracy and our way of life.