Grassley Comments on FBI Director Testimony
GRASSLEY COMMENTS ON FBI DIRECTOR TESTIMONY
Senator Chuck Grassley today made the following statement after questioning FBI Director Robert Mueller III at an oversight hearing of the Judiciary Committee.
Grassley, who has a long history of conducting oversight of the FBI, was disappointed with answers from the Director. Grassley's questions revolved around long-standing issues with the Bureau such as coordination with other agencies in the War on Terror.
In particular Grassley was concerned with the Director selectively reading unclassified paragraphs of a classified Inspector General report about FBI cooperation with DHS on a terrorist financing case in Houston. In June 2005, Grassley wrote to both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security about turf battles between the two agencies. At that time he asked the Inspectors General at the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security to investigate the effectiveness of the terrorist financing Memorandum of Agreement between the departments. In May 2005, Grassley asked Mueller to make available several individuals for interviews with staff.
Here is Grassley's statement.
"Director Mueller paints a distorted picture of the IG report by reading only certain unclassified paragraphs from it. The public also deserves to hear unclassified paragraphs from the report critical of the FBI's handling of the terrorist financing case. If people had a chance to read the report in its entirety or at least receive a more detailed summary, I think they would find it very different than what was portrayed at the hearing. I find the allegations that unflattering analysis and conclusions of the IG were improperly classified to be very serious, and they deserve further inquiry. The Director has promised to work toward a declassified summary of this report so that the public can get the full story without compromising legitimate national security concerns. If a true reflection of the entire report is finally made public, then that will be a big step in the right direction."
Here is the press release and letter of Grassley's asking for the IG report. Also included is the letter to Mueller from May 2005.
For Immediate Release
Friday, June 3, 2005
FBI Turf Battles with ICE Cause National Security Concerns
Grassley asks Inspectors General to Investigate Claims
WASHINGTON Sen. Chuck Grassley today continued questioning the FBI and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency about turf battles between the two agencies. He has asked the Inspectors General at the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security to investigate the effectiveness of the terrorist financing Memorandum of Agreement between the departments.
"The safety of the American people has got to be at the top of every law enforcement agency's list. Plain and simple, the turf battles have got to stop to ensure national security," Grassley said. "Nobody should have time to worry about who's getting the credit or who's stopping the terrorists as long as the job is getting done."
Grassley said that he learned of the problems from a senior agent at ICE. Grassley was informed that the government failed to intercept communications between the subject of a criminal investigation and a designated terrorist for more than four months because the FBI took over, and then mishandled, the case.
On May 9, Grassley asked the FBI for additional information from three agents, but the FBI has been unresponsive. By contrast, ICE has made their agents available for questioning upon request. Today's letter informs Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff that the Inspectors General will be conducting an investigation.
"I've asked these two departments for their cooperation with the Inspectors General. Despite the lack of cooperation from the FBI thus far, I hope they will finally take these allegations seriously," Grassley said.
Here is a copy of today's letter followed by a copy of the May 9 letter.
June 3, 2005
VIA FACSIMILE: (202) 514-2141 & (202) 772-9734
Original via USPS Mail
The Honorable Alberto Gonzales
Attorney General
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20535
The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
3801 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20528
Dear General Gonzales and Secretary Chertoff:
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, ought to have taught every American serving in government that it is infinitely more important to work together against the terrorists than to fight about who is in charge or who gets the credit. Some turf wars may be inevitable given human nature, but as leaders of your departments, you have a duty to ensure that interagency disputes do not harm national security. Unfortunately, the Committee is aware of at least one case where national security may have been the casualty of bureaucratic infighting. Such infighting should never be tolerated when national security is on the line, and America needs strong leadership from both of you to ensure that it is not.
Earlier this year, a senior Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent, Joe Webber, informed me that our government failed to intercept communications between the subject of a criminal investigation and a designated terrorist for more than four months because the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) took over, and then mishandled, the case. These are serious allegations that deserve high-level attention and a thorough review. Instead, they have largely been ignored. Neither the Department of Justice (DOJ) nor the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has conducted an inquiry. Nor has the leadership of either department sought an independent review by an inspector general. To his credit, I understand that the head of ICE, Assistant Secretary Michael Garcia, suggested that a joint working group be established with the FBI to review this case and others like it. However, it appears that his suggestion has fallen on deaf ears.
An examination of Mr. Webber's allegations has raised a number of questions that need to be answered by an independent inquiry. I am concerned that the May 13, 2003, Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between DOJ and DHS is being enforced in a way that creates a strong disincentive for anyone outside the FBI to investigate suspected terrorist financing activity. Why would we want to discourage agencies with experience and expertise investigating cross-border financial crimes from contributing to the fight against terrorism? Instead of trying to protect its turf, the FBI should be actively pursuing real partnerships with other agencies that have something to offer.
Unfortunately, it looks like the FBI is not interested in partnerships nearly as much as in taking promising cases from other agencies. Under the MOA, ICE agreed to shut down its highly successful Operation Green Quest program, which yielded 38 arrests, 26 indictments, and the seizure of $6.8 million in terrorist assets in its first nine months of existence. Rather than partnering with ICE to build on this success, as contemplated by the MOA, the FBI's initial reaction was to propose what one DHS official called the "box theory" of interagency of cooperation (i.e. just shut down Green Quest and hand over your files in boxes). While that view did not ultimately prevail, ICE has had to combat this mindset in seeking a meaningful partnership with the FBI. I understand that since the MOA has been in place, 11 terrorist financing cases (including the one Mr. Webber wrote to me about) have been transferred from ICE to FBI-controlled Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). This has had a devastating effect on morale within ICE. Even though the FBI has allowed ICE agents to continue working some of these cases, many agents avoid any case that might potentially relate to terrorism for fear that it will be taken away by the FBI.
