Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Floor Speech

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Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise to call upon the administration to take urgent action, as we did in 2012-2013, to pressure Rwanda to end its support for United Nations sanctioned M23 rebels and stop destabilizing eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC, and to stress the need for DRC to hold credible, on-time elections in December 2023.

According to the final report by the U.N. Group of Experts for the DRC, Rwandan support for the M23 extends from the highest levels in Kigali, including the Minister of Defense, an alarming allegation. Rwandan troops now are fighting alongside the M23 inside DRC, and the Rwandan Government is providing the M23 with weapons, uniforms, and equipment. M23 has killed hundreds of Congolese civilians over the past year, including the November 29 massacre of more than 170 men, women, and children in the village of Kishishe. With Rwandan support, M23 downed a U.N. helicopter, killing U.N. peacekeepers, recruited child soldiers, and displaced more than 1 million Congolese in eastern DRC. Incidents of sexual violence targeting internally displaced persons are also skyrocketing. On June 13, Human Rights Watch reported that, ``Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo have committed unlawful killings, rape, and other apparent war crimes since late 2022.''

There is overwhelming evidence of Rwandan support for M23, and M23 has repeatedly failed to adhere to ceasefire agreements brokered by the East African Community. Despite this, the United States, the United Nations, and other members of the international community have been slow to respond. The last time Rwandan President Paul Kagame supported M23 rebels in eastern DRC, in 2012, the United States suspended Foreign Military Financing--FMF--for Rwanda, a decision that prompted several European donors to also suspend or redirect assistance away from Rwanda. The U.S. also imposed additional security assistance restrictions under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, CSPA. President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Sherman, and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Carson all engaged directly with the leaders of DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda to end the conflict and pressure Kagame to cease his support for M23.

Our response to the current M23 crisis has been, by comparison, woefully inadequate. Although Secretary of State Blinken travelled to the region in August 2022 to discuss the instability in eastern DRC, the United States did not publicly call on President Kagame to end Rwanda's support for M23 until October 2022, months after the first U.N. Group of Experts report documented Rwanda's actions. We have not imposed any new sanctions on M23 leaders or Rwandan officials implicated in gross violations of human rights in eastern DRC, nor have we completely cut security assistance and military-to-military engagement to Rwanda. In fact, as recently as May of this year, Rwanda participated in the African Land Forces Summit sponsored by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. In February 2023, the United States invited members of the Rwandan Defense Force to participate in a multinational exercise in Kenya called Justified Accord, where the U.S. reportedly provided Rwanda cyber capability training. The decision to provide cyber-related training to Rwanda is particularly difficult to comprehend in light of 2021 reports by Freedom House and Amnesty International. According to the Amnesty report, ``Rwanda used NSO Group's spyware to potentially target more than 3,500 activists, journalists and politicians.'' The Freedom House report states that ``Rwandans abroad experience digital threats, spyware attacks, family intimidation and harassment, mobility controls, physical intimidation, assault, detention, rendition, and assassination.'' The United States cannot continue to support Rwandan efforts to serve as peacekeepers in some parts of Africa while the very same Rwandan military is fomenting violence and instability next door in DRC.

In addition to disrupting the lives of more than 1 million people in eastern DRC, Rwanda's support for M23 is also undermining efforts to prepare for elections. The last elections were so poorly managed that the United States sanctioned the leadership of the National Independent Electoral Commission--CENI--a precedent that should serve as a warning to future electoral commissions across Africa. While CENI is under new leadership, procurement and management of the voter registry seem as opaque now as they were before. This is a problem. It is important for CENI to be transparent about its spending and its management of the voter registry. Contrary to its actions in 2018, the DRC should welcome international election observers and do everything it can to help, not hinder, domestic election observers.

Even if all of those shortcomings are addressed, violence in the east may disenfranchise voters by preventing them from registering to vote or casting a ballot on election day. Credible and timely elections are crucial to the future stability of the DRC and in the interest of the United States, the region, and the international community. The U.S. and its partners must increase pressure on Rwanda to end its destabilization campaign and must encourage the CENI and the Congolese Government to do all they can to hold timely, credible elections in December 2023.

Although the situation is dire, it is not hopeless. There are steps that the United States can take. First, the State Department must complete a review of its Rwanda policy, which it committed to undertake in response to a letter I sent last July. As I also requested in July, the Department should continue suspending security assistance until Rwanda ceases support for the M23. This suspension should apply to security cooperation and exchanges with Rwanda at all levels. The U.S. should impose sanctions on Rwandan Government officials implicated-- either directly or indirectly--in human rights violations or corruption, to include the theft of minerals or other resources from eastern DRC.

And there are steps the Congolese must take. I encourage President Tshisekedi and DRC officials to do more to combat corruption in their country, particularly within the judiciary and the armed forces, and to lift the ``state of siege'' in eastern DRC. It is clear that conditions for civil society have improved under President Tshisekedi, but much more should be done to ensure that Congolese are able to criticize their government freely, particularly in eastern DRC. I am troubled by multiple reports that journalists have been arrested, including by national intelligence agency operatives, for reporting on what is happening in the east. There have also been disturbing reports that the DRC Government or individual DRC military officers are enlisting the support of rebel groups or militias to help combat M23. If these reports are true, it is incumbent upon President Tshisekedi to put an end to such efforts. Finally, I urge CENI and President Tshisekedi to ensure that international organizations are able to obtain accreditation and visas in a timely manner, so that they are able to support domestic election observation efforts without impediment.

The situation in eastern Congo is not going to fix itself. It requires a collective effort--from us, from our partners, from the U.N., and from the Congolese. I urge us all to act.

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