Endless Frontier Act-- continued
Floor Speech
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. President, I want to commend my colleagues for the important work that everybody is doing down here on the Senate floor, bipartisan work, addressing one of the most important challenges we have as a nation. Not just today but for years this challenge is going to be with us, and that is the challenge of dealing with the rise of the Communist Party of China. That is going to be more and more of a challenge and focus of the efforts of all elements of America's economy, military, society.
And here is the good news. As you are seeing here, there is a lot of focus, a lot of effort, and a lot of bipartisan work. It is a democracy, a Republic, right? It is messy. It is not going to be perfect. But, for the Chinese, I think the worst nightmare of the Chinese Communist Party is to see Americans coming together and recognizing that this is something we all need to work on together.
China's economy is growing. Their high-tech capability is growing. Their military capability is growing. Their aggressiveness throughout the region is growing.
Just look in the last year: Hong Kong; the disputes along the China- India border with India; the aggressiveness toward Taiwan; the economic embargo, in many ways, against our ally Australia; Xinjiang Province; the full discrimination against the Uighurs. And, of course, China is now fully focused on exporting its authoritarian model abroad--not just at home but abroad. But again, as I mentioned, the good news is that we as a nation, we as a Senate, we as a Congress, Republicans and Democrats, are starting to awaken to this challenge.
This is an issue I have been focused on since I came to the Senate over 6 years ago. I think the previous administration, the Trump administration, with their National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, which said, hey, we know we have challenges with violent extremists organizations, but we need to start shifting our focus to great power competition with China as the pacing threat--that is where we should be focused.
Those strategy documents--the National Defense Strategy, the National Security Strategy--these were actually quite bipartisan documents, quite bipartisan strategies. The National Defense Authorization Act, which will be taken up here in a couple of months, in the last few years has been built around this National Defense Strategy, focusing on great power competition--China, Russia. So that is continuing. It is actually continuing on the floor here in the U.S. Senate as we speak.
What I have been trying to do is work with Members on both sides of the aisle--certainly with the Trump administration but also with the Biden administration--as they address this challenge. I had some good meetings with a number of senior officials in the administration, and one takeaway I got from discussing these issues with the National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan, was a comment he had made about how when we were looking at our challenges with China, we need to think about these in the way in which Dean Acheson, who was a very famous Secretary of State, talked about the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s; how America needs to be dealing with the Soviet Union and that Cold War from situations of strength, positions of strength. I thought that was a really insightful comment by the current National Security Advisor.
So I want to mention a few of these because we have a lot of them relative to China. Our comparative advantages, in my view, are much greater than theirs in this competition that is going to, in my view, last for decades. So let me name a few of these situations of strength.
First, our allies. The United States is an ally-rich nation. China is an ally-poor nation and getting poorer by the day, by the way. Maybe North Korea is one ally. Maybe Russia sometimes, but I don't really buy it. So that is a huge comparative advantage that we have as a nation, and we need to look at our system, our network of allies and deepen them and expand them.
One area that that has happened with regard to our allies, really is a cornerstone of our alliance system in Asia, is the continued focus on what is called the Quad. The Quad is three of the biggest economies and democracies in the whole world: the United States, Japan, India, and Australia.
The Quad actually began in terms of a focus of strategy in the George W. Bush administration. The Trump administration highlighted it even more. To the Biden administration's credit, they took the Minister- level meetings that were the focus of the Trump administration's effort with the Quad and took it to the leader level. President Biden met with the leaders--India, Japan, Australia, and the United States--recently. It is a very important development. The Quad can help anchor our alliances in the Asia-Pacific and beyond in a very significant way. The Chinese are constantly talking about it because they don't like it because they know what it signifies.
So that is one area of strength, situation of strength that I think all of us can agree on, and I think Members of this body can certainly help play a role
As we look to head into a work session, I am going to head to the Asia-Pacific with some of my Senate colleagues here--Senator Duckworth, Senator Coons, and maybe a few others--and we are going to help build on this important comparative advantage that we have as a nation-- allies. We are an ally-rich nation. China is ally-poor. The more aggressive they are acting in the region, the more this situation of strength is going to play to our advantage.
