Security and Accountability for Every Port Act

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR EVERY PORT ACT -- (Senate - September 12, 2006)

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Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I rise to express my support for the bill and say I am proud to be a cosponsor with Senator Collins, Senator Murray, and Senator Coleman. This is a comprehensive, bipartisan port security bill.

I would also like to thank Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye of the Commerce Committee, and Senator Grassley and Senator Baucus of the Finance Committee, for their hard work, leadership, and commitment to passing a port security bill this Congress. This is really important. In the midst of a Congress and a Capitol that has become all too reflexively and destructively--I might say self-destructively--partisan, and that partisanship getting in the way of us getting anything done, this is a bill on which members of our Homeland Security Committee and the other relevant committees have risen above partisanship and focused on a real threat to our security, a terrorist threat that would come to us in containers moving through our ports or in terrorist acts at our ports.

I know there will be many amendments offered this week. I hope we will consider them in the fullness of debate that is part of the Senate but that we always ask ourselves the question: Will this amendment stand in the way of this bill passing and making it through conference committee to be signed by the President? This is urgent and this bill responds comprehensively to the urgent terrorist threat that we face.

Ninety-five percent of our international trade flows through our ports. Prior to 9/11, the main goal was to move these millions of tons through our ports efficiently, quickly, for reasons obviously of commerce, jobs, and employment. Since 9/11, we have realized that we need to bring security into the equation but without inflicting on ourselves the precise economic harm that the terrorists intend to do to us. This is a difficult but imperative balance we must achieve.

The 9/11 Commission report said that ``major vulnerabilities still exist in cargo security,'' and that, since aviation security has been significantly improved since 9/11, ``terrorists may turn their attention to other modes. Opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime and surface transportation''--i.e. ports.

Just last month, RAND's Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy published a report entitled ``Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack'' that considered the effects of a nuclear weapon smuggled in a shipping container sent to the Port of Long Beach in California and detonated on a pier. This is chilling.

But I remember that the 9/11 Commission, in its conclusions, said one of the great shortcomings we had prior to 9/11 was a failure of imagination. Imagination is usually thought to be a wonderful thing, but what they meant by that is our inability to imagine how brutal, inhumane, and murderous terrorists could be.

The potential short- and long-term effects of a nuclear weapon smuggled in a shipping container sent to the Port of Long Beach and detonated on a pier are devastating. The report estimated that up to 60,000 people might die instantly from the blast or radiation poisoning, with 150,000 more exposed to hazardous levels of radiation.

The blast and fires could completely destroy both the Port of Long Beach and the Port of Los Angeles and every ship in the port. As many as 6 million people might have to be evacuated from the Los Angeles area, and another 2 to 3 million people from the surrounding area might have to relocate due to the fallout. Gasoline supplies would quickly dry up because one-third of all the gas used on the west coast is processed at the refineries of the Port of Long Beach.

Short-term costs for medical care, insurance claims, workers' compensation, and evacuation and reconstruction could exceed $1 trillion. By comparison, the cost in similar categories resulting from the attacks on America on September 11, 2001 were between $50 billion and $100 billion. Besides damage to the United States, the attack would cause economic effects that would ripple across the globe.

That is devastating and chilling. I hesitate to even speak it on the floor of the Senate, and yet it is the world in which we live, and the threat is real.

The unsettling fact is, we still have too little idea about the contents of thousands of containers that are shipped into and across the heart of America every day. It is strange to say, but perhaps the controversy over the Dubai Ports World incident raised the collective consciousness of the American people and Members of Congress to the vulnerabilities that we face at our ports. Following that incident, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee marked up the GreenLane bill, and later Senators Collins, Murray, and I started working with the Senate Commerce and Finance Committees to craft the comprehensive port security legislation that is before the Senate today.

The Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 builds on these foundations for homeland security by strengthening key port security programs by providing both direction and much-needed resources. I would like to focus my colleagues' attention on a few critically important parts of the bill.

First, the bill moves us closer to the goal of inspecting all of the containers entering the United States through our ports. The legislation requires DHS to establish a pilot program to inspect 100 percent of all containers bound for the U.S. from three foreign ports within 1 year and then report to Congress on how DHS can expand that system.

There is legitimate concern that inspecting 100 percent of containers would be so burdensome that it would bring commerce to a halt. However, technology companies have been working for several years to build more efficient inspection systems. The Port of Hong Kong is currently testing an integrated inspection system to scan every container entering the two largest terminals at that port, while the research and development offices of DHS have begun work on developing automated systems to analyze this data. We should move towards 100 percent inspection as fast as we can get there, understanding that we can not afford to bring commerce to a halt. This legislation will provide us critical information about how soon we can achieve this goal.

Second, this bill authorizes comprehensive and robust port security grant, training, and exercise programs, with a $400 million grant program available to all ports. Third, this legislation requires DHS to deploy both radiation detection and imaging equipment to improve our ability to find dangerous goods and people being smuggled into the United States.

DHS has committed to deploying radiation portal monitors at all of our largest seaports by the end of 2007. Unfortunately, this ``solution'' is, in fact, only half of the equation. To provide real port security, radiation detection equipment capable of detecting unshielded radiological materials, as these portal monitors do, must be paired with imaging equipment capable of detecting dense objects, like shielding.

This legislation requires DHS to develop a strategy for deploying both types of equipment, and the pilot program for screening 100 percent of containers at three ports similarly requires that both types of equipment be used.

Fourth, this bill requires DHS to develop a strategic port and cargo security plan, and it creates an Office of Cargo Security Policy in DHS to ensure Federal, State, and local governments and the private sector coordinate their policies.

Currently, the Coast Guard is responsible for the waterside security of our ports. U.S. Customs and Border Protection regulates the flow of commerce through our ports. The Transportation Security Administration is responsible for overseeing the movement of cargo domestically. And the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has been working with the Defense Department and the Department of Energy to strengthen our ability to detect radiological materials anywhere in the country.

It is imperative that these agencies, offices, and departments are working closely with each other, as well as State and local government and the private sector to develop and coordinate port security policies and programs.

Lastly, this bill requires DHS to develop a plan to deal with the effects of a maritime security incident, including developing protocols for resuming trade and identifying specific responsibilities for different agencies.

This is critically important to ensuring the private sector and our global partners have enough confidence in our system, so that we can mitigate any economic disruption and foil a terrorist's plan to hurt our economy.

Moving the Port Security Improvement Act of 2006 forward will take us one giant step closer to where we ought to be by building a robust port security regime, domestically and abroad, and provide the resources necessary to protect the American people.

I look forward to continuing to work with Senators Collins, Stevens, Inouye, Grassley and Baucus, and our colleagues in the House, to finalizing meaningful port security legislation.

Yesterday was a day of remembrance and requiem. Today is a day to resolve that we will do everything in our capacity to make sure that no terrorist attack against our country and our people succeeds in the future. That is the intention of this bill. I urge Members of the Senate to adopt it by this week's end.

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