Recess Subject to the Call of the Chair

RECESS SUBJECT TO THE CALL OF THE CHAIR -- (Senate - November 16, 2006)

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Mr. REED. Mr. President, today the Senate is undertaking an important debate on the India Agreement for Civil Nuclear Cooperation.

On July 18, 2005, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an agreement to resume full civilian nuclear cooperation for the first time since India conducted its initial nuclear test in 1974. Such an agreement will require changes to U.S. law and accommodations with the international community.

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 assures the proper management of source, special nuclear, and byproduct material. Several sections of the AEA are at issue in this agreement, so I would like to take a moment to explain the pertinent provisions.

Section 123 of the AEA limits the ability of the United States to enter into agreements with nonweapons states unless the agreement meets a minimum of nine criteria, including a requirement that the recipient country has in place an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, to safeguard in perpetuity nuclear material, equipment, and technology so that it will not be diverted for weapons use. This type of agreement is known as a ``full-scope safeguards'' agreement. A 123 Agreement is the precursor to any export license for the nuclear materials, equipment and technology.

Section 128 requires that any export license for nuclear materials, technology or equipment contain a requirement that the recipient nonnuclear weapons state maintain IAEA safeguards.

Section 129 of the AEA requires that any 123 Agreement or export license be terminated if the nonnuclear weapons state recipient detonates a nuclear explosive device, terminates, abrogates, or violates IAEA safeguards, or engages in activities that support development of a nuclear explosive device. Section 129 would also prohibit entrance into a section 123 Agreement with any nonnuclear weapons state that detonated a nuclear explosive device after 1978.

S. 3709, the bill we are considering today, establishes a mechanism whereby the President may submit a 123 Agreement for civil nuclear cooperation with India, a nonweapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to Congress for approval. However, this bill would allow the President to waive certain requirements of section 123, section 128, and portions of section 129, as long as the President makes certain determinations that are set out in the bill.

India is the largest democracy in the world. Its economy is growing by 8 percent annually. Since the beginning of this century, United States-India relations on issues from trade to defense have been growing stronger each year. The United States also benefits from a large Indian-American population. Rhode Island is home to a vibrant Indian community who contribute greatly to the State. I believe that the United States should do all that it can to assist India and further strengthen the partnership between the two countries.

However, this agreement does raise significant concerns. I believe that proliferation of nuclear material is the greatest threat facing our country today. North Korea recently conducted its first nuclear test. Iran seems intent on pursuing a nuclear program. Even efforts to reduce the overall size of the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons stockpiles have stalled. While there has been some small progress in reducing the number of deployed nuclear warheads there has been no progress in reducing the overall size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. There is great concern, therefore, that this agreement strikes a blow to what remains of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

I, too, would share that concern, if the Senate had adopted the bill the administration proposed. However, I believe that the Foreign Relations Committee, under the leadership of Senators LUGAR and BIDEN, who are certainly experts on these matters, have crafted a bill which, I believe, has sufficient safeguards. I think that they are trying to adapt the nonproliferation regime, not destroy it.

First, section 105 of this bill sets out a series of determinations the President must make in writing when he submits the 123 Agreement. I believe these determinations will both provide a reasonable equivalent of full-scope safeguards and address several other concerns with respect to the Indian nuclear program, including concerns that the agreement not facilitate or assist the Indian nuclear weapons program. For the most part, the determinations reflect what India has committed to do in the July 2005 joint statement.

Probably the most important of the determinations in section 105 is the fifth, which states, ``India is working with the United States to conclude a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the production of fissile materials.'' This determination breathes new life into efforts to achieve a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, even driving the United States back to the negotiating table. Determination number 5 is the one single element in this bill that could prevent further growth in India's nuclear weapons stockpile and could lead to real reductions. In addition, this certification may also work to eliminate the impasse between India and Pakistan whereby neither wants to be the first to adopt a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

Section 106 of S. 3709 would prohibit the export of equipment, materials and technologies related to uranium enrichment, spent nuclear fuel reprocessing, and the production of heavy water, unless the user is a multinational facility participating in IAEA approved reactor fuel program or the President ``determines that the export or reexport will not improve India's ability to produce nuclear weapons or fissile material for military uses.'' On several occasions administration witnesses clearly stated to the Foreign Relations Committee that the U.S. would not provide such technologies to India. As a result, it is not anticipated that the presidential exemption will be used.

Section 107 of the bill requires a program, which would include end-use monitoring conditions as appropriate, to maintain accountability with respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold, leased and exported, or re-exported to India. This provision would enhance confidence in India's efforts to ensure separation of its civilian and military nuclear programs, facilities, materials and personnel and also further ensure U.S. compliance with Article I of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

S. 3709 also requires the President to provide the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee with updated information regarding India's compliance with nonproliferation commitments. Specifically, it would require the President to keep these committees informed of any material violation of India's nuclear nonproliferation commitments, the construction of any nuclear facilities in India, any significant changes in India's production of nuclear weapons or fissile materials, or changes in the purpose or status of India's non-declared facilities. The bill also requires the President to submit an annual report on the implementation of civil nuclear commerce, India's compliance with its nonproliferation commitments, and U.S. efforts and progress toward achieving India's full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and adherence to the guidelines and policies of the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

It is important that this bill would waive section 129 applicability for any actions taken before July 18, 2005. If India detonated a nuclear device after the date of enactment the waiver authority would cease to be effective and the exports would be prohibited.

Another vitally important provision of S. 3709 is that it follows current law and requires Congress to have a vote to approve any final 123 Agreement. The House bill also has an approval process, but it is not clear if that process requires a vote. The administration had proposed that a 123 Agreement with India would only require congressional notification and a waiting period.

Because of the provisions I have just discussed, I believe I can support this bill. I would also note that passage of this bill is simply the first step on a long road. If this bill passes the Senate, it must be conferenced with the House bill, which has different provisions. If the conference report comes back with the Senate provisions weakened, or absent, I may be obligated to vote against that report.

Much more important is the substance of the 123 statement the President ultimately submits. I understand that this is an attempt to adapt the nonproliferation regime to a changing world. I will carefully examine any 123 Agreement to ensure that it adequately addresses vital proliferation concerns.

But at this first step, I have hope that this agreement will lead to greater cooperation on nonproliferation rather than less. With that hope, I will support S. 3709.

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