Let me give you another situation of strength for the United States, particularly as it relates to China. It is a huge position of strength. It is our energy sector, the all-above energy sector for America--I mean renewables, oil, natural gas. This is an area that for decades we have tried to become energy independent. We have tried to return to the status we had during World War II, which was the world's energy superpower in terms of the production of energy.
The good news on that is we have returned to that. Prior to the pandemic, the United States had once again become the world's energy superpower--a lot of people thought we could never achieve that again, but we have--the largest producer of natural gas in the world, bigger than Russia; largest producer of oil in the world, bigger than Saudi Arabia; largest producer of renewables in the world. This is really good for our economy. It is really good for jobs. It is really good for our national security and foreign policy. And yes, it is really good for our environment.
Why is that? I know some people don't like the production of energy in America, but here is a fact: We need energy, ``all of the above'' energy. My State has it all, all the things that I just mentioned--oil, gas, renewables. We have an enormous abundance in Alaska.
But here is the other fact: We produced these energy opportunities, we produced this energy in America with a higher environmental standard than any other place on the planet. That is a fact. That is a fact. So if we need energy, which we do, ``all of the above'' energy, which we do, we need to make sure we are producing it in a place with the highest standards, in a place that will employ American people workers. By the way, energy jobs are great jobs.
Here is one other thing. You look at the intel. You talk to people who know the region. The Communist Party in China recognizes this comparative advantage, and it scares the living daylight out of them because they are very energy dependent, and we have literally become, through the hard work and ingenuity of so many in our great Nation, energy independent.
By the way, not only has this helped our environment, it has helped with regard to greenhouse gas emissions. From 2005 to 2017, the United States reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by almost 15 percent--15 percent. You don't hear that often, but it is a fact--more than any other industrialized nation in the world.
China was going like this. Still is. By the way, right now, the latest numbers on greenhouse gas emissions--China is producing more than the United States, the EU, and India combined. That is also a fact.
So we have reduced global greenhouse gas emissions dramatically. Why? We all know why. It was the revolution and the production of American natural gas. That is a fact. That is a fact.
So if we want to grow our economy, have an enormous comparative advantage relative to China and adversaries like Russia, produce more good-paying jobs, protect our environment, and enhance our national security and foreign policy, continuing the production of ``all of the above'' energy, which we are going to need for decades, is something that we should be doing.
Now, some in the Biden administration understand this. Others don't and want to restrict production of American energy, and when those people speak, guys like John Kerry, the leaders in China and Russia are smiling. They are smiling.
Fortunately, this legislation here, the Endless Frontier Act, is focused on outcompeting the Chinese, all of us coming together and outcompeting them in many different areas--artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and, yes, energy as well.
Specifically, what is in the bill is called advanced energy and industrial efficiency technologies, advanced energy technologies. That is in the legislation.
Again, I think it is here because we recognize what a critical, comparative advantage we have relative to China in this sector, so we want to take advantage of it. It is in the legislation.
Advanced energy technology is not defined in this bill, but that is because the Congress has been abundantly clear on what this means. In my discussions with Senators and, more importantly, what the Congress has passed a number of times, advanced energy technology means what it states in the definition of a law unanimously passed in the Senate and in the House just two Congresses ago, 42 USC 18632. It actually has the definition of advanced energy technology, which is what is the focus of this bill, the Endless Frontier Act.
18632: Energy Innovation Hubs
Text contains those laws in effect on May 27, 2021 Sec. 18632. Energy Innovation Hubs
(a) Definitions
In this section:
(1) Advanced energy technology
The term ``advanced energy technology'' means--
(A) an innovative technology--
(i) that produces energy from solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, tidal, wave, ocean, or other renewable energy resources;
(ii) that produces nuclear energy;
(iii) for carbon capture and sequestration;
(iv) that enables advanced vehicles, vehicle components, and related technologies that result in significant energy savings;
(v) that generates, transmits, distributes, uses, or stores energy more efficiently than conventional technologies, including through Smart Grid technologies; or
(vi) that enhances the energy independence and security of the United States by enabling improved or expanded supply and production of domestic energy resources, including coal, oil, and natural gas;
(2) Hub
(A) In general
The term ``Hub'' means an Energy Innovation Hub established under this section.