In the case Mr. Webber wrote to me about, the problem is much worse than one agency taking credit for the work of another. It appears that the FBI needlessly delayed a Title III wiretap application for four months, thus failing to capture communications with a known terrorist. When the Committee inquired about this matter, the FBI's response was to admit that it had mishandled the case and that the delay should not have occurred. FBI headquarters blamed the local FBI field office for allegedly failing to transfer the case to the JTTF when instructed to do so. However, according to Mr. Webber and his superiors at ICE, the FBI field office was not the source of the delay. Rather, FBI headquarters raised a number of issues that slowed the approval process, and none of them were related to whether the case had been transferred to the JTTF. This raises questions about whether the true motivation for delaying the case may have been to prevent a rival agency from infringing on FBI turf.
Among the issues raised by FBI headquarters that caused this delay were (1) potential conflicts with other FBI cases, (2) a fear that notification to the subject required under Title III could not be sufficiently delayed, (3) a desire to first explore whether the subject could be recruited as a confidential informant, and (4) indecision over whether to pursue the case as a criminal matter or as an intelligence matter under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). None of these excuses are ultimately persuasive: (1) according to ICE, the potential conflicts were easily resolved, (2) the U.S. Attorney's Office was confident that notification could be delayed as long as necessary, (3) there was no credible reason to believe that the subject could be recruited as a source, and (4) a Title III intercept could be approved faster than a FISA intercept. Moreover, every office that reviewed the request agreed that there was enough probable cause for a Title III intercept, including the FBI field office, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the DOJ Counter Terrorism Section, and the DOJ Office of Enforcement Operation (DOJ-OEO). Yet, FBI headquarters still said "no."
The FBI headquarters' attempt to blame the field office for delay makes no sense in light of its own persistent opposition to the request. Headquarters claimed that the delay occurred because of a failure to transfer the case to the JTTF before the intercept request was submitted to DOJ-OEO for approval. The implication is that if the request had come to Washington as an FBI-JTTF case, rather than an ICE case, it would have been approved more quickly. This may be true, but it is hardly a defense. Whether the field office transferred the case to the JTTF before or after the request was submitted to Washington should have no impact on FBI's ability resolve issues in a timely way. If intercept requests from other agencies are slow-walked through the process simply because they did not originate with the FBI, then the real problem here is an FBI culture where the knee-jerk reaction is to oppose any other agency in order to protect its own turf.
Leadership is essential in order to rise above petty turf wars. Only an independent inquiry into this case and an objective assessment of the effectiveness of the terrorist financing MOA between DOJ and DHS can provide a reliable basis for such leadership. Therefore, by this letter I am asking the Inspectors General for DOJ and DHS to conduct a joint review to determine, among other things, the following:
(1) What was the cause of the delay in processing the Title III intercept request in the case referred to by Mr. Webber?
(2) What steps have been taken, if any, to ensure that similar delays do not recur? How effective are any such safeguards?
(3) How effective is the implementation of the Terrorist Financing MOA between DOJ and DHS?
(4) How well do the arrangements under the MOA operate to ensure that the expertise and experience of ICE with cross-border financial crimes is maintained and employed in terrorist financing investigations?
(5) In light of the known problems with coordination between the two agencies, should the MOA be revised? If so, in what way?
(6) Of the 10 other cases transferred from ICE to the FBI under the MOA, were any of them negatively impacted by delays or other problems associated with insufficient interagency cooperation? If so, what was the nature and consequence of any such problems?
(7) What distinct priorities does ICE pursue and to what extent are those priorities mutually agreed upon by both agencies?
(8) What is the status of other areas where ICE and the FBI share investigative jurisdiction? What agreements, if any, are in place to ensure coordination, and how effectively do the agencies cooperate on non-terrorist financing matters?
Please ensure that your Departments fully cooperate with this inquiry and that you take the time to carefully consider the results. If turf wars are not actively discouraged at the highest levels, this problem will continue to plague our efforts to combat terrorist financing.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
cc: Richard L. Skinner, Acting Inspector General
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
William Mercer, Acting Principal Deputy Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
May 9, 2005
The Honorable Robert S. Mueller
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
935 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535
Dear Director Mueller:
As you know, I was contacted recently by the Joseph Webber, the Senior Agent in Charge (SAC) for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Houston, Texas. SAC Webber wrote to me to express his concern about a terrorist financing investigation his office had been conducting, which he believes was compromised when the FBI unreasonably delayed a wiretap request. Because of this delay, the FBI failed to capture communications with a designated terrorist. We simply cannot afford to let bureaucratic infighting cause missed opportunities like this. I am attempting to determine whether the mishandling of this case was simply an isolated instance of miscommunication or an example of a broader institutional failure of the FBI to adequately coordinate its efforts with other federal law enforcement agencies.
In response to informal inquiries by staff, Michael Morehart, the Director of the FBI's Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) provided a briefing on this matter. His briefing, and subsequent staff interviews with ICE personnel, have raised additional questions about what happened in this case. In order to gain a full understanding of what occurred, these questions need to be addressed by other FBI officials, including representatives from the Houston Field Office and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
Therefore, I request that you make the following individuals available for staff interviews: (1) Mike Clancy, Group Supervisor, Houston JTTF, (2) Steve Gentry, Assistant SAC, Houston Field Office, and (3) Tony Guerrero, FBI Supervisory Special Agent, ICE Joint Vetting Unit. Please have your staff contact my office by May 13, 2005, to schedule these interviews.
Sincerely,
Charles E. Grassley
Chairman
http://grassley.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=5048&Month=5&Year=2006