Rep. Berman Delivers Speech at the Arms Control Association on "Strengthening U.S. Nonproliferation Policy"

Rep. Berman Delivers Speech at the Arms Control Association on "Strengthening U.S. Nonproliferation Policy"

Today Rep. Howard L. Berman delivered a speech at the Arms Control Association entitled, "Strengthening U.S. Nonproliferation Policy." The text of the speech is below.

Thank you very much for inviting me to be here today, and for the kind introduction.

I have great respect for the Arms Control Association, and had an opportunity recently to use Daryl's expertise extensively in dealing with the India nuclear cooperation legislation.

You played an important role in educating me, other members and staff on some very complex issues.

While the legislation didn't end up exactly the way you wanted (my guess is that you really didn't want it), your efforts helped make a bad bill better.

Unlike the Administration's initial proposal to implement the deal, the version enacted into law requires Congress to approve the final nuclear cooperation agreement with India by an affirmative majority vote.

Before that vote takes place, the NSG must approve an exemption for India, and India and the IAEA must complete a safeguards agreement.

The bill also includes language that prevents the President from waiving key portions of the Atomic Energy Act, and includes a provision that terminates nuclear cooperation if India transfers nuclear or missile technology in violation of NSG or MTCR guidelines.

Finally, we got 184 votes for my floor amendment to condition exports of nuclear fuel on India's willingness to halt production of fissile material - that's many more than anyone expected.

Based on my observations of the Administration's negotiating strategy with the Indian government, we might consider negotiations as an additional outsourcing opportunity - or maybe that's what we did.

As a result of this deal, India will be able to increase the size of its nuclear arsenal, since it will no longer be forced to use its scarce domestic uranium reserves to generate electricity.

And in response, China may push to cut a similar deal with Pakistan, which could further destabilize South Asia.

But those are only two of many nonproliferation challenges we face today, some of them much more urgent.

North Korea has launched nuclear-capable missiles, withdrawn from the NPT, and conducted a nuclear test - and some believe they may test again soon.

Iran continues to enrich uranium in defiance of the international community, and if it continues on its current course, could have the capability to build a bomb in just a few short years.

Deeply concerned about the prospect of Iran becoming a nuclear power, other countries in the volatile Middle East - including Turkey, Egypt and the Gulf States - have expressed interest in nuclear technology.

A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market opened up whole new dimension of nuclear proliferation.

And, most troubling of all, the same terrorists that attacked us on 9/11 are dedicated to acquiring WMD - and unlike a state, can't be deterred.

Many people that have been dealing with these issues for a long time warn that the nonproliferation regime is teetering on the brink.

Jessica Matthews at Carnegie recently remarked that "the nonproliferation regime that has served us extremely well for years is today on the verge of collapse."

And the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists just announced that they're moving the hands of their "doomsday clock" two minutes closer to midnight

But for me, the stunning development was the recent statement by Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, George Schultz, and Sam Nunn in the Wall Street Journal arguing for a totally new paradigm.

They urge us to transform our entire way of thinking about nuclear weapons.

They call for a rekindling of the vision of Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik.

Nuclear weapons today present tremendous dangers, but also an historic opportunity. U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage -- to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world.

Nuclear weapons were essential to maintaining international security during the Cold War because they were a means of deterrence. The end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete. Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective.

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Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be -- and would be perceived as -- a bold initiative consistent with America's moral heritage. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.

We endorse setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal.

More astounding than what they said is who said it.

Kissinger - I remember as a college student assuming that Dr. Strangeglove was some composite of Henry Kissinger and Herman Kahn.

George Schultz - I still have an image - perhaps apocryphal - of he and Reagan's other advisors grabbing Reagan by the shoulder as he left that room in Reykjavik, exclaiming - "You've agreed to what? Go back in there and tell Gorbachev your fingers were crossed."

And as I recall it Sam Nunn was in the 1980's closer to "build up to build down" than nuclear freeze.
Everything we do on nonproliferation will be more effective if we fundamentally change our perspective.

