October 6, 2004 Wednesday
HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE SUBJECT: DUELFER REPORT ON IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS
CHAIRED BY: SENATOR JOHN WARNER (R-VA)
WITNESSES: CHARLES DUELFER, SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR STRATEGY REGARDING IRAQI WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH J. MCMENAMIN, USMC, COMMANDER, IRAQ SURVEY GROUP
LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEN. JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ): Thank you, Mr. Duelfer, and thank you, General, for your great work.
Sort of a follow-up. So therefore, knowing the history of Saddam Hussein-his use of weapons of mass destruction; he had them 1991 -- is there any doubt in your mind that if Saddam Hussein were in power today and there were no restrictions or sanctions placed on him, that he would be attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction, Mr. Duelfer?
MR. DUELFER: To me, I think that's quite clear. But more importantly, it was quite clear to many of the senior advisers around Saddam. He had an exquisite sense of the use of power and influence. To him it was a continuous spectrum: oil, military forces --
SEN. MCCAIN: So there's no doubt in your mind; he's in power today, the sanctions are gone, he would be pursuing them because that was his history?
MR. DUELFER: He had two life experiences where they saved him. Which is, I think, why some of the prewar assessments were colored. I mean, people would kind of look at it and say why wouldn't he have these things?
SEN. MCCAIN: Okay, let me lead you through a couple of questions here because we've only got six minutes.
There is the belief purveyed by some-this is sort of in line with what we were just saying-that there was a status quo in Iraq where basically the sanctions were in effect and things were fairly normal, and so therefore, we really had a choice between the status quo and an attack on Saddam Hussein. Isn't it more likely, as you have stated in previous testimony, the sanctions were being eroded, American airplanes were being shot at; as you just mentioned, businessmen all over Baghdad were thinking that it was a matter of time before the sanctions were lifted, we have a burgeoning scandal in the oil-for-food program, and there was not a status quo. In other words, there was a steady deterioration of any restraints that Saddam-real or imagined, that Saddam Hussein may have felt. Is that an accurate assessment of the situation in Baghdad?
MR. DUELFER: That is a very accurate assessment. We spent a fair amount of time analyzing exactly that, trying to understand the strategy and tactics which Iraq was using to encourage the decay of sanctions.
SEN. MCCAIN: So we didn't have a choice between maintaining the status quo and attacking Saddam Hussein. We had a situation which was rapidly deteriorating and eventually over time, in the view of most experts, Saddam Hussein would have been either relieved of or evaded these sanctions as more and more business was done and more and more-excuse me-less and less actions on the part of the United Nations in enforcing those sanctions.
MR. DUELFER: Sir, I think, you know, we detail at great length exactly those sorts of conditions, but, you know, we allow for others to draw their own conclusions. But my personal view is that the sanctions were in free fall. They were eroding. There was a lot of corruption. Were it not for 9/11, I don't know that they would exist today.
SEN. MCCAIN: There's also the belief in some circles that this was a idea that was hatched either in the Department of State-excuse me, the Department of Defense or somewhere in the White House right after 9/11: "Let's go attack Saddam Hussein because-and we'll invent this weapons-of-mass-destruction issue as a pretext for it," and that there was really a hidden agenda there.
Why, in your viewpoint, did every single intelligence agency on Earth that I know of-the British, our friends the French, the Germans, the Israelis-every single intelligence agency believed, as our intelligence agency did, believed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction? How do you account for that?
MR. DUELFER: Well, sir, that wasn't really my mandate; however, I do have an opinion.
SEN. MCCAIN: I'd appreciate your opinion.
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SEN. MCCAIN: So every intelligence agency was fooled by him?
MR. DUELFER: Well, not-including, to a certain extent, the Iraqi intelligence agency, because there were many Iraqis who were not convinced that there either were or were not special weapons within their arsenal.
SEN. MCCAIN: Well, my time has expired, Mr. Chairman. And we need to-and I'm serving on the weapons of mass destruction commission-we need to find out why we were all so wrong. But I think it's important for everybody to keep in mind that it was every intelligence agency respected on Earth that came to the same conclusion. And that's an important factor as we move forward with this continuing, ongoing national debate about whether we should have attacked Iraq or not, and whether there was sufficient justification for doing so, and if so, why.
And I thank-Mr. Duelfer, I appreciate you coming here at a very sensitive political time. I appreciate your candor, and I also understand that it's very inappropriate for you to get into any of the domestic policies-politics of this country. And I thank you.
And I thank you, too, General.