Motion to Discharge--S.J. Res. 77

Floor Speech

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Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, I move to discharge the Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.J. Res. 77, a joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed foreign military sale to the United Arab Emirates of certain defense articles and services.

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Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, today I am asking our colleagues to stand up for two very important principles. One is the congressional oversight over arms sales abroad and, secondly, to ensure that these sales, in fact, promote and protect the long-term national security of the United States.

Colleagues, I wish we didn't find ourselves in the position of having to discuss our concerns with this sale in this kind of forum. The United Arab Emirates has, indeed, been an important partner in the fight against terrorism and across the region and, I believe, will continue to do so. However, a sale of this magnitude requires the appropriate due diligence.

For the past few decades, the executive branch has respected the congressional oversight of the arms sales process, a critical piece of which is an informal review period during which we get answers to pressing questions. We have an opportunity to review sensitive information so that, when sales come up for the formal notification, which is what we have before us now, we have a clearer path forward. Unfortunately, in this case, the Trump administration decided to simply ignore congressional rights here and the review process, formally notifying the sales of these complex weapons systems, along with other weaponry, totaling $23 billion.

Beyond obliterating the congressional review process, the administration also seems to have rushed through the interagency review of a sale of this magnitude. Whereas, a sale of this scope would normally merit months and months of detailed deliberations between the Departments of Defense and State, this sale was announced with more missing than a few dotted i's and crossed t's.

I will go into more detail later before we vote, but the bottom line is that there are many outstanding issues that are critical to U.S. national security that have not been addressed, including, by way of example, the United Arab Emirates' present and future military relationships with Russia and China. My understanding is that there are negotiations to have with China regarding an airstrip for the Chinese military off of the UAE. Is that in the national interest and security of the United States?

Should we not have a definitive commitment from the UAE that it will not move forward if these arms sales move forward, including with the most sophisticated stealth jet fighter that we have? How do we work to safeguard U.S. technology? the guarantees we will have in place about how U.S.-origin weapons will be used given the Emirates' history of transferring weapons to a terrorist organization and violating the U.N. arms embargo in Libya? the longer term implications of an arms race in the region? and then, yes, the impact that it could have on both our and Israel's qualitative military edge?

If we aren't going to be willing to ask these questions, then we have to think about the magnitude of the sale without caring about the consequences.

I have heard a number of my colleagues advocate in support of these sales because they believe it will help our like-minded partners better posture against Iran. Now, no one is more clear-eyed in this Chamber or has pursued Iran and its threat of nuclear weapons more than I, and we are clear-eyed about the threat Iran continues to pose to national security interests, but we have yet to understand exactly what military threat the F-35s or armed drones will be addressing vis-a-vis Iran. Furthermore, according to the Trump administration, as recently as last year, the UAE continued to host a number of companies that facilitated Iranian financial transactions in violation of various U.S. sanctions.

So Iran is a threat, but you are helping it facilitate U.S. financial transactions. It is not that I have said so but that the Trump administration has said so. Meanwhile, over the past year, Iran has ramped up its nuclear capabilities amidst American diplomatic fallout.

So, if we really want to talk about countering Iran, we need a comprehensive, diplomatic strategy. Arming partners with complex weapons systems that could take years to come online is not a serious strategy with which to confront the very real and timely threats from Iran.

I have also heard some of our colleagues argue that, if we do not sell these weapons, the UAE will turn to China and Russia. Well, let's be clear: They already do. They already do. Our own Department of Defense's inspector general recently reported that the UAE may be funding the Russian mercenary Wagner Group in Libya. U.N. reporting implicates the UAE's use of Chinese-manufactured drones, in violation of the U.N. arms embargo, also in Libya.

So, while I absolutely agree that we have to counter Chinese and Russian influence in the region, again, this requires a real strategy, not simply more arms. Isn't this a conversation and a commitment that we should get in writing from the UAE as part of such an arms sale? We don't have that. Furthermore, if we go forward with these sales, yet deny similar requests to countries like Qatar or Saudi Arabia, where will they go for their advanced weaponry to keep pace, and what reaction will Iran have to them? Do we really think we can sell this just to the UAE and not have those other countries come knocking on our door, starting a very sophisticated arms race in a tinder box of the world?

Finally, let me be very clear: I applaud the Abraham accords as a historical turning point for Israel and the Arab world. These new, formal relationships have the possibility of transforming the region much more broadly and bringing peace, stability, and prosperity to people who desperately want and deserve it. Yet, as the administration and the Emirates have continued to stress, these sales are neither a reward nor are they part of these accords.

So why can't we take a little more time to really assess the best way forward? We are in the midst of promoting a sale--this is the administration--that has some of the most significant transfers of advanced U.S. technology without clarity of a number of key details regarding the sale or sufficient answers to critical national security questions. This is far more than about congressional prerogative, although I would argue that it is a critical element of our policies on arms sales; this is about national security concerns to which we should have an answer before those arms sales move forward.

Again, colleagues, the bottom line is this: There are far too many outstanding questions and very serious questions about long-term U.S. national security interests. Perhaps, after considerable engagement with the executive, we would assess that all of these sales do, in fact, advance our national security. Given the length of time it will take for the delivery of these systems, it would seem quite reasonable to expect to have 40 days to evaluate these questions.

So I urge my colleagues to stand up for Congress's role in the process of determining arms sales as well as for having clear answers to the critical questions that are posed to long-term U.S. national security interests.

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