If we continue on our current course, we may be able to delay the complete erosion of the nonproliferation regime.

But unless we come to grips with this new paradigm, I think our efforts will ultimately fail.

In that context, there are some critical things we should do to shore up the global nonproliferation system.

First, we must dedicate ourselves to the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, as we are obliged to do under Article 6 of the NPT.

While achieving this goal is not feasible in the short run, there's no reason why we can't start moving in that direction right away.

Under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), concluded with Russia in 2002, the number of our deployed strategic warheads will drop from around 10,000 in 1990 to less than 2,200 by 2012 - a reduction of 80%.

But it's clear we can live with even fewer weapons as we pursue our goal.

An Arms Control Association report from April 2005 recommends that 500 operationally deployed weapons and 500 more in ready reserve is enough.

Within the next couple of years, we need to start thinking seriously about extending the verification mechanism for SORT, which is currently set to expire in 2009 along with the START Treaty.

That could be an excellent opportunity to focus on further reductions.

Second, the U.S. should take a leadership role on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

As you know, the Senate rejected the CTBT in 1989. But since that time, I think we've become much more confident in the ability of our scientific establishment to maintain the safety and reliability of what will remain of our nuclear stockpile.

With Democrats back in control of the Senate - though by a very small margin - we should diligently pursue the political feasibility of reconsidering the treaty.

With folks like Kissinger and Schultz on our side, perhaps the Bush Administration will add this issue to the list of mistakes they are willing to remedy.

The CTBT can't enter into force until it is signed and ratified by 44 specific countries, including India and Pakistan.

Strong U.S. support for the treaty and the ultimate goal may persuade those countries to get on board, but if it doesn't, we might want to consider the possibility of working with the P-5 and other like-minded states to propose a new test ban treaty that doesn't have such rigid requirements.

Third, the U.S. should lead a major push for the negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT).

Since the U.S., Russia, Britain and France have stopped production of fissile material as a mater of policy - and China is also believed to have ceased production - this one should be a no-brainer.

As you know, the Bush Administration tabled a draft FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) last May.

This draft was criticized by many for not including any verification mechanism, but on balance, I think it's a step in the right direction.

I was interested to read Steve Rademaker's piece in the December edition of Arms Control Today that touches on this issue.

Citing the conclusions of the congressionally-mandated Gingrich-Mitchell Task Force on the United Nations, he makes a pretty persuasive case that the CD has become largely dysfunctional.

The FMCT has been held up for almost a decade by certain members of that Geneva-based body that seek to force negotiations on other proposals, like the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), which has been opposed by successive American administrations.

Rademaker argues that the real motivation underlying these efforts to block the FMCT is not a sincere desire to achieve a so-called "balanced program of work," but a desire to essentially "kill" the FMCT.

Whether or not you think PAROS is a good idea, one has to agree that it takes some chutzpah on the part of certain countries to criticize the U.S. for not working to eliminate nuclear weapons, and at the same time preventing consideration of a treaty that would end the production of fissile material.

To get around this stalemate in the CD, it might make sense to take the same approach I suggested for the CTBT - assemble a "coalition of the willing" outside the confines of the CD, negotiate an FMCT, and then open it up for the world to sign.

If all the members of the P-5 were involved in such an effort, then it could gain some sort of endorsement from the Security Council, giving it added international legitimacy.

Would this approach work? I don't know, but it might be worth trying.

Fourth, we should abandon, once and for all, the Bush Administration's effort to design "new" nuclear weapons, including the so-called Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or "bunker-buster."

At a time when we're trying to convince other nations to abandon their bomb-making activities, these efforts to make nuclear weapons more "useable" strike many as the height of hypocrisy.

We should be doing exactly the opposite - trying to devalue the currency of nuclear weapons, and making the argument that their use under any circumstances has become unthinkable.

Fifth, the U.S should be more aggressive in pushing for the creation of an international fuel bank.

There are a variety of proposals on the table for the creation of such a bank, all of which would provide a guaranteed source of civilian nuclear fuel for countries willing to forgo the acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing technology.

