Legislative Transparency And Accountability Act of 2007

LEGISLATIVE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2007 -- (Senate - January 10, 2007)

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Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. President, having recently returned from another visit to Iraq serving as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I come to the floor this afternoon to express my views on the most pressing issue facing our country today: our path to success in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group recently stated the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. When the current path isn't working, you have to be flexible. You have to shift. You have to make a change. And, clearly, in Iraq today we have to make a change. The President of the United States, on Friday, said the same thing.

In December I met with Iraqi political leaders, U.S. troops and their leaders, as well as our diplomats on the ground. Our conversations with this broad range of individuals helped me draw various conclusions that are key to evaluating the proposals currently being debated. In light of the President's upcoming announcement of his strategy for Iraq, I think it is important to share these conclusions.

It is easy to lose sight of the fact that we are in Iraq as part of a Global War on Terror. There is no question that Iraq has become the key battleground of this war. Failure cannot be an option in either the overall war on terror or in Iraq. As the President has correctly stated, this is the battle of this generation. With menacing regimes in Iran and Syria, we cannot dismiss the fact that a failed state in Iraq would lead to much more than chaos and collapse in that nation. It would destabilize a critical region of the world and, most alarmingly, would create a breeding ground for terrorists whose ambitions do not stop at Iraq's borders. Americans--all Americans--have a direct stake in winning this war.

We know the United States will be involved in the war on terror for the foreseeable future. The question is, How do we move forward in Iraq? How do we fight this war? And, where do we put our troops?

From my experience in Iraq, I know now, or at least I believe, that we are fighting it essentially on two fronts. The first is the war we intended to fight: a war against terrorists, primarily Sunni extremists and foreign jihadists linked to al-Qaida--foreign terrorists. The other war is a war between the Iraqis themselves: Shiite against Sunni, in a seemingly endless cycle of grisly violence. Our military must continue the battle against extremists and terrorists, but we have no business being caught in the crossfires of an Iraqi sectarian conflict.

The good news is we have had great success in fighting the war on terror, imposing crippling losses on the international jihadist network which today operates in Iraq. Indeed, during my visit in December with marines from Minnesota stationed in Anbar, they reported they were making great headway against the insurgency there. I am proud of their accomplishments, and I firmly believe these military victories directly enhance our security at home. But to secure the ground that these marines have cleared of insurgents in places such as Fallujah, they need Sunni police officers. They need Sunni members of the Iraqi Army. They need reconciliation between Sunni and Shia. So as we continue to fight the first war, the war against terrorists, we need also to address the second war, that of Iraqi against Iraqi.

The overall consensus I found in Iraq is that we will be unable to hold on to the ground we have gained on the first front without addressing the second front: Iraqi sectarian violence. This violence is spiraling rapidly and is undermining the success we have made against the terrorists. If the Iraqi security forces, both Army and police, are to someday soon take over the fighting of the insurgency from U.S. troops, it is clear that intergroup violence must be brought under control. The Iraqi security forces must include all Iraqis: Sunni, Shiite, Kurd, and others. To be certain, our efforts cannot succeed if sectarian hatred is not addressed at the highest level of the Iraqi Government immediately.

The only long-term solution for bringing stability to Iraq must be centered on national reconciliation. It is true that after decades of Sunni violence led by Saddam Hussein and his regime, the Shiites still have unaddressed grievances. But this does not call for, nor permit, neighborhood-by-neighborhood ethnic cleansing, nor a refusal to work together for the future of all Iraqis. Shiites may be able to win short-term victories through the use of violence, but in the long term they will not have a unified country if they continue to do so. Iraqi leaders should focus on reining in all sectarian groups under the umbrella of a national and inclusive political process. This is a solution that can only be led by the Iraqis themselves.

With no doubt, this sectarian violence was left to grow unchecked for far too long. Even so, it is not too late to get Iraq back to stable footing. But it will come from dialogue and political compromise enforced by a central government prepared to take on militias under the control of religious sects, clans, and even common criminals. We must get to the point where Iraqi citizens express their views through political channels instead of through violence. The Iraqis are the masters of their own destiny, and it is important that our strategy regard them as such.