(B) Inclusion
The term ``Hub'' includes any Energy Innovation Hub in existence on September 28, 2018.
(3) Qualifying entity
The term ``qualifying entity'' means-
(A) an institution of higher education;
(B) an appropriate State or Federal entity, including a federally funded research and development center of the Department;
(C) a nongovernmental organization with expertise in advanced energy technology research, development, demonstration, or commercial application; or
(D) any other relevant entity the Secretary determines appropriate.
(b) Authorization of program
(1) In general
The Secretary shall carry out a program to enhance the economic, environmental, and energy security of the United States by making awards to consortia for establishing and operating hubs, to be known as ``Energy Innovation Hubs'', to conduct and support, at, if practicable, one centralized location, multidisciplinary, collaborative research, development, demonstration, and commercial application of advanced energy technologies.
(2) Technology development focus
The Secretary shall designate for each Hub a unique advanced energy technology or basic research focus.
(3) Coordination
The Secretary shall ensure the coordination of, and avoid unnecessary duplication of, the activities of each Hub with the activities of--
(A) other research entities of the Department, including the National Laboratories, the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, and Energy Frontier Research Centers; and
Each Hub shall maintain conflict of interest procedures, consistent with the conflict of interest procedures of the Department.
(4) Prohibition on construction
(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (B)--
(i) no funds provided under this section may be used for construction of new buildings or facilities for Hubs; and
(ii) construction of new buildings or facilities shall not be considered as part of the non-Federal share of a Hub cost- sharing agreement.
(B) Test bed and renovation exception
Nothing in this paragraph prohibits the use of funds provided under this section or non-Federal cost share funds for the construction of a test bed or renovations to existing buildings or facilities for the purposes of research if the Secretary determines that the test bed or renovations are limited to a scope and scale necessary for the research to be conducted.
(Pub. L. 115-246, title II, Sec. 206, Sept. 28, 2018, 132 Stat. 3137.)
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Mr. SULLIVAN. The definition of advanced energy technology, which is in the bill, the Endless Frontier Act, and is defined in 42 USC 18632 is along the following lines. It says ``Definitions,'' ``advanced energy technology'' means an ``innovative technology that produces energy from solar, wind, geothermal, biomass, tidal, wave, ocean, or other renewable energy.''
That is important for our country. It goes on to say ``that produces nuclear energy''--that is important for our country--``for carbon capture and sequestration.'' Again, a critical comparative advantage. ``That enables advanced vehicles, vehicle components, and related technologies that result in significant energy savings.'' Again, important.
And it also says ``that enhances the energy independence and security of the United States by enabling improved or expanded supply and production of domestic energy resources, including coal, oil, and natural gas.''
That is in the definition of advanced energy technologies, and that is the definition that was passed two Congresses ago, unanimously, and that is why it has not been defined here because it has already been defined in this.
Congress is very clear on what advanced energy technology means in the Endless Frontier Act. That is a huge comparative advantage, as I mentioned, oil, gas, renewables. And that is an important element of this legislation in our competition with China, and I am glad that is recognized.
One final area of what, again, the current administration's National Security Advisor called a situation of strength relative to China, and that, of course, is our military. To be honest, this is where I am worried.
The second term of the Obama-Biden administration cut defense spending by 25 percent. That is actually one of the reasons I ran for the Senate. I never ran for anything, but what I saw what was happening to the U.S. military--an institution I love and I served in for over 25 years--that was enough motivation for me to say I need to help do something. The readiness of our forces during that era, the second term of the Obama-Biden administration--the readiness of our forces plummeted--plummeted. And our adversaries in Moscow and Beijing watched this and were gleeful.
We can talk about AI and everything else that we are talking about in this bill, but if we are gutting our military, that is one of the worst things we can do with regard to sending a message to China about our seriousness. I worry.
