Critical Infrastructure Protection Act

Floor Speech

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Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1073, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act.

Mr. Speaker, H.R. 1073 would require the Department of Homeland Security to undertake research, planning, and educational activities to mitigate the potential consequences of electromagnetic pulses and geomagnetic disturbances on critical infrastructure such as public utilities and national security assets. As the Congressional Budget Office noted in its analysis, the Department is currently carrying out programs similar to those required by the bill.

Along those lines, I think it is important to identify the elements of EMP and GMD preparedness and response activities that are common to the existing preparedness and response efforts as set forth in the national planning frameworks. These national planning efforts identify roles and responsibilities for disaster prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities, and this bill will include consideration of EMPs.

It is also important to distinguish between EMP, or electromagnetic pulses, and GMD, or geomagnetic disturbances. There are significant differences in the nature of the threats, the science behind their impacts, and the range of options for potential solutions.

EMP weapons are most generally recognized as thermonuclear weapons that may be launched on missiles designed to explode in the upper atmosphere and produce intense, short-duration, targeted energy that can impact a wide range of technologies and industries. An EMP blast could disrupt and potentially destroy electronic devices in the affected area with consequences extending to critical infrastructures that rely on microprocessor-based electronic devices.

In contrast, geomagnetic fluctuations, or GMDs, result from solar weather activity. Severe GMD events may produce varying effects on the power system depending on orientation of the solar storm, latitude, transmission line characteristics, the geology of an affected area, and the design of the power system. The effects of GMD are believed to be primarily limited to reliability of the bulk power system, while the effects of an EMP could cross multiple infrastructures and technologies.

Given that any EMP is likely to be the result of an international attack or warlike activity on the United States or its neighbors, DHS may need to partner with the Department of Defense. Going forward, I urge Members to be mindful of the broad range of preparedness demands on DHS.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

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