Post-Saddam Iraq

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Last Thursday, this Committee heard testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, who joined us one day after he presented powerful evidence of Iraq's non-compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. His detailed statement before the United Nations Security Council was a great service to our nation and to the world community.

Today, for the third time this year, the Foreign Relations Committee turns its attention to Iraq. We pose the question: what must we do to help ensure that Iraq becomes a secure and responsible member of the world community following any potential military action? When asking this question, we must avoid any tendency to view military operations in Iraq as separate from reconstruction of Iraq. In fact, our ability to secure allies for any necessary military action will be greatly enhanced if we have laid out a clear vision of how the United States will work with the international community to feed and shelter Iraq's people, help establish responsible governance, and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. We must not assume that our commitment of armed forces will end if and when Saddam Hussein is dislodged from power. Even under the best post-Saddam scenarios, Iraq will remain an enormous security challenge that is likely to require substantial American and allied troops.

Since Secretary Powell's appearance last week the debate over Iraq has taken additional twists and turns. This past weekend, Germany, Russia and France proposed doubling or perhaps tripling international inspectors in Iraq with the support of peacekeepers to enforce what some have termed "coercive inspections." Unfortunately this proposal, as its predecessors, will fail in the absense of Iraqi compliance and cooperation. Han Blix put it best when he said: "The principal problem is not the number of inspectors but rather the active cooperation of the Iraqi side." Absent Iraqi cooperation it is unclear what impact, if any, U-2 overflights and a law against weapons of mass destruction will have with regards to compliance with UN resolution 1441.

Saddam Hussein has not complied with past U.N. Resolutions. He has not opened his weapons programs to the independent auditors - the United Nations and the IAEA. He continues defiant rhetoric and refuses to disarm. Today, fully 12 years after Operation Desert Storm, the world continues to face threats posed by Iraq and its ruler.
We have full confidence in the United States military, which is moving into the region with its allies in a comprehensive manner. Tens of thousands of our Reserves have been called up, including one from our own midst, Commander Patrick Garvey, who will leave my staff next week to join the effort. With well over 100,000 troops already in theater and perhaps as many more on the way, our men and women in uniform and the technology and firepower they control will have every advantage. There is still hope that military action can be averted.

Nevertheless, success in Iraq requires that the Administration, the Congress and the American people think beyond current military preparations and move toward the enunciation of a clear post-conflict plan for Iraq and the region. We must articulate a plan that commences with a sober analysis of the costs and squarely addresses how Iraq will be secured and governed and precisely what commitment the United States must undertake.

Several groups of scholars and experts have produced blueprints for our post-conflict policy discussions. We will use these reports as a framework. I thank the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Strategic and. International Studies, the International Rescue Commission, the Brookings Institution, and others who have wrestled with these issues.

In the same vein, the Washington Post posed several questions last Sunday that have been the subject of much examination by this Committee:
Who will rule Iraq, and how'?
Who will provide security?
How long might U.S. troops conceivably remain?
Will the United Nations have a role?
Who will manage Iraq's oil resources'?
Unless the Administration can answer these question in detail, the anxiety of Arab and European governments, as well as that of the American public, over our "staving power" will only grow.

We want to work with the Administration to formulate a clear post- conflict plan. Such a plan must be embedded in a broader vision of how political liberalization and economic development can be fostered in the aftermath of military conflict.
Today, we will lay out the overarching problems ahead arid focus on the security aspects. Forthcoming hearings will examine humanitarian assistance reconstruction, public governance, economic development, and other critical issues.
We will have before us two distinguished panels. The first panel will feature Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, who will outline the Administration's planning with respect to the future of Iraq.
The second panel of defense security experts will attempt to paint a picture of the security challenges that the coalition will face should the current regime be displaced, by whatever means. We look forward to the insights to 'he provided by General Anthony Zinni, Colonel Scott Neil, and Professor Anthony Cordesman.

I look forward to consulting closely with the members of this Committee and with the Administration on thoughtful preparations for a post-Saddam Iraq. Our security, our alliances, and our credibility will depend on undertaking a vigorous effort to move Iraq into the family of nations.
I welcome our witnesses.