This concept has been criticized by some as yet another effort to create nuclear "haves" and "have-nots," but I think it could quickly win broad acceptance if it were implemented in a neutral fashion, perhaps under the auspices of the IAEA.

This could be a very good way for the U.S. to demonstrate that we are not seeking to limit the ability of countries - even Iran - from enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology.

A few months ago, I would have mentioned the Additional Protocol as a sixth area for the U.S. to demonstrate leadership, but thanks to the efforts of Senator Lugar, the implementing legislation was passed as part of the India nuclear bill - albeit in imperfect form - and that process is moving forward.

Finally, in the context of these major nonproliferation initiatives, I'd like to commend Daryl and others at the Arms Control Association for their work on H. Con. Res. 133, the Non-Proliferation Treaty Enhancement Act of 2005, which was introduced by Rep. Spratt.

This resolution, which I cosponsored along with 41 of my colleagues, reaffirmed the critical importance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime, and urged support for the CTBT and an FMCT.

I look forward to working with you on an updated version of this legislation in this new congress.

Having focused on some major policy initiatives that could help restore U.S. leadership on nonproliferation policy, let me now turn to some specific programs and policies - and steps we might take to make them more effective.

As one of the first acts of the 110th Congress, the House passed H.R. 1, legislation to implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

This bill includes a number of important nonproliferation provisions, one of which is intended to strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

As all of you know, the PSI is the Bush Administration's signature effort to combat proliferation through the interdiction of WMD.

The PSI is a useful innovation, but with no underlying treaty, secretariat, or formal obligations for participating governments, it's now running up against the limits of its effectiveness.

So in H.R. 1, we urge the President to establish a defined annual budget for the PSI, clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Departments of State and Defense, and increase PSI cooperation with non-NATO countries.

We also recommend that he seek a Security Council resolution to authorize the PSI under international law, and expand and formalize the PSI "into a multilateral regime to increase coordination, cooperation, and compliance among its participating states in interdiction activities."

H.R. 1 also creates a United States Coordinator for the Prevention of WMD and Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President.

This is a great idea that's been kicking around for far too long.

Some of us weren't completely satisfied with the way the House provision turned out because it doesn't give the Coordinator any budget or personnel authority, like that provided to the Director of National Intelligence.

Hopefully we can beef up this language in conference with the Senate.

Yet another provision in the 9/11 bill removes some of the legal restrictions placed on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program.

If enacted, the President will no longer have to make a series of certifications before CTR funds are spent.

Of course we want Russia to comply with all relevant arms control agreements, make a substantial investment of its own resources to dismantle weapons, and observe internationally recognized human rights.

But our highest priority must be to keep nuclear materials and other WMD out of the hands of terrorists - and the CTR program is critical to those efforts.

According the Nuclear Threat Initiative's latest issue of Securing the Bomb, 2005 was a relatively productive year in terms of securing nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union.

But 15 years after the inception of CTR, much more remains to be done.

According to that same report, only 54% of former Soviet buildings with nuclear materials and 40% of sites containing Russian nuclear warheads have received security upgrades, only 40% of key border posts in the post-Soviet space are equipped to detect nuclear smuggling, and only 35% of former Soviet weapons scientists and workers have sustainable civilian employment.

Hopefully, the CTR provision in H.R. 1 will help accelerate this vital work.

Finally, the 9/11 bill includes the Nuclear Black Market Elimination Act.

In the interests of time, I won't get into the details of this proposal, but suffice it to say that it could help prevent the emergence of another underground nuclear network like the one created by A.Q. Khan.

To conclude, it's easy to get caught up in the minutia of the many nonproliferation challenges we face today.

But as Nunn, Kissinger, Perry and Schultz argue so persuasively, we've got to focus on changing our fundamental assumptions.

None of the major nonproliferation initiatives that I suggested we pursue are in lieu of diligently working to stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, or preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons.

On the contrary, they just might make those efforts more effective.

And even if they don't, there's nothing to be lost by trying.

http://www.house.gov/list/press/ca28_berman/nonprolifspeech.html