Since my trip to Iraq in December, I have been calling for the Iraqi Government to establish a series of benchmarks that will diffuse the sectarian violence and stabilize the country politically and economically. These benchmarks would include an oil revenue-sharing agreement and economic assistance to areas that have been neglected in the past. The reality is not putting resources in Anbar Province because it is Sunni, and so as a result, what you get is a feeding of insurgency by the actions of a government that has not been prepared to address the issue of sectarian violence. We will be a better supporter of the Iraqi Government if we pressure them to create and adhere to these benchmarks rather than assuming that this fractured Government will take this on by themselves. I fear that up to this point the Iraqi leadership has not stepped up to the plate to make the difficult decisions that are necessary to pave the road for a political solution.

When I was in Iraq with Senator Bill Nelson from Florida, we met with the Iraqi National Security Adviser to Maliki, Dr. Rubaie, who contended that sectarian violence wasn't the main problem, but the problem was the foreign terrorists and was the Sunni insurgency. That is not the case. As a Senator responsible for looking after the best interests of my constituents and all Americans, I take seriously the responsibility of Iraqi political leaders to honor the sacrifices that are being made by American soldiers. I refuse to put more American lives on the line in Baghdad without being assured that the Iraqis themselves are willing to do what they need to do to end the violence of Iraqi against Iraqi. If Iraq is to fulfill its role as a sovereign and democratic state, it must start acting like one. It is for this reason that I oppose the proposal for a troop surge. I oppose the proposal for a troop surge in Baghdad where violence can only be defined as sectarian. A troop surge proposal basically ignores the conditions on the ground, both as I saw on my most recent trip and reports that I have been receiving regularly since my return. My consultations with both military and Iraqi political leaders confirms that an increase in troops in areas plagued by sectarian violence will not solve the problem of sectarian hatred. A troop surge in Baghdad would put more American troops at risk to address a problem that is not a military problem. It will put more American soldiers in the crosshairs of sectarian violence. It will create more targets. I just don't believe that makes sense.

Again, I oppose a troop surge in Baghdad because I don't believe it is the path to victory or a strategy for victory in Iraq. I recognize there are those who think otherwise. The Iraqi Study Group, in their report, said that they could, however, support a short-term deployment, a surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or to speed up the training and equipping mission if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such standards would be effective.

I sat with the President with Democratic colleagues and Republican colleagues. I know that he has weighed this heavily, and I know he has looked at this issue for a long time. Apparently, he has come to the conclusion that, in fact, a troop surge would be helpful. I believe his comments will contain--hopefully contain--discussions about benchmarks and contain a commitment to do those things to rebuild the economy and create jobs so that we get rid of some of the underlying causes and frustrations that feed the insurgency. But the bottom line is, again, at this point in time, it is sectarian violence that I believe is the major issue that we face and more troops in Baghdad is not going to solve that problem.

As one of the final conclusions to share of my experience in Iraq, I would also like to emphasize the significant role of Iran in fomenting instabilities. Across the board, my meetings with Iraqi officials revealed that the Iranians are driving instability in Iraq by all means at their disposal. We had a hearing today in the Foreign Relations Committee and one of the speakers, one of the experts said that it may be, and it is probably clear that, the Iranians have a stake in American failure in Iraq and its stability in the region, and they feed on that. Indeed, there are credible reports that Iran is currently supplying money and weapons to both its traditional Shiite allies and its historic Sunni rivals, all for the purposes of ensuring a daily death toll of Iraqi citizens. It is clear the Iranians have concluded that chaos in Iraq is in their direct interest. Iran's role thus far, not to mention their pursuit of nuclear weapons, makes it hard to believe that they might suddenly become a constructive partner in the stabilization of Iraq.

I want to point out that my commitment to success in Iraq has not changed, nor my willingness to consider options that would realistically contribute toward our goals there. In my trips to Iraq, I have gone with an open mind as to what next steps could be taken as we work with the Iraqis to stabilize their country. I have said all along that the stakes of our mission in Iraq are such that failure is simply not an option, and I will only support proposals that will steer the United States toward victory. Abandoning Iraq today would precipitate an even greater surge of ethnic cleansing. It would, as I indicated before, precipitate an episode of instability and chaos in the region that would be in no one's interest. But my most recent trip to Iraq also reaffirmed to me that it is the Iraqis who must play the biggest role in any strategy for success. Our investment must be tied to their willingness to make the tough choices needed to pave the way to stability and for them to act on them.

I represent Minnesota, but if I represented Missouri, I think I would simply say to Maliki: Show me. Show me your resolve. Show me your commitment. Show me that you can, in fact, do the things that have to be done to deal with the sectarian violence, and then we can talk about enhancing and increasing the American effort. I haven't seen it. I don't see it today, and as such, I am certainly not willing to put more U.S. troops at risk.

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