Last year on this floor--last summer--we had a big debate in the NDAA over defense spending. The majority leader--who was then the minority leader--and the Senator from Vermont, Senator Sanders, put forward an amendment they called--no kidding--``defund the Pentagon'' then. That was the name of their amendment, with 14 percent across-the-board cuts to the entire U.S. military. My response was: There they go again. There they go again.
Well, now that they regained power, it looks like this movie is coming to a theater near us again, and it is not going to be nice. Tomorrow, the Biden administration's budget is going to be coming out. The numbers that we are anticipating are about a 16-percent increase in domestic spending and a real decrease in military spending--inflation- adjusted decrease in military spending again. Beijing will be watching this and will be gleeful.
When Republicans were in the White House and the Senate majority just recently, we were respectful of our colleagues in the minority, and there was an agreement essentially about a one-for-one, domestic programs increasing and the military budget is going to increase by about the same amount. That is what we all agreed on here. That is what we worked on here. Now, it looks like it is going to be 16-for-1 or maybe even worse. This is something we really need to focus on.
Make no mistake, we can talk about supply chains, intellectual property, competitiveness, which is what we are talking about here with this legislation. These are all important topics. But all the policy changes that we are debating here right now are not going to amount to much in our overall competition with respect to China if we lose our military edge with respect to China.
Unfortunately, some of my colleagues just don't recognize that or don't want to recognize that. Soft power isn't much good without hard power to back it up. We learned that lesson before. It has been a painful lesson, if you look at our history.
But the Chinese Communist Party certainly appears to understand this. According to one watchdog, it has increased its military investments by 76 percent over the last decade, and we are going to put out a budget tomorrow with an inflation-adjusted decrease in our military spending, despite the runaway domestic spending proposed by this administration. That is worrisome, and that is not operating from a position of strength with regard to the Chinese Communist Party. We need to watch out for that one. I am very concerned.
Yes, there is a lot of bipartisan work going on in the Senate, but if the leadership on the Senate floor and the House leadership as well and the Biden administration work together to cut defense spending, that is going to be one of the worst things we can do for our long-term competition with regard to China.
As we are focused on these challenges with the rise of China, let me conclude by predicting that not only is this challenge going to be with us for decades, but how we need to address it. I have talked about some of these situations of strength. We must face this challenge with confidence and strategic resolve.
As I have noted and I just talked about a few, America has extraordinary advantages relative to China: our global network of alliances, our military power, and economic leadership, our innovative society, our abundant and innovative energy supplies, advanced energy technology as defined in this bill and other bills, the world's most productive workforce, and a democratic value system.
Yes, it can be messy, but that makes countries around the world, and particularly in the INDOPACOM region, far more comfortable as American partners and allies than as subservient members of a New Middle Kingdom led by China. As a result of the long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union, we also know what works: maintaining peace through strength, promoting free markets and free people at home, and having the confidence in George Kennan's insights when he set forth the strategy of containment in the late forties to deal with the Soviet Union--that the Chinese Communist Party, like the Soviet Communist Party, likely bears within it the seeds of its own decay. While democracies are resilient, adaptive, and self-renewing, there are many vulnerabilities embedded in Chinese's perceived strength.
One-man rule creates acute political risks. Historical grievance can bring violent nationalism. State-directed economic growth can produce massive overcapacity and mountains of debt, and the gradual snuffing out of freedom that we are literally seeing daily in places like Hong Kong sends fear throughout the entire region.
China's budding military power and historical view of itself as a natural and cultural superior to many others is beginning to alarm neighboring states, inspiring them to want to step up security cooperation with the United States, not with China. Nearly half of wealthy Chinese want to emigrate. Remember, these are the winners from China's four decades of heady economic growth.
As we have in the past, we can prevail in this geopolitical and ideological contest, but doing so will require a new level of strategic initiative, organization, and confidence in who we are as a people and what we stand for. This also means that we must redouble our efforts in making this strategic case to others around the world, particularly our allies. This kind of work here--although it can be messy, although it can be difficult, although it can be challenging--is part of the process we need to put together to compete.
BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT
Source