Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 -- (House of Representatives - April 26, 2006)
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AMENDMENT NO. 2 OFFERED BY MR. FOSSELLA
Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
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Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
First, let me thank the chairman and the ranking member for allowing me to bring this amendment forward in the Rules Committee.
One of the essential elements of government responsibility is to communicate effectively to the American people, especially in time of a potential terrorist attack or a natural disaster.
On October 6 of 2005, New York City was made aware of several reports that terrorists were planning a large-scale attack on the subway systems. That evening, as New Yorkers watched the news, they had to struggle with two conflicting messages about the day's events. City officials, led by the mayor and the police commissioner, announced that a credible threat was aimed at New York City subway system, and stated that the threat was specific enough to warrant an immediate and overwhelming response.
However, the news also reported that officials in Washington were downÐplaying the severity of the threat. A spokesman for the Department of Homeland Security described it as ``specific, yet noncredible.'' Other anti ter ror ism officials stated that the information gathered about the plot was not verifiable.
New York officials first learned of the threat earlier in the week. The information gained from a reliable informant indicated that the people in Iraq were plotting with people in the United States to hide bombs in baby strollers, briefcases and packages and set them off in the city's subways.
But the Department of Homeland Security had a different take. They released to law enforcement agencies an unclassified bulletin on the threat to the subway system, indicating that the FBI and Department of Homeland Security had doubts about the credibility of that threat. Yet the document also stated that a team of operatives, ``some of whom may travel to or who may be in the New York City area,'' might attempt an attack on or about October 9, 3 days after this warning. It also said that the terrorists might use remote-controlled or timed explosives hidden inside or underneath baby carriages and briefcases or suitcases.
Vetting and verifying information is one thing. Having our government sending out conflicting messages to the American people when conflict can be avoided is another.
I have always and will continue to be supportive of all efforts by anti ter ror ism forces at the Federal, State and local levels, but it pained me, and I am sure many others, to watch the confusion that unfolded that October.
The trend continued weeks later in Maryland. Officials responded to a bomb threat in the I-95 tunnel under Baltimore Harbor, which the closing of resulted in stopping of thousands of cars for hours along a major transportation corridor. However, Baltimore's mayor and police commissioner said they learned of the tunnel closure and the bomb threat from the news media. This is not the way the system should work.
Bear in mind, since 9/11, law enforcement at all levels has responded to a variety of threats every day such as a misplaced bag, a suspicious package or unknown substance. In general, these agencies and the men and women who work for these agencies are dedicated, responsible, diligent, and respond very well to these potentially dangerous situations.
But what clearly needs to be done and to be improved is how different levels of government interact with each other when these threats are elevated. We need to get everyone on the same page and, when a credible threat occurs, inform the public in a coordinated way. In short, what is needed is a 911 call center for first responders. To achieve that, my amendment works in the following ways:
It authorizes a study to be conducted by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence to identify the problems and the success of terrorist threat information sharing between the Federal, State and local levels of government.
Number 2, in addition to identifying the best practices, it will recommend a formalized process between the Federal, State and local levels of government for communicating threats to the public in a coordinated way.
Once complete, the study will be made available to all Federal, State and local government entities involved in terrorist intelligence gathering.
Finally, based on the results of the study, three centers of best practices will be created; staffs of the centers tasked with developing techniques to teach State and local governments how to improve their information sharing and planning techniques in conjunction with the Federal Government.
The center's staff will ensure the results of the study are incorporated in the daily workings of homeland security preparedness and responsive activities through all levels of government.
And finally, let me just say it is a fact that not every city can dedicate resources to terrorism. On the one hand, we have New York City where more than 1,000, about 1 in every 40, police officers in New York City are dedicated to anti ter ror ism duties. The reality is New York City faces a threat every single day. New York can be Exhibit A. But for other municipalities developing advanced techniques on fighting the war on terrorism, it is not so important. They don't have the resources, the manpower to dedicate. This amendment is not limited to just New York. The other centers of best practices, a suggestion would be in Detroit and Los Angeles, and can disseminate and share their techniques with other cities, whether it be Topeka or Peoria.
The sad fact is that the same terrorist scenarios, if they occurred in five different States, there could be five different sets of responses to the American people. We need, at a minimum, a level of coordination on communicating threats to the public. This amendment, I believe, will achieve that goal. The American people deserve it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
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Mr. FOSSELLA. I would just like to thank the gentlewoman for her efforts and that of your staff, especially Chairman Hoekstra, that of Chairman PETER KING and his staff and Rob O'Connor. But I thank the gentlewoman for her comments and strong support.
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