Hearing of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on U. S. Port Security

Hearing of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on U. S. Port Security

SNOWE ATTENDS COMMERCE COMMITTEE HEARING ON U.S. PORT SECURITY

Senator to Press Deputy Homeland Security Secretary on Dubai Port Deal

Wednesday, March 1, 2006

WASHINGTON, D.C. - At 2:30 pm today, U.S. Senator Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME) will participate in a Commerce Committee Hearing on the security of terminal operations at U.S. Ports. Snowe has voiced her concern about what the proposed deal would mean for terminal operations and security at U.S. ports. The hearing will examine DP World's purchase of P&O Ports and the security role held by the U.S. government at ports. Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary at the Department of Homeland Security will testify.

Yesterday, Snowe sent a letter to Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Thomas Collins requesting the Coast Guard's most recent assessment of security at each of the port facilities impacted by the Dubai Port World deal, which is supposed to be completed today. The Coast Guard's investigation includes an on-site analysis and a thorough review of each port's security plan to ensure that each port is in full compliance with all regulations in the Maritime Transportation Security Act. The Coast Guard raised security concerns about the deal before its approval by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an Administration panel created to review foreign investments in the United States that potentially have national security implications.

The following is Snowe's statement for the hearing as prepared for delivery:

First, let me say I regret that a number of the individuals key to approving the Dubai Ports World's proposed purchase of six major ports on the East Coast are not here today. This decision has rightly produced a public firestorm, and like most Americans, I am deeply disturbed by the potential of adding an additional element of risk at a time when security at our 361 ports throughout America is already extremely vulnerable.

And what has become unquestionably clear is that we - and the American public - are still unclear exactly how this decision was reached, or how it is justified given the new threat environment in which we now live. There is nothing I have seen thus far that convinces me that the last measure of effort has been expended to ensure our security under this proposed purchase.

And as the Chair of the Fisheries and Coast Guard Subcommittee, I am especially alarmed to learn that the Coast Guard, which is responsible for port security, assembled an intelligence report for DHS that expressed objections about the sale due to the "breadth of the intelligence gaps." DHS also initially expressed concerns about the sale and yet, in the end, a purchase was still approved without a 45 day review mandated by law for any sale of this nature.

Moreover, I am further troubled it was only after the proposed sale was approved that the Coast Guard undertook a six-day review of the six effected ports, begging the question, if such a review is a good idea now, wasn't it a good idea before the decision was made? Does this really suggest the most thorough examination was made prior to the decision?

That is why it's imperative the administration "go back to the drawing board" during a 45-day, thorough review now - because this issue demands straightfoward answers that aren't cloaked in classified material. Given the lack of transparency in the process thus far, the conflicting information and statements and the haphazard, piecemeal, conflicted information we've received that does a grave disservice given the threats we face, we need more than a half-page of unclassified material from the Coast Guard to comprehend the conclusions reached. We need an exhaustive analysis and accounting that won't raise more questions than answers.

And so I call on the Coast Guard to detail precisely what information was and was not reviewed by the Coast Guard? Exactly what level of interaction did the Coast Guard have with DHS and the Committee on Foreign Investments? And to what extent were objections considered? If these questions about intelligence gaps don't constitute national security threats, then what does, especially given the reality that our nation's ports continue to comprise one of our nation's greatest terrorist vulnerabilities.

If there's one thing I've heard time and again in chairing numerous hearings on port security, it's that our ports remain extremely porous. To quote the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness that released in response to a National Security Presidential Directive, "The vastness of the maritime domain provides great opportunities for exploitation by terrorists - terrorists can use large merchant ships to move powerful conventional explosives or WMD/E for detonation in a port."

But even with the implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act in 2002, which established a legal framework for our port security, according to the 9/11 Commission's December report card a litany of vulnerabilities at our ports remain unaddressed - for critical infrastructure risks & vulnerabilities assessment" they gave a "D" for a "national strategy for transportation security" they gave a "C-minus," and for "cargo screening" they assigned a "D".

So this is exactly the wrong time to be introducing additional risk, and all the more so given that the Coast Guard has, at once, been presented with the tremendous responsibility of providing security at our ports while receiving paltry funds and resources with which to execute those responsibilities. While the service requires $7 billion to fully implement just the current port security requirements, to-date they have received a mere $825 million. And just as astonishing, the administration not requesting any port security grants for FY 2007.

Finally, it is against the backdrop of all of these facts that I have considered the additional reality that - while I recognize that the government of the United Arab Emirates has assisted in the war on terror - the UAE has not demonstrated its ability to fully detect and deter terrorist activity, even within its own borders. As the New York Times stated in an article on February 23, "Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear engineer, made Dubai his transshipment point for the equipment he sent to Libya and Iran because he could operate there without worrying about investigators."

The bottom line is that there are serious, unanswered questions that demand answers. While it's a step in the right direction to undertake the 45 day review, Congress must have the opportunity to actually examine that report and vote within 30 days to disapprove the sale, as legislation I sponsored would require. Because the potential national security implications of transactions such as this mandate a full and open discussion between Congress and CFIUS, the additional risks to an already strained port security system are simply far too great.

http://snowe.senate.gov/news.htm